Peristiwa Mei 1998

UNIVERSITAS INDONESIA
PERISTIWA MEI 1998: A STUDY OF ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE IN GLODOK DISTRICT, WEST JAKARTA
DISERTASI
GIAN KARTASASMITA NPM 8705150026
FAKULTAS ILMU PENGETAHUAN BUDAYA PROGRAM STUDI SEJARAH DEPOK JULI & 2011
Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
KATA PENGANTAR/UCAPAN TERIMA KASIH

Puji syukur saya panjatkan kepada Tuhan Yang Maha Esa, karena atas berkas dan rahmat-Nya, saya dapat menyelesaikan disertasi ini. Penulisan disertasi ini dilakukan dalam rangka memenuhi salah satu syarat untuk mencapai gelar Doktor Jurusan Sejarah pada Fakultas Ilmu Pengetahuan Budaya Universitas Indonesia. Saya menyadari bahwa, tanpa bantuan dan bimbingan dari berbagai pihak, dari masa perkuliahan sampai pada penyusunan disertasi ini, sangatlah susah bagi saya untuk menyelesaikan disertasi ini. Oleh karena itu saya mengucapkan terima kasih kepada: (1) Prof. Dr. A. Dahana, (Alm) Prof. Dr. R.Z. Leirisa, Dr. Priyanto dan Dr. Ali Akbar selaku dosen pembimbing yang telah menyedikan waktu, tenaga, dan pikiran untuk mengarahkan saya dalam penyusunan disertasi ini; (2) Para korban Mei 1998 untuk bantuannya, Ibu Ella Ubaidi dan teman-teman wartawan Metro TV, Jawa Post, Reuters, dan masih banyak lagi yang tidak bisa disebutkan satu persatu yang telah banyak membantu dalam usaha memperoleh data yang saya perlukan; (3) Orang tua saya (Alm) Dr. Sabana Kartasasmita beserta Ibu Koestinah Kartasasmita, Ibu Alit Djajasoebrata, Wiard dan Banafsha, Bp Pierre Voegeli dan Ibu Raymond Voegeli, Bp German Kartasasmita, Lana dan Inka, Ibu Gia Sinta Kartasasmita-Noor dan Bp Reza Noor, Ibu Marlene dan keluarga, dan seluruh Keluarga Besar Kartasasmita, yang telah memberikan bantuan dukungan material dan moral; dan (4) Sahabat-sahabat seperjuangan Dr Titi Rosidi, Bp. Adri Waworuntu, (Alm) Bp Iwan, Bp Moeflich, Ibu Tamara Salim, Dr Imron Rosidi, Dr La Ode Taufik, Dr Lutfi, dan Dr Yacobus. Juga tentunya kepada staf sekertariat Jurusan Ilmu Sejarah maupun bidang Akademik, mba Titi, mba Wiwi dan mba Ari dan ketiga sahabat kecil saya Ibu Saskia Ubadi, Ibu Yartika Witoelar, dan Ibu Meuthia Muskita yang telah banyak membantu saya dalam menyelesaikan disertasi ini. Akhir kata, saya berharap Tuhan Yang Maha Esa berkenan membalas segala kebaikan semua pihak yang telah membantu. Semoga disertasi ini membawa manfaat bagi pengembangan ilmu. Depok, 23 Mei 2011 Gian Kartasasmita
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ABSTRAK
Nama Program Studi Judul : Gian Kartasasmita : Sejarah : Peristiwa Mei 1998: Penelitian Tentang Kekerasan Terhadap Etnis Tionghoa Di Kawasan Glodok, Jakarta Barat
Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk memahami fenomena kekerasan yang kerapkali dialami etnis Tionghoa sebagai bentuk diskriminasi rasial dan politik ketika terjadinya krisis ekonomi dan sosial di Indonesia. Penelitian ini
menggunakan metode sejarah lisan sebagai upaya mengkonstruksi pengalamanpengalamn dan suara-suara kelompok minoritas yang terlupakan oleh sejarah. Melalui kerangka teori interpretasi Paul Ricoeur, peneliti menyusun dan mengolah data dengan menggunakan teori Rene Girard mengenai kambing hitam dan teori Anthony Giddens mengenai dualitas struktur. Hasil analisa wawancara berdasarkan kesaksian-kesaksian yang diperoleh dari 8 etnis Tionghoa yang juga merupakan korban penjarahan dan pembakaran dan saksi mata, menunjukkan bahwa ketika kondisi sosial dan ekonomi semakin memburuk ditambah dengan ketidakstabilan situasi politik menjelang lengsernya Presiden Soeharto, kelompok minoritas menjadi korban dari kekuasaan segilitir elit politik yang ingin mempertahankan kekuasaannya. Para korban maupun saksi mata merasakan dan menyaksikan bagaimana usaha dan kerja keras mereka hancur seketika. Kerugian materi tidaklah sebanding dengan perasaan takut dan syak wasangka akan kemungkinan terulangnya aksi kekerasan yang sama di kemudian hari. Penelitian ini memperlihatkan bagaimana secara sistematis etnis Tionghoa dikorbankan dan bagaimana praktek rasisme secara struktural saling berkaitan dan berhubungan dalam sebuah narasi sejarah.
Kata kunci: Kerusuhan Mei 1998, etnis Tionghoa, kambing hitam, diskriminasi rasial, aksi kekerasan
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ABSTRACT
Nama Study Program Title
: Gian Kartasasmita : History : Peristiwa Mei 1998: A Study of Anti-Chinese Violence in Glodok Distrik, West Jakarta
The aim of the study is to comprehend the act of violence which occurs most frequently towards ethnic Chinese as a form of racial and political discrimination in time of great economy and social crisis. With oral history as the research methodology, this study attempts to reconstruct personal experiences from the voices of the forgotten into a historical narration. Using the theoretical
framework of interpretation by Paul Ricoeur, the research analyzes the data using Rene Girard theory on scapegoat and Anthony Giddens on duality of structure. Based on the testimonies gathered from 8 victims and eyewitnesses of ethnic Chinese, it can be concluded that as the crisis hit the nation, they fall victims mainly of economic and political interests by the ruling elite.As the victims and eyewitnesses watch their life work being destroyed by the angry crowd, they realize how fragile their lives are and how uncertain the future can be for them. The study demonstrates how ethnic Chinese are systematically persecuted and how structural racism inextricably intertwined in the historical narration.
Key words: May riots 1998, ethnic Chinese, scapegoat, racial discrimination, acts of violence
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DAFTAR ISI
HALAMAN JUDUL.................................................................. SURAT PERNYATAAN BEBAS PLAGIARISME................ HALAMAN PERNYATAAN ORISINALITAS...................... LEMBAR PENGESAHAN......................................................... KATA PENGANTAR................................................................ LEMBAR PERSETUJUAN PUBLIKASI KARYA ILMIAH... ABSTRAK................................................................................... ABSTRACT................................................................................ DAFTAR ISI............................................................................... DAFTAR GAMBAR................................................................... DAFTAR LAMPIRAN............................................................... 1A.PENDAHULUAN...........................................................
i ii iii iv v vi vii ix x xi xii 1
1.1 Latar Belakang........................................................................................ 1 1.2 Perumusan Masalah............................................................................... 7-8 1.3 Pertanyaan Penelitian........................................................................... 8-9 1.4 Tujuan dan Manfaat Penelitian.............................................................. 9 1.4.1 Tujuan Penelitian.......................................................................... 9 1.4.2 Manfaat Penelitian........................................................................ 9-10 1.5 Kajian Literature.................................................................................... 10-11
IB. HERMENETIKA PAUL RICOEUR.................................. 12-15 1C.METODOLOGI PENELITIAN..................................... 15

1.1 Metode Penelitian.................................................................................. 15-17 1.2 Strategi Penelitian................................................................................. 17-19 1.3 Analisa Penelitian............................................................................... 19-22 1.4 Sumber Sekunder................................................................................... 22 1.5 Keabsahan Data................................................................................... 22 1.6 Lokasi Penelitian dan Pemilihan Lokasi............................................. 22-24 1.7 Batasan dan Keterbatasan Penelitian.................................................... 24 1.7.1 Batasan Penelitian....................................................................... 24-25 1.7.1.1 Jumlah Korban................................................................. 25 1.7.1.2 Wawancara Dengan Penguasa........................................... 25 1.7.1.3 Proksimitas..................................................................... 25 1.7.1.4 Durasi Wawancara............................................................ 25 1.7.1.5 Lokasi Penelitian............................................................... 25 1.7.2 Keterbatasan Penelitian............................................................... 25 1.7.2.1 Ingatan Masa Lalu............................................................. 26 1.7.2.2 Komunikasi............................................................... 26
2.PERISTIWA MEI 1998:KRISIS EKONOMI DAN IMF SEBUAH KRONOLOGI..........................................................

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27
3.PERISTIWA MEI 1998:BADAI POLITIK DARI PERTENGAHAN 1996 SAMPAI AWAL 1998: SEBUAH KRONOLOGI........................................................................... 42 4.PERISTIWA MEI 1998:BANGKITNYA SENTIMEN ANTITIONGHOA: KEJADIAN TERKAIT AKHIR 1996-1997..... 60 5.PERISTIWA MEI 1998:POTRET TERKINI DARI RASISME TERHADAP ETNIS TIONGHOA.............................................. 71
5.1 Awal Kerusuhan........................................................................................ 71 5.2 Testimoni Responden.............................................................................. 71 5.2.1 Kasus I : Ibu Vera dan Bp. Michael: Pembakaran Glodok Plaza Mal, Glodok, Jakarta Barat......................................................... 71 5.2.2 Kasus II : Bp. Dani: Pembakaran Topaz Mal dan Penjarahan ITC Roxi Mal, Roxi, Jakarta Barat............................................... 75 5.2.3 Kasus III: Bp. Sadli: Penjarahan dan Pembakaran Glodok, Jakarta Barat............................................................................. 76 5.2.4 Kasus IV: Bp. Darma: Penjarahan dan Pembakaran Glodok, Jakarta Barat.......................................................................... 78 5.2.5 Kasus V : Bp. Hari: Penjarahan di Glodok Plaza Mal, Glodok, Jakarta Barat............................................................. 79 5.2.6 Kasus VI : Bp. Iwan: Percobaan Penjarahan di Fortuna Hotel, Pancoran, Glodok, Jakarta Barat............................... 81 5.2.7Kasus VII: Bp. Yohanes: Pembakaran dan Penjarahan di Gedung Pinangsia, Glodok, Jakarta Barat............................. 82 5.2.8 Kasus VIII:Bp. Alan:Percobaan Penjarahan di Lokasari, Glodok, Jakarta Barat............................................................... 84 5.3 Penemuan Penelitian dan Pembahasan............................................. 86
6.KESIMPULAN.............................................................................
6.1 Diskursus dan Teori Kambing Hitam............................................ 6.2 Etnis Tionghoa dan Nasionalisme................................................. 6.3 Menyelesaikan Masalah Kecinaan...............................................
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91 92 94
DAFTAR REFERENSI................................................................
157
x Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
DAFTAR GAMBAR
Table 2.1.
Macro Economy Indicator As Indicated In the Additional Memorandum........................................................................................
Table 2.2.
New Pricelist for Fuel...........................................................................
Table 2.3
Action Taken By Foreign Companies In Respond to the Attacks on Ethnic Chinese.................................................................................
xi Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
DAFTAR LAMPIRAN
Annex Appendix A Appendix B Cases of Violence Against Ethnic Chinese 1996-99 Members of the Joint Fact Finding Team about the 13 14 May 1998 Riots Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia November 26, 1998 Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4, 1999
Appendix C
Appendix D
Dokumentasi Dokumentasi Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Jakarta
xii Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
1A.INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background Historically, anti-Chinese sentiments in Indonesia have flared up from time to time. The most widely accepted explanation for the dislike against this successful entrepreneurial minority is the widening of wealth gap that separates the native populations further away. Their aspiring business talent continues to threaten members of the majority. Superior in skills and networks, they secure their businesses in the most lucrative ways. Close relationship with the political elite is viewed as the tool to yield further access towards higher capital gain. Such widely held popular explanation cannot be dismissed easily as they have been buttressed by a long tradition of scholarship that fits the historical description of ethnic Chinese1 in Indonesia. Constituting nearly 3 percent2 of the population, ethnic Chinese are considered a minority ethnic group. Weber defines ethnic group as those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities of physical type or of customs or both, or because of memories of colonization and migration; it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists. In the case of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, they are bonded by their innate
The termCina (Chinese) is a pejorative term in Indonesian language. According to I. Wibowo, the term Cina as defined by many social scientists tend to romantize the ancestoral birth land. The term overseas chinese itself for example, is used as reference to the Chinese who has given up the birth right as a citizen and prefers to live abroad. In Indonesia, this term has caused tensions between the two countries whereby the policy of the Chinese government continues to extend protections for their huaqiao or citizens living abroad despite an allegiance pledged to the new host country. Following this event, Charles Coppel begins to highlight the fact that a particular group of Chinese belongs to a certain country as shown in the title of his book Indonesian Chinese in Crisis. A more neutral term like Chinese Diaspora is later introduced simply to state that the Chinese who resides outside the mainland is neither an overseas chinese nor an Indonesian Chinese. In this case, the Chinese is a Chinese who embraces the Chinese culture but happens to live abroad. However, I agree with an Indonesian scholar Melly Tan who prefers to use the term suku Tionghoa or ethnic Chinese to place this ethnic group as part of Indonesian diverse ethnic groups. See Wibowo,2001:256-258 According to Leo Suryadinata, the population percentage represented by this number was based on the 1990 data that was derived from the 1930 census. At the time, Indonesian population had reached 182 million and ethnic Chinese were estimated to be 5.460.000 or 3% from the total population. See Suryadinata, 1999. 1
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business traits as a means of survival.3 It was under Dutch economy, they grew into reliable and competent businessmen. From the colonial period, the Chinese had experienced anti-Sinicism. In the sixteenth century, traders from southern China arrived in Batavia, the port city under the ruling of Jan Pieterszon Coen of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and settled in the countryside of Java. The constant influx of the Chinese was largely due to the sugar boom in Batavia. However, as economic difficulties arose from the closing of the mills, unemployed Chinese from the countryside, revolted against VOC authority by attacking the city. Thousands of Chinese were killed in what was known as the 1740 Massacre. In the wake of this devastation, a small number of Chinese mainly those who were born in Indonesia or peranakan, remained in the colony. Even though strict restrictions on education, residence, and landowning were imposed by the Dutch, the Chinese remained to be the economic arms of the governments in rural areas. Socially and culturally, the way ethnic Chinese function in what Weber calls a type of status group exists for a reason.4 As entrepreneurs, ethnic Chinese become the backbone of Dutch colonial middle distributed trade. The term middlemen was later applied to ethnic Chinese when dealing with indigenous Indonesian and the Dutch. Ethnic Chinese by Dutch colonial term belonged to different category in Indonesian society. Following Article 163 of IS (Indische Staatsregeling Wet van 2 September 1854, Ned.S.1854-2, S. 1855-2 jo.1), Indonesia consisted of three groups of people, namely (1) European people; (2) Foreign Orientals (including the Chinese, Indian, and Arab); and (3) Indigenous people.5 This division based on race set apart ethnic Chinese more so than the Indians or Arabs as those who gained monopoly not just in goods but also in services like revenue collectors and tax farmers for the Dutch.
According to the Indonesian 1930 census, in the population of the Chinese Overseas in Indonesia, Hokkiens accounted for 50%, being the largest majority, followed by Hakkas (in Fukien province) of 16.5%, Cantonese of 11.5% and Teochew of 7.5%. The economic activities carried out by the Hokkiens came for the most part from their domestic interests in rubber, copra, coffee, pepper, tobacco and other indigenous products as well as their external distribution. As for the Cantonese and Hakkas, their groups were mainly involved in rice milling, lumber mills, machine milled soaps, factories and restaurants. See Hank, 1989: 184 4 According to Tan Chee-Beng, the discussion on culture in general and economic performance is in line with Webers thesis on capitalist spirit. Weber states that the lack of spirit equivalent to ethics of Protestantism in the other part of the world explains why modern capitalism emerged in the West and not elsewhere. In the case of China, Weber tries to illustrate his thesis in his The Religion of China (1951). However anthropologists have contested Weber by showing that there is the spirit of capitalism in Asia and that the problem with China is not the lack of capitalist ethics; the failure to have modern capitalism lies with other structural factor. See Tan Chee-Beng,2004 5 See Winarta, 2004:67 2 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
This practice of divide and rule by the Dutch rulers later contributes to the real segregation between indigenous people and ethnic Chinese. Ethnic Chinese were described by indigenous people as discerning community, selfish and exclusive, while the indigenous were looked upon by ethnic Chinese as an inferior and nontrusting group who acted hostile towards them. These stereotypes had a profound effect on ethnic Chinese relations with the native population especially prior to the birth of the Chinese nationalist movement. A new identity marked by the rise of solidarity from the Chinese in Indonesia had finally gained its momentum. The first Chinese school, Tiong Hwee Koan (THKK) was set up by the Dutcheducated Chinese. Equally important is the abolishment of Dutch segregation policy allowing the Chinese to obtain passes to travel and to reside in Chinese quarters. The Chinese were also admitted to advisory councils at the central and local levels. Following the new colonial strategy, the Chinese sought new investment opportunities in kretek (clove) cigarettes, batik and other industries previously dominated by the native bourgeoisie. However, it gave rise to the first conflict with the native population. In the late nineteenth century, the Dutch had dismantled the privilege position of the Chinese as the states financier. Since then, the native viewed the Chinese as an obstacle to the rise of a native middle class. The birth of kongsi The Sarekat Islam (SI) out of a racially mixed ChineseJavanese kongsi signified the native nationalist movement. In 1912 Surakarta, the native awakening took place in the violent anti-Sinicism. Street fights between its Javanese members and their former Chinese kongsi brothers led to numerous killings and racial violence in Javas north coast, East Java and West Java.6 As the struggle towards independence reached its height, ethnic Chinese once again experience violence. Japanese occupation in Indonesia had not only disrupted businesses owned by the Chinese but their loyalties towards the mainland were questioned. China was at war with Japan. Many totoks or those who were born in China felt the danger of being perceived by the Japanese as Kuomintang sympathies. The long-running history of Sino-Japanese had proven to be a disadvantage for the Chinese in Indonesia as they were targeted. AntiSinicism continued during the independence struggle with the Dutch in May and
According to Shirashi, the rise of modern politics provided an opportunity for the Dutch Indies state to adopt a new strategy. Unlike the old order, the real distinctions among Europeans, Chinese and natives were no longer a matter of race and custom. In this case, anti-Chinese sentiments were results of economic specialization and prejudice as intended by the Dutch. See Shirashi, 1997: 204-205 3 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
June 1946 Tangerang,7 killing an estimated 653 Chinese, with 1,268 Chinese residences burned down, 236 destroyed and 25,000 refugees fled to the city. The anti-Chinese sentiments may be attributed to other aspects of ethnic antipathy. During the revolution, conflicts between the Chinese and Indonesian businessmen continued to persist like in Pekalongan 1942. Similar to Tangerang 1946 where a number of haji were said to have taken part in the incident, conflicts in other part of Indonesia like West Sumatra arose because of its anti-foreigner attitude.8 The anti-Chinese escalation had caused a major decline of the Chinese business elite. Enforced financial contributions and acquisitions along with VicePresident Hattas economic policy to devitalize Chinese economic interest and position in republican areas had given maximum latitude for Indonesians to run the economy and therefore undermined the Chinese business position. In the meantime, trade opportunities for Chinese businessmen in Dutch occupied area were curtailed due to economic cooperation between the republican government and the Dutch. The republican elite attempted to control and dominate domestic trade, while the Dutch were to control foreign trade. As a trading minority, the environment for normal trade was generally unfavorable. The Chinese were in economic conflict with Dutch colonial power. In 1947 and 1948, conflicts between republican military with Dutch troops produced nearly 100,000 Chinese refugees in Indonesia and nearly 1,000 killed; whereas the second military action left behind 43,392 Chinese refugees. Property losses of the Chinese during the entire period of the revolution were estimated at more than f.530 million (530 million guilders), apart from 3,500 persons killed and 1,631 missing.9 Republican leaders such as Amir Sjariffudin had tried to improve the relationship between the Chinese and the Indonesian with no success as antiChinese sentiments continued to surface. An independent nation, Indonesia followed Soekarnos Guided Democracy where under this system, democratic institutions were curtailed, elections were suspended, and as president he appointed the parliament. With the new political configuration, came also the so-called benteng (fortress) system to favor
See Twang Peck Yang, 1998:160 ibid. Twang Peck Yang believes that incidents in areas such as Pekalongan had much to do with business interests in trade and industry between the Chinese and the Indonesians while the incidents in Tangerang and its surrounding areas probably had more to do with traditional landlordism. The incident in Tangerang was a reminiscent of the 1924 Tangerang incident in which land owned by the Chinese were seized by wealthy Indonesians. There were indications that incidents in Tangerang and Pekalongan came from local bandits or semi bandits (jagoan) often connected to Islam. 9 For details on Chinese property losses during the revolution due to the scorched earth policy employed by the republican armed forces, see Twang Peck Yang, 1998:150-155 4
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indigenous Indonesian over Chinese in the bestowal of import licenses. The effort to reduce Chinese economic strength through regulatory resulted in the Presidential Decree No.10 (or PP 10) which basically banned all aliens from engaging in retail trade in rural areas. The ban was limited to alien Chinese but since the nationality question was no yet resolved, many Chinese were still classified as aliens. The measure to close down 25,000 shops in West Java and South Sulawesi was a result of Benteng system. Another policy of indigenization in private sectors especially had affected the Chinese control of rice-mills. In 1956 Assaat Movement, the campaign urged the government to give special protections to Indonesian citizens from the Chinese. The movement received some support from the Islamic nationalists but not from the majority of Indonesian leaders who foresaw a possible disastrous impact on Indonesian economy. However, discriminatory measures against ethnic Chinese still continued leading to the exodus of more than 100,000 alien Chinese of mostly totoks in 1960. The economic deterioration resulted from PP 10 had undermined Soekarnos position. Aware of the consequences of continuous exodus of Chinese, Beijing discontinued the repatriation for economic and political reasons. The departure of Chinese had caused economic decline and in turn weakened Soekarnos authority. Meanwhile, Indonesian military who was anti Beijing was gaining strength. Realizing the danger to the countrys economy and his power, Soekarno put an end to anti-Chinese measures. The PP 10 was no longer reinforced. In 1954, the Baperki (Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) was founded to combat discrimination. It succeeded in attracting many Chinese, particularly the peranakan Chinese. It favored pluralism and integration of the WNI (Warga Negara Indonesia Indonesia citizen) Chinese into Indonesian society. Chinese schools and the Chinese language press were re-opened. With the treaty on dual nationality signed by China and Indonesia in 1955, Baperki also made sure that a number of Chinese with dual nationality could be exempted from making a court declaration rejecting Chinese citizenship and taking Indonesian nationality. In March 1963, Soekarno in his speech to the Baperki Congress described the peranakan Chinese as members of the Indonesian nation (bangsa Indonesia) and that the peranakan Chinese is one of Indonesian sukus. The idea was fully supported by Soekarno but any hope was shortlived. In May 1963 series of antiChinese attacks occurred in West of Java, Bandung and Sukabumi.
