TranslatedcopyofUnderstanding International Trade PDF

UNDERSTANDINGSayanternational
TRadeDIPERTANIANPRODUCTS:ONEHUNDREDYTELINGAOF
SUMBANgSIHSebuahgriculturalECONOMISTS
TIMJOSLING,KYMANDERSON,ANDREWSCHMITZ,DANSTEFANTAngermann
Studitentangperdaganganinternasionalprodukpertaniantelahberkembangpesatselamalimapuluhtahunterakhir.Padatahun
1960yangberantakandiduniapertaniandisebabkanolehkebijakandukunganhargadomestikmenjadifokusstudianalitis.Ada
diikutiupayauntukmengukurdistorsiyangdisebabkanolehkebijakanjugadinegaranegaraberkembangdanuntukmodel
dampaknyaterhadappasarpertaniandunia.Alatyangcanggihuntukmenjelaskantrendanvariasihargaduniadanimplikasidari
ketidaksempurnaanpasar.Tantanganuntukmasadepantermasukperdagangananalisisberdasarkanpreferensikonsumenuntuk
metodeproduksitertentudanmemahamidampakdarimitigasidanadaptasiperubahaniklimpadaperdagangan.
Katakunci:perdaganganpertanian;hargakomoditas;kebijakanperdagangan;distorsiperdaganganpertanian;Ukurment
perlindunganpertanian;pemodelanperdaganganpertanian.
JELKode:F13,F55,Q17.
Studi tentang ekonomi perdagangan internasional produk pertanian dan makanan daerah baru tively eratnya
spesialisasidalamprofesiekonomipertanian.Tentusajatigabidangutamayangmendominasilimapuluhtahun
pertamadariAmerikaAsosiasiEkonomiPertanian(AAEA)produksiekonomi,pemasaran,dankebijakanmasing
mengakui keberadaan perdagangan internasional, tetapi mereka sebagian besar diabaikan tantangan analitis
memahami perilaku internasional pasar dan peran mereka dalam penggunaan sumber daya efisiensi effi dan
distribusipendapatan.Sebaliknya,sebagianbesarekonompertaniandilatihsejak1960antelahterkenainternateori
perdagangantionaldanmengakuiper
TimJoslingadalahProfesorEmeritus,FoodResearchInstitute,danSeniorFellow,FreemanSpogliInstituteofInternational
Studies,UniversitasStanford.KymAndersonadalahGeorgeGollinProfesorEkonomidanmantandirektureksekutifPusatStudi
EkonomiInternasionaldiUniversityofAdelaide;AndrewSchmitzadalahBenHillGriffin,Jr.EminentScholardanprofesor
MakanandanSumberDayaEkonomi,UniversitasFlorida,Gainesville;profesorriset,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley;dan
dosen,UniversitasSaskatchewan,Saskatoon.StefanTangermannadalahProfesorEmeritus,UniversitasGttingendanmantan
Direktur Perdagangan dan Pertanian di OECD. Kami ingin mengucapkan terima kasih banyak anggota Konsorsium Antar
nasional Pertanian Dagang Penelitian (IATRC) yang menanggapi jajak pendapat informal tulisantulisan yang paling
berpengaruhdalamperdaganganpertaniandalampengalamanmereka.
pengaruhvasiveperistiwaekonomiinternasionaldipasardomestikdankebijakan.Perjanjianperdagangantelah
berevolusiketempatmerekamembatasikebijakandomestik,danhargakomoditastionalinternabiasanyatrans
mittedsetidaknyasampaibatastertentukembaliketingkatpetani.Bahkanbarubidangagriekonomibudayadan
diterapkan, seperti ronmental gus dan sumber daya ekonomi, ekonomi ment mengembangkan, dan ekonomi
konsumen,dipengaruhiolehlembagalembagaperdaganganinternasional.
UlasaninibertujuanuntukmendokumentasikanpertumbuhanstudiketsMarpertanianinternasionaldanlembaga
denganmengidentifikasibeberapakontribusiutamaprofesiuntukpemahamankitatentangisuisukunci.Iniadalah
penilaiansubjektifdariperkembanganpemikiranprofesionalpadabeberapabidangutamadimanakontribusitelah
dibuatuntukmemahamisifatperdagangannasionalantardibidangpertaniandancommakananModities.Masing
masing dari kemajuan ini menggambarkan kontribusi kumulatif yang dibuat oleh ekonom yang bekerja di
universitasdanbadanpenelitianbadandariinstitusiinstitusinasionaldaninternasional.Kamimohonmaafpada
awaluntukbanyakyangkaryanyakamibelumbisamenyebutkan.
Amer.J.Agr.Econ.92(2):424446;doi:10,1093/ajae/aaq011DiterimaDesember2009;diterimaJanuari2010
Penulis(2010).DiterbitkanolehOxfordUniversityPressatasnamaPertaniandanEkonomiTerapanAsosiasi.Seluruhhak
cipta.Untukperizinan,silakanemail:journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
Joslingetal.MemahamiPerdaganganInternasionalProdukPertanian425
MengubahBidangPerdaganganselamaPastSepuluhDasawarsa
ekonompertanian,dengansifatdisiplinmereka,tertarikdenganisuisuhari.Inimengikutibahwamerekayang
bekerjapadaisuisuperdaganganinternasionaldalammeresponutamauntukemergsituasiperdaganganingyang
menuntut analisis dan penjelasan. Perkembangan teoritis dan perbaikan dalam teknik analisis sering menyertai
upayainiuntukmemahamidanmenjelaskanmasalahsaatini.Sebagailatarbelakanguntukdiskusiyanglebihrinci
darikontribusiekonomuntukmempelajariperdaganganbudayaagriinternasional,karenaitukitamulaidengan
menelusurievolusiisuisuperdaganganselama100tahunsejakberdirinyaAAEAtersebut.Iniakanillustratesifat
penuhgejolakperubahanyangtelahmemanggilditanganiolehparaekonom,sertakemajuandramatisdalamalat
alatteoritisdananalitisyangtelahdikembangkanuntukmemahamimasalahini.
Perdaganganpertaniansecarahistoristelahmenjadibagiansignifikandarijumlahperdagangan,danbagibanyak
negaratelahmemainkanperanyangdominandalammenentukankebijakanluarnegeri.Sampaiakhir1890,ekspor
pertanianmenyumbang75%daritotalekspordariAmerikaSerikat(Johnson1977,hal.298).PadasaatAAEA
munculpadatahun1909,pangsaeksporsekitar50%,dansahamyangjatuhterussampaitahun1940ansebelum
menghidupkankembalidierapascaperangsegerauntuksekitar20%.Untukduniasecarakeseluruhan,perdagangan
pertaniantelahterusmenurunsebagaibagiandaritotalperdaganganbarangdanjasadansekarangkurangdari8%,
meskipuntelahincreasinglebihcepatdariproduksipertaniandunia.Namunperdaganganprodukpertanianmasih
sangat penting bagi kedua berpenghasilan tinggi dan mengembangkan negara ing, dan kebijakan perdagangan
pertanianbiasanyaadalahyangpalingsensitifdalamperundinganperdaganganinternasional.
DuadekadepertamadariAAEA,19091929,adalahperiodepenurunanmantapdalamperdagangandarititik
tinggipadaperiodeabadglobalisasikesembilanbelasterhadappertumbuhangerakanproteksionisdanruntuhnya
kerajaanEropadikehancuranPerangDuniaI.MeskipunpendiridariAAEAyangmenyadariiticsgeopolperiode
dandampakpadaarusperdaganganpertanian,beberapabukuatauartikelolehekonompertanianmenonjolsebagai
berurusansistematisdenganisuisuperdaganganselamaperiodeitu.Intervensipemerintahdalampasarpertanian
tidakdicakrawala,dantarifpertanianumumnyarelatifrendah
untukhambatanperdaganganbarangdanjasadiproduksi.
Selamatahun1920an,situasimulaiberubah.Dengankebijakanpertaniandalamnegerimunculsebagaicara
untukmeningkatkanpendapatanpedesaan,tekanantumbuhuntukmenggunakankebijakanperdagangansebagai
bagiandaristrategi.TheMcNaryHaughenActmerupakanupayaawaluntukmenggunakankebijakanperdagangan
untukmempengaruhiketsMarnegeri,dantrenyangsamakearahproteksionismeyangterjadidibangsaini1lain
BukuolehEdwinNourse(1924)memperkenalkantampilanticlebihholisduniapasarsertapenjelasanmeyakinkan
signifikansimerekauntukASbudayaagri.Padasaatini,teoriperdaganganmulaimemperluasfaktorfaktorpenentu
perdagangan, dan pentingnya dukungan sumber daya muncul sebagai faktor utama dalam penjelasan arus
perdagangan.
DengandekadeketigatenceexisyangAAEA,kebijakanperdaganganadalahmasalahtinggibungaicalpolit
danpertentanganinternasional.DepresiBesartersebarluasdanprotractedsebagiankarenatectionpeningkatan
perdaganganpro,danperdaganganpertaniantidakluput.1930tagihantarifSmootHawleyadalahakhirnyaorigi
dirancang sebagai kenaikan tarif pertanian tapi akhirnya lebih umum diterapkan untuk semua barang. Apakah
profesidudukdiamsementarasistemperdaganganduniahancurdanautarkiekonomimemerintah?Halinitidak
mudahuntukmenemukanartikelinalsemdariperiodeinipadaperdaganganpertaniandanruntuhnyapasar,dengan
pengecualiandariTWSchultz,yangmenulisdiduniaperdaganganpertaniandanimplikasiseriusbagipasarAS
(Schultz1935).
Dekade keempat bukan salah satu dari kontribusi besar untuk ekonomi pertanian lit erature di bidang
perdagangan.Perangtionsmenderitapenyakityangtidakkondusifuntukkegiatanakademik,karenabanyakanggota
profesidikooptasikepostingpemerintahdanpresumcakapmembuatkontribusiyangmungkintidakakanpernah
revealed.2Namun,temperdaganganpascaperangsistematissedangdibangundi1940,danisuisupertaniansering
dijantungdiscussion.3TheperdebatanantaraekonomterkemukasepertiJamesMeadedanKeynesdan
1ekonompertanianmengomentarimasalahini,dalamteksconbaikkebijakandomestikdansistemperdagangan.Sebuah
contohyangbaikadalahstudiolehBlack(1928),yangmemperingatkankonsekuensidarikebijakanini.
2PengecualianadalahbukuHenryC.Taylorpadaperdaganganpertaniandunia,menekankanpentingnyapasarEropa(Taylor
danTaylor1943).
3Perdebatantentangpengelolaanpasarkomoditasadalahcontoh;lihatdiskusidibawahdaritulisantulisanolehDavis(1942)
danTsoudanBlack(1944).
April4262010Amer.J.Agr.Econ.
rekanrekanAmerikamerekasecaraeksplisitditanganidenganmasuknyaperdaganganpertaniandalamsistempasca
perangtetapipentinguntukasumsimerekabahwamasalahiniadalahdarisuatukepentinganpolitikyangtinggi
bahwaargumenuntukpasarbebastidakmungkinuntukmenang.Meansementarateoriperdaganganinternasional
mengambillangkahmajuyangbesar:Samuelson(1948)articlepadapemerataanhargafaktormuncul,dandasar
diletakkanuntukteoriperdaganganmodern.
Dekade1950anmelihatawaldariminatprofesionalyangseriusdipertaniandankomoditasperdagangan.D.
