DISCOURSE ON CURRICULUM & INSTRUCTION

We speak literally when we say thinking takes place on paper or in the mouth, but we speak metaphorically when we say thinking takes place in the head. Wittgenstein

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

Wittgenstein asks: If I ask someone to go and fetch me a red flower

from that meadow how is he to know what sort of flower to bring as I

have only given him a word. (BB, pg. 3).

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

Wittgenstein argues that most people will answer by use of

the method of interpretation or the theory of association.

However, he argues that it must not always be this way..the mental model. One could perfectly well use a color coordinated chart instead of imagining a thought.

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

However, he notes that this is not always practical and that

for most people the individual just walks over to the meadow
and picks the flower without comparing it to anything. It appears that in this simple but yet powerful argument

Wittgenstein is deconstructing the idea of our traditional way

of thinking.

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

Sure, its possible that the individual could have interpreted the image of a red flower prior to picking it. However if you stop and think about it why couldnt the individual just as easily used the color chart to substitute for this process of thinking. Or as Wittgenstein suggest, couldnt the individual just walk over to the meadow and pick a red flower without comparing it to anything?

THE RED FLOWER ARGUMENT

Even if we could compare the red flower to a red image of a flower how are we to know if the mental image is actually the

exact red in question or for that matter the correct flower specie
configuration? Our mental copy is not reliable and could not justify a proper symbolic representation. So then, what else is at work here? Might we not, just act? Is it necessary that we believe in a long held belief that a mental act of thinking occurred prior to selecting the flower? Even if we did just act, could we not have just substituted the color chart in its place?

THE RED PATCH ARGUMENT

To make his point, Wittgenstein then offered a more intuitive argument: To see that the process of obeying the order can be of this kind, consider the order "imagine a red patch". You are not tempted in this case to think that before obeying you must have imagined a red patch to serve you as a pattern for the red patch which you were ordered to imagine. (BB, pg.
3).

But we dont and that point is BIG!

WE JUST ACT
He goes on to point out that the mental process of thinking can be partly avoided with the act of looking at real objects. He notes that a person may say that the mental act of association would be more preferable then to have to carry

with him a color coordinated chart.

However, Wittgenstein argues that the idea of mental association is really irrelevant and in many cases not even true

BUT I KNOW IM RIGHT

P1: Okay, so I dont quite see your argument. Are you saying that I cant see a red image in my minds eye? I saw the red flower and the red patch. I would think that I can see the color red. P2: Explain

P1: Explain? Well, what is there to explain? I see the color red, plain
and simple. I have a mental picture of the color red, I think I know what it looks like. P2: Fine, Ill grant you that. However, how do I know that your concept of red is like my concept of red?

BUT I KNOW IM RIGHT

P1: The concepts have to be the same. Red is red! You know, like the

famous old saying: A rose, is a rose, is a rose.

P2: How do you suppose then that I would know that what your saying is correct? How can we even begin to make a comparison? P1: Because I know what red looks like and I see a red image P2: But you see, thats just not good enough P1: Why not? P2: Because, until you admit that your mental conception of this red

object is unreliable and that it is equally justifiable to point to a red

physical object I will not buy your claim

BUT I KNOW IM RIGHT

P1: This is absurd. Look, bring me a red object or give me a red

marker and Ill show you what I mean by red

P2: Fine, Ill grant you that. However you do understand that by doing this we are in essence agreeing that it takes a public understanding or social agreement before we can even express our inner most thoughts. This mental model you cling to is merely an optical illusion of the mind. P1: Well then what is the mental for? I have a chair in my minds eye and no one can tell me any different.

BUT I KNOW IM RIGHT

P2: Exactly, and therefore it makes no sense to say that you know what

this chair looks like. Because if your going to use the word know then
there must be doubt. How can I doubt the existence of this chair without any certifiable criteria? Youve essentially bankrupted the meaning of the word know when used in this context. P1: Well, I know what I know and just cause you cant doubt it in the context of science doesnt mean that I cant have knowledge of this mental thought.