5 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
Meanwhile, Chinese supporting assimilation had formed the LPKB (Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa Institute of Promoters of National Unity) in 1963. This group blamed Baperki for their integrationists exclusivism holding them responsible for anti-Chinese attacks. The assimilasionists pushed for expression of Indonesian nationalism. The assimilation process included inter-marriage and the abandonment of name, customs and religion as part of the Chinese identity in favor of local culture and religion.10 While the Chinese was pushed to demonstrate their loyalty to Indonesia, the indigenous groups were not expected to do the same. 11 At the same time, the assimilasionists responded in what some saw as Baperkis increasing leftist tendencies. Following the 30 September 1965 attempted coup by the PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia Indonesian Communist Party), anti-Chinese violence escalated. The Chinese language press and Chinese language schools were officially closed down. Labeled as communist, Baperki and its proximity to Soekarno and by extension to China gave rise to anti-communist forces in Indonesia. The 1965-66 which was intended to destroy PKI had escalated to revenge killings. A figure of around 500,000 people killed in the massacre was accepted with a percentage of ethnic Chinese as victims.12 When General Soeharto came to power, Indonesia entered a new political system whereby all control and power derived from the President Soeharto and his Pancasila (five basic principles of the Indonesian state or state philosophy) democracy. From 1966-67 the New Order introduced a series of laws and
policies to suppress expressions of Chinese identity and culture from the use of Chinese language to the celebration of Chinese cultural festivals. Also the Chinese were strongly advised to change their names into Indonesian sounding names. After the 1965 Incident, the Chinese were coerced into making a personal choice of being treated as citizen or non-citizen. By definition, the unassimilated Chinese had limited rights compared to the assimilated one who were less Chinese or possibly non Chinese with more rights.13 However, this policy had taken a different turn than what the LPKB envisaged as a new status quo was
See Somers, 1964:38-39; Coppel, 1983:45 According to Thung Ju Lan, because the Chinese continue to be regarded as foreigners who have no part in Indonesian nation-building and therefore do not have their historical roots in Indonesia, the group is not seen as part of the Indonesian plurality. See Thung Ju-Lan, 1998:41-45 12 See Purdey, 2006:10-15 13 See Thung Ju Lan, 1998:55-56; Dahana, 2004:56-57 6
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established by the New Order. The Indonesian term cukong14 which essentially referred to the exchange of money for security became a common practice for many members of the Soehartos family, the military and the elite when dealing with a number of ethnic Chinese conglomerates. The mounting tensions between the pribumi15 (the natives) and non-pribumi (read: ethnic Chinese) continued to exist under the repressive government of Soeharto. The 1990 meeting at Soehartos private ranch in Tapos, West Java with mainly Chinese business elite and other Indonesian businessmen stir a bit of controversy among the business leaders. Staged as the champion of the poor, Soeharto called on the conglomerates to give 25 percent of their shares over to cooperatives. Televised across the nation, the meeting reinforced suspicions and resentments of many ethnic Chinese among many pribumi. Similar even took place in 1995 where the leaders of Indonesias most wealthy companies almost all ethnic Chinese, were instructed in the meanings of Pancasila. Not long after the 1995 meetings, the next series of riots including violence against ethnic Chinese broke out in Java. In October 1996 in Situbondo, East Java, followed by Tasikmalaya, West Java in December and in Rengasdengklok in January 1997, ethnic Chinese property and places of worship were attacked in cases of mass violence. The attacks on ethnic Chinese shops had increased in frequency and intensity across Java with the onset of economic crisis in the late 1997 and early 1998.
1.2 Problem Statement The study attempts to show how ultimately the change in the economic and political landscape affected the social condition in Indonesia. The 1996-98 events illustrated how the combined external factors including the Asian economic crisis, local conflict and political trends contributed to the widespread of frustration and intense anti-Chinese sentiments. Ethnic Chinese became the ideal scapegoat as mounting economic crisis leading to political uncertainty reached its height in the 1998 May riots.
Cukong or in Mandarin word is known as zhu gong means leader or boss. The emergence of the socalled Ali Baba complex (better-known in Southeast Asia as Cukongism) referred to the rich ethnic Chinese businessmen who generally worked together with the political or the military elite of their country residence. The cukong specializes in administering business affair while the bureaucrats and military officers provide them with government funds, facilities and security protection. 15 Since September 1998, the terms pribumi and non- pribumi are no longer employed in any government policies and their implementations based on the presidential decree issued by President Habibie. See Dahana,2004:46 7 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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Businesses owned and run by ethnic Chinese families had played an integral part in Indonesias economy, responsible for nearly 70 percent of all private economic activities.16 Their companies had contributed highly to the rejuvenation of Indonesias economy especially in the key areas of job creation and non-oil exports. The economic domination by ethnic Chinese and their close link to China were viewed by the pribumi leaders as forms of distrust and disloyalty to Indonesia. Pribumi leaders learned from the past experiences that ethnic Chinese had served the interest of colonial powers, mainly the Dutch and the Japanese. Domestic policies to curtail economic activities by ethnic Chinese were endorsed resulting in the Benteng system in 1950 which granted special preference to pribumi importers against the Chinese and the granting of licenses to new enterprises which were owned by the pribumi in 1954 and 1956. Efforts by the government to assimilate ethnic Chinese into the Indonesian society were also found in its policies which required the name-changing for non-indigenous Indonesian in 1961 and 1967 and the closing of Chinese-medium schools in 1966. The growing resentment by pribumi towards ethnic Chinese had been the constant argument as shown in this study. Therefore, it is important to raise critical questions to comprehend the phenomena of racial discrimination and politics in Indonesia in relation to violence against ethnic Chinese as the minority group. These are the following questions in regards to issues presented in the study: First, racial discrimination against ethnic Chinese is embedded in the historical journey of this nation. Politically and economically, ethnic Chinese are subjects to racism. Second, in time of heightened social hostility, ethnic Chinese are considered indispensable. Why are they targeted and what are the implications? Third, how has anti-Sinicism affected the ethnic Chinese community? What roles should the nation play to prevent this from happening in the future?
1.3 Research Question The general research question is as followed: Why are they (read:ethnic Chinese) being persecuted in time of great social crisis just because they belong to a particular minority group?
Contrary to the controversial economic data, ethnic Chinese owned around forty-five to forty nine percent of Indonesian private sector. This finding based on the 1997 Indonesian Business Data Center (Pusat Data Bisnis Indonesia, PDBI) showed that nearly fifty percent of Indonesian economy were run by Indonesian governmental agencies. See Dr. Yusiu Liem, 2000: 51 8 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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The general research question above consists of the following sub-questions: a. Why anti-Sinicsm continue to happen in Indonesia? b. If discrepancy between the ethnic Chinese and pribumi widened largely due to special priviledges enjoyed by the few conglomerates, then what could possible explain the continuous injustice endured by the average working ethnic Chinese? c. How has the victims voices enriched the life perspectives of ethnic Chinese community viewed from May 1998 tragedy?
1.4 Goals and Significance of Research 1.4.1 Goals The main goal of this study is to primarily collect data, analyze and arrive at the theoretical conclusion based on the sociological framework in regards to Peristiwa May 1998 where ethnic Chinese became the victims in the antiChinese sentiments. It is hoped that the study can provide a scientific explanation regarding the so-called persecution against ethnic Chinese.
Specific goals aimed by the study are as followed: a. To obtain historical perspectives on the formation of ethnic Chinese identity by the regime of New Order. b. To provide a platform for racial discrimination cases from the victims perspectives which therefore lend to insightful understanding of the injustice endured by ethnic Chinese. c. To put forward a theoretical conclusion based on the findings of the kinds of racial discrimination and political ideology practiced in Indonesia. 1.4.2 Significance This research, in my opinion, has contributed greatly to the comprehension of ethnic Chinese minority injustice. Through their testimonies, the study has shown how important their voices are for they represent the missing link in the history of modern anti-Sinicism.
There are three points of significance found in this study: a. To provide academic insights for the advancement of theoretical framework in historical studies.
9
b. To highlight the importance of anti-discriminatory policy as a way to protect the well being of minority groups in Indonesia. c. To promote social harmony between ethnic Chinese and other ethnic groups in Indonesia.
1.5. Relevant Literature Reviews Studies on ethnic Chinese violence in Indonesia have placed great importance on historical and sociological aspects. The first academic writing on the Chinese riots in Batavia in 1740 was written by Vermeulen (1938) in De Chineezen te Batavia en de Troebelen van 1740. In great details, Vermeulen described the background of the massacre which resulted from hostility between the Chinese and Dutch VOC. Blusse (1986) in Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia completed the study by indicating factors that contribute to the 1740 massacre. Based on the findings, a decline in their socioeconomy conditions as well as the failure of Chinese officers to assert their authority in the community had been found to be the cause of hostility between Dutch VOC and the Chinese. In contemporary studies however, the debates on anti-Sinicism have long been the focus of interest among many scholars. Scholarship by Leo Suryadinata, Anthony Reid, Wang Gungwu, Charles A.Coppel, Thung Ju-Lan, Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad and Jemma Purdey has provided the theoretical model for my study. For Suryadinata17, perceptions by pribumi
towards ethnic Chinese influence and determine in many cases, the formation of Indonesian domestic policy. The elite have sought to curtail in what perceived to be the economic, political and cultural strength of ethnic Chinese. In another words, how Indonesia builds its nation in the context of nation-states determine ethnic relations. Therefore, for ethnic Chinese, to subscribe to indiginism
represent a major change of political direction that will determine their course of life. In the construction of Indonesian society, Suryadinata18 believes that assimilationist policy is adopted due to the small size of the Chinese population as well as the undemocratic nature of the authoritarian political system. As a result, ethnic Chinese are expected to be integrated, if not assimilated into indigenous society. This has generated policies controlling and assimilating the Chinese
17 18
See Suryadinata, Leo, 1978 See Suryadinata, Leo, 1997
10
which Indonesian policy-makers have adopted, while cultural pluralism has become unpopular. Interestingly however, the recent study by Thung Ju Lan19 on the cases of young Jakarta Chinese shows how local cultures such as Javanese, Sundanese, etc are instead adopted as part of their identities; while others identify with the discourse of globalization. Thung Ju-Lan argues that opting for cultural homogeneity does not necessarily mean the end of cultural conflict as shown by the recent inter-ethnic conflict such as 1998 anti-Chinese violence. Clearly, assimilation is not applicable in the multicultural society of Indonesia. Furthermore, discrimination and prejudice towards the Chinese in Southeast Asia and the Jews in Europe become more apparent in the essay presented by Anthony Reid.20 He raises questions concerning the economic relations of two important entrepreneurial minorities with the state. If economic success occurs in its transition to capitalism, it is unlikely that issue of nationalism is questioned by nationalists. On the other hand, if economic success is rooted in cultural and political configurations, then it is likely that racial hostility will break out as economic or political conditions deteriorate. Until the crises of transition for the minority to feature in economy and politics are settled, the dangers of violence remain real. In an attempt to find the roots of violence in Indonesia, Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad21 suggest the existing possibility of cultures of violence. Within this context, culture is treated as a set of alternative ways of behavior in certain situations, which is neither static nor deterministic. Thus, the legitimacy by the state to use violence is best described by Manuel Castels22 as necessary only when and if the survival of the nation or of the nation-state is at stake. Consistent with Jemma Purdey23, her study indicates that the 1998 anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia cannot be viewed as a single form or type of violence. It is not a crystallized phenomenon and therefore cannot be labeled singlehandedly as antiChinese violence. In contrast to the views above, Charles A. Coppel however describes the ongoing anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia as another form of violence. Before the 1990s, anti-Chinese violence has largely been viewed apart from other type of violence and framed within a wider picture of violence against the ethnic Chinese minority, either in Indonesia or in neighboring countries. However, since May
19 20
See Thung Ju-Lan, 1998 See Reid, 1997 21 See Colombijn and Lindblad, 2002 22 See Castels, 1997 23 See Purdey, 2006
11
1998, anti-Chinese violence is interpreted differently as it conveys many aspects of representation. Sai Siew Min24 raises the fundamental question of whether one can ever know the historical truth of such an event. Whereas Elaine Tay25 describes how the issue of rape victims in May 1998 is used by overseas Chinese websites to inflame anger and promote a sense of kinship among the Chinese worldwide. Mely Tan26 on the other hand shows how the National Commission on Violence against Women relates to the rape of Chinese women in May riots and agrees that it is part of a wider pattern of violence against women throughout the archipelago. Unfortunately, violence in respect to the cause and timing can easily be found in local culture forms that most often have been manipulated to conflict by parties. Or in the words of Elizabeth Collins, the characterization of Indonesian culture as violent can be used to justify a return to authoritarian rule and further state violence. The approach employed by the above-mentioned scholars in studying antiSinicism was contrasted largely to the approaches of other scholars like Benedict Anderson, G. William Skinner, J.A.C. Mackie to ethnic relations mainly from the elites point of view. Following May 1998 tragedy in Indonesia which led to antiChinese conflict, the study aims to interpret the underlying message implied in the historical narrative of Peristiwa May 1998 as told by the victims. IB. PAUL RICOEURS HERMENEUTICS With the emergence of post-structuralist, post-modernism, and postcolonialism, social reality can be constructed in various ways and therefore opening up a new horizon of knowledge which extends to other domain of social science like history. A text which is formerly thought to contain accurate information is now being reinterpreted by historians. Hermeneutics to Paul Ricoeur refers to the theory of operations of understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts. The central theme of Paul Ricoeurs hermeneutics is the realization of discourse as a text. To Paul Ricoeur, the event of May 1998 can also be read as a text by treating it not merely as the inscription prior to speech. Speaking and writing are viewed as alternative and equally legitimate modes of the realization of discourse. A discourse is language-event or linguistic usage. There are four traits that constitute speech as an event. First, discourse exists ony
24 25
See Sai Siew Min, 2006 See Elaine Tay, 2006 26 See Mely Tan, 2006
12
as a temporal and present instance of discourse. It is the meaning of the speech event that implied what is actually said and not the event as event. Hermeneutics must appeal not only to linguistics but also to the theory of speech act where it is constituted by a hierarchy of subordinate acts distributed on three levels: (1) the level of the locutionary or propositional act, the act of saying; (2) the level of illocutionary act or force, that which we do in in saying; and (3) the level of the perlocutionary act, that which we do by saying. Second, in discourse, the sentence designated its speaker by diverse indicators of subjectivity and personality. In spoken discourse, this reference by discourse to the speaking subject presents immediacy that we can explain in the following way. Third, a discourse refers to its situation common to the interlocutors. This situation in a way surrounds the dialogue, and its landmarks can all be shown by a gesture, by pointing a finger, or designated in an ostensive manner by the discourse itself through the oblique reference of those other indicators that are the demonstratives, the adverbs of time and place, and the tense of the verb. Fourth, discourse in writing is most exemplary. Only discourse, not language, is addressed to someone. This is the foundation of communication. What is written is addressed not just to you, the second person, but to the audience that it creates itself.27 Ricoeur contends that human action, no less than literary texts, displays a sense as well as a reference. It possesses an internal structure as well as protecting a possible world, a potential mode of human existence which can be unfolded through the process of interpretation. To understand what a text is to the concept of meaningful action, there are four criteria that must be applied. They include the fixation of action and the autonomization of action followed by relevance and importance and lastly human action as an open work. On the first criteria on fixation of action, Ricoeur meant that action is no longer a transaction to which the discourse of action would still belong. But it prepares the detachment of the meaning of the action from the event of the action. In this case, Peristiwa May 1998 belongs to the social inscription which leaves behind its marks on its time. Whereas the second criteria refers to the fact that an action is social phenomenon where it has effects that one does not intend. An action leaves a trace and it makes its mark which become the documents of human action. History is itself the record of human action or sum of the marks, the fate of which escapes the
27
See Ricoeur, 1991
control of individual actors. This is where the third criterion of what a text is implied that a meaningful action is an action where its importance and relevance goes beyond its initial situation. The death toll and destructions speak of a devastated stage in Indonesian history that is faced with racial violence. This is what Ricoeur referred to as durable in importance and relevance. Finally, the meaning of human actions is something that is addressed to possible readers. Like a text, human action is an open work and therefore new references await for fresh interpretations that decide their meanings.28 The term hermeneutics comes from Hermes, the ancient Greek messenger of the gods. The origin of hermeneutics is also associated with Greek poetics and rhetoric. It is therefore an art of verbal persuasion rather than of cognitive domination through definitive proof. Modern hermeneutics begins with Friedrich Schleiermacher who codified traditional hermeneutics into a systematic and critical method of biblical interpretation. Schleiermacher was also credited with a psychological standpoint based on the outset of two forms of interpretation. The first one is the grammatical interpretation and the second one is technical interpretation. The first interpretation is called objective since it concerns with the linguistic language of the author, but also refers to as negative because it indicates the limits of understanding. The second interpretation is called
technical where the focus is the subjectivity of the one who speaks and not the language. It is also called positive because it reaches the act of thought which produced the discourse.29 Wilhelm Dilthey developed and extended Schleiermacher method into historical or human sciences- those disciplines that studied the objective expressions of human mind. Dilthey is known to be the interpreter of
hermeneutics and history. To him, the text to be interpreted is reality itself and its interconnection (Zusammenhang). His interpretive procedure or hermeneutics, is the concepts of lived experience, objectification, and understanding. Such a process depends upon two important facts that first, human nature is everywhere the same and second that every expression of the mind is continuously connected to some mental component. Diltheys work highlights the central theme of
hermeneutics that emphasizes the understanding of texts to the law of understanding another person who expresses oneself. It is not what a text says,
28 29
ibid ibid
but who says it. The object of hermeneutics therefore constantly moves away from the text, its sense and reference, towards the lived experience that is expressed. In another word, the text must be unfolded, no longer towards its author, but towards its sense and the world which opens up and discloses.30 To Ricoeur, the work of Dilthey is seen as an attempt to go deeper into the world of epistemology in order to reveal its ontological condition. With Dilthey, subjectivity remains the main reference. Difficulties arise when he needs to explain his historical consciousness. To Dilthey, one belongs to the history before belonging to oneself. However, with Hans-Georg Gadamers theory of historical consciousness, reflection belongs not to methodology or historical inquiry, but to the reflective consciousness of this methodology. It is the consciousness of being exposed to history and to its action as they are part of the historical phenomenon itself. In another words, an action cannot be objectified. Gadamers work has influenced Paul Ricoeur to investigate further on how one can communicate into a distance in this case, the matter of the text, which belongs neither to its author nor its reader. Hermeneutics is described by Ricoeur as, Leaving up to the reader to inhabit that world, and finding within is situation which explain his or her own situation. What must be interpreted in a text is a proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my outmost possibilities. That is what I call the world of a text, the work proper to this unique text.31
1C. METHODOLOGY 1.1 Research Method For the purpose of the research, the mode of interview is used to gather information. Considered relatively as a newcomer in the world of data collection, an interview is now considered a tool to understand human behavior.32 The format of an interview is based on three premises as follows: a. Democratization of opinions The interview format assumes that human beings share a common experience which anyone in society is capable to articulate opinions when asked to do. However, in research study which focuses only on a specific group in a population, data collection using a large representative sample would not be
30
ibid ibid 32 See Gubrium and Holstein, 2002

31
15
effective. Instead researcher relies on respondents with insiders knowledge about the topic to conduct the research. In this research, I collect data from reliable respondents who are of ethnic Chinese. For the purpose of the study, eight ethnic Chinese in Jakarta are selected for the interviews. The segmentation of the respondents revolves around the merchants and private sector employees in West Jakarta area where they mostly reside. Predominantly coming from the middle class background, most ethnic Chinese place themselves in the golongan menengah or middle strata. The reason being is because most ethnic Chinese regarded themselves neither in the lower class group as it makes up of indigenous farmers, fishermen, and factory workers, nor in the upper class group where it belongs to high-ranking (indigenous) Indonesian government officials.33 However, during the course of the interviews, the notion of middle class background is kept in discreet as to avoid questions regarding their current financial status. The interviewees-male and female-come from different age groups although for the majority, the year of birth is not filled out on the respondents form for personal reasons. Various educational backgrounds are also present, from high school graduates to those who have completed local university degrees. Through an important contact, the researcher gains access to information normally kept among the inner circle from Chinatown, located at Glodok district in West Jakarta. b. Researcher-respondent duality The second assumption in conventional interview is the division between the two formalized roles of the researcher and the respondent. The roles and the expectations assosiated with them roughly correspond to a leader-follower relationship. The interviewer is the leader while the respondent is the follower responsible of providing coherent answers when prompted to do so. However the etiquette applied by the interviewer-interviewee is commonly disobeyed. In the case of research, it is important for me to acknowledge their hardship in order to understand their backgrounds. Once the trust has been established, the interviewees are more than willing to share their side of the stories without questioning the social background of the interviewer.
33
See Thung Ju Lan, 1998:106
16
c. Respondents as vessels of knowledge The third assumption of the interview format is when a respondent is viewed as a vessel of answers or a fountain of knowledge that could be turned on or off by the right question. During the interviews, I employ different treatments for each respondent with regards to their various backgrounds. It is an important aspect in the construction of reality as it concerns not only with the recollection of the past but also with the present and future conditions that lie ahead.
In regards to the interview methods, the researcher based the questions on an open interview technique where respondents are encouraged to share their ordeals. However, for reasons of fear faced by most respondents when reconnecting to the past, the researcher finds herself in a difficult position. The tragedy speaks of painful memories and it simply hurts to talk let alone share their experiences. General requirements when conducting an interview indicate that interviewer must avoid connecting the main issue raised by the interviewer with the respondents.34 However, the condition proves otherwise. Most repondents prefer to have an off-record interview simulation in order to establish two ways communication before the actual interview. It is for this reason the recordings consist of rehearsed interviews, an improvised technique employed by the researcher to build trust as ways to bridge the emotional scars endured by the victims and or the eyewitnesses while maximizing the restricted time schedule.
1.2 Research Strategy Methodology is the theoretical study of the logical basis of research, of collecting data, and of interpreting and analyzing the findings. This study uses oral history as its research strategy. Despite of the ongoing debate on the analytical accuracy and validity of oral history, the method proofs to provide meanings. According to Italian historian, Alessandro Portelli, oral history is concerned not with the act of people, but with their intention, belief, and thought of their actions35. People acquire what Gwyn Prins defined as information pool filled by personal relationship. Social historians have used oral data to give voice to those who are voiceless. In this case, oral history best reconstructs the minute particulars of the lives of ordinary people.36
34 35
See Koentjaraningrat, 1986 See Lysa, 2000:74 36 See Prins, 1991:133
17
The retrospective nature of oral history also allows historians to gather and find evidence of the past which is unavailable in the written documents. If written documents opens a room for bias due to the subjectivity of the writer than oral history provides collective memory of how symbols, narration, and imagination are constructed. As a method, oral history can reconstruct the experiences of the minority groups and accommodate those whose voices are forgotten by history. This study provided primary sources of information from ethnic Chinese who became victims and those who witnessed the acts of violence in Peristiwa May 1998. The web of racial interaction between politics, social and cultural is inherently present in the study following the theory of interpretation by Paul Ricoeur, whose methods are in conjunction with the methodology of oral history. In his book Memory, History, Forgetting, Ricoeur gives his fullest argument which begins with things purportedly remembered; for without memories there could be no history involving people.37 The task of writing history, or what Ricoeur calls the historiographical operation
38
is to support, to correct and to refute collective
memory. This operation does not deal directly with individual memory except as reported to and believed by others.39 It has three distinct but inseparable constituents, all of which are interpretative activities. Firstly, the building up and use of archives that contain in some form traces of the past. Guided by their interests, historians and alike determine which traces to preserve and therefore in itself is an interpretative activity. Secondly, explanation or comprehension refers to the activity by which historians relate facts to one another; and lastly the activity of producing a verbal representation of some part of the past in the text. This inscription is always rhetorical and therefore interpretative. Even though the historiographical operation is thoroughly interpretative, it is still possible to speak of the objectivity and truthfulness of the historians account. This operation has its point of departure in testimony. Even false testimony refers to a world in which something actually occurred, something objective. Furthermore, all testimony refers, at least implicitly, to some specific groups and the social bond that supports the activity of giving all receiving testimony among its members. To the extent, historians perform the historiographical operation well by giving a substitute representation of the past. A well made substitute is faithful to the
37 38
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ricoeur ibid 39 ibid 18 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
available evidence and so deserves to be called true even though its always amendable or reformable. Like history, Peter Burke argues, historiography seems to repeat itself with variations.40 The perspective of this particular methodology has what Jim Sharpe defined as history from below, where it opens up new areas of research and above all it explores the historical experiences of those who are taken for granted or mentioned in passing in the mainstream history.41 It can be argued that as an approach, history from below fulfils two important functions. First, it is to serve as a corrective top to top persons history, to show that May 1998 riots involved the stepping down of Soeharto or the making of a new era for Indonesia. Secondly, it opens up the possibility of a richer synthesis of historical understanding, of a fusion of the history of the everyday experience of the people with the subject-matter of more traditional types of history. Thus history from below is at its most effective when it is set in a context as it assumes the history of the common people even when aspects of their past experience which are explicitly political are involved and therefore part of the social structure and social power.
1.3 Research Analysis Qualitative research engages with the complexity of analyzing human action in terms of meanings. Using hermeneutics approach in the interpretive process, this method of qualitative research aims at being open to understanding the other person. In being open to hear the other person, the researcher aims to listen, to hear some things that might be inconsistent with the researchers preexisting theory but nonetheless are understood and reinterpreted within theoretical traditions. Interpretation of the content as well as the form being interpreted becomes the essential tool in analyzing data gathered from interviews, secondary sources, and expert opinions. In the realm of social theory, history can be defined as diverse and complex collection of perspectives that attempt to understand, to interpret, and to explain social phenomena. A reference to the phrase social theory, rather than a more specific reference to sociological cultural, or political theory is made.42 Here, Rene Girards theory on scapegoat and Anthony Giddens theory of duality of
40
See Burke, 1991:234-246 See Sharpe, 1991:32-33 42 See Turner, 2002

41
19
structure are seen as analytical tools to interpret the distorted representation of reality or illusion of social reality. It can be said in the narrative, Girard attempts to see the victims perspectives from his four stereotypes of persecutions while Giddens social practices that emerge from the structural properties of human action that are not constraining but enabling social behaviors. Rene Girards theory on scapegoat reflects the systematic fashion of how a persecution towards a minority group takes place. According to Rene Girard, human culture is predisposed to the permanent concealment of its origins in collective violence. With this definition of culture, it is possible to understand the successive stages of an entire culture as well as the transition from one stage to the next by means of crisis similar to those found in myths and history during periods of frequent persecutions. During periods of crisis and widespread violence there is always the threat of subversive knowledge spreading, but that very knowledge becomes one of the victims or quasy-victims of the convulsions of social order. 43 Considered one of the worst racial violence in Indonesian history, Peristiwa May 1998 belongs to what Rene Girard called collective persecutions and resonances. By collective persecutions, Girard means acts of violence committed directly by the mob. Collective resonance on the other hand refers to the acts of violence itself. These kinds of persecutions generally take place in time of crisis, which weaken normal institutions and favor mob formation. An act of violence that is directly or indirectly collective includes the description of social and cultural crisis found in the typology of the stereotypes of persecution. The first stereotype is a generalized loss of differences, followed by the second one which is the crimes that eliminate differences, and the paradoxical marks of the absence of difference as the third stereotype. The fourth stereotype is violence itself.