GaleJohnsonmenerbitkansebuahbukutentanginkonsistensiantaraperdaganganASdankebijakanpertanian:satu
advokasipasarterbuka,mempertahankanhambatantiveproteksilainnya(Johnson1950).Selamaduapuluhtahun
Johnsondisempurnakanpesaninidanmemilikiditemukandampakpropadaprofesi(jikatidakkebijakan),seperti
yangdijelaskandibawah.Condliffe(1951)termasukbeberapakomentarwawasantentangperdaganganbudayaagri
dalambukunyaTheCommerceofNations,disampingmenunjukkanikatancomplexiperaturanperdaganganpada
waktu itu (Condliffe 1951) .4The hubungan antara perdagangan komoditas dan pembangunan ekonomi dan
pertumbuhan juga mulai dipertimbangkan selama periode ini. Sebenarnya ini adalah awal dari ekonomi
pembangunansebagaisistemkolonialhancur.Bahkanningsbeginekonomipolitikperdaganganpertaniandapat
ditelusurikeperiodeini.Kindleberger(1951)memperkenalkananalisiskepentingankelompokdalampenjelasan
kebijakantarifnasional,settingpanggunguntukkemudianbekerjaekonomipolitikpadaperdaganganpertanian.
Padaawaltahun1960anisuagriperdagangankomoditasbudayamenjadiperhatianinternasionalyangsignifikan.
Tahun1960anmelihatpeningkatantajamdalamperlindunganpertaniandinegaranegarasidangindus.Sistem
perdagangan terhuyunghuyungdi bawah beban disposisi plussur dibangun di bawah dukungan harga tinggi.
Negaranegara berkembang melihat sisi yang berbeda dari ini dengan permintaan mereka untuk akses pasar
(persyaratankonsesi)ditolakolehpasukanyangkuatdomesticpolitikdanpendapatanekspormerekatertekanoleh
hargakomoditasyangrendahdipasartionalinterna.SebagianbesaringPenulisanprofesionaldiAmerikaSerikat
padaperdaganganpertaniandi
4 Condliffe dipengaruhi generasi mahasiswa di Berkeley, termasuk Hillman, yang mulai mengajukan pertanyaan yang
sistematis tentang masalah yang dihadapi perdagangan pertanian. Hillman (1996) menunjukkan beberapa trasi frus atas
kurangnya studi sebelumnya pada perdagangan, menyatakan: [A] pertarungan satusatunya karya yang berkaitan dengan
perdagangan pertanian adalah sebuah buku tahun 1920 oleh Nourse dan Gale Johnson bekerja pada dilema kebijakan
perdaganganpertanianAS
.periodeinidifokuskanpadabagaimanameningkatkanekspor,baikkomersialataumelaluibantuanpangan.
1960anmelihatperkembanganlainyangtelahmemilikidampakyangmendalampadaperdaganganpertanian:
kelahirankembalitionperusahaanintegrasiekonomiregionaldandaerahperdaganganbebasagakkurangambisius.
EkonomEropa,sertarekanrekanmerekadiAmerikaUtara,tertarikdenganeksperimenyangberanidariEropaEco
nomicCommunity(EEC)tapikhawatirtentangKebijakanproteksionisUmumPertanian(CAP)yangmembentuk
bagian integral dari perjanjian. Ketegangan antara EEC (kemudian Uni Eropa) dan Amerika Serikat atas
perdaganganpertanianadalahtemautamabagiparaekonomselamaperiodeinidanmemangsampaipertengahan
1990an,ketikanizationWorldTradeOrga(WTO)diinternalisasibeberapakonflikini.
Keduateoriperdagangandanteoriintegrasinomicekoyangberkembangpesat,sepertiperistiwadunianyata
ditantangditerimanegarapenjelasanyang.Padatahun1960,teoriperdagangandibayarmeningkatkanperhatian
terhadappergerakanmodalinternasionaldalamkonteksteoriperdaganganstandar:gerakanModalbisamenjadi
penggantiproduktrade.5nomicsekoPertaniansecarakeseluruhanterjebakdekatdenganakarnomicmicroecodan
ke perekonomian tertutup pandangan sektor pertanian. Masih ada dis sebuah menghubungkan antara ajaran
pemasaranpertaniandankebijakandalamnegeridisatusisidanmengajartentangfungsiperdagangannasional
antardansistemmoneterdisisilain.Iniberartibahwaprofesiitukadangapayanglambandalammenanggapiisu
isuperdaganganyangmunculdari1960s.6
Pada tahun 1970an sejumlah isuisu baru telah muncul yang menekankan pentingnya peristiwa ekonomi
eksternal.Kenaikantajamhargaminyak,bersamasamadengankekeringandiIndia,Afrika,danUniSoviet,yang
disebabkanpasarkomoditaspertanianuntukspikekeatas.Duadevaluasidolar
5SchmitzdanHelmberger(1970)kemudianmengembangkanmodeldimanamerekamenunjukkanbahwapergerakanmodal
danperdaganganprodukdapatmelengkapi,dalampergerakanmodalmeningkatmembawapeningkatanperdaganganproduk.
Contohyangmerekapilihadalahuntukindustripertaniandansumberdayaalamdandiramalkanpertumbuhanpertaniandan
makananperdaganganterkaitdenganinvestasiasinglangsungyangterushariini.
6 Dalam pengantar editorial ke pembacaan kumpulkan jika tidak mengesankan artikel tentang ekonomi pertanian yang
diterbitkan olehAmerican EconomicsAssociation (AEA)pada tahun1969, para editormengakui bahwakeputusan untuk
menekankan sejumlah topik mengakibatkan pengecualian dari angka dari daerah di mana ekonom pertanian memiliki
spesialisasi.Diantarabidangyanglebihpentingyangtelahdikeluarkan[adalah]...internasionalperdagangan(AEA1969,p.
Xvi).D.GaleJohnsonberadadipanitiaseleksiuntukvolumeini,jadimungkiniamenemukanbahanyangtidakmemadaidi
daerahiniuntukmemasukkan.
dan ditinggalkannya virtual dari sistem moneter Bretton Woods menambahkan lebih banyak guncangan pasar.
PeningkatanKetidakstabilanitymakroekonomidanperilakupasarkomoditaskacaumunculdalamdysfunctionality
darikebijakandalamnegeri.BukumaniD.GaleJohnsonDuniaPertanianberantakandankaryanyapadapasargula
dikemas situasi ini (Johnson 1973, 1974). G. Edward Schuh (1974) mengingatkan profesi pentingnya nomics
macroecountukpasarpertaniandanicancesignifnilai tukarpolaperdaganganpertanian.Dan,dalamsebuah
survei yangluasdariraksasamelewati ditionalbidangekonomipertaniandaritahun1940ketahun1970an
(Martin1977),kebijakanyangterkaitdenganperdaganganpertaniandianggapMuberibadahdaribagianpenuh,
ditulisahlinyaolehD.GaleJohnson(Johnson1977).
Tahun1980andiantardalamperiodeyangluarbiasadarikonflikperdaganganpertaniandanreformasikebijakan
yangmenaburbenihuntukonciliationrecmereka.Reformasiaturanperdaganganmultilateraluntukpertanianharus
menungguperubahanidendalam kebijakandalamnegeri,tetapireformasiiniakhirnyamuncul dari campuran
tekanan anggaran dan paradigma shifts.7 The Interna tional Perdagangan Pertanian Penelitian Consor tium
(IATRC,dibahaspadabagianselanjutnya)menjadifokusuntukbekerjapadaperdagangan.Itujugasuatuperiode
ketikaekonomyangmenjadisemakincanggihdalamsenimembangunmodelpasardanmemperkirakanparameter
perilaku. Literatur perdagangan internasional pada umumnya berubah selama periode ini, dengan pemeriksaan
persaingantidaksempurnaelsmoddanpentingnyageografi,studitentangekonomipolitikperlindungan,danisu
integrasi regional. Agricul ekonom tanian menjadi mahir menerjemahkan dan menerapkan daerahdaerah baru
eksplorasikeduniaperdaganganprodukpertaniandankebijakanterkait,sepertidibahasdibawah.
Dekade 1990an melihat perubahan yang penting didalam aturan internasional pemerintah tentang Erning
kebijakanperdagangannasionaluntukpertanianmembuat.Setyangdariperubahanyangdilakukaninimerupakan
dekadeaktifuntukprofesionalperdaganganpertanian.MeskipunpenandatangananmentUmumsetujutentangTarif
danPerdagangan(GATT)padatahun1947olehnegaranegaraindustrimaju,danpenguranganprogresiftarifatas
impormanufaktur,adasedikitkemajuandalammengurangihambatanperdaganganpertanian.
Dialog7KebijakandibadanbadaninternasionalsepertiOrganisasiuntukKerjasamaEkonomidanPembangunankontribusi
cantlysignifiuntukpergeseranparadigma,dandialoginiadalahperpanjangandaridiskusiakademikwaktu.
mengubahparadigmakebijakanekonomiyangdimulaipadapertengahan1980anyangdipimpinakhirnyapada
tahun1995untukpenggabunganpenuhpertaniankepenerusGATT,WorldTradeOrganization.8Multimarketdan
modellebareconomymenjadimasihlebihcanggih.Iniadalahusiakerjaempirisrincipadaperdaganganpertanian
daripadasalahsatuperbaikanceptualcon.Tapiperdaganganpertanianyangmenjadimainstreamdinomicseko
pertanian kurikulum, dan kursus kebijakan domestik di Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa mulai memasukkan
beberapaperekonomianterbukamasalah.Meansementara,perdaganganpertanianitusendiri berubahdengan
globalisasiindustrimakanan,berposetantanganbaruuntukparaekonom.
Halinijelasterlaludiniuntukmenilaisifatabadidarikontribusisejakawalmileniumbaru,tetapiperluasan
berbagai isu perdagangan terhubung dengan environ mental, konsumen, kesejahteraan hewan, air, dan isuisu
perubahaniklimtelahsangat memperluasfokusanalisperdaganganpertanian.Kekhawatiranbarubaruini atas
dampaklonjakanhargapadakeamananpangandanpenggunaantanamanpertaniansebagaibiomassauntukbahan
bakartelahdisimpanisuisuperdaganganpertanianyangtinggipadaagendainternasional.
Pertumbuhanyangcepatdalamprodukolahandanbernilaitinggipertaniandanmakanan,dantionarypenyebaran
revolusupermarketritelaccomdengandidampingigelombangkeduadariglobalisasidieramodern,sehingga
tidaklagianehuntukberbicaradaripasarglobaluntukuctspertanianproduk.Beberapaekonomfokuspadaisuisu
WTO,yangtelahmenjadisubbidangyangsignifikandaripenelitianperdaganganpertaniandananalisis.ErsOth
mengambilpandanganpembangunan:pekerjaanempirisBanyakpadaperdaganganpertaniansekarangdilakukan
oleh mereka memeriksa isuisu negara berkembang, termasuk dida lamnya pertanyaan seperti penggunaan
kebijakan perdagangan sebagai unsurdalam program ketahanan pangan atau antikemiskinan. Masih orang lain
mempelajari pengaturan perdagangan eral regional atau bilat dalam segala kemuliaan mereka, merenungkan
keseimbanganantaramanfaat liberalisasi parsial danbiayagivingaksespilihanuntukprodusenbiayatinggi.