BUT I KNOW IM RIGHT

P2: Well, if philosophers are in agreement, then your knowledge of this
mental image of the chair should conform to the following three criteria:
that you believe it, that it is true and that it be justified thru observation and agreement. Right now, it seems as if though your right about one: belief. However, you cant prove that its a fact or for that matter true and secondly you cant justify your belief without a factual truth to observe and confirm its tenability

THE PRUSSIAN BLUE ARGUMENT

He gives a classic example involving the color: Prussian Blue. If an individual were ordered to paint a shade of blue called Prussian Blue he might need to use a table that would match the name with that particular color. In this case the act of looking at the actual color would be your copy or replacement for the mental act itself.

IS THERE ONLY ONE WAY TO THINK

Wittgenstein Made the following remark: We could perfectly well, for our purposes, replace every process of imagining by a process of looking at an object or by pointing, drawing or modeling; and every process of speaking to oneself by speaking aloud or by writing. (BB, pg. 4).

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

This is a very simple but yet powerful argument on Wittgensteins behalf. It seems as if though in some cases

we interpret a word before we execute an order and in other

cases we just act. It we were to look at curriculum across the board we could apply Wittgensteins pedagogical style to multifaceted aspects of culture and to the learning process in general, specifically when it comes to the concept of thinking

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

The relevant point is whether we truly have a grasp of words like: understanding, meaning, knowledge, thinking, thought or

for that matter mind.

How often do we rely on our students to possess an extraordinary semantic memory? In history we require students to remember specific dates and events? In mathematics we often assume that students will be able to recall the right formula and in physics we expect no less from the conscientious pupil.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

In our English class we expect students to know the difference between a noun, verb or adjective. In biology we

expect the learner to understand classification schemes as

they relate to the animal kingdom. In chemistry we expect the student to memorize the periodic table and the vast stores of data within the table. thinking to meta-cognition and mind scaffolding. Why is it

that we attribute so much of our supposed knowledge and

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

How is thinking occurring when we device new and innovative ways of delivering curriculum and instruction?

How much of memorization can be attributed to interpreting a

command or directive and if so how is that a thought? In retrospect, then what can we say that we are doing, if not thinking? How might we be able to distinguish between this and when we just act?

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

As to interpretation, what is its relevancy to the field of epistemology and to what degree can we say that its justifiably correct? Wittgenstein noted that if it cannot be counted on with utmost certainty then what criteria could we use to deduce its

reliability and when would it be more suitable to just replace

the mental act of interpretation with a physical object one could just point to.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

In other words, what do we stand to gain by utilizing the complete memorization of facts as opposed to just being able to openly point to their physical representations. If this point is open to debate then we should re-evaluate our methodology that we so tacitly take for granted. Wittgenstein

once pointed out that the mental activity coined thinking

should be open to debate and possibly even be debunked.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

If you were asked to recite a specific poem by Walt Whitman I Sing the Body Electric or to recall the Pythagorean theorem.could you? Even if you had memorized the poem or for that matter memorized the theorem some time back how would you

know the difference between a thought and a memory?

Merriam Webster Definition: Memory The power or process of
reproducing or recalling what has been learned and retained, especially through associative mechanisms.

Merriam Webster Definition: Thought(Think) To form or have in

the mind, to form a mental picture.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

"But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I don't know if I have remembered the time of

departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a

page of the time-table looked. Isn't it the same here?"No; for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct... Wittgenstein.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confirm the correctness of the

first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the

morning paper to assure himself that what it said was true.)

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

So if the idea of a mental construct can be doubted or even debunked, then what are its epistemological implications? If, as philosophers imply that knowledge is nothing more than justified true belief, than there must be an inherent contradiction when it comes to this schematization.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

So, how fine is the distinction? Say, we were to suddenly have an image of the Pythagorean equation in our minds eye, is that a mental thought or did we remember ( which is the result of having stored the equation somewhere in our memory?)

Memory or thought, which would it be attributable too? If

asked to write down the chemical symbol for Potassium (K) and to note its atomic number.could you? You might find it more useful to use a periodic chart and to coordinate the name with the symbol etc

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

Now a critic may in turn trivialize the argument by stating the obvious: Understanding occurs when the student is able to recall and apply what has been taught in the class setting. How else could we possible access or check for understanding?