44
Peristiwa May 1998 contains all the stereotypes of persecution when
real acts of violence are targeted against real victims. Agency therefore becomes an important reference in relation to structure as Girards theory of scapegoat explains just how persecutions occur in light of institutionalized behavior. Anthony Giddens duality of structure is central to his theory of structuration, a theory which attempts to avoid voluntarism as found in the fields of ethnomethodology and phenomenology on the one hand and determinism on the other, which Giddens associates with structuralism and
43 44
See Girard, 1989 ibid 20 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
functionalism.45 Structure consists of rules; defined as social conventions and knowledge of the context of their application, and resources, which are capabilities of making things happen. Rules include, for example, unwritten norms as well as written regulations. Resources consist of allocative resources such as land and raw materials, and authoritative resources including non-material resources such as status or hierarchical position. Although power is rarely equally distributed, everyone including subordinates almost always possesses at least some power and most individuals are able to exercise an element of choice arising from the relational dynamics of power. Giddens argues that agency and structure are viewed as two sides of the coin. The reason being according to George Ritzer is because Giddens sees agents as always rooted in a structural context and inevitably draw upon their knowledge of their structural context when they engage in any sort of action.46 Giddens divides these structures-within-knowledgeability into three different types: the structures of domination (power), signification (meaning), and legitimation (norms). This is knowledgeability about the distributions and configurations of power, meaning, and norms within the terrain of action. Giddens refers to these structure-withinagents as virtual in that they provide the conditions that guide the actions and make them possible, and it is only their traces within the actions they give rise to have an empirical reality in the social world. Structuration theory is therefore hermeneutically informed social theory which gives a place to interdependency between agents, practices, and their situated, structural contexts.47 This concept of duality of structure is found in social practices that spread across space and time. It explains then how from a macro point of view, racial discrimination according to Giddens is a system of structured inequalities and a historical process, both created and re-created through routine practices. Here, system means reproduced social relations between individuals and groups organized as regular social practices. From a micro point of view, specific practices, whether their consequences are intentional or unintentional, can be evaluated in terms of racial discrimination only when they are consistent with (our knowledge of) existing macro structures of racial inequality in the system. In other words, structures of racial discrimination do not external to agents they are made by
45 46
See Seidman, 1998 See Ritzer, 2003 47 See Giddens, 1984 21 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
agents but specific practices are by definition racist only when they activate existing structural racial inequality in the system.
1.4 Secondary Source Data findings will incorporate articles and publications from reliable and trusted document sources mainly media, ethnic Chinese organizations, and other relevant documents pertaining to the study.
1.5 Data Validity Validity refers to the problem of whether the data collected represent the picture of the event being studied. Data validation can be carried out in several ways. First, the method of cross-check is commonly used to compare the available data with other respondents or other sources found in documents. Second, the
verification of data can be achieved through proof readings by ethnic Chinese historians or academicians.
1.6 Research Location and Choice of Location This research chooses Glodok district in West Jakarta as its location for historical and sociological reasons. Historically because a day after the shooting of four students from Universitas Trisakti in Jakarta, acts of violence have started by the crowd who march earlier towards the university and its surrounding areas including the Glodok district. Sociologically speaking however, the commotion portrays images of how society reacts violently towards others and how ethnic Chinese are victimized in the course of Peristiwa May 1998. Based on the 2006 census by West Jakarta district office, the total population in West Jakarta reached an estimated 1,584,766 lives. Glodok itself, as part of the Tamansari area in West Jakarta district, has a total population of 153,671 with the composition of Indonesian residents (Warga Negara Indonesia, WNI) amounting to 153,249 lives and foreign residents (Warga Negara Asing, WNA) 422 lives. The demography of Glodok begins with Pasar Glodok, Glodok market, which is located at Jalan Glodok Selatan, in Tamansari area between Jalan Gajah Mada and Jalanl Pancoran. Viewed from the organizational structures, Pasar Glodok belongs to the other 11 markets in Glodok area including Gang Kelinci, Ikan Luar Batang, Jembatan Cina, Kampung Duri, Muara Angke, Pasar Pagi, Pejagalan, Perniagaan, Pluit and Teluk Gong. The main road towards Pasar Glodok can be
accessed from the north side via Jalan Pintu Besar Selatan and Jalan Hayam Wuruk, and from the south side via Jalan Gajah Mada.48 Glodok is known after the bloody massacre of 1740 as a ghetto areas outside the city walls where ethnic Chinese was confined by the Dutch.49 From the 17th century, Glodok has served as the centre of trade and is recognized as Chinatown. Ruled by Jan Pieterzoon Coen, the Governor General of VOC, the economic growth in Batavia continues to rise due to skillfull ethnic Chinese traders who are known for their high work ethics. In turn, Dutch government provides securites and assist those who come to live in Batavia. The residential area where ethnic Chinese reside is called Sirih or today as Glodok. Until today, no historians can acclaim the right versions of the name Glodok as its origin. According to Ridwan Saidi, an expert in Betawi culture, the name Glodok comes from the word gojrok-gojrok resembling the sound of a water fountain nearby Pancoran area. Others say that the name originates from the word grobak or a wooden carriage which is used to transport and sell water from Pancoran.50 At the time, Glodok is also known for its transportation using a coach for visitors to enter Batavia. Another version mentions that the word Glodok is taken from the name of a Balinese captain, Tjitra Glidok, who is appointed by the Dutch as the commander of Batavia at the time. Strategically located as a trading centre between different continents, Batavia becomes the wholesale center of Indonesian produce which attracts merchants from West Java, Central Java as well as ethnic Chinese. As the Dutch begins to build a prison for criminals and insurgents, rumours about cruel treatments received by the criminals begin to surface. It is said that the criminals are being boiled or digodok by Dutch prison guards. Since then, the prison is named Penjara Glodok or Glodok Prison.51 In 1969, Ali Sadikin, the first Governor of Jakarta province, built Glodok market whose occupants consist of only 1358 merchants with 61.45% conducting their businesses in electronic products. After the rebuilding of shopping center compound in 2001, the number of merchants in Glodok market has increased significantly. According to the business data by PD. Pasar Jaya, there are 591
http://eprints.lib.ac.id/3653/5/1224...Analisis Pengaruh-Literatur.pdf, Iwan Indriyanto, Program Pascasarjana, 2008, Universitas Indonesia 49 http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Berkas:Glodok_Tempo_Doeloe.jpg 50 See Lubis, 2008:81 51 http://eprints.lib.ac.id/3653/5/1224...Analisis Pengaruh-Literatur.pdf,Iwan Indriyanto, Program Pascasarjana, 2008, Universitas Indonesia 23 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
48
merchants with various business types from textiles, gold jewelries, mini cafetarias to mini shops. Nearly 48.66% reside in the surrounding Glodok area of Mangga Besar and Gunung Sahari, whereas the remaining 34.27% in Pluit, Muara Angke and Jembatan Cina. A smaller percentage of 5.67% settle in Sunter area and the rest of 11.40% in new residential areas. 52
1.7 Limitation and Delimitation of Study
1.7.1. Limitation of Study The study of anti-Chinese violence on Peristiwa May 1998 is limited for the following reasons:
1.7.1.1 Number of victims The selection of the respondents are strictly limited to those whose business are burned and/or looted and to eyewitnesses whose accounts are crucial as to provide the road map of violence on the day of the riots. As previously anticipated, difficulties in finding the burning and/or looting victims arise for reasons of fear. Some have moved their businesses away to the other parts of Jakarta and others prefer to have their identities and whereabouts kept secret by close families only. It is an experience they choose to forget and it
becomes imperative for the researcher to listen to their shared experiences and have their stories narrated as it is told. In the case of allegedly rape victims, however, the researcher must take the ideological position for the subject matter deals with the political and empirical merits related to power. As Anthony Giddens implied in the theory of structuration, structural domination becomes a haven of those who are accused but remained untouched; whereas the victims stand in silence with no power to share their sides of the stories. It becomes increasingly difficult if not impossible to provide empirical data about rape victims that are therefore scientifically proven and credible.
52
ibid
24
1.7.1.2 Interviews with the Elites Efforts to interview the elites mainly those who were allegedly responsible at the time like the former Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto are completely restricted. Apart from their tight schedule, the elites prefer to refrain from commenting even further. Their early statements to the press are considered sufficient and therefore additional opinions are deemed unnecessary.
1.7.1.3 Proximity Due the sensitive issues brought up in the interview, the researcher is accompanied by the trusted member of the community and introduced as familys close friends. Having established the trust, the researcher is able to carry out a one on one interview in the appointed locations, mainly in the shops or offices where they work. In regards to the interview materials, psychological considerations must be made due to emotional and traumatic experiences that many have preferred to put behind. 1.7.1.4 Duration of Interview For reason of fear, the length of the interview varies from a minimum of an hour to two or three hours a day. The magnitude of the tragedy is as such that during the limited interview time, the interviewer must gather important data with care and sensitivity. Since most respondents prefer to put the past behind, interview opportunities are strictly limited. 1.7.1.5 Research Location This study focuses on Glodok district in West Jakarta where violence predominantly hit the area and its surroundings in order to establish the enormity of the problem that occurs in Indonesias largest retail business.
1.7.2 Delimitation of Study 1.7.2.1 Recollection of the Past It is an experience most respondents choose to forget and therefore to have them narrated their experiences, they have to rely on memories. For many, to retrace the past brings back painful and sad memories. And for some, details of the events regarding time and date prove to be a difficult task.
1.7.2.2 Communication During the interview, some respondents have problems articulating their stories in fluent Bahasa Indonesia. Highly influenced by their daily spoken Chinese dialects, the respondents cannot express their views freely, thus presenting a minor communication barrier.
CHAPTER II PERISTIWA MAY 1998: The Economic Crash and IMF: The Chronology
This chapter aims to provide insights based on the chronological events that have shaped Indonesian economic landscape prior to the fall of Soeharto in 1998. The analysis focuses on the 1997 monetary crisis as the contributing factor which leads to the downfall of Indonesian banking sectors and instability among the political elites. The analysis is based on the research results of earlier scholars on the study of Indonesian economic crisis namely Kevin ORourke in Reformasi, Adam Schwartz in A Nation In Waiting: Indonesians Search for Stability, Esther Indahyani Jusuf in Kerusuhan Mei 1998: Fakta, Data dan Analisa as well as from local and international magazines and newspapers. The chain of event leading to Peristiwa May 1998 could not be separated from the monetary crisis which began in July 1997. One of the worlds most impressive economic performers, Indonesia enjoyed average economic growth rates of 7 percent per annum and inflation below 10% until the fall of president Soeharto in May 1998. Many had speculated the end of Soeharto was largely due to the economic crisis that battered Indonesia, Thailand and Korea. In May 1997, the exchange rate of Thai baht had come under attack. As a result of its devaluation, Indonesia suffered from a major economic crisis. On 21 July, the exchange rate of the rupiah to the dollars plunged from Rp2,450 into Rp2,700 causing a rush to buy dollars in the bank, despite financial supports totaling of US$6.499 billion granted from IMF of US$1.2 billion and US$5.299 billion from the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI). On 14 August, the decision by Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank, to stop the intervention and therefore abandoning its control over the exchange rate had caused a further decline of rupiah from Rp2,600 to Rp2,795. However, panic in the market had not taken its toll until the value of rupiah reached Rp3845 to the dollar in October.53 Beginning of September, the government had begun to put under review the banking sector which proved to be financially defective and therefore must be liquidated, merged or acquired. The Minister of Finance, Marie Muhammad,
53
SeeVan Dijk, 2001 27 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
introduced the fiscal belt-tightening package in efforts to cut governments spending. Muhammads package was well received by the market as it promised project cancelations involving powerful tycoons while at the same time, it raised import tariffs on luxury goods. Ten large scale infrastructure projects worth of Rp42,435 trillion were postponed. Projects in private sectors, government ministries or state companies worth of Rp63,660 trillion were also re-evaluated. Following the Presidential Decree no 39/97, electricity and toll roads projects were delayed. These included the building of the longest bridge Malindo which would connect Sumatra and Malaysia by Tutut Soeharto and her US$2 billion project to burrow a subway line through the swampy soil of Jakarta. In the meantime, to address the financial sector, Soeharto had instructed Muhammad and Bank Indonesia Governor, Soedrajad Djiwandono, in a cabinet meeting on 3 September, to provide liquidity support to troubled banks. This lending was known as BLBI (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indonesia-Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support) lending. While contradicting the central banks own policy of reigning in liquidity, it had no choice but to inject more liquidity by printing banknotes to fulfill the demands of bank depositors. However, printing new currency would only devalue the rupiah further thereby fuelling a vicious cycle of devaluation, bank rushes, monetary expansion and further devaluation. Muhammad and Djiwandono hoped that as long as BLBI lending was kept to modest level, Bank Indonesia could offset the lending by draining funds from banks with surplus cash such as state banks. Through September and October, the strategy seemed to work. Deposits were withdrawn but overall liquidity remained tight and money supply was kept in check. But this all changed with the closing of sixteen private banks on 1 November. BLBI lending, combined with dollar demand from corporations belatedly trying to hedge their offshore debts, caused the currency to slump to Rp3,600/$ by month-end. Analysts concluded that 96 percent of BLBI funds or nearly Rp138 trillion were subject to abuse. Of the total BLBI lending of Rp145 trillion, Rp116 trillion was disbursed from November 1997 through March 1998 mostly to private banks suffering from depositor withdrawals.54 Four banks stood out among the 48 private banks that received BLBI funds: Sudomo Salims Bank Central Asia (BCA)55, Sjamsul Nursalims BDNI, Usman Atmadjayas Bank Danamon and Bob Hasans Bank Umum Nasional. Based on banks loan portfolios, these banks
54 55
Bank Indonesia, Statistic Ekonomi Keuangan Indonesia, p.21 The growth of Salim Group has been extraordinary. Its total capital grew at an average of 46% 28 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
had been channeling credits to their own group. Investigators found that loans were disbursed not to third party but to sister companies forming 60 percent of total loans to BCA and Bank Danamon, 78 percent in Bank Umum and 91 percent in Bank Dagang Negara Indonesia (BDNI).56 It was speculated that the order of disbursal of BLBI credits came from Soehartos children. As stakeholders, Sigit and Tutut owned 30 percent in BCA, while Danamon had financed the first family projects. BDNI on the other hand maintained a close tie to the military and Bank Umums Bob Hasan was closely associated to the Cendana family. Assigned as the Indonesian Coordinator Team in early October cabinet meeting, Prof. Widjojo Nitisastro, Indonesian most renowned economist, must deal with the monetary crisis and of liaising with IMF. The abrupt closure of 16 banks was an indication of how Bank Indonesia had failed to supervise private banking sectors. Following the deregulation of 1988, most banks were either mismanaged or used as private property by owners. They asked a higher interest rate than normal on loans, and paid a very low rate on savings accounts. Even in some cases, as much as 90 percent of the credit had gone to their own purposes or even to illegally finance their new investments. The result of such conduct was the socalled kredit macet, or uncollectable credits which had often been used to finance large and expensive projects run by other companies without proper guarantees by the banks owners or shareholders. In most cases, the value of the project was highly marked up, leading to the over financing of an investment. The rise of financial scandals such as Eddy Tansil case was an example of such collusion. In order to obtain credit, Eddy Tansil had used the letter of recommendation signed by Sudomo, the Minister Coordinator of Political and Security Affairs, to acquire the loans he needed from the state bank Bapindo. By October it had become evident that immense financial problems were largely due to huge short-term unhedged loans abroad with low interest rates, mostly in dollars by Indonesian businessmen. As rupiah continued to fall, the value of foreign debts grew enormously. The general chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Trade and Industry, Ir Aburizal Bakrie estimated that the value of
annually between 1970 to 1985 and by 1985 it was already 300 times higher than the initial level in 1970. The Salim Groups BCA had been the largest private bank in Indonesia. In the beginning BCA was only a knitting company based in Semarang until Liem took it over in 1957 and restructured it into a bank. For several years BCA did not experience significant capital growth until in 1975 Mochtar Riady (Li Mo Tie) was appointed as the banks president and immediately BCAs net worth is 28 increased by injecting profits from other group members to higher the banks capital base. In 1993 the assets of the group are estimated to be Rp30.403.4 billion. See Pusat Data Business Indonesia, Conglomeration Indonesia, 2nd edition, Jakarta 1994 56 Suara Pembaruan, 22 August 1998 29 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
short-term loans in the form of commercial paper which had to be paid off before the end of the year exceeded US$20 billion.57 Businesses in the construction, manufacturing and banking sector were hit hard by the crisis, forcing them to close down their businesses and therefore adding the unemployment level up to about 20 percent of the work force or about 20 million people. With the majority layoffs carried by most companies, the number of people living below the poverty line had increased significantly to nearly 50 percent of the total population. From 1996 to 1998, Indonesia per capita had decreased from US$1,155 to US$610. 58 On October 8, Indonesian government announced that it would seek financial assistance from IMF in order to regain market trust and stabilize the rupiah. Reluctant at first to appeal to IMF, Soeharto finally gave in to the advices of his economic team. A total of US$23 billion was offered in the form of loans by IMF, the World Bank, and ADB. IMF itself was to add another US$10 billion and bilateral donors were to furnish another US$20 billion. The First Letter of Intent with the IMF, titled the Memorandum on Economics and Financial Policies was signed by Muhammad and Djiwandono on 31 October 1997. The highlight of the agreement was to implement reforms within the unregulated banking sector, eliminate subsidies on fuels, electricity, and foodstuffs; dismantle monopolies and cartels; and facilitate a greater access to the Indonesian market for foreign competition. Furthermore, state companies had to be privatized. The policy
framework by IMF package was basically designed to restore confidence and arrest the decline of the rupiah. The program was built around three areas of first, a strong macroeconomic framework designed to achieve an orderly adjustment in the external current account and incorporating substantial fiscal adjustment as well as tight monetary stance. Secondly, a comprehensive strategy to restructure the financial sector, including the early closure of insolvent institutions. And third, a broad range of structural measures to improve governance. Bank Indonesia received financial back up of Rp2.3 trillion to repay debts in regards to the closing of 16 banks. The domestic reaction to the closure of the banks was quiet unexpected. Efforts to restore confidence in the banking sector resulted in the collapse of confidence. Many banks lost their deposit base and from January 1998, letters of credit issued by Indonesian banks have been denied abroad.59 Among the largest bank on the November list of closures was Bank Harapan Sentosa owned by Hendra Rahardja, a brother of Eddy Tansil. Accused
57 58
Jawa Pos, 12 October 1997 See Zon, 2004 59 See Djiwandono, 1999
30
of embezzlement over US$1 billion from Bank Harapan Sentosa, Hendra fled Indonesia leaving depositors empty handed with counterfeited property projects and affiliated loans. But Muhammad was powerless to act because the banks board of commissioners included a brother-in-law of Soeharto.60 The second largest bank was Bank Pacific where Bank Indonesia owned 38 percent of the bank. Run by the daughter of Gen. (ret.) Ibnu Sutowo, the head of state oil monopoly Pertamina and a close associate of Soeharto, Endang Mokodompit embezzled funds around a third of the banks assets to her own companies. Bad credit had burdened the bank with an estimated loss of Rp3.3 trillion, as observed in June. Almost 60 percent of its credit had gone into property and other projects of Ibnu Sutowo family and friends. The bank closures had also hit three smaller banks whose shareholders included Soeharto family members and relatives.61 Bank Andromeda was led by Bambang Trihatmodjo, the second son of Soeharto followed by Bank Jakarta with Probosutedjo, the presidents foster brother, as the chief commissioner. Tutut Soeharto also held eight percent shares of Bank Industri, another troubled bank, together with Hashim S. Djojohadikusumos shares of four percent. Muhammad and Djiwandono were clearly trying to show that economic management took precendence over Cendanas interest, but Soehartos family simply were not ready to back down yet. Bambang lashed out upon hearing the closing of his bank implying that it is an attempt to smear the familys name as an effort to indirectly
60 61
Sydney Morning Herald, 4 November 1997; Suara Pembaruan, 14 June 1999 Tutut, Bambang, and Tommy had the highest economic profiles as Soehartos children. Tutut headed the group Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada (CLG) to which firms like Citra Marga Nusaphala Persada (CMNP) participated in the management and the building of toll-roads in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Phillipines and China. Within the group, she managed Citra Flour Mills Nusantara and Citra Transport Nusantara, the holding company of Citra taxis and public buses. Bambang on the other hand led the Bimantara Citra Group and held 38 percent of the shares while Indra Rukmana, the spouse of Tutut, had a 14 percent stake in the company. Meanwhile, Tommy headed the Humpuss Group, a short for Hutomo Mandala Putra Soeharto Sumahardjuno, of which part of the shares were owned by Sigit. In media business, Bambang, Tutut and Sudwikatmono, Soehartos cousin were owners and shareholders. RCTI TV station (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia) belonged to Bambang and TPI TV station (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia) was controlled by Tutut. Sudwikatmono on the other hand owned SCTV TV station (Surya Citra Televisi) in which Bambang and spouse were shareholders. Other business ventures led by Sudwikatmono were the Golden Truly Group (supermarkets), the Subentra Group (in cinemas, films, magazines), the Astenia Group (in trade and real estate), and the Wijaya Kusuma Group (in agriculture and Mining). In banking sectors, Sudwikatmono also owned Bank Surya and Bank Subentra. His business empire started as he joined Liem Sioe Liong, Ibrahim Risjad and Djuhar Sutanto where they founded Waringin Kencana. Sudwikatmono was a major shareholder of Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa and Indofood Sukses Makmur. Other Soehartos relatives included his half-brother, Probosutedjo, who was the president director of the Mercu Buana Group and Hasyim S. Djojohadikusumo, the brother of Soehartos son in law, Prabowo. The latter was the owner of Tirtamas Group which included firms like Semen Cibinong and Prima Comexindo. See Van Dijk, 2001 31 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
topple his father from the presidential seat.62 Market reactions varied upon the closing of these banks, but mostly many public depositors were dismayed. For many years depositors had invested their trust on these banks for safety reason as they were closely affiliated to Cendana. Fear for their funds, local depositors panicked and withdrew their funds from all but the state-owned banks. Meanwhile, on 3 November, the government released the retail price of cement and opened up a greater access for foreign companies to enter the retail trade sector earlier than originally planned in 2003 in respect to manufacturing and trading companies. In the case of Bulog (Badan Urusan Logistik National Distribution Agency), beginning 1 January it no longer had the monopoly on imported products of soya beans, garlic and wheat flour. Except on the distribution channel, Bulog would maintain its import monopoly only on rice and sugar. With the liberation of the economy in motion, IMF had agreed to provide further financial support in the form of three years standby credit of US$7,338 billion within the next two days. In the meantime, Soehartos health was beginning to deteriorate. Rumors about the presidents health condition had caused the rupiah to plunge to Rp4,600/$. Cancellation by the president to attend the ASEAN Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur pushed rupiah to new lows reaching Rp5000/$ on 12 December. Soehartos refusal to heed the IMFs advice to reform the rent-seeking structure was a clear indication of how the president was insistent on his way of running the economy. The composition of BIs internal board of directors was affected by this move. Four of BIs seven managing directors were abruptly dismissed on 20 December without notifying Djiwandono beforehand. The directors were soon under the investigation by the attorney general for a Rp1.5 trillion rupiah embezzlement scandal. No case of corruption was ever present but it was more of a disapproval gesture from Soeharto for having attempted to liquidate banks owned by the first family. New taskforce was immediately appointed by Soeharto with Radius Prawiro leading the commission of TPULNS (Tim Penanggulangan Utang Luar Negeri Swasta-Private Foreign Debt Settlement Team). Team members included Anthony Salim, the son of Soedono Salim (Liem Sioe Liong) from Salim Group followed by the Ning King from Argo Manungggal Group and Rachmat Gobel from Gobel Group.