Banyakkontribusisekarangdibuatolehmerekayangbekerjadi(ataudengan)lembagamultilateral(sepertiBank
Dunia, Organisasi untuk Kerjasama Ekonomi dan Pembangunan [OECD], dan ence PBB Confer tentang
PerdagangandanPembangunan[UNCTAD]),
8Namun, negosiasi perdaganganterus berporospada masalahpelik dariliberalisasi perdaganganproduk pertanian, yang
dibuktikandenganmasalahsaatinidalamWTOPutaranDoha.
sering dalam studi kolaboratif. Hal ini tampaknya mencerminkan pergeseran dalam cara di mana penelitian
perdaganganpertaniantelahdiselenggarakan,topikyangkitakembalipadaakhirkertas.
SebagaicarauntukmenyoroticaradimanaprofesitelahmenanggapiperistiwaingChang,kitamengatursurvei
subjektifkamidiseluruhenambidang.Setiapdaerahadalahcontohdarikemajuankumulatifdalampemahaman,
dimulaidengansatuatauduaartikeldanbukudanyangsedangmengembangkankedalamtubuhkebijaksanaan
lebihataukurangditerima.
Kontribusi#1:Memahamiperilakuhargakomoditasinternasional
Salahsatupertanyaanyangpalinggigihdalamperdaganganpertanianadalahapakahadayangkonsistentrenjangka
panjanghargapasarinternasionaluntukkomoditaspertanian.Dikendalasatusisi,pasokan(luaslahanterbatas)
dalammenghadapipertumbuhanpermintaan(pendudukdanpendapatanperkapita)bisamendoronghargaproduk
pertanianyanglebihtinggi.Disisilain,sebagaikonsumenmenghabiskanpangsatinggikenaikanpendapatanpada
makanan non (efek Engel), pertumbuhan ekonomi akan menyebabkan pergeseran dalam permintaan jauh dari
makanandasar.Relatifcepatpertumbuhanproductivitypertanianakanmenurunkanbiayapertanianproduction
dankarenanyacenderungmenurunkanhargapertanian.Buktiuntukbanyakabadinimunculuntukmenunjukpada
sebuahtrend.9hargamenurunNamun,maknadarikecenderunganinimenjadimasalahyangcukupkontroversidi
tahun1960an.
Variabilitashargajugamenjaditopikutamauntukpenyelidikanselamabertahuntahun.Hargatinggidiawal
1970an membawa masalah ini ke depan, dan lonjakan harga yang lebih baru di 20078telah memperbaharui
kekhawatiran tentang dampak ekonomi sive corro ketidakstabilan pasar. Harga produk mary pri di pasar
internasional terkenal lebih stabil daripada harga untuk produk lain. Berapa banyak dari harga ity volatil ini
disebabkanolehkarakteristikpasar(misalnya,guncanganpasokandaricuacaataupenyakit)danberapabanyak
untukintervensipemerintahmenjadisubjekuntukstudipada1970andan1980an.
HargakomoditasdanPersyaratanPerdagangan
Perilaku harga Modities com pertanian di pasar dunia telah menjadi obsesi dimengerti dengan ekonom.
Kepentingankhususuntukanalisisperdaganganpertanianadalah
9Haliniberbedadenganbuktibaruuntukperiodedarikedelapanbelasterlambatkeawalabadkeduapuluh(Williamson
2008).
trendalamhargarelatifprodukpertaniandibandingkandenganproduknonpertanian.Kondisiperdaganganuntuk
pertanian (dan lainnya primer) produk telah menampilkan promi nently dalam perdebatan tentang bias yang
mungkindarisistemperdaganganterhadapkelompokkelompoktertentudarinegara.Perdebatantentangapakah
sistemekonomihasilyangditumpukterhadapnegaranegaraberkembangyangdihasilkanadalahsangatterlihat
pada1960an.Prebisch(1950)danSinger(1950)telahdatangsecaraindependenpadakesimpulanbahwaadaalasan
strukturaluntukpenurunandiamatidalamhargapertanianrelatifterhadapbarangbarangmanufaktur,memperkuat
kecenderungandikarenaelastisitaspendapatanyangberbeda.Pasartidaksempurnadalambarangbarangindustri
memungkinkanprodusenuntukmempertahankanbanyakmanfaatdaripeningkatanproduktivitasdaripadapassing
mereka kepada konsumen, sedangkan peningkatan produktivitas pertanian yang dikirimkan secara langsung ke
konsumen (atau setidaknya prosesor) dalam bentuk harga yang lebih rendah. Akibatnya, kondisi perdagangan
ternyatasemakinmelawanpedesaanpinggirandalammendukungindustripusat.Konsepterbuktikuatdalam
hal politik dan merupakan motivasi utama bagi berdirinya UNCTAD tahun 1964 dan panggilan untuk New
EconomicOrderinternasionaldengannegaranegaraberkembangpada1970an.
ThePrebisch/ Penyanyihipotesistelahmelakukanlebihbaiksebagai panggilanpolitikuntuksenjataselain
sebagaikesimpulanvertikalstatis.SebuahrevisibesardaridatayangsemuladigunakanditerbitkanolehGrillidan
Yang (1988), yang secara luas con menguat sebuah trend.10 ke bawah Tapi analis lain tidak setuju dengan
interpretasidata:Trenhargaselama100tahunterakhirtidakberartihalus.Memangadapenurunantajamharga
pertanian(khususnyauntukparalarlypadatahun1920)tetapijugaperiodedimanatrenkeatas(atasbagianpertama
abadethtwenti),ketikamenghilang(dari1920sampaiakhir1970an),danketikatrenbangsaldownyangkuat
dimulai(sampai1990)(OcampodanParra2002).CashindanMcDermott(2002,2006)mengkonfirmasihasilini
dan menolak baik adanya tren jangka panjang dan bukti dari perubahan struktural dalam seri digunakan. Satu
dekade terakhir telahmelihat pemulihan harga, danbanyakyang berpendapat bahwatren mungkinnaikuntuk
setidaknya beberapa tahun yang akan datang. Selain itu,hubungan antara segi perdagangan dan pembangunan
ekonomitelahmenjadi
10datamerekatelahsejakdiperbaruiuntuk2000olehPfaffenzeller,Newbolt,danRayner(2007).
lebih kabur. Identifikasi utama eksportir SLTproduk dengan negaranegara berkembang tampak semakin
tanggal:Bagibanyakkomoditaspertanianutama,negaranegaraberpenghasilantinggiadalaheksportirbesar,dan
bagi banyak negara berkembangterutama dalam barangbarang Asiadiproduksi sekarang mendominasi ekspor
mereka.
Kebangkitan barubaru ini gagasan bahwa agricul harga tanianmungkinpada trenjangkapanjang berutang
banyaktigafenomena:pertumbuhanyangcepatdinegaranegaraberkembang,terutamadiCina,India,danBrazil,
dengan implikasi untuk perbaikan diet; peningkatan luar biasa dalam harga minyak pada tahun 2007, yang
mengangkatbiayaenergidibidangpertaniandanmenyebabkanpemerintahtentangmandaternmentaldansubsidi
untukelsbiofu;danstagnasijelasdimukateknisdibidangpertaniansebagaiakibatdaripengeluaranpenelitianing
declin.Kontribusiuntukmemahamipergerakanhargainitelahagakkontradiktif.Beberapamenemukanperan
nifikansiguntukspekulasi(Gilbert2008);oranglainuntukkebijakanbiofuel(OECDdanOrganisasiPangandan
Pertanian[FAO]2008).Tapiapayangtampaknyaumumnyasepakatbahwaagrihargakomoditasbudayasekarang
memiliki link langsung dengan harga minyak bumi, setelah melebihi ambang batas di mana biofuel menjadi
penggantipribadimenguntungkanbagibahanbakarfosil.
InternasionalHargaGuncangan
Pentingnyahargakomoditastionsfluctuadantanggapankebijakandomestikmerekadibuatjelaspada1970an.
Theempatkalilipatdarihargaminyakbumidi19731974danmerekaduakalilipatlagipada19791980,ketika
OrganisasiPengeksporMinyaknegaramencoba(OPEC)dikoordinasikanpenguranganbesardalampasokan,
memicufokusbarupadamenganalisiskonsekuensidariguncangannonfarmtersebutuntuksektorpertanian.
Awalnyafokussastrainiadalahpadaanalisisdampakpadasumerscondanperusahaan,sebagaiprodusen
menghadapibiayaenerginaiktajam.Namunbesarnyahargaminyakbumidirangsangeksplorasibesarbesarandan
cepatdaneksploitasicadanganenergibaru.Reaksipasokansepertiituincorpodinilaidalamanalisisdampakharga,
yangmenyebabkanapayangdikenalsebagailiteraturBelandaPenyakityangberusahaawalnyauntuk
menjelaskanefekpadasektorlaindariekonomiBelandamenyusulpenemuandaneksploitasigasUralNATbidang
lepaspantaiBelanda.Gregory(1975)membuatkontribusiawaluntukliteraturinitentangdampakboomingsektor
nonpertanian:Iamenemukanbahwaefeklangsung
adalahpeningkatanpermintaantenagakerjadisektornonpertanianboomingyangawalnyaakanmenarikpekerja
darisektorlainkesektorboomingtetapibahwainidiikutiolehdampaktidaklangsungpadapertaniandansektor
lainnyasebagaiperubahanpendapatanriildalamperekonomianmempengaruhipermintaanuntuksemuaproduk.
Teoriintiyangsamatelahdigunakanuntukanalyzedampakantardanintrasectoraldankebijakanpajakdari
booming harga komoditas pertanian dan patung. Dalam konteks subSahara Afrika, itu praktek umum bagi
pemerintahuntukpajakjauhrejekidariboominghargaekspor,baikuntukmenyimpandalamdanastabilisasiuntuk
ditarik pada untuk mendukung petani selama periode runtuh harga atau untuk meningkatkan pundipundi kas
sehingga untuk memungkinkan boom untuk dibagikan dengan sisa masyarakat, termasuk industri nonbooming
pertanian. Tetapi analisis barubaru ini telah meragukan kemampuan pemerintah untuk mempengaruhi transfer
tersebut.
Ekonom perdagangan juga telah peduli dengan dampak kebijakan penyimpanan pada stabilitas harga pasar
nasionalantardandikebijakanpenyimpananyangoptimaluntukperekonomianterbuka.Awalpekerjaanteoritis
padastabilisasidirangsangolehHuethdanSchmitz(1972),yangmenunjukkanefekdistribusidikeduatertutupdan
perekonomian terbuka dari stabilisasi harga dibawa melalui penyimpanan. Feder, Hanya, dan Schmitz (1977)
dianalisisbadanstoragepolibawahketidakpastianperdagangandanmenunjukkankasusdi manaperdagangan
akansangatberkurangdibawahtingkatketidakpastianyangtinggi.Hanyaetal.(1978)menganalisisimplikasi
kesejahteraanpenyimpanandariperspektifinternasionalmenggunakanasumsinonlinear,danNewberrydanStiglitz
(1981)memperluaskerangkakerjauntukintervensikebijakanyangoptimaldibawahketidakstabilanbagiekonomi
terbuka.Sifatpersuasifmelebihialasanalasanmereka,bahwapenyimpananswastadanpublikkodetermineddan
yangterakhirmungkinhanyamengambiltempatbekas,bersamasamadengankembalikehargayanglebihrendah
dipasardunia,telahsecaraefektifmenjatuhkantopikstorantarpemerintahperjanjianusiadariagendakebijakan
sejak1980s.11
kebijakandomestikdanInstabilitaspasar
argumen bahwa pemerintah dapat memperparah fluktuasi pasar internasional erbate oleh upaya mereka sendiri
untukmenstabilkanhargadomestik
11topiktidakbenarbenarhilang:WilliamsdanWright(1991),misalnya,menambahkanwawasantambahankedampak
kesejahteraanpenyimpanankomoditasdalamsituasiperdagangandantidakadaperdagangan.
munculsebagianbesarsebagaiakibatdaridampakkebijakanUniEropapadaawal1970an.TheKASIHinstrudari
CAPtermasukpungutanvariabeldansubsidieksporvariabel(restitusi)untukmenghindariimporketidakstabilan
daripasarinternasional.EkonomdiEropamenunjukkanbahwaimplikasidaripenetapankebijakantersebutadalah
untukteregangkurvapermintaanimpordanpenawaraneksporkurvapadahargastabilisasiyangdipilihdomestic.