However, is that the only way? If thinking is some nebulous

form of the category of understanding , then how can we ever pin down that were actually thinking

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

The point is we cant, we have to assume. Whats unsettling is just how much stock weve put into this recurrent view of seeing the world Providing a clear distinction between knowledge and thinking has never been as clear a distinction as far as their inter-

relationship is concerned.
Can you see the connection between thinking and knowledge or is that just something weve become accustomed to

believing

WHEN WE THINK WE OPERATE WITH SIGNS

According to Wittgenstein thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs. By signs Wittgenstein is trying or should I say intending to say words, sentences or propositions. This activity is performed by the hand when writing and by

the mouth when speaking.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

However, Wittgenstein states that when we insinuate that the mind is thinking we are in essence saying that the mind is an agent just as the hand or mouth are agents when writing or speaking. However, it appears that we are using the mind as agent in

a different sense when we make this metaphor. The problem

according to Wittgenstein is when we reference to the locality of thinking.

Its the grammatical use of the mind as agent that obscures

our way of looking at this clearly.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

In "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (Section 6) Quine asserts that our beliefs form a web. As such none of our beliefs are un-revisable. Some beliefs are so firmly entrenched at the center of the web that we ordinarily (but incorrectly) consider them to be

un-revisable e.g. what we often (mistakenly) think of as

analytic truths.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

Heres where we run into the problem when using the mind as metaphor to explain a thought. If Quine is correct and everyone has a web of belief then when you look at the very center of your own web of belief you will notice that this is where there are beliefs that are unassailable

Where does the the concept and beliefs associated with the
mind lie in this web of belief?

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

Well, it would have to lie at the very center of our web of belief. It lies at the heart of our personification, where our core beliefs lie. These core beliefs do not depend on observation. It seems as if no empirical evidence could prove them to be wrong.

These a priori beliefs lie at the core of our beliefs.

Those beliefs that lie on the outer edge of the web come into contact with ultimate reality and are easily susceptible to

change while those in the middle of the web are more

inferential and require empirical evidence to be changed.

A SIMPLE BUT POWERFUL ARGUMENT

Those at the center of our web of belief seem to be completely protected by any observational empirical evidence. They are untenable and not subject to change. Examples of core beliefs:
Thoughts

occur in our minds

Concept of objective time Concept of objective space

The fact that 1 + 1 = 2

NOTES

What are we discussing here? Philosophical psychology?

Many often attribute to Wittgenstein the idiom that thinking is

linguistic. or What we cannot speak we cannot think.

Author Phil Hutchinson believes that this is not necessarily the case. So, did W actually propose any real views on thinking. We often attribute thinking and understanding to be the same thing. However they are grammatically different.

NOTES

Much confusion arises out of the fact that we are unconsciously

unaware of this

We have this craving for generality. We want to so badly theorize an inner mental process model. However, not all substantives must correspond to things The key is to go from the unconscious to the conscious We are in the grip of a particular picture, deep in our unconscious. This leads to us craving for generality or general theorizing.

It skews are view in regards to the inner mental process.

NOTES

Wittgenstein wants to apply a therapeutic approach towards our

bewitchment..

Wittgenstein wants to treat this mental malady that keeps us in a vice like grip. The is that we assume This craving for generality causes us to overlook what is essential. Substantives must not always correspond to things. There is only family resemblance.

When it comes to the mind or thinking we typically offer up three

theories.

NOTES

We typically offer the following three models of the mind: 1.

Materialist theories, 2. Ethereal theories, 3. Quasi-hypothetical

theories.

Therefore, when we cant show how the mind or for that matter thinking occurs we posit that these substantives MUST correspond to: processes, states, things, quasi-hypothetical things. We often assume that thinking and understanding correspond to some type of process

NOTES

We always point to some process and make mere assumptions. Wittgenstein was no behaviorist Wittgenstein believed that cognitivist and behaviorist were equally confused concerning the matter of mental processes. We unconsciously assume that mental processes are akin to

processes that we are consciously aware of.

We mistakenly employ or redefine the word process in an unconscious manner

Wittgenstein believed that cognitivist and behaviorist must be held accountable for their interpretation of the term process