62
Asiaweek, Now The Hardest Part, 14 November 1997
32
Results of the investigation by TPULNS showed that a staggering number of 228 Indonesian companies were found to have difficulies in paying off their foreign debts. It was also stated that the corporate debt had amounted to US$23 billion, while the private foreign debt reached US$74 billion. The difference of US$51 billion was held mostly by foreign firms and joint ventures. In the
meantime, foreign debts of the Indonesian government and of state companies came to a total of US$63.5 billion. Without the financial support by the
government and the rescheduling of debts by foreign money-lenders, a large number of Indonesian businesses fell into deep trouble.63 Nearing the end of the year, a drastic measure by the government included the merger of seven banks. Four banks consisted of BBD (Bank Bumi Daya), BDN (Bank Dagang Negara), Bapindo and Bank Eksim merged into one bank while BTN (Bank Tabungan Negara) into BNI (Bank Negara Indonesia) with the exception of BRI (Bank Rakyat Indonesia) which remained the same. However, mounting economic crisis had caused a public mistrust towards the government. Immediately after Soeharto released a State Budget on 6 January 1998, rupiahs exchange rate declined to Rp10000/$. By early January 1998, rumors over the scarcities of food supply had created panic in the market. Shoppers converged on grocery stores to hoard food before prices rose again. The government appealed for calm, but food riots erupted in a host of towns across Java. With food prices inevitable soar following the devaluation, mobs accused ethnic Chinese shopkeepers for price-gouging. The clash between authority and street vendors (kaki lima) in Cicadas, Bandung, on 5 January, ended up with attacks towards shops belonging to ethnic Chinese as well as pribumi businessmen. In other parts of Indonesia, farmers and motorcycles
and trucks protested against unfair prices on 12-16 January in East Java. There was violence against Chinese and pribumi stores and warehouses. Furthermore, a crowd of fishermen damaged shops in the small town of Kragan, Rembang, in Central Java, on 26 January. Two days later, similar incidents took place in Lumajang, East Java, riots lasted from 28-30 January. On 2 February, it was in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi, on 7 February in Bima, on 9 February in Sidoardjo, East Java, and on 18 February in Ende, Flores.64 A Second Letter of Intent was signed on 15 January where Indonesia and IMF reached fifty points of agreement. Those comprised included the macroeconomic policies of fiscal policy monetary and exchange rate policy; the financial sector
63 64
See Van Dijk, 2001 ibid
33
restructuring and the strengthening of legal and supervisory framework for banking; and the structural reforms of foreign trade and investment, deregulation and privatization as well as social safety net and environment. Within the financial sector restructuring, it was agreed that state banks will not be recapitalized except in conjunction with privatization. Within the structural reforms, programs including liberalization of foreign trade and investment, deregulation of domestic activities as well as the acceleration of the privatization program were prioritized. At the same time, projects to alleviate poverty were envisaged. It was also stated that twelve major infrastructure projects involving Tutut Soehartos $2.5 billion project Tanjung Jati-C power plant were to be canceled due to the crisis. The mounting pressure was added with the IMF Director, Michael Camdessus, photographed with his arms folding over Soeharto when signing the Second Letter of Intent. The implication of the accord clearly called for major fiscal reforms on the abolishment of various monopolies on sugar, clove, flour, plywood, cement, paper, and the termination of government supports for a number of projects such as IPTN (Industri Pesawat Terbang Nusantara Archipelago Aircraft Industry) and Timor car. For years, IPTN had received special funding totaling to US$500 million obtained from the regular national budget. Founded by B.J. Habibie in 1976, IPTN became the strategic industry which would raise the skills and ancillary industries while at the same time increasing the economys total production. As the Minister of Research and Technology, Habibie soon implemented his dreams of building high-tech industries that would allow Indonesia to leapfrog from a less developed country to a modern global economy using the state resources. By 1993 economists estimated nearly US$2 billion a year of state resources were allocated towards Habibies strategic industries.65 In the case of Timor car, it was financed by the government to develop Indonesias own automotive industry, following the example of Malaysia Proton national car. With soft loans of US$690 million and exceptionally low interest rate of six percent, Timor car had the full financial back up from consortium of banks including BCA, Bank Danamon, Bank Lippo and the state bank, Bank Dagang Negara. The use of local components in the production was set at 20 percent for the first year, followed by an increase of 40 percent in the second year and 60 percent by the third year. Based on the presidential decree on February 1996, cars producers using local components would receive tax
65
The Economist, Indonesia Survey: Engineering the Future, 17 April 1993, p.12 34 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
exemptions in import tax and luxury tax for a period of three years. The condition also applied to built-up cars produced abroad by Indonesia labor. In this case, Timor car was produced in joint venture with the South Korean firm KIA Motors. The car was produced in South Korea using the imported local components from Indonesia. Viewed as a violation of GATT (General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade), World Trade Organization and IMF decided to stop the production. In November 1997 at the instigation of IMF, Tommy resigned as the president director and became the president commissioner. With the major revision on state budget by IMF, inflation was estimated at twenty percent and economic growth was down to zero percent followed by the exchange rate of Rp5000/$. Subsidies for fuel and electricity were also drastically reduced from Rp10 trillion to Rp7.45 trillion.66 Soeharto, in turn, formed
DPKEK (Dewan Pemantapan Ketahanan Ekonomi dan Keuangan - Council for Economy and Financial Resilience) headed by the president himself, Widjojo Nitisastro as secretary general, and the Minister of Finance, Fuad Bawazier as deputy secretary-general, to ensure the implementation of IMF economic and financial restructurisation.67 It seemed however, that the public had lost faith in Indonesian banks and nearly Rp7.5 trillion was withdrawn from Indonesian banks and transferred to foreign banks within the first three weeks of January. The government had then decided to establish BPPN (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional - Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency-IBRA) on 26 January. One of the tasks is to audit unhealthy banks and ensure the taking over of insolvent banks. On 27 January, BI issued full liability insurance for local banks to
creditors and depositors. The government also declared that it would guarantee the deposits at about 70 medium-sized and large banks. By February, in an effort to stimulate bank mergers, BI announced that before the end of the year, the minimum capital requirement for banks was to be Rp1 trillion or US$125 million. Soedradjad Djwandono hoped that by the end of 1998, the number of private banks would drastically be reduced from 212 to 28. The sweeping structural reforms recommended by IMF and other donors put Soeharto in a vulnerable position and desperate measures were needed to restore confidence. Stephen Hanke, a professor at John Hopkins University in Baltimore, USA who was also appointed by the DPKEK as the advisor, introduced a monetary solution through a currency board system (CBS). Soeharto indicated
66 67
See Van Dijk, 2001 On 19 March, structural changes were made to DPKEK by Soeharto where Anthony Salim replaced the position of Prof Widjojo Nitisastro as the secretary general and remained as the deputy. See 35 Indahyani Yusuf et al, 2007 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
that the implementation of a CBS could halt rupiah to the dollars at the fixed exchange rate. However, for a currency board to succeed at the exchange rate of Rp5000/$, the government would need to convince the rupiah holders that every Rp5000 was backed by one US dollar in the state treasurys foreign reserve.68 Despite oppositions by BI governor, IMF and World Bank, Soeharto went ahead with the plan. On 10 February, all 500 parliamentarians favored a CBS. BI governor, Djiwandono was sacked and replaced by Syahril Sabini who immediately worked on plans for a CBS. The rate of rupiah rose from Rp10,900 to Rp 7,300 to the dollar. Soehartos interference with BIs monetary policy and references to a CBS called for harsh reaction from the international community. Fearing the worst, IMF and G7 (Group of Seven Countries)69 threatened to cut its support of US$43 billion if Indonesia imposed a CBS, while American President Bill Clinton through Walter Mondale, his special envoy, bore a message, which was to follow the recommendations of IMF. The German Minister of Finance Theo Waigel, Singapores Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, Derek Fatchett, British Deputy Foreign, and a special envoy of the Japanese Prime Minister, soon followed suit. Soeharto was left with no choice but to postpone the implementation of a CBS. On his presidential speech before the Peoples Consultative Assembly, Soeharto announced a new concept of IMF Plus as an alternative way to solve the financial crisis. It remained unclear however what Soeharto meant by IMF Plus except for the incontrovertible fact of the abolishment of subsidies on rice and other basic necessities and of the pegging of the rupiah to the dollar. On 2 March, the government reported the rate of inflation went down to 12.7 percent by February from the expected rate of 19.64 percent. The wave of good news was highlighted by the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to Jakarta in regards of financial aid on foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies desperately needed by the poor. A total of 2 billion Japanese yen was received on 3 March from the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. On 10 March Soeharto was re-elected as the President serving a five years period for the seventh time with B.J. Habibie as the Vice President. Despite protests from students and threats from IMF to postpone the granting of the
Soedradjat Djiwandono stated that gross foreign reserves stood around US$20 billion, while in order to make CBS credible, Indonesia would need reserves estimated at US$70 billion to cover the broad money supply. See Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Bank Indonesia and the Recent Crisis, Vol. 36, No.1, April 2000 p. 65 69 G7 or Group of Seven Countries consisted of USA, The Great Britain, Germany, Canada, Italy, France and Japan 36 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
68
second installment of US$3 billion out of US$10 billion as promised and scheduled on 15 March, Soeharto announced his new cabinet which comprised of Soehartos cronies and his eldest daughter, Tutut. Rupiah hit a low bottom of 16,500 to the dollar or one-seventh of its pre-crisis value with the announcement of the vice president and the new cabinet. Throughout Indonesia, students demanded replacement of a number of cabinet ministers. Commander of Armed Forces, Gen. Wiranto responded to the student movements and offered dialogue together with prominent critics such as Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, and Megawati for fear of uncontrollable outburst of violence. The Armed Forces were in favor of reformation as long as it followed a constitutional path. Any radical movements simply could not be tolerated. Keeping up with IMF demands, the Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, Ginandjar Kartasasmita announced the dismissal of a CBS plan on 17 March due to the lack of necessary currency reserves. The immediate effect was felt in the banking industry with monthly interest rate going down from 6.75 percent to 4.75 percent. The Minister of Justice, Muladi, declared that the regulation on bankruptcy was to take place in May following the inflation rate that had reached 5.49 percent on 2 April. Fear for panic in the market, the government decided to postpone the liquidation of seven banks and ensured clients funds in savings and deposits. On 8 April, after weeks of tough negotiations with IMF, a new agreement was reached. Five major points were included into this additional memorandum namely on economic and financial policies which followed a strict time table (see Table 2.1). A Third Letter of Intent (LOL) with IMF was signed on 10 April. BPPN soon announced a list of thirty-two banks that came under its supervision excluding the fifty-four national banks; in which seven banks were to be liquidated, another seven felt under the direct management of BPPN. The other thirty-two banks became the focal point of BPPN and the rest were no longer on the list. The memorandum had also called for a lifting up of restrictions on foreign investment in wholesale trade and privatization of state companies. In the meantime, Indonesian delegation to New York led by Radius Prawiro and members including the Minister of Finance Fuad Bawazier, BI Governor Syahril Sabirin, and BI Director Dono Iskandar came to discuss the economic frameworks in regards to terms of payments on private foreign debts and on trade finance and money market line. Working on a tight schedule, Soeharto led the second meeting of DPKEU on 22 April with the main agenda focusing on
economic and finance reforms including terms of payments on foreign debts and trade finance. Soeharto must act fast to restore public confidence. With mounting economic crisis, the growing numbers of people had begun to question Soheartos credibility and the government. Fear for harsh reaction by the public, Soeharto cancelled the announcement on execution of reforms in 2003 which was scheduled the following day. Reportedly, the president had worked immediately on drafting the constitutional acts of reforms. On 4 May, oil price had increased by 77 percent and the price of electricity to 60 percent. Governments subsidies in oil was reduced from Rp16 trillion to Rp6 trillion while in electricity from Rp11 trillion to Rp2 trillion. The price hikes were followed by increased transportation fares (See Table 2.2). Throughout the nation, students protested against the increased price for basic commodities and demanded political reforms despite installment payment by IMF totaling to US$989 million. While the exchange rate of rupiah came to Rp8,700/$ on 6 May, social disorder had escalated70. Ethnic Chinese in Medan had begun a massive exodus to Malaysia and Singapore following riots in their hometown. To prevent currency devaluation, BI increased its interest rate to twelve points and deposits interest rate had gone up from 40 to 62.5 percent. Efforts to stabilize the ongoing economic fluctuation were carried on by the government in Tokyo meeting on 810 May. Radius Prawiro led the Indonesian delegation with members including the Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the Minister of Industry and Trade, Muhammad Hasan, Head of BPPN, Iwan Prawiranata, BI Director, Dono Iskandar to discuss bank debt and trade finance with officials from IMF, World Bank, and ADB. The estimated foreign debt of US$63.6 billion was scheduled in the upcoming meeting in Frankfurt, Germany. Despite deteriorating economic condition, Soeharto attended the G-15 meeting in Cairo, Egypt on 9 May and was scheduled to return in a week time. A few days after he left the country, the nation was shaken by the death of four students from Universitas Trisakti in Grogol, West Jakarta. As students rallied peaceful protests against the government in their campus, students were shot by the troops. The shooting incident resulted in the drastic decline of rupiah up to 500 points and the rate went down to Rp9,200/$. With the growing tension in the market,
Human Rights Watch Asia found in the first five weeks of 1998 more than two dozen incidents of demonstrations, price riots, bomb threats, bombings on Java alone, and the unrest was spreading to other islands. See HRW/Asia, Indonesia Alert: Economic Crisis Leads to Scapegoating of Ethnic Chinese. New York, February, 1998 38 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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rupiah had weakened to Rp11,500/$. The Minister of State Enterprise, Tantri Abeng, stated that due to the recent condition, two foreign companies had withdrawn their initial shares acquisition of Indonesian public enterprises. Furthermore, angry crowd took matters into their hands and the streets of Jakarta turned violent. Cars were smashed and buildings were burnt down. The act of violence had spread to other parts of Indonesia such as in Solo, Central Java and Padang, and West Sumatra. The exchange rate of rupiah went as low as Rp12,250/$. With the unexpected turn of event, Soeharto decided to return the following day in an effort to restore the condition. Prices for gasoline were 16.6 percent lowered from the usual price of premium Rp1,200 to Rp1000 whereas the electricity price was gradually reduced beginning of August to 3.9 percent and 4.7 percent in November. The economic loss amounted to nearly 2.4 trillion rupiah. Meanwhile, embassies had begun to organize their staffs for evacuation due to political instability. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto requested immediate evacuation from Indonesia. War planes were flown from Japan to Singapore to ensure safety evacuation. Following the act of violence specifically targeted towards ethnic Chinese, Taiwan, one of the sixth largest investor in Indonesia decided to postpone and even withdraw their investments in Indonesia (see Table 2.3). On 16 May, Soeharto announced his plans to reshuffle the cabinet. Unaffected by Soehartos plans, students marched towards the MPR assemblies and demanded the convening of an extraordinary session of the MPR to overthrow Soeharto. As Speaker of the parliament, Harmoko had no choice but to voice students aspirations to Soeharto. At 3.20 pm, Harmoko entered a press room and appeared on national television asking for the resignation of Soeharto. In response to Harmokos statement, Gen. Wiranto, offered a formal explanation that it was of individual opinion and therefore had no legal basis. The following day, nine Muslim leaders led by Nurchholis Madjid, Islamic scholar, were invited to Cendana. Soeharto wanted to establish a reform committee, or Komite Reformasi, to draft the guidelines for political reforms and to select a new cabinet. Sensing Soehartos invitation for some to join the new reform cabinet, all nine leaders agreed not to accept any positions offered by the president. The tide of anti-Soeharto momentum was so strong that fourteen ministers led by Ginandjar Kartasasmita soon followed suit. Soeharto had lost nearly half of his cabinet. Following the political chaos, the World Bank released a statement to postpone the financial support of US$1.2 million to Indonesia. As thousands of
students began to occupy the MPR assemblies and demanded the resignation of Soeharto, the exchange rate of rupiah plunged to Rp11,500/$ and the stock exchange index went up to nearly 2.5%. Soeharto was finally left on his own devices and agreed to step down and transfer his power to the Vice-President B.J On 21 May, Soeharto resigned after thirty-two years of power. B.J. Habibie took the oath of office and became Indonesias third president. He vowed to serve out the remainder of Soehartos term through 2003 and form a new cabinet imminently. Military structural changes also took place on 22 May as Let. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, the Commander of Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command), was first replaced by Lt. Gen. Johny Lumintang71 and within seventeen hours by Lt. Gen. Djamari Chamiago. On the same day, military officials instructed students to leave the MPR assemblies. Revision and reviews were orders of Habibies government beginning with the governments instruction to review Pertaminas, State Oil and Natural Company, business partners and procedures on export and import. In the banking sector, a major bank rush happened for nearly a week at BCA mainly due to shares owned by Soehartos family. Sigit and Tutut each owned 16 percent and 14 percent. One day before the rush, the Director of BCA had stated that its shareholders would increase the value of investment up to Rp1 trillion to ensure the market that rumors concerning the plans to liquidate BCA and the death of Liem Sioe Liong were untrue. Despite efforts by shareholders to contain the situation, BPPN took charged and formed a team to audit the bank. On 28 May, the newly elected president B.J. Habibie and DPR had agreed to execute an extraordinary MPR session at the end of 1998 followed by presidential election in the coming year. Meanwhile, in the financial sector, efforts to settle Indonesias foreign debt continued to be the main agenda. In the Frankfurt meeting from 1-4 June which was attended by the delegation of Radius Prawiro and thirteen foreign bankers, an agreement was reached. Indonesia must settle its obligation in interbank debt and trade finance arrears by the end of the month.
The official explanation why Lt. Gen. Syahrir M.S. Lumintang became the shortest serving Commander of Kostrad was because Lt.Geng Djamari Chaniago was unable to come to Jakarta from Bandung in such a short notice. Meanwhile, someone had to fill in the gap after Prabowo was relieved of command. Another explanation was that Prabowos Islamic image could not be replaced by Lumintang who was a Christian. Some of Habibies closest Islamic advisors were opposed to Lumintangs appointment as he was closely associated with Gen. Benny Moerdani,a devout Catholic with a deepseated aversion towards Islam. See Van Dijk, 2001 40 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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Following the agreement, Indonesian government via BI provided installment funds on 15 June. In exchange, the Frankfurt agreement which involved the Bank Steering Committee could begin drafting the restructuring frameworks for foreign debts and trade facilities including the mechanism for exports and imports. To guarantee the installment, the government issued the Presidential Decree no 120/1998. The Fourth Letter of Intent was signed on 24 June. In the first three months since Habibies election, economic problems had not abated. From the macroeconomic indicator, the prospects for GDP growth, the inflation rate, budget deficit and the supply of food and other basic commodities were slim. Although the rupiah had been strengthening somewhat, possibly it was due to the CGI loan disbursement totaling to US$8 billion. Data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics also showed that for the whole of 1998, economic contraction was more than 13 percent. The inflation rate for 1998 was estimated at more than 80 percent while unemployment reached 17 percent. People living below the poverty line had increased significantly from 22 to 80 million. Since Habibie took charge, rupiah depreciated more than 20 percent while budget deficit remained large. 72
72
See Djiwandono, 1999
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CHAPTER III PERISTIWA MAY 1998: Political storm in mid 1996 to early 1998: The Chronology
Following the conflicts between the elites, May 1998 tragedy is regarded as politically biased and controversial. Tensions between various groups arise as the results of political turmoil. This chapter attempts to map Indonesian political journey that is colored by power and greed based on the chronological events beginning from the PDI raid in July 1996 until the end of Soeharto era in 1998. The analysis is based on research results of earlier scholars namely James Luhulima in Hari-hari Terpanjang: Menjelang Mundurnya Presiden Soeharto , Kees Van Dijk in A Country in Despair: Indonesian between 1997 and 2000, and Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (Joint Fact-Finding Team), Seri 2 Data-data Kerusuhan in Laporan Akhir Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta (TGPF) Peristiwa Tanggal 13-15 Mei 1998:Jakarta, Solo, Palembang, Lampung, Surabaya dan Medan as well as from local and international magazines and newspapers. Political turmoil following the election began with the raid of PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia), Indonesian Democratic Partys headquarter in Menteng, Jakarta, on 27 July 1996. The loyalists of Soerjadi, seized the building claiming as the rightful owner and asserted on the fact that his legality although denied by the party congress in June 1996, had been in fact re-elected by the authorities as general chairman of PDI and therefore proclaimed Megawati Soekarnoputris board null and void. On that day known as Sabtu Kelabu, or Grey Saturday, the material damage of the Jakarta municipality amounted to Rp100 billion. The riots, followed in the wake of attack, made by supporters of one faction in the PDI, headed by Soerjadi and backed by the government and the Armed Forces against the Megawati supporters who had defended the PDI headquarter. To members of PDI, the name Soerjadi was a familiar one as he served twice as PDI chair from 1986 until 1993. He was first elected by Soepardjo Rustam, the Minister of Internal Affairs, in party congress at Pondok Gede, Jakarta. Under his leadership, PDI earned twenty-four representatives in the parliament in 1982, an increased of forty seats in the parliament in 1987 and another sixteen in 1992.