IniberlakumengurangisejauhmanaUniEropaberpartisipasidalampenyerapanguncangandariseluruhduniadan
meningkatsejauhmanaguncangandalamnegerisendiriyangditransmisikanluarnegeri.
IntinyadibuatdalamkonteksyanglebihluasolehD.GaleJohnsonketikaiaberpendapatbahwaPemerintah
pemerintah pemerintah tentang menggunakan berbagai instrumen untuk menambah stabilitas pasar domestik,
sehinggapasarinternasionalkurangstabil,yangmengarahkekeenggananlebihlanjutuntukpercayapasarbahwa
untukpasokanyangdapatdiandalkan(Johnson1975).Exportersarelikelytocompeteinaggressivewaystooffload
surpluses from the domestic market, causing prices to fall below the level that should clear the market. This
argumenthasbeenrecognizedintheadoptionintheUruguayRoundofruleslimitinggovernmentstotariffsrather
thanquotasandvariablelevies,andtocommittingtoneverraisethosetariffsabovenegotiatedboundrates.Butthe
issueisstillofconsiderableinteresttotrademodelers,whomustchoosethedegreeofpricetransmissionfrom
worldtodomesticprices.
Contribution#2:Demonstratingthelinkagesbetweenagriculturaltradeandexchangeratepolicies
In times of large global imbalances, fluctuat ing exchange rates, and other macroeconomic instability, it has
becomeclearthatsuchmacropricesasexchangerates,interestrates,andinflationmattergreatlyindetermining
nationaleconomicwelfareandthecompetitivenessandprofitabilityofindividualsectors.However,theimportance
ofexchangeratestoagriculturaltradewasformanyyearsneglectedintheliteratureandinpolicymaking,perhaps
reflectingthefactthatexchangerateswerefixedforlongperiodsoftimeinthepre1969era.The1970sdisabused
economistsofthenotionthatagriculturaltradecanbestudiedinisolationfromthebroadereconomicenvironment.
Macroeconomicconditionsclearlyhadanimpactonforeigndemandaswellasonthedomesticmarket.Agricultural
sectorscompetedwitheachotheronanunsteady
playingfieldwiththegoalpostsandsidelinesinconstantmotion.
TheUSDollarandAgriculturalTrade
The large exchange rate realignments that occurred worldwide in the early 1970s, result ing in a significant
devaluation of the US dollar, drew the attention of agricultural economists to the influence that monetary
developmentscouldhaveonagriculturalmarkets.TheoutstandingcontributionwasthatofG.EdwardSchuh
(1974),whodrewattentiontotheimplicationsoftheexchangeratefortradeflowsanddomesticmarketsinagri
culture.WhatmotivatedSchuh'sanalysiswashisimpressionthatthemanyexplanationsoftheUSfarmproblem
thathadbeenprovidedhadoverlookedonecrucialelement,ie,thedollarexchangerate.Schuharguedthatthedollar
exchangeratehadindeedsignificantlyinfluencedtheeconomicfateofUSagricultureinthepostWorldWarII
period.Morespecifically,SchuhclaimedthattheUSdollarhadbeenovervaluedforaconsiderablepartofthe
periodandthatthismisalignmenthadcontributedtodepressingpricesfortradedagriculturalproductsonthe
domesticUSmarket.Thishadreducedoutputoffarmproductsbelow,andstimulatedtheirconsumptionabove,
whatotherwisewouldhavebeenthecase.Inshort,theovervalueddollarexchangeratehadactedasadisincentive
toUSagriculturalexports.
Schuhdidnotlimithisanalysistothedirectinfluenceoftheexchangerateonpricesandquantitiesinastatic
context.Henotedthatinspiteofthispricedepression,USagriculturaloutputcontinuedtoexpand,andsohe
extendedtheanalysistoincludedynamicfeatures.StartingfromdeJanvry'sexpositionofinducedtechnicalchange
andtheconceptofaninnovationpossibilitycurve,Schuhshowedhowanovervaluedexchangerate,throughits
influence on both product and factor prices in domestic agriculture, could affect the speed and nature of
technologicalprogress.Hearguedthatthenegativeeffectonfarmprofitsresultingfromtheovervaluationofthe
dollarinducedamorerapidadoptionofproductivityenhancingtechnicalprogress.Coupledwithhigherlandprices,
broughtaboutbyacreageretirementpolicies,andtheresultingshiftinfactorproportions,thisinturnaccelerated
theoutmigrationoflaborfromagriculture.Allofthesedevelopmentschanged
Joslingetal.UnderstandingInternationalTradeinAgriculturalProducts431
signasthedollarbegantodepreciateunderthecurrencyrealignmentsoftheearly1970s.
Theintroductionofmacroeconomicdevelopmentsintotheanalysisofagriculturalmarketsandtrade,further
developedinSchuh(1976)andMcCalla(1983),firmlyestablishedawidersetoffactorstobetakenintoaccountby
theprofessionwhenconsideringtheeconomicconditionsofagriculture.Thisappliedtodevelopingcountriestoo,
especiallyaftermanyofthembegantoliberalizetheirmarketsforforeignexchangeinthe1980s(Schiffand
Valds2002).ChambersandJust(1981)demonstratedthedeficienciesinsomeofthemodelsusedandcameup
withtheirownversionofadynamicquarterlyeconometricmodeloftheUSwheat,corn,andsoybeanmarkets.
Theirresultsshowsignificantmarketandtradeeffectsofdollardevaluations.
EuropeanExchangeRatesandtheCAP
Meanwhile,Europe'sagricultural economistswerebusystudyingaveryEuropeanexchangerateissue,that of
greenmoney.Whenaunifiedagriculturalmarketwascreatedacrossthememberstatesofthenewlyestablished
Euro pean Economic Community, support prices under the Common Agricultural Policy were set not in the
currencyofanymemberstate,butinavirtualunitofaccount,equalinvalue(originally)totheUSdollar,andfrom
thereconvertedintonationalcurrenciesthroughtheprevailingexchangerates.However,soonafterpriceshadbeen
harmonizedacrossmemberstatesin1967,exchangeratesbegantochange,withthedeutschmark(DM)reval
uationandtheFrenchfrancdevaluationin1969.Keentokeeppricesinnationalcurrenciesunchanged,agricultural
policymakersdecidedtomaintaintheoldratesforconvertingsupportpricesfromtheunitofaccountintonational
monies.Thus,ineffect,theycreatednewspecificexchangeratesforagriculturalpolicypurposes,dubbedgreen
rates. In order to prevent arbitrage trade from under mining the resulting price differences between member
countries,policymakersalsohadtointroducebordertaxesandsubsidiesforbothintraandextraCommunitytrade
inagriculturalproducts(calledmonetarycompensatoryamounts).Thesystemsoonbecametechnicallycomplex,
withdisastrousimplicationsforeconomicefficiency.TheagriculturaleconomicsprofessioninEurope,though,
benefitedfromit,astheregimeprovidedmanyopportunitiesforanalysisandcritique.Anearlyexample
wasJosling(1970),whoanalyzedtheimpactoftheDMandfrancrealignmentsonfarmersandcalculatedthe
compensationthatwouldbeneededtoGermanfarmers.Thiswasindeedpaidthrougharebateoftaxrevenues.
Therefollowedarichliteratureonthegreenmoneysystem:Heidhuesetal.(1978)contributedoneofthemore
comprehensiveinvestigationsintothisspecificEuropeanexchangerateissueinagriculture.Thisaberrationtothe
EU'ssingleinternalmarketinagriculturalgoodssurviveduntiltheestablishmentoftheeuroin1999inthecontext
ofEUmonetaryunion.
Contribution#3:Introducingmarketpowerandindustrialorganizationintoagriculturaltradeanalysis
Thepuretheoryofinternationaltradewastypicallypremisedonarmslengthexchangebetweenatomisticfirms
andconsumers,eachidentifiedbytheircountryofbusinessorresidence.Thusitbecamecommontoreferto
countriesasimportersorexportersofaproduct,eventhoughtheywereessentiallystatisticalaggregationsofthe
actorsinvolved.Twodevelopmentsintradetheorymovedtheanalysisawayfromthisviewofcountriesasthe
tradersinacompetitivemarketplace.Onedevelopmentwastowardincorporatingintermediategoodsintotrade
models,atrendthatacceleratedasitbecameclearthatmuchtradewasamongfirmsandbetweendifferentpartsof
thesamefirm.Aseconddevelopmentwastoincorporateadegreeofmarketpowerintotheanalysis,oneitherthe
exportersideortheimporterside,suchthatmonopolyandmonopsonyrentscouldbecapturedbythe(private
sector)actors.Thiscomplicatedthebasicresultsoftradetheorybutimprovedthecredibilityoftheanalysisbased
onsuchconcepts.
AmajoradvanceconsistentwiththesedevelopmentswasmadeinKrugman's(1979)articleonanewtheory
oftrade,wherethedecisiontotradeisdevelopedwithinacontextofthetheoryofthefirm.Hecreatedageneral
equilibriummodelofnoncomparativeadvantagetrade.Suchtradeisdrivenbyeconomiesofscale,whichare
internaltofirms.Becauseofthescaleeconomies,marketsareimperfectlycompetitive.Thusthestructureofthe
sectorandtherelationbetweentheactorsbecameamatterofrelevance.
Thisadvancewastakenupbyseveralagriculturaleconomistswhohadbecomeuneasywiththeoriesthatrested
onthenotionthat
432April2010Amer.J.Agr.Econ.
competitiveconditionsappliedwhenmanycommoditymarketsappearedtobelessthanperfectlycompetitive.
Largecorporationspresumablyhadmarketpowerinthegraintrade,andmanymarketsweredominatedbystate
tradingfirms.Later,thegrowingcomplexityofsupplychainsaddedanewdimensionwhereasinglefirmmight
havemanysuppliersinforeigncountriesandpossiblyalsobeexportingtheresultingfinalproductstootherparts
oftheworld.12
MarketingBoardsandExportCartels
Theearlyworkonmarket structureandagricultural tradefocusedonmarket instability,storage,tariffs,and
marketingboards.Thewheatmarketofferedanimportantexampleofwheremarketinginstitutionsdidnotfiteasily
intothecompetitivemodel,andseveralinfluentialstudiesfocusedonthisproduct.McCalla(1966)developeda
cooperativeduopolymodelofworldwheatpricingwhereCanadaandtheUnitedStatesaretheduopolists,with
Canadabeingthepriceleader.Thearticlesuggestedthatpricestabilityintheworldwheatmarketfrom1956to
1965wasduemainlytothestabilizingactionsofCanadaandtheUnitedStates.Inafollowuparticle,McCalla
(1979)generalizesthestrategicchoicesfacingprimaryproductmarketingagencies.