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Although, known as a reform-minded party chair, Soerjadi posed as a threat to the current government. After each presidential election Indonesias three political parties, United Development Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP),
73
Gatra, Soerjadi dan Babak Baru Konflik PDI, 8 June 1996, p.22-25
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Functional Groups, Golongan Karya (Golkar), Soehartos political party, and Indonesian Democratic Party, Partai Demokrat Indonesia (PDI), installed new leaders in special party congresses. When PDIs 1993 congress convened in midyear to re-elect Soeryadi as chair, the military intervened. Soeryadis supporters were issued threats while the military allowed Megawati, the daughter of Soekarno to replace Soeryadi. By the virtue of her pedigree alone, Megawati was still a threat to Soeharto. The militarys meddling had backfired. Fully supported by a handful of reform-minded PDI colleagues, Megawati used her position to criticize the government and called for the long overdue political and economic reforms. Her low profile and modest character had attracted a large pool of supporter which consisted mainly of youth. Throughout 1994 and 1995, pro-Megawati supporters in particular from the island of Java had grown significantly. By 1996, it was clear that PDI had become an iconic party which represented reforms. Meanwhile, Megawatis campaign was perceived by the opponents as a vehicle of anti-government sentiments. The internal crisis that had existed between Soerjadi and Megawati in East Java was seen as a potential venue to create conflict. The conflict was further intensified as Soerjadi proposed the idea to have an extraordinary party congress or known as Kongres Luar Biasa (KLB) to resolve the issue of leadership.74 With the majority of the party supporting Soerjadi, KLB was soon underway.75 Taking place in Medan, North Sumatra on 20 June, Megawati was rendered powerless. The congress achieved a quorum and Soerjadi was reinserted. Meanwhile, Megawati and her supporters were prohibited from attending the congress and Megawatis term as party chair was cut short. Soeharto once again secured his political position. Over the years PDI had grown stronger and within the political arena PDI was seen as the potentially second largest party after Golkar. To Soeharto, Megawati had become a threat that could possibly disturb the balance of power in the upcoming MPR session. Unwilling to concede defeat, Megawatis supporters mainly of student activists refused to leave the PDI headquarter in Menteng, Jakarta. Situated in a large house of a prestigious residential neighborhood, the students denounced the Medan congress. Within
Gatra, Soerjadi dan Babak Baru Konflik PDI, 8 June 1996, p. 22-25. Also see Tempo,Mendungmendung Menggayuti Mega, 27 November 1993, p.36-37 75 Arbi Sanit, a well-known political analyst, had predicted the aggressive campaign of Golkar against the reformed-minded PDI by means of recruiting students as a way to ensure its political position. See Forum Keadilan, Peta Politik 1996: Ramalan para Pakar,15 January 1996, p. 22-24;Gatra, Inilah Jalan Kembali Bagi Soejadi, 15 June 1996, p.22-24; Gatra, Politik Sudah Berubah: Alex Asmasoebrata Bingung Soerjadi Mendapat Lampu Hijau. Ia Duga Ada Negosiasi Dengan Pemerintah, 15 June 1996, p.31 43 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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days, Jalan Diponegoro was packed with loyal followers of Megawati. Their protests against the government were delivered on the footpath to the assembled crowd. Fearing retaliation from the authorities, Megawati urged the youths to leave the headquarters. Instead, the movement grew in size and by July it had become clear that the students were not going to be coaxed into surrendering. The only way to contain the situation was to force the pro-Megawati supporters out of the premise. As the supporters of Soeryadi began their attack towards the students, riot police poured into the compound. No one was reportedly killed during the incident but twenty suffered from injury. As the situation worsened, acts of violence became unstoppable as the crowd turned into angry mob. Five busses were burnt and twenty-seven cars were smashed. The 1996 PDI raid was listed as the worst riot after The Malari riots in 1974 and Lapangan Banteng in 1982.76 With the parliamentary election around the corner in June 1997, all three parties had begun their intensive campaign. The rallies of Golkar and PPP usually involved a large number of mass compared to the usually modest campaign by PDI. For the Jakarta area, Maj. Gen. Sutiyoso, acting as the Chief of the
Operational Command to Safeguard the General Elections, rules were imposed to ensure minimum clashes among members from other parties. Street parades were strictly prohibited as they collided with traffic jams and public order. Sutiyoso stressed the danger of campaigning that could cause fatality and injury. Golkars chairman, Harmoko, promised an indoor campaign which focused more on discussions with a limited number of audience. Soerjadi however commented that street rallies should be allowed as it provided positive interactions between a political party and its supporters. Nevertheless, in the case of PPP, its campaign in Jakarta was brought to an abrupt end by authorities as it potentially created clash. At the first round of campaigning in Jakarta on 22 April, PPP was found to have violated the rules. Authorities had to cancel PPPs large outdoor gathering as it could lead to clashes. The campaign rules clearly stated that only small discussion meetings at the level of city ward were allowed. As a form of protests, local PPP in Yogyakarta took a stance and refused to appear on small event. But PPP supporters in Jakarta reacted in anger and acted violent towards passing cars and shops. Despite the imposing danger, other parties like Golkar followed suit. The supporters of Golkar paraded on the street and their campaign managed to attract
76
Gatra, Setelah Serangan Pagi di Markas PDI, 3 August 1996, p. 21-29
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a large crowd. But with repeated outbreaks of disturbances, the government pled a stop to illegal city parade that led to fatalities. Party leaders were asked to halt campaigning by holding indoor rallies. PPPs secretary-general, Tosari Widjaja, spoke on behalf of his party that there had been systematic and planned efforts to discredit his party by creating the impression that PPP campaign was a violent one.77 On 29 May, eligible voters cast their votes for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR), the Legislative Assembly, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah I (DPRD I), Assembly at provincial, regional or municipal level, and DPRD II. As the results were coming in in the following days, countless cases involving intimidation, bribery, and fraud were found. Accused of violating the election rules, PPP urged the electoral board not to recognize the election results. Meanwhile, leaders of PDI suspected irregularities concerning the results. The party and its branches demanded new elections and recounts in West Sumatra and North Bengkulu. Meanwhile, violent protests by supporters over the election results instigated series of riots in several areas like East Java and Madura. Prayer houses were burned down during the riots. Even in Bangkalan, the angry crowd attacked government buildings, a church and a Buddhist temple.78 With only 3.5 million votes, PDI scored poorly in the elections. Earning only ten seats, PDI
representatives in the parliament were less than required for the eleven parliamentary committees. At least two parliament members of each faction had to sit in each committee. To have a balance representation, PDI needed to have at least one extra seat. On 1 June, the chairman of Golkar announced PDI would gain additional votes from Golkar. PDI responded by stating that the party
needed sympathy only from its people and not from other parties. Nevertheless, on 23 June, Harmoko on behalf of Golkar, Ismal Hasan Metareum on behalf of PPP and Buttu Hutapea on behalf of PDI signed the final election results. Despite Soehartos victory, his deteriorating health had always become a major concern. On 4 July 1996, Soeharto was reportedly flown to Germany due to his health problem. Economic activity was deeply affected by the news and rupiah plunged against the US dollar. The Secretary of State Moerdiono stated that Soeharto was in perfect health and to ensure his overall health condition, the president must undergo a routine medical check-up every six months. The result from Bad Oeyenhausen, Germany, confirmed Soehartos healthy condition regardless of his old age. In the eyes of the political elite however, the news
77 78
Republika, 27 May 1997 See Van Dijk, 2001
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implied the end of his presidency from 1993-1998; whereas others believed that Soeharto simply had long planned to enter the upcoming presidential election with the credible letter of recommendation from the medical team abroad. Nearing the 1998 election, the president declining health condition once again took precedent. On 5 December 1997, Moerdiono made an announement that based on the advise of the presidential medical team Soeharto was required to take ten days bed rest. News about Soehartos health had an immediate effect to the rupiahs exchange rate and stock exchange index. Adding to the already panic market, rumors had circulated that Soeharto became severely ill and worse yet that he had been deceased. Soon after his fourteen days of total rest, Soeharto made a short appearance in the ceremony of armys graduates in an effort to calm the market. Known as a private individual, Soehartos move was unpredictable to anyone outside his inner circle. In the congress held by KNPI (Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia-National Committee of Indonesian Youth) on 1 April 1997, the chairman, Maulana Isman had proposed the re-election of Soeharto for 1998-2003 periods. Fear of being accused of maintaining his status quo, Soeharto stated that his re-election at his age would send a wrong impression. But yet, at the end of the meeting, Soeharto asked the DPR fractions to forward the request by KNPI in the parliamentary meeting. Meanwhile, the chairman of Golkar, Harmoko, reinstated the will of the party to re-elect Soeharto on 16 October during its meeting in Jakarta. On Golkars 33th anniversary in Jakarta, official announcement was delivered. Soehartos reaction to the announcement was to immediately challenge Golkar about his re-election. He reminded the enormous responsibility that had been trusted by the people which could not be taken lightly. The question remained whether or not the party could bear such responsibility when clearly Soehartos credibility was put at stake. To show their outmost believe in Soehartos leadership, party members shouted in full support during his speech.79 In light of the event, the eldest daughter of Soeharto, Tutut, reconfirmed Soehartos statement at students gathering in Universitas Diponegoro (Undip), Semarang on 20 December. Speaking as a daughter, Tutut asked her father not to be re-elected and that MPR should only pursue the will of
According to Frans Seda, a renowned economic and political analyst, Soehartos statement could be interpreted as two things. Firstly, Soeharto clearly avoided being idolized as an icon. And secondly, Soeharto felt the public had lost confidence in him and therefore Soeharto needed to know if he still had public support behind him as claimed by his party, Golkar. To Seda, Soeharto was mentally ready to step down if the public insisted upon. See Kompas, Ucapan-ucapan/Pesan/Sinyal Politik Pak Harto, 22 October 1997. 46 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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the people objectively and not otherwise. It seemed however that her statement was not taken seriously by the party. Harmoko claimed that Soehartos re-election was decided by the majority and not by individual choices. By 20 January 1998, Harmoko announced the decision of Soeharto to be the next presidential candidate. As explained to Harmoko from the party Golkar, Chief of the Armed Forces, Gen. Feizal Tanjung from the army, and the Minister of Interior, Yogie S.M, from the office, Soeharto agreed to serve the people. On 10 March, Soeharto took an oath and B.J. Habibie became his vice president. According to the constitution, MPR exercised the power to select a president. Nevertheless, Soehartos process towards presidency was designed early on by parliament members which were none other than his children, in-laws, siblings and relatives of the president. Names like Halimah Trihatmodjo, Hutomo Mandala Putra, Bambang Triharmodjo, Siti Hediati Hariyadi Prabowo, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, Sudwikatmono, Sukamdani S. Gitosardjono, Prabosutedjo came up in the list of parliament. In the 1997 MPR election, nearly eighty percents of parliament members were chosen by the president. Despite protests, Soeharto was convinced that they could carry out the aspiration of the people.80 Following the inauguration of Soeharto as the president on 11 March and the announcement of the new reformed cabinet on 14 March, student protests heightened. The students demanded Soeharto to step down and agreed to have dialogues only with MPR as the highest parliamentary assembly. Gen. Wiranto, the Minister of Defense and Security on the other hand, believed that he could persuade the students to come around. On 18 April, a dialogue between the government and public figures, intellectuals and students was held in Gedung Niaga Arena Pekan Raya Jakarta, Kemayoran. The gathering was attended by twenty-five public figures, thirty-nine Organisasi Kemasyarakatan Pemuda (OKP), Youth Organization, thirty-nine students bodies, twenty-four universities rectors, and seventeen ministers from the new reform cabinet namely the Minister of Social Affairs, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana or known as Tutut, the Minister of Industry and Trade, Mohamad Bob Hasan, the Minister of Education and Culture, Wiranto Arismunandar, the Minister of Information, Alwi Dahlan, the Minister of Justice, Muladi, the Coordinating Minister of Economy, Finance, and Industry, Ginandjar Kartasasmita, and the Minister of Defense and Security, Gen. Wiranto. Issues regarding Soehartos resignation remained the main theme
80
See Luhulima, 2001
during the dialogue. Consistent with their early demands, the students pushed for political change. Adding to the already turbulence weeks, several activists and students were reportedly missing. According to Komnas HAM (Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia- National Committee for Human Rights) until 30 March 1998, the list of missing people accounted to four people by the name of Desmond J. Mahesa, Pius Lustrilanang, Haryanto Taslam, Andi Arief. As they recounted their stories, new evidence about their kidnappings had begun to unravel. During the interrogation, they were asked specific questions regarding the activities of opposition groups such as PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokratik-Peoples Democratic Party)81 as well as their relations to opposition leaders like Megawati and Amien Rais. Other testimony from Pius Lustrilanang to Komnas HAM revealed minutes of kidnapping. On 4 February, he was kidnapped by a group of unidentified people in front of Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital in Jakarta. According to Pius, for the next two months he was put in cell and tortured by his captors. It was then he met other missing activists like Haryanto Taslam and Desmond J. Mahesa. In response to the hearing, Gen. Wiranto stated that neither the army nor the government allowed such practice. On 2 May, the army formed a fact-finding team led by the Chief of Army Military Police Maj. Gen. Syamsu Djalaluddin. After months of investigation, the team concluded the involvement of military personnel in the abduction. The findings were based on the victims testimonies obtained from Komnas HAM and Kontras (Komisi Untuk Orang Hilang Dan Korban Tindak Kekerasan-Committee for Missing People and Victim of Violence). On 13 July, the new Kapuspen, Armed Forces Chief of Information Center, Maj. Gen. Syamsul Maarif, revealed the roles of Kopassus (Komando Pasukan Khusus-Commander of Elite Special Forces) behind the abduction.82 Syamsul Maarif explained that in light of radical movements, Kopasus was instructed to secure what potentially seen as harmful. The evidence however pointed to Kopassus Group IV and V Army Post in Cijantung, East Jakarta where the victims were held. The victims had been kidnapped by Tim Mawar or Rose Team which were formed in July 1997 to combat those who tried to disrupt the
PRD led by Budiman Sudjatmiko was accused of provoking angry mobs during PDI raid. PRD took advantage of the pro-Megawati crowd who came to listen to the free speech outside PDI headquarter. It was believed that PRD had tried to instill their belief in communism. See Gatra, Setelah Serangan Pagi di Markas PDI Tanggal 27 Juli 1996, 3 December 1996, p. 21-29 82 On this issue, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen called off a routine training exercise between members of its elite special forces and their Indonesian counterparts, Kopassus. Washington also put a hold on all other planned military activities in Indonesia until April 1999. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Strategic Withdrawal: U.S. Defense Chief Explains More to Shelve Exercises, 20 August 1998 48 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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general session of MPR Congress. Headed by Maj. Bambang Kristiono, the team was made up of eleven selected Kopassus soldiers. During the press conference held on 17 July, Let. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, the previous Commander of Special Elite Kopassus, stated that he was ready to bear the responsibility if his soldiers were proven to participate in the abduction. On 3 August, Gen. Wiranto set a DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira-Military Honour Council)83, headed by Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Soebagio and the seven members to try Prabowo and two other high ranking officers. On 10 August, Prabowo appeared at a Military Honour Council to answer allegations that he ordered the abduction and torture more than 20 pro-democracy activists during the 2 years he commanded Indonesias Kopassus regiment.84 Prabowo admitted that he had misinterpreted instructions that he was only to monitor the movement of activists. Prabowo was not among the 11 soldiers who faced a court martial for alleged direct involvement in the abduction. In an interview with the media later on, Prabowo conveyed that the written instruction had come straight from Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. R. Hartono who was Soehartos closest. The instruction stated that Prabowo was to safeguard the general session of MPR congress from 1 until 11 March. It clearly asked for heightened security due to recent acts of terrorism in Demak on 13 September 1997, and Tanah Tinggi, Jakarta on 18 January 1998. At the time, reports from the intelligent had mentioned the potential riot led by Haryanto Taslam from PDI Perjuangan party. Maj. Bambang Kristiono was appointed as the Special Elite Kopassus Commander of Battalion 42 with duties to secure the so-called terrorists. The mission was to gather evidence through interrogation and to hand them over to the police. Instead, the activists were held in captivity and tortured. Furthermore, the three activists, Pius Lusrilanang, Haryanto Taslam and Desmond J Mahesa were mistakenly abducted.85 In defense of his regiment, Prabowo felt that Kopassus had acted accordingly. On 24 August, Lt. Gen. Prabowo was honorably
Regarding a Military Honor Council, Wiranto found many senior officers closed to him opposed the formation of such council as it allowed the army to wash its dirty laundry behind the closed doors. See Far Eastern Economic Review, Honour at Stake: Prabowo Makes an Easty Target As Military Probes Abuses, 20 August 1998 84 Until today, it still remained a mystery on who abducted the rest of the thirteen activists. Prabowo and his men denied their involvement in the abduction and were unaware of other existing military operation similar to Tim Mawar. The list of missing people obtained from Kontras included Yani Avri and Sonny (last seen 26 April 1997), M. Yusuf (last seen 7 May 1997), Dedy Hamdun, Noval Alkatiri and Ismail (last seen 29 May 1997), Suyat (last seen 1 February 1998), Herman Hendrawan (last seen 12 March 1998), Petrus Bima Anugerah (last seen March 1998), Hendra Hambalie, Ucok Munandar Siahaan and A Nasir (last seen 14 May 1998). See Luhulima, 2001: 96 85 ibid 49 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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discharged from the army by Gen. Wiranto based on the recommendation of a Military Honor Council.86 Rivalry between Prabowo and Wiranto was a known fact in the elite army circle. Being married to the daughter of Soeharto, Prabowo Subianto also the son of renowned economic scholar Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikusuma, had the outmost advantage. Appointed as the Commander of Special Elite Kopassus on 4
December 1995, he was promoted to brigadier general. His military career took off when he successfully led the Kopassus regiment in the 1996 hostage liberation from a separatist group of Free Papua Organization in Mapenduma, Papua. Kopassus gained the world attention and was considered the third best elite unit in the world after the British SAS (Special Air Service) and Israels anti-terrorist force. Prabowos interest in combat forces also earned him a position as the Commander of Kostrad (Army Strategic Reserve Command) in March 1998, a position once held by Soeharto in 1965 attempted coup detat. On the other hand, Wiranto served as the adjutant of Soeharto from 1989-1993. Wiranto graduated from the National Military Academy and pursued a lackluster army career before being noticed by senior generals in the 1983. He began his career as the Chief of Staff of the 9 Infantry Brigade in 1983 and as the Operations Assistant for Kostrads 2 Infantry Division in 1987-1988. His military career began to showcase as he became the presidents adjutant from 1989-1993. In March 1993, Wiranto was appointed as Chief of Staff of the Jaya Military Command replacing Brig. Gen. Haris Soedano. Within a year, Wiranto earned the commanding position of the Jaya Military Command. From then on, Wiranto was promoted as Commander of Kostrad from 1996-1997, and afterwards as Armed Forces Chief of Staff from 1997-1998. On 16 February, he held the position of Armed Forces Commander. And in the new reform cabinet, Wiranto served as the Minister of Defense and Security. In the case of abduction, Prabowo and Wiranto differed in attitudes. As a commander, Prabowo accepted the responsibilities of his mens actions. Before the council, Prabowo acknowledged the abduction of nine people by Tim Mawar and stressed the fact that all of them had been safely returned.87 Following the instruction, Prabowo must act fast to secure the capital which had become targets
Based on presidential decree no 62/ABRI/1998 date 20 Nov, Lt. Gen. Prabowo was officially discharged. Maj. Gen. Muchdi Purwopranjono and Col. (Inf.) Chaerawan were relieved of active duty. See Gatra, Kenangan Tanpa Prabowo. Akhirnya Bekas Komandan Pasukan Elite Itu Dipensiunkan. Namun Kasus Penculikan Aktifitas Belum Juga Digelar, 19 December 1998 87 Gatra, Kisah Akhir Tiga Perwira, 5 September 1998 50 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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of bombing. Reports of bomb threats in offices had come nearly every day, until a bomb exploded in Tanah Tinggi, Jakarta on 18 January. From the documents found in the location, the Armed Forces Commander of the Jaya Military Command, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin concluded that the Tanah Tinggi bombs were intended to destroy Jakarta. The documents also revealed plans by certain group to disrupt the general session of MPR Congress. To anticipate the possibility of turmoil, Sjafrie came up with the contingency plants which put the security authorities on alert to the potential disturbance caused by certain activists. Regardless of the explanations offered by Prabowo, Wiranto insisted on having a court martial for those who were deemed responsible for the acts of abduction. Acting as the Commander of Armed Forces, he had ordered a factfinding team to investigate the matters further in no time. In a book written by Katoppo, Soemitro stated that the tactics employed by Wiranto had been to win public sympathy and to remove Prabowo at the same time.88 Questions however remained under whose authority Tim Mawar carried out their operation. Prabowo had refused to provide the answer, although he had been advised by his seniors to leave no trace behind.89 Meanwhile, the previous Armed Forces Commander, Gen. Feisal Tanjung claimed his ignorance until Wiranto informed him on the matter. Meanwhile, Wiranto himself had declined to reveal the identity of the master mind. Subagyo further stated that the order had not come from either the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces or the Armed Forces Commander. On December 1998, eleven solders of Tim Mawar stood on trial. The maximum penalty for such case was normally around seven years. They were sentenced between 12 and 22 months of imprisonment on 6 April 1999.90 Prices of gasoline and electricity in the meantime had gone up despite protests from the parliament and students. Soeharto was confident of his decision as stated on 9 May in the Halim Perdanakusuma airport. Soeharto had said that the time to raise the gasoline could not have been more perfect as farmers had begun to enjoy their harvest with the price of crops going up to Rp700. At the same time, state employees received a 15 percent increased of salary. Furthermore, Soeharto mentioned that he understood the suffering of his people as he was once lived
See Katoppo, 2000:431-432 See Zon, 2004 90 Five of the Tim Mawar personnel were discharged from the army while serving time including Maj. (Inf.) Bambang Kristiono, Capt. (Inf.) F.S Multhazar, Capt. (Inf.) Nugroho Sulistyo, Capt. (Inf.) Yulius Selvanus, Capt. (Inf.) Untung Budi Harto. The rest of team included Capt. (Inf.) Dadang Hendra Yudha, Capt. (Inf.) Djaka Budi Utama, Capt. (Inf) Fuaka Noor Farid, Sgd. Sunaryo, Sgt. Sigit Subianto and Sgt. Sukadi. 51
89
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below the line of poverty. Following the Javanese philosophy, jet basuki mawa bea, Soeharto believed that there would always be sacrifices in everything one aimed to achieve. Soeharto felt at ease knowing that he was trusted to serve his nation and that nothing could stop him. His departure to attend G-15 meeting in Cairo, Egypt proved just that. As students staged their protests that day in Universitas Djuanda (UNIDA), Bogor, on duty police officer, Dadang Rusmana became the victim of physical contact with the angry students. According to eyewitnesses, the officers head was hit by a stone. Other officers were victims of abuse by students and suffered serious injury. However, further forensic results from the medical faculty of Universitas Indonesia indicated differently. The officer had died of heart attack and not from students attack. Three days after the incident, four students from Universitas Trisakti were shot inside their campus. Tuesday, 12 May was marked by peaceful students protests in the campus parking lot of Universitas Trisaksi, West Jakarta. In the open forum speech, critics were aimed towards the parliamentary assembly and the executive branch. Six thousands students, academics and alumni gathered in front of Sjarif Thayeb Hall at 10.am. At around 1.pm the students began to leave campus through Jalan S. Parman, Grogol, West Jakarta. They called for a long march to MPR assemblies in Senayan, South Jakarta, to voice their concerns. Due to security reason however, students request for rally at Senayan, was not permitted by the Armed Forces Commander of the West Jakarta Lt. Col. (Inf.) A. Amril. Instead, students were allowed to stage their demands in front of the West Jakarta Mayors Office located 300 meters away from the university main entrance. Dean of the Faculty of Law, Adi Andojo, asked the students to carry out a peaceful protest. The students agreed and began their open forum speech demanding reforms in law, politic, and economic sectors. Nearly 500 security authorities from the police and the army were present in front of the Judicial Office right next to the Mayors Office. At approximately 1.30 pm, the police battalions arrived at the Military District Command 0503 headquarter under the command of Police First Lt. Agus Tri Herryanto from the Commander of 2 Company/B Battalion I Regiment Mobile Brigade and acted as the assistance was Police Second Lt. Pariyo from the Commander of 3 Platoon/2 Company/B Battalion.91
Extra security measures were taken in accordance to the guidelines of the Commander of Armed Forces Gen. Wiranto. Students were only allowed to have open forums and stage their protests within the campus area. Outside campus activities required permission from the security authorities for fear of possible acts of anarchy. 52 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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The rally lasted until 5.pm. Roses were distributed to the security officers as a sign of peace. It was a very relaxing kind of atmosphere. Students were seen to joke around with the officers and even some had their pictures taken. At about the same time, students were informed by the chief local police officer and the commander of the military district to return to their campus. The students agreed to do so provided the officers retreated as well. Since the students had held their protests in an orderly manner, the officers agreed to leave first in the direction of the military district headquarter while the students headed back to the campus. As heavy rain began to pour the street of Jakarta, students began to enter their university compound. At around 5.20 pm, the sound of machine guns was heard from the direction of the Mayors office. As students panicked and ran towards the campus or hid inside the office building, security officers were put on alert. While some students were beaten by the officers, rifles were aimed at the students as both sides began to clash. Angered by the incident, students rebelled against the officers. Tear gas was sprayed towards students who were throwing stones from inside the campus. Meanwhile, police officers were seen from above and below the flyover. Those who were positioned below the flyover had moved closer and formed lines ready for shooting. Between 6.30 to 8.pm, four students were found dead and many others were seriously injured. They were brought to the Sumber Waras hospital to be treated. Hundreds of students stood in the hospital corridor shocked by the magnitude of the incident. Later that day, the Armed Forces Commander of Jaya Military Police, Maj. Gen. Hendardji verified the death of the students at the autopsy room. At 1.30 am, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie held a press conference in the Metro Jaya Police headquarter which was attended by the Chief of Metro Jaya Police, Maj. Gen. (Pol.) Hamami Nata, Rector of Universitas Trisaksi Prof. Dr.Moedaton Moertedjo and two members of Komnas HAM, A.A Baramuli and Bambang W. Soeharto. During the press conference, Moedaton stated that six students had died in the incident. Maj. Gen.Hamami added that the cause of death could be determined based from the autopsy results. In the incident as such, officers were assigned only to prevent the possible acts of violence. Therefore they were not equipped with sharp objects but instead with police stick, rubber and blank bullets, and tear gas. At 4.am, Maj. Gen. Sjafrie accompanied by Maj. Gen.Hendardji and Brig. Gen. Sudi Silalahi arrived at the Sjarif Thajeb Hall in Universitas Trisaksi campus to give their condolences to the parents of Elang Mulya Lesmana. At 6.am, news about the shooting of the four students was broadcasted by mass media.
Thousands of people came to Trisaksi campus including public figures critical of Soeharto to share their grievance. Among them were Ali Sadikin, Megawati, Amien Rais, Emil Salim, Kwik Kian Gie, Hariman Siregar, W.S. Rendra and others. That day on 13 May, the four students were crowned as Heroes of Reformasi. Students from Universitas Indonesia performed prayers followed by speeches condemning the incident. While others on the Trisaksi campus took to the podium. At the same time, a large crowd arrived to attend the funeral processions for the two students Heri Hartanto and Elang Mulya Lesmana at the Tanah Kusir resting place, South Jakarta. Meanwhile the body of Hafidhin Alifidin Royan was buried at the family burial site not far from his residence in Bandung. As students mourned for the death of the students, a large crowd of people began to approach the campus area to give their supports. Feared for possible clash, security officers prohibited the crowd from entering the campus while the students were restricted from coming out of the campus. As expected, the angry crowd took matters into their hands. A garbage truck was stopped and burned by the crowd. Stones, bottles or anything they could grab were thrown to a nearby gas station and a police station at Grogol. By 12.pm riots had spread in various directions. The crowd headed west on Jalan Daan Mogot towards Citraland shopping mall which was tightly guarded by the Marine and other security forces while others went into the east direction of Jalan Prof. Dr. Latumeten, Jembatan Besi and Bandengan. Along the street of Daan Mogot, no office buildings were spared by the angry crowd. They smashed and burned the small shops at the gas station. Six parked cars owned by employees of corporation Putra Surya Multidana were also burned and one was smashed. A nearby hotel Daan Jaya Hotel became their next target. The hotel was put into fire causing a discotheque building behind it to burn. Other buildings surrounding the hotel area like BCA building were looted by the crowd. Meanwhile, a smaller crowd who joined the rest on the east side in Jalan Kyai Tapa began to burn down a gas station on that street. Officers from Tanjung Duren Police Station placed police barricades to restrict the crowds activities. But behind the barricades, the crowd continued to loot and burn Topaz Shopping Center. As act of solidarity hundreds of students of Universitas Katolik Atma Jaya gathered on campus to mourn. Supports came from professionals working nearby the Atma Jaya campus and those living in Bendungan Hilir area in Central Jakarta. At exactly 1.30 pm Heri Hartanto was buried followed by Elang Mulya
Lesmana. Hendriawan Sie was buried at Al Kamal resting place in West Jakarta at about the same time. Within an hour time, acts of violence had begun as the crowd in Bendungan Hilir plundered the market and smashed shops and cars with stones or whatever else available. Black haze from fires had thickened the air. A large concentration of mass attempted to blend in with the students but security officers soon dispersed the crowd. Meanwhile three helicopters flew around the Daan Mogot area to monitor the situation. From a loud speaker, the crowd were instructed to return to their homes to avoid clashes as happened in front of the Ciputra Shopping Mall at Jalan S. Parman. PHH (Pasukan Antihuru-hara-the Anti Riot Brigade), in the black uniform blocked the main street to prevent further clashes. As the crowd grew in number, security forces increased their numbers. Despite extra security measures, the crowd managed to loot and burn 15 cars, a bus and destroyed 9 vehicles at the parking lot of Ciputra Shopping Mall. The riots which started primarily in West Jakarta area had spread to Central Jakarta on Jalan K.H. Hasyim Asyari, the Roxy intersection, and Jalan K.H. Muhammad Mansyur, Tanah Abang to Bendungan Hilir Raya, Kedoya, Jembatan Besi, Bandengan Selatan, Tubagus Angke, Semanan and Kosambi and towards the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport at Cengkareng reaching as far as Jakartas border, Tangerang. Looting and burning had become the objective of the rioters. Shops and office buildings on Hasyim Asyari streets were smashed and BCA belonging to conglomerate Liem Sioe Liong was purposely destroyed. Among the targets were the police officers as angry crowd threw stones and burned down the Majapahit police station near Duta Merlin Shopping complex. As the night fell, the streets looked empty and as far as the eyes could see there was barely any vehicle passing through on what was commonly known as the most congested streets during the day and night in Jalan Gajah Mada and Jalan Hayam Wuruk. Meanwhile, riots continued until nightfall in Cengkareng. Cars heading towards the international airport were stopped by the crowd. At 7.pm the office of Cengkareng sub-district and a patrol car of the Batu Ceper police were burned down. Concerned with the overall situation, Habibie read Soehartos message stating his concern for the calamity that had befallen the students. The president expressed his profound sorrow and condolences to the victims families and the university community.92 On that day, Soeharto met with the Indonesian community in Cairo. He stated that if the people had no longer wished for him to
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Kompas, 14 May 1998; Media Indonesia, 14 May 1998
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be the president, he was indeed lengser keprabon and for that he would not defend his position by the use of force. To Soeharto, the situation had presented the opportunity for him to be closer to the Almighty, his family, children and grandchildren. 93Soehartos statement was responded positively by various circles throughout the nation but did not stop the riots from occurring the next day. On 14 May, a large concentration of crowd returned to the street. This time, the act of looting had turned more violent. Security officers were unable to contain the situation as they were overpowered by the people. At 9.am, a meeting initiated by the Armed Forces Chief of Socio-Political Affairs, Lt. Gen. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was held in the Armed Forces headquarters in Cilangkap. Those who attended the meeting were Nurcholish Madjid, Eep Saifulloh Fatah, Indria Samego, Salim Said and Yudi Krisnandi. On Thursday, during the riots, Nucholish presented a paper on political reform which called for elections in January 2000 and an extraordinary MPR session three months afterwards. Soeharto must also extend public apology for the prolonged monetary crisis and must return his illegally obtained wealth.94 With all parties reaching agreement, Nurcholish prepared the text which would be presented by the Minister of Religion, Quraish Shihab, to Soeharto after the fridays prayer. In the meantime, the rioting continued.95 Violence had spread to Tangerang, Bekasi and other areas. The crowd went into rampage and this time the Chinese communities were targeted. At Cileduk, Tangerang, angry crowd looted shops and electronic shops belonging to ethnic Chinese. Electronic goods were taken out of the shops to be burned and thrown to the street. Expensive residences at Modernland, Tangerang were destroyed. Similar incidents had also occurred in Pondok Gede, Bekasi, where attacks were aimed specifically to ethnic Chinese shops. Jakartas Chinatown, Glodok was badly hit. Its main commercial area, like luxurious shopping malls, electrical markets and a traditional market, was badly damaged. Closed to Glodok, on Jalan Hayam Wuruk and Jalan Gajah Mada, dozens of motorcycles, cars and discotheques were burned down. The international airport of Soekarno Hatta was packed with ethnic Chinese ready to leave the country. Within 24 hours, the act of violence had reached other parts of
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ibid In regards to Nurcholis paper, Yudhoyono agreed with the part of the paper concerning the elections, but recommended the demands regarding Soehartos apology and wealth be dropped. See Mietzner, 1999, p. 80 95 In what was later described as the peak of riot in 14 May, all high-ranked military officers were not present in Jakarta. Under the instruction of Wiranto, all commanding officers were obliged to attend the Kostrad military ceremony despite the escalation of the riots. See Luhulima, 2001:122 56 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
Indonesia. In Solo and Palembang, the rippling effect continued with the plundering and burning of shops and shopping compounds. While in Egypt, Soeharto had been briefed by Wiranto every hour and due to the mounting tension in the capital, the president decided to cut short his trip. On the same day, Amien Rais, Muhammadyah chair, formed the Majelis Amanat Rakyat (MAR), a council consisted of Soehartos opponents as members.96 Amien Rais stated that MAR had called for the resignation of Soeharto to ease the process of political reforms in spirit of Soehartos statement in Cairo. The hopes to resolve the political crisis however was short-lived the moment Soeharto arrived in Jakarta on 15 May. The president retracted his statement. Through the Minister of Information, Alwi Dahlan, Soeharto claimed he never said anything about resigning but only ruminating out loud the moment he would actually step down. The Minister also added that the president had welcomed political and economic reforms. During the next few days, the president headed the Komite Reformasi, Committee of Reforms, which tasks were to expedite the general election based on a new General Elections Act. The drafting of new acts included the revision of the parliaments composition and MPR session and acts on antimonopoly and anti-corruption. The composition of these institutions was to be announced on 21 May. Out of the habits of 32 years and the respect for the authority embedded in Indonesian culture, none of those around Soeharto dared to ask him directly to resign. On 16 May, Harmoko presented resignation as one of the three options, allowing Soeharto either a cabinet reshuffle or an extraordinary MPR session which Soeharto feared might impeach him. In response to that, Soeharto promised to reshuffle the cabinet. Fifteen ministers including Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut), Wiranto Arismunandar, and Bob Hasan were to be replaced. To the inner circle, the prospect of Soehartos replacement meant the possibility to gain power as the first person in the nation. As the ministers were talking about resigning, the military leadership was hastily drawing up options for succession. Speculations among who would succeed Soeharto came down to three names, Wiranto,
Members of MAR included the following names of Amien Rais, Albert Hasibuan, Goenawan Mohamad, Adnan Buyung Nasution, Rizal Ramli, Toeti Heraty, Arifin Panigoro, Daniel Sparinga, Arbi Sanit, Trimoelja Soerjadi, Mudji Soetrisno, Arif Arryman, Abdulhakim Garuda Nusantara, Fikri Jufri, Emha Ainum Nadjib, Emil Salim, Ali Sadikin, K.H. Mustofa Bisri, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Siswono Judohusodo, Frans Seda, Adi Andojo, Dawam Rahardjo, Syamsudin Haris, Ichlasul Amal, Husein Umar, Mohamad Sadli, Faisal Basri, Laksamana Sukardi, Heri Akhmadi, Onghokham, Bambang Widjojanto, Tjuk Sukiadi, Rizql Panggabean, Wimar Witoelar, Sujana Sapiie, Frans Magnis Soeseno, Nucholish Madjid, Haryono Tjitrosoebono, Mochtar Masoed, A. Syafii Maarif, Ratna Sarumpaet, Saparina Sadli, Th Sumartana, Bambang Sudibyo, Hendardi, Ulil Abshar Abdalla, Dede Oetomo, Sayuti, Hotman Siahaan, Moedrik Sangidu and Meilono Suwondo. See Luhulima, 2001:206 57 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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Prabowo and Habibie. The army itself had a dividing view on the red and white generals, Wiranto and the green generals, Prabowo. The latter was closely
associated with Islamic organizations and advocated a greater role of Islam and the Muslim community in the politics, while the nationalist, red and white Wiranto, stressed a nation-wide loyalty. Habibie, on the other hand knew that only through impeachment that he would be elected as the successor. Considered as one of the biggest students protests in the last 30 years, an estimated of 30000 students gathered in the MPR assemblies demanding the resignation of Soeharto. Students protests had won widespread support. There were more than 100 medical students from Universitas Indonesia and 30 doctors including 18 ambulances present in the compound. A large donation of food and beverages for students were generously provided by the public, NGO and even professionals. This time, the students had refused to leave the compound and occupied the parliament building until their demands were met. Some even climbed the parliament dome and prevented members of parliament from leaving to speed up an extraordinary MPR session. With no reinforcement by Armed Forces to prevent students from entering the parliament compound, the city of Jakarta had prepared for the worse. Meanwhile calls for mass demonstrations and long march by Amien Rais on the National Awakening Day, the following day, were viewed as the moment of truth. Students in Bandung and Yogyakarta had announced a long march and the retired military officers of the Generation of 45 also joined forces. Feared for another possible outbreak, ethnic Chinese fled the country and took refuge in Australia, Singapore, Hong Kong and other Asian countries. On 20 May, shops and offices in Jakarta were closed. Roads leading to Monas, the National Monument, and the presidential palace were blocked by soldiers, tanks and armored cars. This time, the Armed Forces placed the Marines and Kostrad soldiers at the MPR compound to prevent the students from leaving and marching to the National Monument. Extra security precautions were taken on major shopping centers and office buildings. With intense security forces, Rais feared for bloodshed and decided to abort the mission through press conference at 1.15am. The news was broadcasted at 6.am throughout the nation. In other cities however, mass demonstrations and long march carried on. The student body of Institut Teknologi Bandung (ITB) urged for the resignation of Soeharto. While in Lampung, students occupied the provincial parliament and forced the governor to sign a statement supporting political reforms. In Yogyakarta, thousands of people
took to the street and demanded Soehartos resignation. At Universitas Gajah Mada (UGM), a banner of 400 meters long was signed by pro-students and the Sultan, Hamengkubuwono as the alumni of the university. Soeharto was virtually without support. Soeharto was given two days to consult to the chairman of the parliament in regards to his resignation. If by 22 May Soeharto failed to do so, then Harmoko would go ahead with an extraordinary MPR session. Meanwhile, Soehartos own political party deserted him with a clear majority in favor of an extraordinary MPR session. The opposition parties PDI and PPP supported the resignation of Soeharto. As Wiranto withdrew his support, the presidents only choice was his own cabinet which he hoped would back him up. But to his surprise, the 14 ministers including Ginandjar Kartasasmita, Akbar Tanjung and Tantri Abeng refused a seat in the newly reshuffled cabinet or the reform cabinet. Soeharto instructed Habibie to persuade the ministers to reverse their decision, instead the VP asked them to give him their support.97 It was the final blow and Soeharto knew his time had come. On the morning of 21 May, at 9.am, Soeharto walked to the Credential Rooms in the presidential palace and announced his resignation. The 76-year-old resident read from a statement: I am of the view that it is very difficult for me to carry out my governmental duties. I have decided to cease to be the President of the RI effective immediately.98 Habibie was sworn as Soehartos successor with the Armed Forces by his side. Wiranto also promised to guard the honor and the safety of Soeharto and his family.
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As interviewed by Metro TV show Kick Andy, Habibie explained that when Ginandjar Kartasasmita informed him about the decision by the 14 ministers to resign, he acted as the coordinator of fractions and not as the vice-president. Tim Kick Andy, 2006:11 98 Far Eastern Economic Review, A Nation awakes: The Inside Story of Soehartos Last Days In the Palace and an Assessment of his Legacy, 4 June 1998 59 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
CHAPTER IV PERISTIWA MAY 1998: Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiments: Late 1996-1998

This chapter follows the chain of events that are marked by acts of violence towards ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Viewed as an exclusive group with strong economic power and priviledges, ethnic Chinese have become a threat to the majority of indigenous Indonesian. The 1997 economic crisis coupled with political instability prove to be a recipe for disaster as mounting anti-Chinese sentiments take place. The analysis is based on the research results of earlier scholars namely Jemma Purdey in Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 19961999, Adam Schwartz in Indonesias Search for Stability as well as local and international magazines and newspapers. Soehartos success came with Golkar (Golongan Karya), the government party, scoring the highest with 74.5 percent or 325 seats, an increase of 43. Unsurprisingly PDI came in only 3 percent of the votes in the general elections of 29 May 1997, a significant decline of 12 percent from the previous election. While the Islamic Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan or PPP received 22.4 percent of the votes, with 89 seats. With the triumphant victory for the
government, political attention was now turned to the MPR coming session in March 1998 and its task of electing a president and vice president for the following years. Efforts to secure the presidential election therefore became crucial and all measures were taken to ensure a successful election. Prior to the 1997 election, anti-Chinese violence had begun to escalate. A seemingly trivial incident led to a potential riot between ethnic Chinese and pribumi as witnessed in Rengasdengklok, West Java on 30 January 1997. The conflict started as Cik Gweh and Kim Tjoan confronted the group of youths for making loud noises from the loudspeaker which was used to broadcast the call to prayer during the fasting month of Ramadhan. At this point, the fifteen-years-old son, Feri, allegedly climbed onto the roof of the house and threw stones at the mosque. In retaliation to the attack, the youth threw stones at the house and at Kim Tjoan. The conflict was soon resolved by a policeman arriving on the scene. Dissatisfied with the end-result, the youth returned to the house accompanied with a larger crowd after their pre-dawn meal. This time, the house was attacked with stones forcing the family to flee. By 8.am, the crowd had grown to three
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thousand people. The attack grew more violent as the crowd burn churches, ethnic Chinese shops and homes, a Confucian hall and a Buddhist temple. During the violence, security officers were present on the streets but they did little to stop it. The violence which took place around the village of Warungdong, now had spread to other areas where many ethnic Chinese lived. The damage to Rengasdengklok was extensive as factories, shops and houses were attacked, including those belonging to ethnic Chinese Muslim.99 As early as the late 1996, mass violence had taken place in Situbondo, East Java and Tasikmalaya, West Java where ethnic Chinese and Christians were among the main targets.100 Hostility and jealousy towards the rich ethnic Chinese were evident in each of the circumstances. The common denominator was perceived to be the abuse of Islam like in the case of Rengasdengklok. On 10 October 1996, another highly politicized incident among the Islamic organizations and elements of the military happened in Situbondo. Mass violence broke out after a local court found Saleh, a young Muslim man, guilty of blasphemy against Islam. Home to numerous pesantren, Islamic boarding school, Situbondo suffered a serious damage. The courthouse, churches and Christian schools were the primary targets of violence. The majority of those involved in the violence were Muslim and members of the Nadhatul Ulama, NU the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. The 28 years old Saleh worked as an attendant at Nurul Islam mosque in nearby Kapongan. A shy and devout Muslim, Saleh was reportedly insulted a deceased local religious leader, Kiai Asad Syamsul Arifin. The local kiai, or Islamic teacher Zaini, also head of the pesantren Nurul Hikam at Kesambi Rampak Kapongan reported Saleh to the Kapongan branch of NU representatives on charges of blasphemy.101 After preliminary investigations, the Board of the NU Situbondo branch decided not to pursue the matter based on the allegedly written evidence by Saleh. Dissatisfied by the response, Zaini reported the case to the police. Saleh was
Jakarta Post, 31 January 1997; Suara Pembaruan, 31 January 1997; Kompas, 31 January 1997 Situbondo and Tasikmalaya cases resembled the Malari incident in 1974. The Muslims had blamed ethnic Chinese and foreigners for special privileges given by Soeharto. In late 1973, anti-Chinese riots took place in Bandung, damaging 1,500 shops and houses. What initially began as protests on the development strategy had turned into accusations of mismanagement of the countrys wealth. The cukong and the cronies had come under attack. It was a response against big businesses owned by Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan who had become conglomerates in Indonesia. The arrival of Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka on January 14 further intensified the already heated tension between students and the government. Calling Japan an economic animal, student demonstrators had turned the streets of Jakarta into violence. Astra, the Toyota dealership owned by William Soeryadjaya was burned down. The burning of the Japanese-made vehicles also took place. Gen. Sumitro, the Head of the Armed Forces Internal Security Command (Kopkamtib) resigned after failing to contain the outbreak. 101 Gatra, Si Pendiam Bikin Perkara, 19 Oktober 1996 61
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arrested in May 1996 and charged with inciting hatred and blasphemy. The trial began on 12 September at the Situbondo courthouse. The behavior of the spectator was especially violent on the day of the verdict. On 10 October around 10.am, Saleh was sentenced with a maximum five years imprisonment.102 Disappointed with the terms of punishment, the crowd began to throw objects at security officers. Fire was set to the courthouse and soon the act of violence spread to the Mount Zion Bethel Church which was located opposite the courthouse. The crowd then attacked other churches and Christian schools, a Buddhist temple, ethnic Chinese shops, and government offices. By afternoon, the towns of Asem Bagus, Besuki, Panarukan Banyu Putih and Wonojo located 30 kilometers away from Situbondo were targets of violence. Churches were set alight. The total damage had amounted to Situbondo courthouse, 24 churches, one Buddhist temple, six Christian and Catholic schools, an orphanage, numerous vehicles and shops. There were casualties and many were injured in the incident.
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In the aftermath of the incident, tensions began to emerge within NU branch in Situbondo and between NU and the government. Wahid extended apology on behalf of NU stating that because more rioters were NU members, the responsibility should fall upon him as NU chairman.104 Coming from a religious family, a grandson of Hasyim Ashari, Wahid was introduced early on in the life of pesantren by his father Wahid Hasyim. A believer in religious pluralism, the young Wahid studied and lectured in a host of pesantren after his return from universities in Cairo and pre-Baath Iraq. Born in the worlds most culturally diverse country, Wahid held on to the principle of religious tolerance. NU professed a synthesized Javas teaching which embraced ancient Hindu and Buddhist traditions with Islam. By the mid-1990s, NU members reached nearly 40 million. Despite the growing numbers of membership in rural Java, Wahid faced other dominant organization, Muhammadiyah. Founded in 1912, Muhammadiyah followed the Middle Eastern movements that sought to reconcile Islam with an increasingly modern and secular world. Highly political,
Muhammadiyah aimed to improve the government through Islamic ethical values. Leaders of Muhammadiyah believed that the goal was achievable and that the religious minorities would not be offended. Muhammadyah had a complete
I. Hariyanto et al.(ed.), Melangkah dari Reruntuhan: Tragedi Situbondo, Grasindo, Jakarta, 1998. See Kompas, 12 October 1996: Media Indonesia, 12 Ocotober 1996; Republika, 12 October 1996 103 See Purdey, 2006 104 Kompas, 13 October 1996 62 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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opposite view to Wahid who strongly opposed the idea of political Islam where fanatic elements were exploited to benefit certain groups. Such ideology as Wahid pointed out responsible for the resurrections of armies in West Java in the 1950s and in Aceh in the present day. In Situbondo incident, the focus of public and institutional interest quickly turned to tension within the NU elite. Rumors about a mass conspiracy to bring down Wahid had begun to circulate. Originating from NU youth groups such as PMII (Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia-Indonesian Movement of Islamic Students) and later from PIKI (Persatuan Intelektual Kristen Indonesia-The Indonesian Association of Christian Intellectuals), both organizations arrived at the same conclusion.105 Wahid at first rejected this speculation that the violence was resulted from religious intolerance. Later on however, Wahid countered his earliest statement claiming that the violence had been orchestrated by AS and AR. The initials were speculated to be Adi Sasono, the Secretary General of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia-The Association of Islamic Intellectuals) and another of Muhammadiyah Amien Rais. Wahid also stated that the violence was possibly connected to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Gen. Hartonos
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race for vice-presidency.107
A religious think tank, ICMI was
designed to give modernist Islam a higher profile. The Minister for Research and Technology, B.J. Habibie was chosen to chair this organization. ICMI had been viewed by many as a moderate organization which many politicians had used it to make inroads to political Islam, including Amien Rais. A devout Muslim, Rais received his degrees from universities in the US. But unlike some other Islamic scholars who studied abroad, Rais made no apology for his temperate views. As a chair to Muhammadiyah and a lecturer at the Faculty of Social and Political Science at Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Rais stood out as a modernist in the Indonesian Islam. His blunt remarks on anti-Christian and anti-Chinese stirred controversy but earned him a position in ICMI. Both leaders later denied
Wahids alleged accusations of their involvement in the incident. Within a few months, another trouble brewed in Tasikmalaya, West Java. This time, the conflict started between local Muslim and police. Ethnic Chinese and
Jawa Post, 18 October 1996; Jakata Post, 23 October 1996 Gen R. Hartonos name was among the most likely candidates for 1998-2003 vice presidency. Hartono was known as the political mentor of Tutut as she began her political career in Golkar. Hartonos relation with Wahid grew apart as Hartono was accused of supporting Wahids rival, Abu Hasan during a bitter dispute within NU in December 1994. In the beginning of June 1997, Hartono replaced Harmoko as the Minister of Information and in months to follow became the members of ICMI. See Van Dijk, 2001 107 See Purdey, 2006 63
106 105
Christian once again became the target of violence similar to Situbondo incident. On 23 December 1997, two students from the Riyadul Ulum Waddawah pesantren in Condongan village were summoned to Tasikmalaya police station. A 14-year-old non-residential student, Rizal was accused of stealing from his fellow students on numerous occasions. The students and their teacher Kiai Mahmud Farid along with the son of the head of pesantren, Kiai Makmun responded to the letter signed by the local head of police to discuss the punishment given to Rizal. They were questioned and put in detention where they received physical abuse from the police. News spread throughout Tasikmalaya as the crowd demanded prosecution of the police and an apology to the pesantren the following day.108 As tension mounted, two thousand people assembled at the mosque on the morning of 26 December. Another six thousand pesantren students were due to arrive by trucks. As they failed to reach to the police chief to talk over the case, the crowd had turned violent. Department stores were the first target followed by ethnic Chinese shops and the Salib Suai Catholic Church. The violence spread to villages south of Tasikmalaya including Singapurna, Kawalu, Bantarkalong and Karangnunggal.109 The total damage included the destruction of 13 churches, one Confucian temple and one Buddhist temple, 89 shops, 12 police stations, school, banks, hotels, and vehicles. Komnas HAM estimated the financial lost at Rp85 billion.110 Several weeks after the violence in Tasikmalaya and at the height of the standoff between the IMF and Soeharto, Genta (Gerakan Cinta Indonesia- I Love the Rupiah Campaign) was launched by Soehartos daughter, Tutut. The campaign was seen as an effort to restore Soehartos confidence and to encourage national solidarity through support for the currency. BI governor, Soedrajat Djiwandono and the new bank directors had met Soeharto earlier on 8 January 1998 to discuss the currency crisis. According to Djiwandono, as foreign currency owners converted their earnings to rupiah, they must not feel that they were making wrong decisions.111 It was also feared that with rupiahs inexorable plunge, antiChinese violence would only grow worse. On 9 January, led by Soehartos daughter, Tutut exchanged US$50,000 for rupiah on the first day and was soon followed by ethnic Chinese business leaders like Liem Sioe Liong, Eka Tjipta
108 109
Republika, 28 December 1996 Media Indonesia, 28 December 1996 110 Jakarta Post, 29 December 1996; Jakarta Post, 30 December 1996; Kompas, 28 December 1996; Pikiran Rakyat, 28 December 1996 111 Kompas, 9 January 1998 64 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
Widjaja, Tommy Winata112. The campaign managed to raise only US$650000 despite continuous coverage on national televisions and newspapers. The movement also urged people to donate gold and jewelry to Bank Indonesia. Tutut herself donated two kilograms of jewelry and gold. However, there had been mix reactions coming from all layers including the conglomerates. Sofyan Wanandi indicated that most conglomerates could not afford to donate gold as they had spent a large sum to pay off their foreign debts due to the fall of the rupiah. According to Wanandi, an increase amount of Indonesian export could overcome the current economic crisis. Soon after releasing the statement on January 14, Sofyan Wanandi and his colleagues had become subject to threats by the Chief of Armed Forces Gen. Feizal Tanjung. On 18 January, the Tanah Tinggi bomb explosion was enough to alert the capital of suspicious activities that could jeopardize the national stability and the upcoming presidential election. The police claimed that the explosion came from the bombs that were assembled in the building. Later, Lt. Gen. Prabowo
Subianto, Commander of Kopassus, the Special Forces Command of the Army, substantiated the claim that in fact 40 bombs had been assembled in the house and so far only eighteen of them had been found. The remaining 22 bombs were unknown. To the military interest, one person, Agus Priyono, allegedly a PRD (Partai Rakyat Demokrasi-Peoples Democratic Party) was arrested. The party was branded communist by the New Order after its formation in 1996. During the investigation, the police discovered a laptop computer, from which emails and other documents mentioning Sofyan Wanandi, head of the Gemala group of companies and once a close confidant of President, were recovered. Authorities claimed that the email stated that Wanandi had been approached with a request to fund the partys activities. Jakarta elite meanwhile were perplexed by claims that Wanandi, until recently very close to the New Order and a well-known anticommunist, would have anything to do with PRD. 113 On January 26, Wanandi was brought in for questioning by the Chief of the Jakarta branch of the Regional Agency for the Coordination of Support for the Development of National Stability (Bakorstanasda), Maj. Gen. Syafrie Sjamsoeddin, to answer the allegations, in which he denied. On the press
conference, Wanandi refuted the claim made against him and urged people to resist blaming on a particular group. Wanandi was clearly referring to the anti112 113
Kompas, 13 October 1996 See Van Dijk, 2001
65
Chinese demonstrations shortly after the explosion. Still, the departure of Wanandi to Australia a few days after his meeting with Sjamsoeddin, only circulated more rumors that the collapse of the rupiah was partly the responsibility of ethnic Chinese. Presumably the capital flight of about US$60 billion by the conglomerates had precipitated the currencys collapse.114 No evidence was ever produced to support the charge.115 Wanandi concluded that the Tanah Tinggi event was designed to single out ethnic Chinese as the agent of economic and social devastation and to place accusations of disloyalty to the nation during the time of crisis.116 Sofyan Wanandi in his youth had been a leader of PMKRI (Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia-The Association of Roman Catholic Students) and one of the founders of CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Long regarded as an organization of Catholic Chinese Indonesian, the CSIS had enjoyed close relations with the New Order government until Soehartos shift towards more Islamic policies in the early 1990s. Sofyans sibling, Yusuf Wanandi, was closely associated with the Roman Catholic and the Chinese communities. Wanandis days as a student activist were the beginning of his close relationship to former personal assistants of Soeharto, Gen. Ali Moertopo and Gen. Soedjono Hoemardani. Wanandi was also linked to Gen. L.B. Moerdani, also a Roman Catholic and a former Armed Forces Commander. To leaders of ICMI like Adi Sasono, CSIS served as the think-tank of Moertopo, the main architect of the New Order political structure. On the other hand, Moerdani was the extension of what was perceived to be the anti-Islam policy of the Indonesian government in the 1970s and early 1980s. For the first two decades of the New Order, CSIS was accused of plotting the anti-Islam movements such as the Malari riots117 of January 1974 in Jakarta, the Komando Jihad affair of 1977, the hijacking of a Garuda airline by a radical Islamic group in March 1981, and the bloody clash between Muslims and security forces at Tanjung Priok in September 1984. The main objective was to create impressions that political Islam was closely associated with violence.