BieriandSchmitz(1973)analyzedexportinstabilityinthepresenceofmarketpower.Theyfoundthatthewelfare
consequencesofpriceinstabilityforinternationallytradedgoodscriticallydependonwhethertariffsormarketing
boardsarepresent.Forexample(unlikethefreetradecase),whenthesourceofpriceinstabilityisexternal,the
importingcountrypreferspricestabilitywheretradeisrestrictedbytariffs.Theoppositeistrue,however,when
tradeisrestrictedbymarketingboards.Just,Schmitz,andZilberman(1979),extendingtheoptimaltariffliterature,
developamodelthatconsistedoffoursectors:competitiveproducers,competitiveconsumers,thegovernment,
andnoncompetitiveinternationaltradinginstitutions.Inthemodel,amarketingfirmwithbothmonopolyand
monopsony power is considered where the firm oper ates independently from producers and con sumers to
maximizeitsownprofits.Theyalsodealwithinternational transactionscarriedoutbyproducercartels.Ifthe
activitiesof
12AfulldiscussionofthesedevelopmentsisgivenbyKarpandPerloff(2002).
internationalmarketinginstitutionsresultinnoncompetitivepricing,domesticpricecontrolsdonotresultinthe
optimalallocationofresources.
Intheearly1980s,thisworkwasextendedaspoliticalinterestfocusedonissuesofexportcartels.Sarrisand
Schmitz(1981)analyzedtradeinanimperfectlycompetitivesettinganddemonstratedhowacartelcouldhave
broughtaboutacompetitivesolution.Thereisasignificantchangeinincomedistributionsfromconsumersto
producers under cartel conditions. The theoretical foundation and extensions for cartels and applications were
developedbySchmitzetal.(1981).KarpandMcCalla(1983)extendthistomakeuseoftheemergingdevel
opmentofgametheoryasawayofexaminingtradepolicies.
IndustrialOrganization
Foranumberofcommodities,internationaltradehasfordecadesbeendominatedbymultinationalcorporations.
Morerecently,retailfirmsandfoodprocessorshavedevelopedextensivesupplychainsforfoodproducts,raw
materials,andingredients.Therefore,itbecamenecessaryforeconomiststounderstandtheverticalandhorizontal
linkagesthatexistamongmarkets.Standardtarifftheorydoesnotdealspecificallywithverticalmarketsthat
includeproducers,processors,andwholesalers:Forthat,oneneedstoincorporatesomeinsightsfromtheliterature
onindustrialorganizationandmarketstructure.
Agriculturaleconomistshaverespondedininnovativewaystothechallengeofmodelinginternationaltrade
underimperfectcompetition.SomeofthemajorstudiesincludethoseofPaarlbergandAbbott(1986),Karpand
Perloff (1989), McCorriston and Sheldon (1991), Schmitz and Gray (2000), and Schmitz, Schmitz, and Seale
(2009).Theprevailingconclusionfromthesepapersisthatthedegreeofmarketpower,whichcantakeseveral
forms,hasasignificantimpactonpricesandcommodityflows.
Contribution#4:Quantifyingthetradeeffectsofagriculturalpolicies
Tradedistortionsfromagriculturalprotectionweretreatedasafactoflifeformuchofthetwentiethcentury.A
valuable contribu tion to the understanding of the longerterm trends in agricultural protection was made by
McCalla(1969).Butithasbeeninonlythepast
thirtyyearsthattherehasbeenanyconsistentefforttoquantifytheimpactofprotectivedomesticandtradepolicies
ofdevelopedcountriesonworldmarkets.Meanwhile,asdevelopingcountriesbecameindependent,theybegan
to discourage their agricultural sectors directly with export taxes and indirectly with protection from import
competition for their infant indus trial sectors and with overvalued exchange rates. This disarray in world
agriculture,asD.GaleJohnson(1973)describeditinthetitleofhisseminalbook,meanttherewasoverproduction
offarmproductsinhighincomecountriesandunderproductioninmoreneedydevelopingcountries.Johnsonalso
stressedthefactthatbothgroupsofcountriesaddedtotheantitradebiasoftheirpoliciesbyvaryingtheextentof
theirtradebarrierssoastostabilizethroughtimedomesticpricesandquantitiesoffood.Insodoing,thatinsulating
behavioraddedtointernationalpriceinstability.
WhileJohnsondidnotprovidecomprehensiveempiricalestimatesoftheeconomiceffectsofthesepriceand
tradedistortingpolicies,thepastthreedecadeshaveseenmajorcontributionsbyotheranalystsemergetofillthis
lacuna. This section discusses the direct effects of pricedistorting farm policies on producer and consumer
incentives,theindirecteffectsonfarmerincentivesofnonfarmtradeandexchangeratepolicies,andtheattemptsto
estimatetheeffectsofthosedistortionarypoliciesonnationaltradeandeconomicwelfareandonpricesand
quantitiestradedintheinternationalmarketplace.
DirectEffectsofPriceDistortingFarmPoliciesonIncentives
Haberler's(1958)expertgroupreporttotheGATTcalledforacomprehensivemeasureofsupporttocapturethe
variouswaysinwhichgovernmentsinfluenceincentivestoproduce.Attemptstomeasurecomprehensivelythe
extenttowhichfarmpoliciesdistortpricesandtradebeganwithanalysesconductedfortheFoodandAgriculture
OrganizationoftheUnitedNations(FAO1973)byJoslingwithassistancefromEarleyandHillman.13Thiswork
calculatedestimatesofproducerandconsumersubsidyequivalents(PSEsandCSEs)ofpoliciesin196870for
fiveproductsinfivehighincomecountries:Canada,France,
13The1973studywasheavilyinfluencedbyCorden(1971),whodiscussedthesubsidyequivalenceoftariffsandcited
calculationsfromCanadaandAustraliaoftheseequivalents.
Germany,theUnitedKingdom,andtheUnited States. That series was extended to 1974 for eleven highincome
countriesbytheFAO(1975).Aroundthesametime,anofficialannualseriesofnominalandeffectiveratesof
assistancebegantobeestimatedforAustralia(reportedforthe1970sbytheIndustriesAssistanceCommission
1983),usingageneralizationofthenominalandeffectiveprotectionconceptsdevelopedbyBalassa(1965,1970)
andCorden(1966,1971).Butitwasnotuntilthemid1980sthatmorecompletetimeseriesestimatesofdistortions
toagriculturalincentivesbegantoappear.Aseriesforadvancedandnewlyindustrializingeconomiesfrom1955is
reportedinAndersonandHayami(1986).TheEconomicResearchService(ERS)oftheUSDAbegantocalculate
PSEsfortheirtradingpartners.Thenaregularexerciseofmonitoringallhighincomecountries'farmpolicies
beganattheOECDSecretariatwiththeannualpublicationofempiricalindicatorsfortheprecedingyearoffarm
sectorsupport(nowcalledproducerandconsumersupportestimates,butstillabbreviatedasPSEsandCSEs).These
measuresrevealabreakinthelongruntrendofagriculturalprotectiongrowthforsomeofthosecountriessincethe
late1980s,althoughsomeoftheirpricedistortingmeasureshavebeenreplacedbymoredirectformsofincome
supportthataremoreorlessdecoupledfromproduction.TheOECDPSEsandCSEshavebeenusedwidely(if
sometimesincorrectly)asrepresentingaproxyforthesumofdomesticandborderpolicymeasuresintrademodels.
AsforcountriesoutsidetheOECD,amajoreffortwaslaunchedbyKrueger,Schiff,andValds(1988,1991)
undertheauspicesoftheWorldBankthatinvolvedthecreationofempiricalindicatorsofproducerpricedis
tortionsforeighteendevelopingcountriesforthetwentyfiveyearstothemid1980s(discussedfurtherbelow).
Fewcomparabletimeseriesestimatesweregeneratedfordevelopingcountriesinthefollowingtwodecades.To
fillthegap,ateamledbyKymAndersonfortheWorldBankrecentlydevelopedtheDatabaseofAgricultural
Distortions, which complements and extends those efforts by the OECD and Krueger, Schiff, and Valds.
SummarizedinAnderson(2009),itbuildsonthembyprovidingsimilarestimatesforothersignificant(including
manylowincome)developingeconomies,bytakingestimatesforOECDcountriesbackasfarasthemid1950sand
bydevelopingandestimatingnew,morecomprehensivepolicyindicators.Thefindings
fromthislatestWorldBankeffortattransparencyareveryconsistentwiththosefromKrueger,Schiff,andValds,
butwhenmoreproductsandmorecountriesareincludedinthesample,theestimatedextentofpastdiscrimination
bygovernmentsofdevelopingcountriesagainsttheirfarmersisevengreater(Anderson2010).However,thenew
estimatesindicatethatfromthemid1980s,moreandmoredevelopingcountrieshavebeguntoreformtheirfarm
policies.Asforhighincomecountries,thestudyalsorevealsthatthehighlevelsofdirectassistancetotheirfarmers
inthemid1980swastheculminationofthreedecadesofagriculturalprotectiongrowth,consistentwiththeearlier
findingsofAndersonandHayami(1986).
IndirectEffectsofNonfarmPoliciesonFarmerIncentives
Nonfarmpolicieshavehadsignificantimpactsonagriculturalincentivestoo.Drawingonthetheoreticalinsight
fromLerner(1936)thattaxingimportshasasimilareffectontheexportingsectorasdoestaxingexports,Krueger,
Schiff,andValds(1988,1991)soughttoestimatefortheireighteendevelopingcountriestheadverseeffecton
farmerincentivesresultingfromeachcountry'smanufacturingprotectionpoliciesandovervaluedexchangerates.
Theyrevealedthattherewasindeedanadditionalantiagriculturalbiasinthosecountries'pricedistortingpolicies
andthattheseindirecteffectsofnonfarmpolicieswereevenmoredebilitatingthanthedirecteffectsofagri
culturalpolicies.Theyalsorevealedastrongantitradebias,withtheexportingsubsectorbeingmuchmoreharmed
thantheimportcompetingpartoftheagriculturalsector.ThemorerecentWorldBankstudyagainconfirmsthat
tendencyuptothemid1980s,butdoessobyestimatingasocalledrelativerateofassistance(RRA),afunctionof
thenominalrateofassistancebothforagriculturaltradablesandfornonagriculturaltradablegoods.Theestimates
oftheRRAaveragedaround50%fordevelopingcountriesasagroupduringthe1960sand1970s.Fortheperiod
since the mid1980s, however, that severe disincen tive toproduce farm products gradually disap peared on
average,althoughthereremainsawidedispersionofRRAsacrossthespectrumofdevelopingcountries.Roughly
halfofthechangeintheaverageRRAisduetoreformsinnonagriculturalsectorsofthosedevelopingcountries,
suggestingthatgeneralreformsthat
brought down manufacturing protection rates and removed multiple exchange rate regimes were at least as
importantforreducingtheantiagriculturalbiasaswerereformstoagriculturalpoliciesthemselves(Anderson
2009).
ModelingtheEffectsofPriceDistortingPoliciesonInternationalTrade
Myriadpartialequilibriumstudieshavebeenpublishedoverthepastcenturyreportingestimatesofthemarketand
welfareeffectsofindividualfarmcommodityprograms,andnoattemptismadetosurveythemhere.Untilthemid
1970s,economistshadincorporatedtradeintocommoditymodelsmainlythroughtheadditionofanexportdemand
orimportsupplyfunctiontothedomesticdemandandsupplyframework.AsThompson(1981)pointedoutina
usefulsurvey,suchmodelshaveonlylimitedusefortradeanalysis,astheydonotingeneralallowforspecific
policychangesintherestoftheworld.FollowingSamuelson's(1952)formulationofspatialpriceequilibrium
modelsandtheworkbyTakayamaandJudge(1964),otheragriculturaleconomistsbegantoquantifytheimpactof
policiesonbilateraltradeflowsinamoresystematicway.