Jawa Post, 2 October 1996;Jawa Post, 15 October 1996; Jawa Post, 13 November 1996; Jawa Post, 16 November 1996 115 On the Tanah Tinggi arrest, Wanandi stated that the order had come from higher up as the police could not find evidence of his involvement in the event. See Schwartz, 2004 116 Kompas, 10 December 1996; Kompas, 11 December 1996 117 The Commander of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan-Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), (Ret.) Gen. (Ret) Soemitro offered another explanation in his book that CSIS and Ali Moertopo were the ones responsible for the riot. Soemitro mentioned that the act of violence was plotted by CSIS to create disorder as students were protesting against Soehartos regime. See Cahyono, 1998 66 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
114
Earlier in 1998, Sofyan had openly expressed his preference for the current vice-president Gen. (Ret.)Try Soetrisno to be re-elected for the 1998-2003 terms. Soeharto was outraged by what he sensed as another attempt by the military to hand-pick Soetrisno similar to the previous election 1993-1998. Soeharto and Prabowo suspected Moerdani and CSIS were behind the nomination of Soetrisno. Prabowo and most radical Muslim communities suffered from a case of paranoia when it came down to Moerdani. Shortly before the Wanandi incident, Prabowo host a breaking of the fast at the Kopassus headquarters on 23 January. He invited around 5000 Muslim clerics and activists with links to ICMI and the radical KISDI (Komite Indonesia Untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam-Indonesian Committee for World Islamic Solidarity) and its leader Ahmad Soemargono.118 At the meeting, Prabowo distributed a booklet titled Conspiracy to Overthrow Soeharto which argued the reason why Soeharto had been targeted (Purdey, 2001).119 During the gathering, Prabowo had told the preachers that Soehartos closer relation to the Muslim communities had been seen as a threat to ethnic Chinese conglomerates120 including Sofyan Wanandi and they were trying to replace Soeharto with Try Soetrisno.121 Around late January, early February, various Islamic groups had openly voiced their animosities towards Wanandi which were explicitly anti-Chinese. Demonstrations were held at CSIS. The protesters carried posters saying CSIS- Parasite and Sofyan Wanandi-traitor. 122 The protesters consisted of various Islamic youth groups like KISDI demanded that Wanandi answer the claim against him and made anti-Christian and antiChinese statements.123 Further accusations on ethnic Chinese continued as a group called the Extended Family of the Victims of the Tanjung Priok Incident led by relatives of Amir Biki, a Muslim clerk killed during the 1984 Tanjung Priok Incident, went to the national parliament demanding a decrease in the price of basic goods and the prosecution of Wanandi and ethnic Chinese conglomerate, Liem Sioe Liong on 2 February.124 Following the deaths of 28 Muslim
demonstrators by armed forces, Bank Central Asia owned by Liem Sioe Liong
118 119
Margot Cohen, Us and Them, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 February 1998 See Purdey, 2001 120 Prabowo had publicly denied making anti-Chinese statements attributed to him. But he had told acquaintances that Indonesia should never again allow an ethnic minority to funnel much of the countrys capital into offshore banking, effectively holding the country to ransom. Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 August 1998 121 Schwartz, 2004:347. See also Andreas Harsono, Amid Economy in Crisis, Embattled Soeharto Plays Islamic Card, American Reporter, 15 April 1998 122 Kompas, January 28, 1998 123 Gatra, February 14, 1998; Forum Keadilan, February 23, 1998 124 Kompas, February 3, 1998 67 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
became the first bombing target. The protesters claimed there was a link between these issues where Indonesian people, mostly Muslim, had become the victim of price hikes caused by these businessmen. 125 The rise of anti-Chinese sentiments by Muslim groups reached its climax on February 8, at which ulama and leaders of Muslim organizations from across Java made speeches about the economic crisis, its causes and consequences and pointed fingers of blame. From Al-Azhar Mosque in Jakarta where the meeting was held, speakers were united in calling people to rise and resist the new colonialist and traitors who, they argued had plundered the wealth of the people.126 Bambang Pribadi, head of the National Solidarity Front of Indonesian Muslim strongly supported the movement and added the intention of his followers that: They join to face traitors of the nation like Sofyan Wanandi or whoever stands behind him.127 Two days later on 10 February, MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia-Indonesian Council of Ulama) met with Soeharto during a break from their annual national meeting. The president asked the ulama to stay alert to events that may provoke the people. MUI chair, Hasan Basri urged the
government to support pribumi business and reduce the wealth gap while stating his support for Soehartos re-election. Basri issued a call for jihad nasional, or a national holy war, against currency speculator and hoarders of basic commodities and urged ulama to defend the nation.128 Amien Rais on a Muhammadyah meeting denounced the calls for holy war and declared that looting and burning were against Islamic teaching.129 He condemned the attacks on ethnic Chinese and directed the protesters to express their anger and protests at the government as they were responsible for the crisis.130 Ilyas Rukhiyat, chairman of the lawmaking body of the NU, also issued a statement that hoarding was illegal according to Islamic law. Meanwhile, the scenes of violence across Java and other parts of the nation continued. Restaurants hold-ups and an upsurge in shop thefts and house breakins were signals of a long-feared explosion of social unrest. Economists were concerned that the situation would set the recovery back even further. With the further decline of rupiah, Soeharto may opt for a CBS (currency board system) that would peg the rupiah to the US dollar. Such fixed system would be difficult
125 126
Jakarta Post, 3 February 1998 Kompas, 9 February 1998 127 ibid 128 Kompas, 11 February 1998 129 Jakarta Post, 19 February 1998 130 Jakarta Post, 16 February 1998; Suara Pembaruan, 14 February 1998 68 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
to implement and could lead to sky-rocketing interest rates.131 As predicted, on 12 February becak drivers and laborers protested on the Bandung-Cirebon highway, over the higher prices of basic goods and spare parts. Hundreds attacked vehicle showrooms and shops selling motor vehicle parts, dragging stock outside and burning it.132 On the same day in Losari between Cirebon and Brebes, people attacked shops and looted household items such as soap, oil and sugar, declaring, We are not stealing.133 But on the next day, 13 February, Pamanukan, West Java, witnessed one of the most violent incidents after rumors that cooking oil sold in Bandung for Rp4000 per litre was cheaper than the one sold on local market for Rp6000. It was reported that many ethnic Chinese had closed the shops and sought refuge at the police station following the outbreak of violence.134 In March 1998, Soeharto was elected as the president for the seventh consecutive five-year term. Throughout the nation, a wave of reformasi
movements against the New Order regime was evident. Despite the governments resistance to allow students from protesting outside their campuses, demonstrations continued. Frequent clashes between students and security officers in Yogyakarta, Medan and elsewhere intensified in April leading up to the tragedy on 12 May. From 12-15 May, mass violence continued in Palembang, Solo, Surabaya and Lampung135 with widespread burning and looting. Under the international pressures from China, Taiwan, and the US, Habibie appointed TGPF (Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta-The Joint-Fact Finding Team) to investigate the May violence. Protests were held by ethnic Chinese in front of the Indonesian embassy in Washington DC on August 7 followed by 200 people petitioned the embassy in Beijing on 10 August. Dozens of other demonstrations had been held in Southeast Asia.136 Six weeks after the incident, top foreign ministry officially demanded the protection of ethnic Chinese. On 3 August, Peoples Daily called on the Indonesian authorities to protect the rights of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia and to punish those responsible for the mayhem. The commentary had said, These criminal acts have sparked grave concern and strong indignation among the people in China and the overseas Chinese societies. Since 1950s, this had
Far Eastern Economic Review, Dangers Persist, 19 February 1998 Gatra, 21 February 1998 133 Kompas, 14 February 1998 134 Suara Pembaharuan, 14 February 1998 135 On 14 May at 3.pm, nearby Muhammadyah University in Palembang, a car driven by ethnic Chinese was burned down by angry crowd. On the same day in Solo at Jalan Slamet Ryadi around 6.pm, 14 mini shops belonging to ethnic Chinese were looted and burned. 136 Far Eastern Economic Review, United We Stand, 20 August 1998
132 131
been the first time Beijing had criticized a friendly country for its treatment of ethnic Chinese.137 Immediately after the May riots, reports and rumors began to circulate that there were organized groups behind the riots and the rapes. These agitators had incited the crowd to act violent and encouraged them to direct their anger towards ethnic Chinese communities. It had the same ringtone to the allegedly organized mob rape of ethnic Chinese women. Such incidents were said to have taken place in apartment buildings where many of the residents were ethnic Chinese. TGPF had received various reports on this particular issue and the team was divided over methods of verification and collection of data about victims of sexual violence. The final report by TGPF would state that under the Jakarta Protocol138, there were 15 victims of sexual violence. Whereas based on data gathered from victims families, psychologists, religious clerics and eyewitnesses, there were 37 cases. Hermawan Sulistyo, TGPF member reported that the team had found 13 verified cases of sexually assaulted women.139 The disagreement over the numbers of victims and especially the rape victims were marred by unprecedented conclusions regarding the involvement of the armed forces and political elite in the violence. Father Sandyawan Sumardi from TRUK, the founder of local
human rights group, believed that the organized violence stemmed from a conflict among Indonesian elite which led to racial hatred. This was not about ethnicity, it was an intra-elite conflict that needed victims.140 With respect to the total number of victims of all other violence, TGPF came across similar problem of finding consensus on either the number of victims or one set of accurate date. The Final Report was based on multiple sets of figures where the police reported 451 dead and no wounded; TRUK data estimated that 1,109 died in fires, 27 shot dead and 91 wounded. While the district military command listed 463 dead, 69 wounded and the Jakarta regional government just 288 dead and 101 wounded.
Far Eastern Economic Review, Compatriot Games: China Changes Tack on Atrocities in Indonesia, 20 August 1998 138 Jakarta Protocol was the name chosen by the police, military and supporters of the verification process during the investigation of May violence 139 See Sulistyo, 2002:103 140 Far Eastern Economic Review, Shadow Play, 23 July 1998 70 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
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CHAPTER V PERISTIWA MEI 1998: Portrayal of Modern Anti-Sinicism
5.1 Outbreak of Violence This chapter aims to provide a vivid portrayal of the May 1998 victims experiences based on their stories as narrated in the interviews. As mentioned earlier, the number of victims varied from those who directly experience material losses to those who witness the act of violence on that particular day. The following testimonies given by the victims and eyewitnesses have in no doubt aroused deep emotions within the community of ethnic Chinese, giving rise to discussions on racial violence. The lingering question remains the same of why they fall victims whenever there is a social crisis. Based on the profiles of the respondents, the study attempts to show how the pattern of collective presecution experienced by ethnic Chinese is systematically fashioned during Peristiwa Mei 1998. It should be noted that in compliance with general research ethics, the respondents will be addressed with aliases.
5.2 Respondents Accounts on the Outbreak The following cases are accounts derived from the respondents personal experiences as told to the researcher. Following the chronological events of their stories, the researcher is able to provide a vivid picture about the situation they are in or forced to be in as outbreaks begin on May 12 and end on May 15. 5.2.1 Case I: Mrs. Vera and Mr. Michael: The burning of Glodok Plaza Mall in Glodok, West Jakarta I was in the shop around four and five in the afternoon when I received a phone call from friends saying that a gas station in Grogol area had been burned down. I did not know how to go back home. I was told to stay behind as cars and tires were torched on the streets. All of us were afraid and decided to stay in our shops at Glodok Plaza Mall until around 7.pm and 8.pm when the streets were relatively safe although the traffic was still heavy. At the time I carried ten million rupiahs in cash and was terrified to go home. People heading towards the airport were looted and women were raped. We were truly afraid. I thought that it was safer to keep the cash in the shop but others told me to bring out all the merchandises.
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I was however unsure if we could make it home or not, the car could be burned on the way home, but inside my own shop we felt safe. Shortly afterwards my friend told me that the situation was under control and it was better to head home. So my son and I went home and watched the television. Early in the morning my friends who owned shops in Glodok Plaza Mall told me that the mall had been burned down. It turned out the mall had been looted from morning until afternoon. The looters had brought a torch with them and accidentally burned the carpets inside the mall when looting. We found out that the looters had come from the nearby village or kampung. At the time we watched the burning from our television. We saw that everything was taken outside by the looters, from television set to sound system and other electronic items. We could do nothing but felt distressed and afraid to leave home. Until dark, the fire had not been extinguished. Earlier on, the building manager had called to collect money from shop owners in order to ask for firefighters. The manager had insisted that whoever paid the highest would receive immediate help from firefighter units. But it turned out that nothing was being done. We were speechless and angry. In two days and one night, we lost everything. Later we found out that other shop owners who lived nearby in Pinangsia area could only watch the act of looting from a safe distance. They were afraid of the looters who were identified as gang members. At the same time, I also heard that poor people from Mangga Besar area participated in the looting of Glodok Plaza Mall. Even a number of ethnic Chinese from other parts of town became looters. However, they were caught inside the mall with no oxygen and no way out. Many had died inside. Insurance agents later surveyed the location and
discovered remains of white ashes from human beings. Those remains were seen in front of our shop and escalators.
Business Competition Looking back, the relationship between the merchants and villagers had always been good. Some of them even worked in the shops like ours. Most probably because of the social and economic gap they acted as looters. Rumors had circulated that Glodok Plaza Mall was most sought after for electronic products compared to Mangga Dua Mall or nowadays known as ITC. Shortly after the burning incident, shop owners were given temporary shelters in Glodok, but many had decided to look for a new space at Mangga Dua Mall. At the time,
merchants could use the kiosks free of charge excluding the service fee at Mangga Dua Mall. Its nearby location to Glodok was an attractive alternative to merchants and automatically they reopened their businesses there.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims Nearing the downfall of Soeharto, the economic and political conditions in the country had become uncertain. The outbreaks of violence were not only directed towards ethnic Chinese merchants but also towards other ethnic Chinese. My neighbor who was a Hajj rescued ethnic Chinese women who were dragged on the street and raped. Naked women were given clothes by him. I could not say therefore that everyone had bad intention. Although there were others who were disrespectful to the death. When someone died in our culture, he or she would not be immediately buried but the corpse was preserved in a coffin at a funeral house where family members would gather to pay the last respect to the death in the malam kembang tradition. Sadly, I heard that the corpse was moved around onto the streets, simply distasteful.
Security Measure I dared not to leave the country. First, I had lost my shop and my jewelries possessions which were not worth much even if they were sold for cash money. Second, we were too afraid to take a trip to the airport. I guess for those who had money they could join the military car until they reached the airport. I knew that there was a BMW car sold for very cheap in the airport just to have enough cash to buy tickets. For those who could not get into the next flight, they chose to sleep in the airport. They were even willing to pay big money for a ticket. That particular situation applied to those with lots of cash money. Unfortunately that was not the case for us. Until the return of Soeharto from Egypt, residents at our housing compound took turn to guard the residential area. From morning until late at night, men carried sharp objects like samurai and knifes. All residents including the pribumi participated around the clock to ensure safety. Unlike us who relied on just a satpam, or a residential security officer, the elite residential area like Pantai Mutiara, could afford to ask military officers for security. At night, no lights were allowed for fear of attracting looters to our residents. There had been attempts by villagers who lived right behind the warehouses opposite our residential area. At the time there were no iron gates, only us
protecting the compound. We decided to give basic staple which had been bought collectively to drive away the villagers. Since then, most residents had iron wrought gates similar to residential areas in Pluit.
No Amends President Habibie had extended his apology for the tragedy but no amends were granted. Furthermore, debt collectors from the Citibank had come frequently to ask for payment installment. My friends told me that the Citibank abroad had resolved this issue with the Citibank in Indonesia. It was even reported by television reporters that the riots were declared national disasters and as the result of the riots many businessmen had filed bankruptcy. Every time debt collectors came to us, members of our family would say Do you think that we dont know all debts were already paid by the Citibank abroad as reported on television? It means that we are freed from our financial obligations to the bank. To me, it just does not make any sense that we still had to endure this kind of pressure.
Ethnic Chinese and the Pribumi Muslim One month after the riots, we were told to safeguard our house and walls. We were told that if there was a stroke of chalk on the walls, it meant death. Every single day we made sure that there was no such sign on the walls of our house. We had to make sure to take out the sign if there was any to avoid people from looting and stealing our house. Since most of the houses were targeted towards ethnic Chinese, some painted the words We are Muslim on their houses. Even some of the houses were colored green. Ancestor tables were nowhere to be found. I wore a veil just in case. And there was always a veil in the car for me to cover myself should anything happen. We knew that those looters targeted anyone with white pale skin who looked like ethnic Chinese as we saw in Glodok. Ethnic Chinese were forced out of their cars only to be beaten up until they bled. For a long time, social gap had existed between ethnic Chinese and the pribumi Muslim. During my grandmothers time, a sight of pribumi was a terrifying one. This way of thinking was passed to our grandchildren as we were told to be extra careful when socializing with pribumi. For the Muslim pribumi, they perceived us ethnic Chinese as being arrogant and unfriendly. Moreover, ethnic Chinese turned out to be successful business people. And for that reason alone, the Muslim pribumi were resentful towards us. To make matters worse, ethnic
Chinese living in the west and north Jakarta hardly mingle with the pribumi. If the pribumi need money, they would provide but that was as far as they could get. Other than that they lived separately. As a result, the pribumi thought negatively of us. It had been more than 10 years. And since we live here in Indonesia, we must blend in with the locals. Nearly all of my friends were of Muslim background and like ethnic Chinese, some were bad and some were not. We simply could not judge people from their physical appearances.
5.2.2 Case II: Mr Dani:The burning of Topaz Mall and the looting of ITC Roxi Mall in Roxi, West Jakarta As I left home from Roxi in the morning for work at Proyek Senen, I noticed a large crowd of people had gathered in the Gajah Mada area. I was not sure of what was happening until I was told to go back. I came home around 10.am. In the meantime, a growing number of people had begun to occupy the area. At the time my children were still at school in Jalan Ketapang. I was confident of their safety since they were still at school. However at around 11.am to midday, the crowd had begun to plan attacks on ITC Roxi mall but failed to do so as it was guarded. There were no military officers present yet, but the security personnel had managed on their own. The crowd who were mostly villagers from the nearby village ran towards Topaz Mall. They began to loot and burn the mall until the afternoon before returning to ITC Roxi Mall for another session of looting. From what I saw, the crowd would first begin the act of looting followed by burning. Various items were gathered just to be burned until the building was set on fire. Afterwards the looters would go into ITC Roxi Mall and took whatever items available from clothing to video set. At the time, the incident did not strike me as dangerous. I thought my children were at school and the situation was still under control. But then my wife asked me to pick up the children from school. I was unable to leave home and was afraid seeing a large concentration of mass outside. I decided to ask my friend who lived in Gajah Mada area to pick them up and brought them to his house. I remained in Roxi until the afternoon. As I walked on the street, I saw the crowd stopped and burned every passing car on the main streets. Through friends, I learned that Glodok had been set on fire. Television set and other items were looted including my friends electronic merchandises. I saw no firefighters on any of the locations until the afternoon I picked up my children.
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There were only a few security officers present until the Marines showed up in the afternoon. The looting came down as a spontaneous act and I saw no act of violence towards ethnic Chinese. In the case of ITC Roxi Mall, the crowd most probably had already planned to loot the handphones. As a new mall, ITC Roxi was considered the largest handphones center. As for Proyek Senen, where I worked, no looters could enter the area as it was heavily guarded by the merchants and nearby residents.
Security Measures At night, extra security measure was employed and people were thoroughly checked before entering the residential area. For three nights and days, we took turn guarding the residents. We wanted to make sure that those people would not burn our residents as they did to the shopping buildings. Shop owners whose buildings were completely burned down and ruined could do nothing. They lost everything and felt helpless. After more than 10 years, some of my friends had rebuilt their businesses in Roxi and Glodok areas. It was a traumatic experience for some but with supports from friends they were motivated to move on with their lives without expecting amends from the government or their insurance companies.
5.2.3 Case III: Mr Sadli:The looting and burning of Glodok, West Jakarta On the day of the riots, I stood in front of my store when I noticed a large crowd taking orders to force entry the gate entrance to Glodok. I could not exactly remember the date when it happened. It was between the night of 13 May or 14 May. As the gate fell, looters consisting of children to elderly entered Glodok. I decided to mingle with the crowd to give the impression that I was part of them while protecting my own shop. The moment I learned about the burning of Grogol gas station, I immediately closed my shop. I prepared myself for the worse. It turned out that the large crowd had indeed showed up from everywhere. The looters specifically aimed for shops with boards of electronic brands. They also looked for shops which were easy to break in. Once they were inside, they carried television set, a fridge and other items as many as they could afford physically. As I sat quietly by my shop, they asked me to watch after their stolen goods. I acted as if I was just a passerby watching them. They took a keyboard, a
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guitar and placed those items in front of me. I did not know who they were. I only knew that I was terrified for my life. After the looting, the looters kept the stolen goods. Later as my relative who lived nearby and I found out, they sold them to the pribumi for very cheap like Rp100000 to Rp200000 per item.