Withtheprovisionofcomprehensiveestimatesofthelevelofprotectionandthesubsidyequivalentofdomestic
policies,theopportunityopeneduptodevelopmultiproductmodelscoveringtheagriculturalsectorasawhole
fortradingeconomies.Anearlystaticmodelthatcapturedtheinteractionsbetweenlivestockandfeedmarkets
globallywasdevelopedbyRoningen(1986)fortheUSDA.Aroundthesametime,adynamicandstochastic
modelofworldfoodandfeedmarketswasbuilttoprovideexanteestimatesoftheeffectsoffarmpoliciesinthe
leaduptotheUruguayRoundofmultilateraltradenegotiations(TyersandAnderson1986).Thiswasusedinthe
WorldBank'sWorldDevelopmentReport1986toindicate,amongotherthings,theextenttowhichdeveloping
countryfarmerswerediscriminatedagainstnotonlybytheirowngovernments'agriculturalpoliciesbutalsoby
thoseofhighincomecountries,andtheextenttowhichinternationalfoodpriceinstabilityinthe1980swasdueto
policiesthatloweredthetransmissionofpricemovementsbetweendomesticandinternationalmarkets(WorldBank
1986).
Suchsectoralstudiessufferedfromtheinherentlimitationthattheydidnotincludeallfarmproductsanddidnot
capturetheeffects
ofdistortionsinothersectorsofeacheconomy.Thepossibilityofeconomywideanalysisemergedfromthe
pioneeringworkofLeontiefandothersininputoutputanalysisandlinearprogrammingandthenofJohansen
(1960)indevelopingamultisectormodeloftheNorwegianeconomy.That,combinedwithadvancesincomputing
hardware,ledtoarevolutionincomputablegeneralequilibrium(CGE)modelingforpolicyanalysis,notleast
becausesuchmodelswereadmiredfortheirtheoreticalcompletenessinlinkingfactorandproductmarketsforall
sectorsoftheeconomy.
ThefirstnationalgovernmenttofundthedevelopmentandsustaintheroutineuseofsuchaCGEmodelin
agriculturalandotherpolicyformulationandreformwasthatofAustralia(seeDixonetal.1977).Amongthe
pioneersofCGEmodelingintheUnitedStateswasShermanRobinson,whoincooperationwitheconomistsat
ERSproducedaCGEmodelspecificallyforfocusingonagriculturalpolicyanalysis(Robinson1990;Robinson,
Kilkenny,andHanson1990;Kilkenny1991).RobinsonlatermovedtotheInternationalFoodPolicyResearch
InstituteandforadecadeledateamtherethatproducedmanynationalCGEmodelsforfoodandotherpolicy
analysesofvariousdevelopingcountries.
WiththeinclusionofagriculturehighontheagendaoftheGATT'sUruguayRoundoftradenegotiationsfromits
launchin1986,therewasademandfromgovernmentsforeconomywideanalysisofmultilateraltradeandsubsidy
reform.Tothatend,theAustraliangovernmentfundedthedevelopmentofaglobalCGEmodel(SALTER)in
which a replica of the national ORANI model was used as the prototype for the other national economies
representedinthatglobalmodel(Jominietal.1991).TomHertel'ssabbaticalin199091attheUniversityof
MelbournestimulatedanefforttobuildaglobalCGEmodel(whichisopensource)andglobaldatabaseuponhis
returntoPurdueUniversity.Fromthathumblebeginning,hecreatedtheGlobalTradeAnalysisProject(GTAP)and
inparticularitsmodelandassociatedglobaldatabase(Hertel1997).Thatmodelnowhasthousandsofusersin
morethan150countries,thankstothetrainingcoursesofferedbyPurdue'sGTAPCenteroverthepastfifteenyears.
Itsdatabaseisalsousedinmostothermodelsoftheglobaleconomy.ThefactthattheGTAPmodelwashousedin
anagriculturaleconomicsdepartment,andwasheavilyusedattheoutsetforanalyzingagriculturalpolicy
reform,meantthatitretainedaconsiderabledegreeofproductdisaggregationwithintheagriculturalsector.
GlobalCGEmodelshavebeenusedforestimatingthebenefitsoftradeliberalization,includingtheremovalof
domesticfarmsupportthatdistortstradeflows.Theyhavebeenespeciallysuccessfulinprovidingexantesimu
lationsoftradenegotiations,bothregionalandmultilateral.ExamplesincludeanalysesoftheUruguayRoundatthe
beginningofitstenyearimplementationperiod(see,eg,MartinandWinters1996)andoftheWTO'sDohaRound
atthetimeoftheHongKongMinisterialMeetinginlate2005whenthemostcomprehensiveproposalswerebeing
discussed(see,eg,AndersonandMartin2006).Thosemodelshavealsobeensuccessfullyusedtopointoutthat
agricultural policiescurrentlyaccount foraroundtwothirdsofthecost totheworldofall merchandisetrade
distortingpolicies,eventhoughagricultureaccountsforlessthan7%ofglobaloutputandtradeingoodsand
services(AndersonandMartin2006;Anderson2009).
Contribution#5:UnderstandingthePoliticalEconomyofAgriculturalTrade
Agriculturaltradeanditsinteractionwithnationalpoliciesisadomainwhereagriculturaleconomistshavealways
beenkeentoprovideadvicetogovernments,andsometimesthisadvicehasactuallybeenheeded.Atthesametime,
thepreponderanceofpoliticalinterestsinagricultureimposestightconstraintsontheextenttowhicheconomic
reasoningcandeterminethechoiceofpolicies.Agriculturaleconomistshavealwaysbeenawareofthistension.
Forexample,TheodorHeidhues(1979)emphasizesthatasawiderandgrowingsetofpolicyobjectivesisbrought
into play and the role of governments changes as they are torn between domestic concerns and international
pressures,thepolicychoicesbecomemorecomplex.Theseinvolvesimultaneousattemptstoachievesecurityof
food supply, market stability, solutions to domestic adjustment problems, and macroeconomic bal ance. For
Heidhues,theconclusionisthataseconomistsweneedtounderstandtherealmofpoliticsandtobemodestin
strivingforeconomicallyrationaldirectionsforinternationaltradepolicies.
Theunderstandingofthepoliticalcontextinwhichagriculturaltradetakesplaceledeconomiststoattemptto
modelsuchpolitical
tingkahlaku.Sometimestheyusedtheinsightsofpolitical sciencetoassessthestrengthoflobbygroups,the
interplayofpoliticalideasandideologies,andthelinkagesamongseeminglydiverseissuesthatiscommonin
democracies.RobertPaarlberg,apoliticalscientist,hasbeenaproductivecontributortothispartoftheliterature
bothinconjunctionwitheconomistsandinhisownright.HisanalysisoftheUruguayRoundnegotiationsasatwo
level game has been particularly insightful (Paarlberg 1997). At other times economists have used the more
homegrownframeworkofpoliticaleconomy,therationalbehaviorofpoliticalactorsinpursuitofsomegoal,to
understandtradepolicy.
RentSeekinginAgriculturalTrade
AnneKrueger's(1974)seminalpaperonrentseekingbehaviorunderliesaconsiderablebodyofempiricalworkin
internationalagriculturaltrade.Inmanyagriculturalsettings,significantsumsofmoneyarespentbythosewho
gainfromprotectionismtolobbygovernmentfortariffandnontariffbarrierstotrade.Thusrentseekingisvisible
andpervasive.
Severalstudieshavemadeuseoftheconceptofrentseekingtoexplainpolicyactions.14CarterandSchmitz
(1979)quantifiedtheroleofEUwheattariffsandsuggestedthattheEuropeanUnionmayhavefollowedastrategy
ofusingoptimalwelfaretariffsforthebettermentofproducers.Rausser(1982)soughttoexplainthecoexistence
ofagriculturalpoliciesthathurtwithonesthatboostanationaleconomyorevenanindividualindustry.Bredhal,
Schmitz,andHillman(1987)consideredborderdisputesbetweentheUnitedStatesandMexicointomatoes.They
demonstratedtheimpactofbothcooperativeandcompetitivepolicystrategiesandconcludedthattheUnitedStates
hadbeenpursuingacompetitivestrategy.Later,theUnitedStatesadoptedacooperativestrategyintheprice
agreementwithMexicoinearly2000.Rentseekingbehaviorcontinuestobestudiedbyagriculturaleconomists,
particularlyintheareaoftradestrategiesandtradeconflicts.
14Studieshavealsofocusedonhowregulationsaffecttradeflowsandcomparativeadvantagethroughtheeyesofrentseeking
behavior.Forexample,Ulrich,Furtan,andSchmitz(1987)showhowavarietylicensingregulationtotallystoppedtheadoption
ofayieldincreasingtechnologythathadthepotentialtoincreaseeconomicrentsflowingtowesternCanadianfarmersby15
25%.Canadianfarmerslostsomeoftheiredgeintheinternationalwheatmarketduetoincreasedcompetitionfromother
exporters.
CrossCountryStudies
The1980sandearly1990swasanactiveperiodinthedevelopmentofpoliticaleconomyofagriculturaltrade
policy, particularly in broad crosscountry comparisons. Economists drew on emerging general theories of the
economics of politics that were coming out from the University of Chicago and from the public choice and
collectiveactionschools.Alsostimulatingthisresearchwasthearrivalofnewdata,suchasthedeveloping
country dataset assembled by [Krueger, Schiff, and Valds (1988, 1981) and the highincome and newly
industrializedeconomies'datasetcompiledbyAndersonandHayami(1986)asdiscussedabove.
Aftertheearly1990s,researchinterestinthepoliticaleconomyofagriculturalpolicieswaned,butitisbeginning
toflourishonceagainandforsimilarreasonstothefirstwave,namely,newdataandnewtheoreticaldevelop
ments.InadditiontothenewWorldBankDistortionsdataset,thereisanewandexpandingdatasetonsome
(potential)explanatoryvariablesintheWorldBank'sDatabaseofPoliticalInstitutions(Becketal.2001and
subsequentupdates).
Applicationsofthesenewtheorieshaveaimedatexplainingtheevolutionofdistortionstoagriculturalincentives,
andneweconometrictestingusingtherecentpaneldatasetscanbeexpectedoverthenextdecadeorsotoaddress
suchquestionsas:Howimportanthavedomesticinstitutionalandpoliticalreformsbeeninexplainingagricultural
and trade policy reforms since the 1980s?What hasbeen the contributionof changes in international orga
nizations and international trade agreements, including the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, the
establishmentoftheWTO,EUenlargement,andpreferentialtradingagreementssuchastheNorthAmericanFree
TradeAgreement?Andwhyhavecountriesbeensowillingtoundertakeunilateralreformsandsignpreferential
tradingagreementsandyetsounwillingtoconcludetheWTO'scurrentDohaRoundofmultilateraltradenegotia
tionsinwhichagricultureisamajorstumblingblock?
Contribution#6:Studyingtherolesofinternationalinstitutions
Agriculturaltradeeconomistshavecontributedinseveralwaystoourunderstanding
oftherolesthatinternationalinstitutionscanplayandhaveplayedinfosteringagriculturaltrade.Thissection
focusesoninternationalcommoditymarketmanagement,multilateraltradenegotiations,preferentialtradearrange
ments,internationalorganizations,andtheemergenceofadhocinstitutionstostimulatetradeanalysis.
ManagementofInternationalCommodityMarkets
Recentlargeswingsincommoditypriceshaverevivedinterestinwhatcanbedonetocalmdownglobalmarketsfor
agriculturalrawmaterials.Thethemehasalwaysattractedtheattentionofagriculturaleconomists,andtheir
ample contributions to the literature on international commodity arrangements provide examples of practical
contributionstothedesignofinternationalinstitutions.OnesuchcontributionwasmadebyJosephS.Davis
(1942),whofocusedonwhatroletheremightbe,ifany,forcommodityagreementsinthepostwarworld,fol
lowingthemaximIntimeofwar,prepareforpeace.Startingfromasetofassumptionsonhowtheworldmight
lookoncethewarwasover,DavisprovidedadetailedpictureoftheactivitiesthroughwhichtheUSadminis
trationandtheBritishgovernmentpreparedforthatmuchhopedforpeaceperiod.Provisionoffood,nottheleast
fortheGermanandAustrianpeoples,wasacentralconcern,asexpressedinthesloganFoodwillwinthewarand
writethepeace.ButDaviswarnedagainstexpectationsthatrestrictivecommodityagreementsmightwork.He
pointedtotheunsatisfactoryexperiencesmadewithseveralpastagreements,andconcludedthat[b]yandlarge,
theyhaveconstitutedelementsinanincreasinglycomplexsystemofrestrictionsonproduction,internationaltrade,
andconsumption(p.400).Whilenotfundamentallyopposedtothinkingaboutwhatcouldbedonetomake
commoditymarketsworkproperlyintheinterestoftheinternationalcommunity,Daviswarnedthatinpractice,
stabilizationofpricescommonlymeansboostingpricesaboveequilibriumlevel,notmoderatingfluctuations
aroundaneconomiclevel(p.401).
While such warnings by skeptics like Davis were widely accepted, other economists were more favorably
disposedtobringingsomeformofpolicytobearoninternationalcommoditymarkets.Commentingonthedebates
thathadtakenplaceatthe1943HotSprings
ConferenceonFoodandAgriculture,StanleyS.TsouandJohnD.Black(1944)statedthreeimportantpurposes
thatmaybeservedbyrationallyconceivedcommodityarrangementsofoneformoranother,namely,securinga
widerdistributionoffoodandsimilarproducts,adjustmentsinthedirectionofabetterorderedproduction,andthe
dissipationofchronicsurpluses.Attaininganyofthesewillatthesametimecontributetobetterpricestructures
andmorerationalpricemovements(p.540).However,TsouandBlackdidnothaveanyillusionsregardingthe
dangersofpricemanipulation.Whileconsideringitdesirabletoassistreadjustmentinanindustrysufferingfrom
chronicsurplusproduction,theywarnedthat[t]odothisbyraisingpricesinanyonecountryabovetheexport
level will rarely be good strategy; and it may be equally dubious strategy, except in limited degree, on an
internationalbasis.Iftherearetobesubsidies,theyshouldbeintheformofincomepayments,ratherthanofprice
supports;andtheybesttaketheformofspecificaidinshiftingproductiontootherlines(p.546).Seemingly
modernconceptssuchasdecoupledpaymentsandadjustmentassistancehaveapparentlybeenaroundforsome
time.
Inthe1960s,commodityissuesdidindeedbecomethesubjectofinternationalaction,mainlyinUNCTAD,butin
other fora as well. In addition to price volatility, an imputed secular deterioration in the terms of trade for
commodityexportingdevelopingcountries(discussedabove)andrelatedconcernsregardingthedistributionof
welfarebetweenrichandpoor countries appeared tomany governments tocall for remedies. Inadditionto
commodityarrangementsofthemoretraditionalmanifestation,newschemesofcompensatoryfinancinghadalso
beentried.VernonL.Sorenson(1975),however,warnedthatanyincometransfertocommodityexportingcoun
triesunderschemessuchascommodityagreementsmeansthatthegreatestamountofaidorincomesupplements
gotothosewhosellthemost.Thisisnotnecessarilythebestwaytoredistributeincome,eitherdomesticallyor
internationally(p. 173).Hereagain,theparallel between international anddomesticpolicy conclusionsis
striking.InternationalcommodityagreementsdroppedfromthetradepolicyagendaafterthefailureoftheUNC
TAD Integrated Programme for Commodi ties to incorporate any agreement except one for tin under its
administrativeandfinancialumbrella.
MultilateralNegotiationsonTradeinFarmProducts
Politicalfactorsare,ofcourse,particularlyprevalentwhenitcomestointernationalnegotiationsonagricultural
trade,beitatthemultilateral,regional,orbilaterallevel.Theabilitytocombineinstitutionalknowledge,afeelfor
politicaleconomyandsoundeconomicanalysisisoneoftheobjectivesofagriculturaleconomists,anditisparticu
larlyusefulinthisdomain.WhiletheTokyoRoundofGATTnegotiationswasunderwayin1976,Warleyprovided
awealthofinformationonthenatureandimplicationsofagriculturalpoliciesinrichcountries,onapproachesto
internationalpolicycoordinationintheGATTandotherfora,andontheagriculturalcomponentoftheprevious
roundofGATTnegotiations,ie,theKennedyRound(Warley1976a).Heemphasizedthecloselinksbetween
domesticagriculturalpoliciesandtheinternationalagendaandthenegativespilloversfromagriculturalprotection
ism to the international economic order over all. Warley's invited address to the AAEA of the same year,
AgricultureinInternationalRelations,alsofirmlyplacedagriculturalissuesinthewidercontextofglobaleco
nomicandforeignpolicyissues.Hepointedlyremarked:Itisacauseforbothsurpriseandconcernthatsofew
agriculturaleconomistshavechosentomakeasustainedcommitmenttothestudyoftheinternationaldimensionsof
nationalagriculturalpolicyorofinternationalcommoditypolicy(p.827)(Warley1976b).
ThiscriticismcertainlydidnotapplytoJamesP.Houck,whopublishedaninsightfulexplanationoftheToyo
RoundofGATTtradetalks(Houck1979)andfollowedthiswithawidelyusedtextbookonagriculturaltrade
(Houck1986).NordiditapplytoDaleE.Hathaway:His1987bookAgricultureintheGATT:Rewritingthe
RulesexplainedtheobjectivesoftheUruguayRoundofGATTnegotiationswhichhadrecentlybeenlaunched.For
thefirsttimeinthehistoryofmultilateraltradenegotiations,aseriousattemptwastobemadetocomemore
effectively to grips with the distor tions that plagued agricultural trade, by rewrit ing the GATT rules for
agriculture(Hathaway1987).LikeWarleyandHouck,Hathawayprovidesamplefactualinformationonthestruc
tureanddevelopmentofagriculturaltradeintemperatezoneproductsandthepoliciespursuedbymajornations.
Healsospelledoutthe
GATT'sexistingrulesinagriculture.ButthecoreofHathaway'sperspectivewasthattheUruguayRoundcould
achieveareductionofsubsidiesandimportbarrierswhileleavingenoughflexibilityfornationalagriculturalpoli
cies. Interpreting the process and outcome of the agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round, against the
backgroundofpastGATTnegotiations,Josling,Tangermann,andWarley(1996)showedhowfundamentalthe
changewasthattheUruguayRoundbroughttotheGATT'sdealingswithagriculture.Thedifficultiesnowfaced
bytheagriculturalnegotiationsintheDohaRoundmirrorthefactthatgovernmentsknowthattheteethgenerated
throughtheUruguayRoundAgreementonAgriculturearenowexpectedtobite,andtheyfearthepain.15
UnderstandingAgriculturalTradeIssuesinRegionalIntegration
Bilateralorplurilateraltradenegotiationsaimingatpreferentialtreatmentwithin(oftenregional)tradingblocs
havealwayshadanambivalentrelationwiththemultilateralapproachtotradeliberalization.Isthepositiveeffect
of opening up trade between mem bers of the trading bloc worth more than the negative implication of
discriminationagainstoutsiders?McCalla(1992)addressesregionaltradingblocsandagricultureandlooksatthat
question.Reviewingalargebodyofliteratureonpreferentialtrade,followingfromViner'spioneeringworkon
customsunions,McCallafindsthatthereisnounequivocalanswertothisquestionasinothercasesofsecondbest
policies,italldependsonthecircumstances.Thingsbecomeevenmorecomplicatedifonemovesfromastaticto
adynamicviewoftheworld.However,McCallafindssomewhatlessambiguousresultsinhisreviewofnumerous
empiricalstudiesontheissue,mostofwhichfoundthepositivetradecreationeffectsofpreferentialarrangements
tohavebeenlargerthanthenegativetradediversionimplications.AsMcCallaclearlypointsout,agriculture
serves as a notable exception. Trading blocs tend to provide high levels of pro tection to their agricultural
producers,theEU'sCommonAgriculturalPolicybeingthemajor
15Forafullertreatmentofthecontributionsofagriculturaleconomiststotheareaoftradenegotiations,seeSumnerand
Tangermann(2006).
caseinpoint.16Hence,forcountriesoutsideanyofthetradingblocs,seeingmoreandmorediscriminatorytrading
blocsbeingestablishedisnotahappyaffair,inparticulariftheyhaveimportantexportinterestsinagriculture.For
them,multilateralliberalizationremainsthepreferredoption.
AmoreoptimisticpictureispaintedbyJosling(1993),whofocusedontheagriculturalpolicydynamicswithin
trading blocs. While agriculture always creates political dif ficulties in negotiating the establishment, or
enlargement,ofatradingbloc,oncetheblocisestablished,agriculturalpoliciescanbegintochange.Sincemany
productsarerelativelyhomogeneous,agriculturalcommoditieslendthemselveseasilytoarbitrageacrossmember
nationsofthetradingbloc,whichtendstounderminetheintendedfunctioningofmanyinstrumentsofnational
agriculturalpoliciesinthebloc'smembercountries,forbothborderanddomesticmeasures.However,thepolitical
dynamicsresultingfromcommonfinancingandlimitedparliamentarycontrolmaywellleadthebloctodevelopa
moreprotectionistpolicythantheaverageofitsmembercountriesmighthavehadintheabsenceofacommon
policy.
ResearchinInternationalOrganizations
Whilethisreviewhasfocusedonindividualcontributionstotheliteratureonagriculturaltradematters,itwouldnot
becompleteifitweretoneglecttheworkdoneininternationalorganizations,wheredocumentsandreports
producedaretypicallyattributedtotheorganizationratherthantoindividualauthors.Theseorganizationsinclude
theInternationalMonetaryFund,withalonghistoryofstudiesoncommodityprices,theWorldBank,with
extensivesupportforglobalmodelsandtradeanalysis,andtheFAO,witharangeofstudiesoncommoditypolicy
andtrade.AparticularcontributionhasbeentheworkdoneonagriculturalpoliciesandtradeintheOECD.Over
the years, and in particular since its 1982 Ministerial Trade Mandate, the OECD has developed a strong and
consistentparadigmonthebenefitsofmarketorientedagricultural
16ThereisalargebodyofliteratureontheEUsCommonAgriculturalPolicy,includingitseffectonbothinternaland
external trade. We have chosen not to review that literature here, though many of the problems faced by countries at a
multilaterallevelarealsofoundatthelevelofintegrationofeconomiesinacustomsunion.
policyreformandtradeliberalizationandhasprovidedaplatformfordialogueamonggovernmentsonhowtoput
that paradigm into policy practice. One of the strengths of the OECD's work is that it is based not just on
philosophy,butonhardevidence,generatedthroughahostofquantitativeanalysesofthenatureofexistingpolicies
andtheimplicationsofreformingthem.WorkdoneintheOECD,firmlygroundedinthepremisethatgovern
mentsshouldbeabletopursuetheirdomesticobjectives,butinawaythatminimizesinternationalspilloversand
tradedistortions,hascontributedtopromotingamongpolicymakersconceptssuchasdecouplingandtargetingof
agriculturalsupport,intheinterestofallowingtradetorespondasmuchaspossibletomarketforcesratherthan
governmentintervention.TheOECDhasalsohelpedtodispelthemythofmultifunctionalityofagricultureandthe
relatedcallsforallowingtradepoliciestorespondtonontradeconcerns.
AdHocInstitutionsandtheReformofAgriculturalTradePolicies
Itisunderstoodinthepoliticalscienceliteraturethatinstitutionscanariseinanadhocwayasgroupswithsimilar
interestsandapproachescongregateandsharecommonexperiences.Anexampleofsuchanadhocinstitution(or
epistemiccommunity)thathasbeenactiveintheareaofagriculturaltrade,intheory,analysis,andpolicy,isthe
InternationalAgriculturalTradeResearchConsortium(IATRC).Foundedin1980bysixagriculturaleconomists,the
membershiphassincegrowntoabout200economistsfromacademia,government,andotherresearchinstitutionsin
31countries,forwhomitservesasaplatformfordiscussingandpublicizingtheirresearch,advancingthefrontiers
ofknowledgeonagriculturaltradeandtradepolicy,andinformingbothpolicyformulationandpublicdebate.Core
fundingfortheIATRChasbeensecuredovertheyearsfromtheUSDA(boththeERSandtheForeignAgricultural
Service)andfromAgricultureandAgrifoodCanada.TheIATRChasplayedanimportantandeffectiverolein
creatinganinternationalcommunityofresearchersinterestedinagriculturaltrademattersandinovercomingthe
dearthofworkonagriculturaltradeissuesintheprofession,asearlierbemoanedbyWarley.Ithasalsocontributed
substantiallyandnottheleastthroughitsseriesofCommissionedPapersandTradeIssuesPaperstotheglobal
poolofknowledge
onoptionsfor,andimplicationsof,internationallyagreeddisciplinesforagriculturalandtradepolicies.Manyof
thepaperscitedinthispresentarticlefirstsawthelightofdayaspresentationsattheIATRC.
Therehavebeentimeswhenpolicymakersfacedwithchoicesregardingtradepoliciesinagriculturehaveturned
toeconomistsforanalysisandadvice.TheIATRChasbeeninstrumentalinbringingeconomiststogetheronat
leasttwooccasionstoexplorepolicychoicesandprovideanimpartialanalysisofanissue.Theseissuesincludedthe
useofembargoesandvariousmethodsofsurplusdisposalbytheUnitedStatesandtherebalancingofprotection
bytheEUamongcommodities.17
ConclusionandFutureDirections
Itisclearfromthisselectivesurveyoftheworkofagriculturaleconomistsonmattersrelatedtointernationaltrade
thattheissuesofthedayactasthedriverofdemandforprofessionalservices.Thetheoreticalconstructsand
analytical techniques, gleaned largely from the wider pro fession of international economics, provide the
technologyavailable;andthesupplyofstudiesisgovernedbythefundingofuniversityandgovernmentresearch.
But even though agricul tural trade economists mainly react to current issues, they have also contributed
incidentallytotheadvanceoftheoryandempiricalmethodologiesusedbytheinternationaleconomicsprofession.
Thishasprovidedanexternalityoftradeworkdonebyagriculturaleconomics,tothebenefitofthewiderstudyof
internationaltrade.18
Oneobviousbutimportantaspectofthenatureofinternationaltradespecialistsisthattheyworkinanarenawith
professionalsfrom
17ThestudyEmbargoes,SurplusDisposal,andUSAgriculturewascommissionedbyCongress(USDA/ERS1986).Ina
situationofeconomicstressforUSagriculture,resultingfromdepressedmarkets,thequestionwasaskedwhetheranumberof
USagriculturalexportembargoesbeginningintheearly1970swereamongthecauses,butalsowhetherdisposalofsurpluses
throughexportsubsidiesmightbeoneofthesolutions.Theothergroupstudy,DisharmoniesinECandUSAgriculturalPolicy
Measures(Koesteretal.1988),wasdoneonbehalfoftheCommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities,whichwaslookingfor
anassessmentofoneaspectofitsposition(itsrequestforrebalancingprotectionlevels)intheUruguayRoundnegotiations.
18Thesetheoreticalcontributionshavenotbeengivenfullweightinthisarticle.Manyofthemhaveinvolvedstudentsand
faculty at the major centers that focus on agricultural trade, includ ing UC Berkeley, UC Davis, Minnesota, Purdue,
Saskatchewan,Guelph,Florida,andasimilarnumberofinstitutionsinAustraliaandEurope.
othercountries.Thisaddstoresearchcostsbutalsobroadenstherangeofcontactsandassiststhespreadofideas:
Thecommonappreciationofproblemsandthesharingofsolutionsensuresahighpayoffgloballyfromsuchinter
nationalresearch.Italsoensuresthattraderesearchislesstiedtoproductionpatternsthanmanyareasofagricultural
economics.Tobesure,exportmarketdevelopmentwillbeofimportancetoindividualstates(andcountries)with
exportcapacity.Butbeyondtheanalysisofmarketpotential,thereislikelytobelittleinterestinthemoresystemic
aspectsoftrade;andresearchonimportsisnotlikelytobeahighpriorityforfarmstates.Thisleadstoasystemof
communicationwithintheprofessionthatislessregionallybasedandmorelikelytocrossborders.Thesuccessof
theIATRCasdiscussedabovehasshownthattraderesearchersbothbenefitfromandcontributetoacollective
epistemiccommunity.19
Traderesearchisbyitsnaturedataintensive.Thishasbeenperhapsthebiggestchallengethathasfacedthose
wishingtomodeltradeandtradepolicyforgroupsofcountriesoftheworld.Thesituationisrapidlychanging.
Largevolumesofcomparableandcarefullyscrutinizeddataarenowavailable(mostnotablythroughGTAP),
althoughthereisstillalongwaytogointermsofimprovingthequalityofdatafordevelopingcountries.While
thepartialandgeneralequilibriummodelingcommunityhasmovedforwardbyleapsandboundsinthepasttwo
decadesintermsofprovidingestimatesofthelikelyeconomiceffectsofagriculturalpriceandtradepolicies,there
aremorethan100smallerdevelopingcountriesforwhichnosuchmodelshaveyetbeenbuilt.Evenincountries
forwhichmodelsareavailable,theirdatarefertoabaseperiodthatisseveralyearsold.
Thereisstillademandbygovernmentsandadvocacygroupsforsimpleindicatorsthatcanbeusedforuptodate
monitoringofthetradeandwelfareeffectsoffarmortradepolicies.Theestimationofdistortionstoagricultural
incentivesfordevelopingcountriesneedstobeinstitutionalizedinthewayithasforhighincomecountriesatthe
OECDSecretariat.20
19ThescholarsthathaveusedGTAP(Gtappers)alsoconstituteanepistemiccommunity.
20ApromisingstarthasbeenmadetodothatforAfrica,withanewgrantfromtheBillandMelindaGatesFoundationtothe
FAO(incollaborationwiththeOECD)toupdateandexpandtheestimatesofhistoricaldistortionindicators.
Bettercoverageofcountriesandtheirpolicieswillbecrucialtoimprovingtheunderstandingofthebenefitsof
open trade. The issues of measuring and understandingtrade distortions are far from settled. And, asalways,
theoreticalandanalyticaladvanceswillbeneededtoguidetheempiricalstudies.
EmergingTrendsandIssues
Inthisregardseveralnewtrendsareemergingthatwillgiveagriculturaleconomistsadequateemploymentforthe
nextfewdecades.
There is evidence that developing coun tries are increasingly providing protection to the importcompeting
subsectoroftheiragriculturalsector.Thissuggeststhattheswitchfromtaxingtosubsidizingagriculturerelativeto
other tradable sectors in the course of economic development, clearly observed in the newly industri alized
countriesofEastAsia,maybespreadingtolaterdevelopingcountries.Moreover,inbothdevelopingandhigh
incomecountries,thedispersionofassistanceratesacrossindustrieswithinthefarmsectorhasnotdiminishedover
time,eventhoughthesectoralaveragerateofdistortionhasbeenfalling.Thismeansthattherearestillresources
wastedascountriessupportsomeoftheirleastcompetitivefarmindustries,therebycontributingtotherelatively
slowproductivitygrowthofthesector.
Manytradebarriersarehiddenamongtheregulatoryprocessesthataccompanyinternationalcommerce.Databases
onstandardsaffectingtrade,suchassanitaryandphytosanitarymeasuresandthoseaffectinggeneticallymodified
products, are still lacking, and their incorporation into models is still at an early stage. Coop eration among
agenciesandinstitutionsinthisareaneedstobeexpanded.
Significantchallengesfacethetrademodelersinrepresentingthenewrealityofworldtrade.Globaleconomy
widesimulationmodelsneedtocapturethevaryingextentofimperfectionincompetitionalongthefoodvalue
chainasconcentrationincreasesinfarminputsupplies,processing,andsupermarketretailing.Moreattentionis
neededtotheactivitiesofmultinationalagriculturalfirms,includingthesignificanceofpatentarrangements
thatmightrestricttradeandthepurchaseoffarmlandabroad.
Accountneedstobetakenofconsumerconcernsforfoodquality,foodsafety,andtheenvironment,especiallyfor
highincomecountries.Environmentalconcernsaffectingsuchthingsasthedisposalofpackagingorthecarbon
footprintassociatedwithtransportofgoodsneedtobecarefullymodeled.Increasingnumbersofconsumerswish
toknowhowproductsareproducedonfarmandprocessed,soastoassesswhethertheyarecausingenvironmental
damage,giventhatmanyenvironmentalexternalitiesarenotcorrectlypriced.
Thecontinuingpreferenceofsomeconsumerstoavoidfoodscontaininggeneticallymodifiedorganisms(GMOs)
remains a challenge to agricultural trade economists. This consumer concern has already led to significant
governmentbarrierstotradebasedonproductionprocesses,andtoconstraintsondomesticproduction.Nowthat
traceabilityinformationalongwithotherattributescanbestoredonbarcodes,thoseconcernscangetreflectedin
thedemandsthelargesupermarketchainsplaceontheirsuppliers.
Biofuelspolicyhasaddedanotherdimensiontotheequationofhowcrudeoilpricesinfluencefoodprices.With
newbiofueltechnologiescomingonstreamoverthecomingdecades,therebyloweringthethresholdpriceofcrude
oilatwhichfoodpricesbecomelinkedtoit,thespeedofthatdevelopmentwillbefasterandgovernmentswill
continuetosubsidizeandmandatetheuseofbiofuels.Willthisleadtofurthertradetensions?Areweincorpo
ratingthedemandforbiofuelsadequatelyintrademodels?
Finally, much more attention will be needed in the coming decades to the trade effects of climate change
mitigationpolicies,aswellastothebenefitsthattradeoffersaspartoftheprocessofadaptation.Afirststepwill
betoimproveandmakepubliclyavailablethenecessarydataandprojectionsontheimpactsofclimatechangeand
of possible endogenous policy and technological innovations on agricultural production. It would include an
analysisofwatermarketssoastobeabletoexplorethecombinedeffectsofwaterpoliciesandclimatechangeon
theaggregatelevelandlocationaroundtheworldofproductionofvariousfarmproducts.Modelersarebeginningto
moveinthisdirection,butagreatdealmoreresearchisneeded.
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