Security Measures The following day, I heard a gunshot and the crowd left the location. Everything was back to normal. Prior to the riots, all of us merchants knew that the crowd was coming our way. Instead of going home, I decided to wait at my relatives house until night time. The crowd had looted from afternoon to the next morning for two days in a row. We did not sleep during that time to make sure everything was safely sound. As I went to Pejagalan to borrow my friends handphone charger, the streets looked empty. It was a sight of a dead town. Until today, I did not understand why there were no security officials present. It was as if nothing had happened. There were also no fire fighters available on location. From what I had seen, there was no fire fighter from the moment the fire started until the next day. I heard later on that Glodok was offered security for 50 million rupiahs or 100 million rupiahs. But since there was no response from the management, we had to endure the lost. One month after the riots, I reopened my business. For the first two weeks, there were no business transactions.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims During the looting, I heard the crowd making comments like Indonesia is now truly an independent nation. There were also anti-Chinese remarks. Honestly I could not help thinking how it started after all these years. Is it because of a political situation? I came to the conclusion that it must be the case because I was there and saw with my own eyes. I had to act quickly and by disguising as a poor man, they left me alone. However, should it be the other way around, I may not be here today. I also heard about the raping of ethnic Chinese women. Nobody liked to talk about it because they were afraid to do so. They preferred to keep matters to themselves. The issue was definitely a sensitive one. Even for those who were raped, they refused to talk about it. I was also told that a number of ethnic Chinese were dragged out of their cars. The cars were then torched by the crowd. Unfortunately with the lack of good will from the government to resolve the matters, nobody would ever know the truth.
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To me, I only hoped that it was the first and the last. It should mark the end of discrimination for the sake of the next generation. I grew up here and although I visited China frequently, I would never be accepted as a citizen. I looked Chinese but when asked by the Chinese immigration from which country I came from, there was no doubt in my mind that Indonesia was my country. I had nowhere else to go. I was born and raised here and I hoped to die here too.
5.2.4 Case IV: Mr Darma:The looting and burning of Glodok, West Jakarta On 12 May, I heard the rumors that Glodok would be closed. The merchants were told to close their shops for approximately one hour due to students protests. I decided to close my shop for half a day and left for home. My employees also returned home that day. The next day at 12.pm, I opened my shop when I heard that around 1.pm cars were being torched on the streets. At 2.pm I headed home on a motorcycle leaving behind my cars. From what I heard, everywhere there was a major traffic jam and no cars could go through the traffic. I took the route passing through Asemka and Angke to reach my home at Green Garden, West Jakarta. I noticed on the way home that a large crowd had gathered in Angke. I hurried home and a little bit after 2.pm I arrived safely. I heard that those who just left Glodok after 3.pm or 4.pm were not able to come home due to the traffic. I heard that my friend, another shop owner in Glodok, and his company were beaten up on the street of Angke as he headed home around 4.pm from Glodok. His motorcycle was torched but he managed to run. Considered lucky, he was rescued by a Hajj in the village area of Angke. My friend stayed over at his home for one night.
Security Measure I heard residential area like Muara Karang in North Jakarta was looted by the villagers living behind the compound. My sibling who lived there told me that residents were asked to step outside their homes and gathered in the field. Everyone from women and children were outside. Although fearful for their lives, they were ready to fight the crowd. Fortunately, my resident at West Jakarta area was guarded by military officers. They wore black uniforms with no ID numbers and names. They carried guns to guard Hero supermarket, Top supermarket and BCA. From 14 May and 15 May, the looters continuously tried to loot the supermarkets but failed to do so after hearing gunshots. However around 4.pm on 15 May, I saw that Top supermarket which was located at the street of Green 78
Garden residential allowed the crowd to enter the building. They were told to take
all the items including the food and beverages as long as they left the building alone. The crowd took everything from the first and second floors. I saw the crowd having a blast with abundant of food and beverages. Satisfied, they left for Hero supermarket. Around 6.pm, Hero supermarket decided to follow suit.
Everything was put on the parking lot for the crowd. Around 15 May, the situation was relatively calmed although I could still see smoke everywhere.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims On 14 May around noon, I checked on my shop in Glodok. My employees did not show up but the windows and the building were still in one piece. There were however a large gathering of crowd but with the military forces guarding the area my shop was left untouched. All of sudden around 4.pm or 5.pm, the officers were retrieved back to their post. And within an hour, a violent crowd of men and women stormed in with their gerobak ready to pick up anything on sight. I saw for myself women on their sarongs lifting heavy items. A safe deposit cabinet, heavy as it was, had gone missing. Shops were looted and burned. I lost hundreds of millions rupiahs during the looting. They were back to the shop on 20 May. Surely I was shocked by the tragedy. But in business, we had to take risks. I had no regrets. I could only insure my shops but other than that we the merchants could do nothing. For two years I remained unemployed. But as a senior
merchant, I managed to reopen my business with the insurance money I received in two years time. It gave me a head start although I still had to borrow money here and there. But as a merchant I owed it to myself the responsibility to remain truthful. I gave my life to this country. I saw no reason for me to flee the country as I have families here. I wished that the leaders would stop playing dirty politics. The victims had always been the poor people. During the riots, there were no business activities. It meant no salaries for the employees and no food on the table. Like my own employees, even after two years they returned to me and started over.
5.2.5 Case V: Mr Hari:The looting of Glodok Plaza Mall The day of the Trisaksi incident, I was at my shop in Glodok Plaza Mall conducting business until 2.30pm. Other shops were still opened as usual. I only heard from the telephones that there were riots everywhere. But I remained calm
knowing that there were two military tanks standing by at Glodok Plaza Mall. As I arrived at the shop in the morning from Jalan Gunung Sahari, I noticed there were no security forces present and the street looked extremely empty. However I had my shop opened confident that with the military tanks parking next to the mall and in front of Jalan Pinangsia Raya nothing could possibly happen. Just few hours around 5.pm after I closed the shop, Glodok Plaza Mall was looted. I wanted to leave home but was not allowed by my wife and children. I was sure had I left for my shop, I would not lose everything. The looters had used a Molotov bomb to break into my shop. Around 6.30pm, I asked my driver to check the shop. I regretted the fact that I did not contact my employees to stand by in the shop. Had my employees been there, the looting could probably be avoided. When seeing my employees as another pribumi whose lives were dependent on the shop for their income, the looters would change their minds and left my shop alone. However, it was too late and nothing was left of my shop. My merchandises were put outside on the street. Sixty kilos of 34 inches television set and a refrigerator of 155 kilos were swept away. On 15 May, I went to see the remainder of my shop. All my documents were lost and no one could be held responsible. That was the reason we formed an organization of joined security system on 18 May for areas including Glodok Plaza, Pinangsia and Glodok Kota, Oreon Plaza, Harco, Glodok Baru, Glodok Metro, Glodok Makmur, Hayam Wuruk Indah, Glodok Jaya and Glodok Metropol.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims President Habibie had come to apologize for the tragedy accompanied by Sutiyoso, the Military Chief of Command, the Chief of Police, the Minister of Finance and the Mayor. They all claimed that the tragedy had come
unexpectedly. When asked about the whereabouts of the security officers and fire fighter units, they were unable to answer. I personally came to the District
Military Command (KODIM) to ask why Glodok Plaza Mall was not guarded. It turned out that the management had been asked to pay 40 million rupiahs for extra security but the money was never delivered. The management was only thinking of profit making and by assuming the tenants refusal to pay them back, they had put everyone in danger. At Glodok Plaza Mall, only 123 people out of 276 were reported as casualties. Unidentified dead bodies were still discovered even until September. Those
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bodies had mostly turned to ashes because it was difficult to make identifications. Only those who could be identified were securely removed from the premise. I had lost my faith with the leaders of this nation. The riots reminded me with 1965 where there were burning on the streets. It was all political. To me, the incident was born out of personal revenge. After more than 10 years, the economy situation remained stagnant with the widening of social gap.
5.2.6 Case VI: Mr Iwan:Looting attempt at Fortuna Hotel in Pancoran, Glodok On the day of the riots, I was at Pancoran, Glodok working. I noticed a number of people were running from the east side towards the west. Lots of merchants had closed their shops that day due to the burning and looting. I saw the crowd carrying a television set and other electronic items they took from Glodok Harco. The looters had mostly come from outside the Glodok area as we knew everyone well enough. I was not sure however whether it was an organized crime or just spontaneous acts. But security officers had arrested a number of looters and confiscated their stolen goods before they were turned in to the policemen. On 14 May, Hotel City at Glodok was set on fire. All six floors were completely destroyed, including Jembatan Harco. From the hotel manager, he informed me that there were four men with short hair wearing boots going up the stairs. Carrying containers of gasoline, these men ordered the guests to leave the hotel. Shortly, the hotel was on fire. The relations between the street vendors and the pribumi had been good. For that reason when the crowd tried to destroy Hotel Fortuna, they were dismissed by pribumi women. They had said Mister, do not destroy anything here because this is our source of income. Please look for trouble elsewhere. Businesses in Pancoran which mostly sold Chinese medicines or housewares were worthless compared to Glodok Harco where it sold electronic merchandises. The looters left the hotel and headed back to Glodok Harco. By 15 May, the situation was under control. Trucks with Marine officers were seen in Hayam Wuruk area. Their arrival had certainly alarmed the looters. Just seeing the officers, people of Pancoran were delighted because they kept us safe whenever there were troubles.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims As I looked in the direction of Glodok Plaza Mall, I saw a black smoke coming out of burning buildings. With no firefighters units present on location, the fire could not be extinguished. At the time I was not yet informed about the riots.
But here in Glodok we were cautious following the Trisakti incident. I remembered in the tragedy of Malari, Glodok was their target. The objective was to set Glodok on fire similar to May 1998 tragedy. I felt that ethnic Chinese had always been the target whenever there were major events in the nation. Economic gap could best explain this condition. Pancoran was the economic barometer and should anything happen to Pancoran, it would certainly affect the national economy. Ethnic Chinese in Pancoran had been targeted before like in the Tragedy of Malari. Experiences of the past had been traumatic and whenever there were rumors regarding ethnic Chinese, we got the firsthand information. News travelled fast when it concerned the well being of Pancoran and its people. The locals and international merchants from Singapore, Malaysia and Hongkong would look or check for any news in Pancoran. Born and raised in Glodok, I had been working here in Pancoran for 32 years. Since 1978, I moved to Pluit but I still came to work here. For the next three months, residents of Pluit took turn guarding the area from looters. High fences were built for extra security. I told my family to stay home and not to go out. Important items must be packed ready to go. In case of anything, my family could immediately leave the house. After the May tragedy, shops only opened from 10.am to 6.pm where previously from 8am to 10pm. Before the riots, Pancoran was always very busy. But now people were afraid to leave home at night.
5.2.7 Case VII: Mr. Yohanes:The burning and looting of Pinangsia building in Glodok, West Jakarta When the riots took place on 13 May, I was in Pinangsia, Glodok. A large crowd gathered on the streets. I saw someone instructed the crowd to burn things. I was not sure from where the crowd came from. But on the streets, cars were torched. From Mangga Besar until Glodok everything was burned down. That afternoon, the crowd had begun to enter the shops and the mall. The crowd did not resemble people from the nearby village. Everything in Pinangsia and Glodok from buildings to Jembatan Harco was set into fire except for the gas station which was guarded by military officers. They burned everything but I could do nothing. I called the Military District Command (KODIM) and Rayon Military Command (KORAMIL) for help. Firefighter was sent our way from Kemukus in the district office but could not get through the crowd. The West
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Jakarta Commander of Military Regiment (DANREM) was present but could do nothing. Outnumbered by the crowd, the present military unit of KORAMIL was powerless to contain the situation. I was desperate for help but there was nobody I could turn to, not even a police officer.
Security Measure Unable to save the shops in my building, I thought only of my family. Fortunately my family and the residence at Krekot, Pasar Baru were safely guarded by friends from Flores. I asked them to safeguard my house and they were ready to fight anyone who was trying to burn the house. I was lucky that my home was safe and sound as it was protected by the pribumi who lived in the nearby village.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims As I returned to the shopping building on my motorcycle at night, the crowd was still on the streets burning things. At Mangga Besar, I saw ethnic Chinese being dragged out of the car. He managed to run but his car was torched. Seeing the brutality by a young man of twenty to thirty years of age, the pribumi were afraid. I thought it was strange that there was no help whatsoever. There were no security officers from the military let alone the police. On 14 May, the Commander of Rayon Military (DANRAMIL) at Jalan Gajah Mada asked me to join him on his tank. Everywhere I saw only burning fires. Afterwards I heard that the looters and shop attendants were trapped inside the building. They first looted then burned the stolen goods. They took anything from television set to tape recorders. And one person could take two to three items at once. If the items were too heavy, they just threw them on the street. I even heard people making anti-Chinese remarks, Burn this Chinese shop. Others wrote on the shop, Milik Pribumi which referred to shops belonging to pribumi in Indonesian and Arab languages. Funny thing, those shops were left untouched. It was a chaotic situation except for the areas protected by the Marine like in Krekot, Pasar Baru. A month before the riots, the management of Glodok Plaza Mall had heard rumors about the possible riots. They did not believe those rumors right away. So when there were offers for military protection, they began to negotiate the price. The asking price was 50 million rupiahs for Glodok Plaza Mall and my building, Pinangsia. Since the coverage area for Glodok Plaza Mall was larger than mine,
they offered a large number of Marines with two military tanks. I noticed if the Marines took over the security, everything was under control. They were treated with respect as people would yell on the streets Long Live the Marine. But before we reached an agreement on the terms of payments, the riots had occurred. Luckily, I still managed to save the warehouse located on the top floor of my building with the help of KODIM. I had called and paid for firefighter units, but the crowd prevented them from coming in. Although I could not save the first three floors, at least one floor was not burned down. I saw no amends were granted by the government. It was all political. Past experiences had shown how ethnic Chinese were easy targets. Social and economic gap remained the issue and it created difficult position for ethnic Chinese. I personally had good relations with the pribumi, but other ethnic Chinese preferred to live apart from the pribumi.
Ethnic Chinese and Pribumi I saw the only future for us in Indonesia was through assimilation. My three siblings lived together with pribumis. That was the whole point of assimilation as we resided in Indonesia. To us, Indonesia had lots to offer. It was true that the situation in Indonesia was always short lived. But if the government ensured the safety of those ethnic Chinese who fled abroad with their assets, I was sure that they would return here. The future would look promising when there were no difference between race and ethnicity. If however the situation remained the same, I would say that it would be best to flee abroad with our assets.
5.2.8 Case VIII: Mr Alan:Looting attempt at Lokasari. Glodok, West Jakarta On 13 May, the situation in Pancoran remained quiet. Nothing really happened although all of us were cautious knowing that riots had occurred in other part of town as targeted. There were no business activities that day. Fortunately there was no looting or burning in our area different than in Glodok Harco and Hotel City where the buildings were targeted. Hotel City belonged to one of the ethnic Chinese conglomerates and the majority of merchants in Glodok Harco were of ethnic Chinese origin. Should there be no target why the shop adjacent to it like Raja Mas was left untouched? I made a round a clock trip in the neighborhood and surveyed the location.
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On May 14, I left for work around 8.am and decided to go on a rigshaw. It so happened I had to guard the office building in Mangga Besar 8. From the Olimo area, I noticed a large crowd being led by a young man of around twenty to thirty years of age with dark skin who looked like someone from outside Java. He led the crowd of more than hundred young people towards Husada Hospital. As they reached the hospital, they decided to make a retour. I came to the conclusion that the hospital was not their target although there were expensive cars parked in the hospital parking lot. When they were back again in Olimo, the crowd began to break the decorative pots and road curbs and shop windows with stones. Those shops were located next to Pujasera and Bilyar Utama. But they only threw stones and continued walking towards Husada Hospital until they reached train railways. Located nearby was an eatery place, Dunkin Donut. Stones were thrown towards the shops windows by the crowd and they moved on. It was evident that those places were not their targets. By the time they reached Lokasari, they were refused entry from the front and the back side. It looked like there were securities officers present inside the building with their guns. I was twenty to thirty kilometers away from the location and that was why I could not see clearly. I was afraid the officers had begun shooting. With no success, they headed back towards Olimo. As they reached Mangga Besar 8 junction, they were forced to retrieve by the locals. In that area there were lots of discotheques and hotels. They were heavily guarded. The residential leader of Mangga Besar 8 had informed his residents by phone to fight the crowd from entering the area. As the crowd pushed their way in, I heard gunshots. Nobody died as the bullets were made of rubbers. But a man was accidentally shot in his buttock and was brought to Husada Hospital. I decided to return home.
Ethnic Chinese as Victims In my opinion, the number of casualties when it concerned pribumis was significantly higher than those of ethnic Chinese in Jakarta area. Many had died during the looting because they were mobilized and they did not realize the danger of looting. Someone gave an order and assured them that there was no reason to be afraid. When seeing others successfully stole things, the rest followed suit. Someone had started burning and before they knew it there were smoke everywhere and the building was set on fire. As a head of security, I was informed by my staff about the situation.
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Security Measure At my residential area in Pancoran, we took turn guarding the residents. Nobody slept for days as we were worried the large crowd would attack our residents. From friends we learned how to make a chemical solution. In case they showed up, we would throw the chemicals already prepared in the plastic bags and within seconds the group would disperse. Fortunately until 17 May, the situation was under control.
Ethnic Chinese and Pribumi After living in Pancoran for more than thirty years, I knew everyone by name. By nature, ethnic Chinese had always been merchants and we preferred to live peacefully. Until today, there had never been any problems between Pinangsia and Glodok districts. However nothing was quiet the same as in the old days. Before the tragedy, people would still come and eat noodles until 9.pm. But today, there was nobody after 4.pm. Other economic factor played part as well. Glodok was once a designated place to buy medicine, fruits and snacks. But now people would do grocery shopping nearby their residential areas like Kelapa Gading. The fact remained however that the head of dragon would always be in Glodok. Despite efforts to decentralize the economy, Glodok would always be part of ethnic Chinese. Glodok symbolized ethnic Chinese culture, habits and way of living. If the Javanese went home to their village in Java, then ethnic Chinese would always return to Glodok. 5.3 Analysis and Findings Respective of the May 1998 tragedy, there had been recurrings patterns in the act of looting and burning of Glodok and its surrounding areas. Viewed from the perspectives of Girard and Giddens, clearly the tragedy highlighted social and economic discrepancy between the rich and the poor as well as issues of ethnic identity. Most respondents agreed that their ethnicity had been the underlying reason for the outbreak. Stemmed from jealousy and hatred towards ethnic
Chinese, racial issues began to surface. Acts of violence towards ethnic Chinese were evident throughout the riots in Glodok. Clearly, ethnic Chinese vulnerability in time of crisis was used against them in what Girrad reffered to as collective persecutions and resonances. The day the students were buried, the outbreak of violence had started. The
Joint Fact Finding Team documented that the burning of the Grogol gas station in west Jakarta occured around 2.30pm. Within hours, the crowd had reached Glodok area and began to loot and burn down Glodok Plaza Mall, Hotel City, Jembatan Harco, Glodok shops and Pinangsia buildings. One of the respondent, Mr Sadli who witnessed the brutality of the crowd as they looted shops right in front of him reconfirmed the economic gap that had existed between ethnic Chinese and pribumi. Acts of violence and further damages to the properties underlined the mounting frustrations felt by the looters. Coming from densely populated villages, the looters blamed ethnic Chinese for their poverty and misfortune. Stolen goods of electronic and foodstuffs indicated their hunger for power and financial resources that had long been denied. Being associated with wealth and corruption, ethnic Chinese were held responsible for their economic condition. Ethnic Chinese whose foreign origin had been politicized revealed the truth of the existing system, its relativity, its fragility and its morality. Material losses which amounted in billions of dollars were a constant reminder of their very existence. With no firefighter units and security forces present during the riots, it showed how ethnic Chinese were victimized. Their rights as a citizen were denied simply because they were considered different.
CONCLUSION THE AFTERMATH
Despite Soehartos resignation, Indonesian economy sank further into economic collapse. May 1998 riots destroyed many urban business centers, severely
damaging confidence in Indonesia, particularly among international investors and ethnic Chinese who had been the backbone of Indonesian economy. Capital flight and the disruption of production and distribution of goods had made recovery even more difficult, and had contributed to high inflation. The rupiah continued to plunge from Rp9500 to the dollar when Habibie took office to Rp13000 in late July before recovering to Rp7000-8000 in October. The number of unemployed was estimated to have reached about 20 million, with the increase of poverty from 14 percent to over 70 percent of the population. One of the first tasks of President Habibies government was to persuade ethnic Chinese who took refuge in other countries or simply ceased their economic activities to return home and re-open their business. In his visit to Glodok, Jakartas Chinatown, Habibie expressed his sympathy for the loss and damage they had to incur.141 Abdurahman Wahid, Amien Rais and other political leaders also expressed their supports and encouraged ethnic Chinese to help rebuild Indonesias economy. At the same time, Wahid pushed for the recognition of Confucianism as religion in Indonesia.142 Despite the outpouring supports for the return of ethnic Chinese by Indonesian leaders, Habibie continued to make inconsistent statements regarding ethnic Chinese businessmen. In an interview with international media, Habibie
remarked that nobody could force ethnic Chinese to return home including himself if they refuse to do so. Habibie further on commented that the economic role of ethnic Chinese would be taken by others, in reference to the indigenous businessmen.143 Immediately after the release of Habibies statement, the rupiah plunged to seven per cent.
144
The comment was consistent during the Vice
Presidential visit to Japan on March 1998: It is absurd that the Chinese, who make up three per cent of the population are controlling ninety per cent of the economy.
141
In an interview with Jakarta Post, the Chairman of the Indonesian Anti-Discrimination Movement, or Gandi, Wahyu Effendi, remarked that Habibies visit to Glodok, Jakartas Chinatown area in West Jakarta, was nothing more than a ceremonial thing. The victims need a more complete solution (including) political acknowledgement and justice. Jakarta Post, 14 May 2008 142 Jakarta Post, 13 August 1998 143 Keith B. Richburg, Habibie Pushes for Visit to US, Washington Post, 19 July 1998 144 Strait Times, 23 July 1998 88 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
I would like to give the opportunities to the pribumi, who make up the majority of the population, and build them.145 However, efforts by the leaders to invite the ethnic Chinese back home gave the impression that those who fled the country were actually in control of the nations economy. This attitude in fact justified the political engineering which had created social jealousy throughout the New Order regime.146 In the meantime, the renowned ethnic Chinese economist, Kwik Kian Gie made a remark that logically the exodus of ethnic Chinese could not affect the increase in prices for basic good. If anything, the blame should fall on the decreased value of rupiah. 147 Meanwhile, violence continued to dominate the news even after the resignation of Soeharto. On 7 September, an incident involving an ethnic Chinese employer and her employee led to violence in Kebumen, Central Java. Employed by Yohanes and Elizabeth as an employee in the automobile spare-parts shop, Sukiman accidentally spill oil in the shop. Sukiman was scolded severely by Elizabeth for his mistake. As news travel fast, by mid-morning nearby villagers had joined the angry crowd and over 80 shops, houses and factories as well as dozens of vehicles and public facilities were looted, burned and destroyed.
148
Few days later, another incident in Bagansiapi-api, Riau, occurred on 15 September 1998. It started two days earlier when a fight broke out between Zulkilfi, a pribumi, and Supardi, an ethnic Chinese after their motorcycles collided accidentally. Rumors circulated that Zulkifli had died on the way to hospital in Pekanbaru as a result of injuries. On the evening of 15 September, a large crowd from various parts of Bagansiapi-api gathered on Bagan Kota district, the economic centre of the city and home to ethnic Chinese majority. The angry crowd burned down places of worship including a temple, houses and shops. Troops from the army, the mobile brigade and the regional police arrived the following day. They were deployed from Dumai and Pekanbaru. That day, thirtyone suspects were detained.149 Days after the violence, a silaturahmi (a friendly gesture) was extended by ethnic Chinese groups from various backgrounds, Javanese, Malay, Buginese and Batak. The event was to mark the harmonious
145 146
Leo Suryadianta, How will Habibie handle the Chinese issue?, Strait Times, 15 June 1998 Kompas, 22 September 1998 147 Kompas, 7 July 1998 148 Jawa Post, 8 September 1998 149 Suara Pembaruan, 17 September 1998 89 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
relations between ethnic Chinese and the rest of the community that had been amiable for many years despite recent violence.150 Efforts to reduce racial problems had become a pressing issue for the new government. Habibie pledged to reform discriminatory laws and to support equality for all Indonesian including ethnic Chinese.151 In Soeharto time, racial discriminations were apparent in the formulation of law. Social distinctions between various groups such as the Javanese and non-Javanese, Muslim and non Muslim had further created social distance between ethnic Chinese and pribumi. On 16 September 1998, under the Presidential Instruction (Inpres No 26.1998), the terms pribumi and non pribumi152 were no longer used in any of the official governmental policy and business. On 5 May 1999, further Presidential Instruction (Inpres No 4. 1999) restated Presidential Instruction (Inpres No.56 1996) which was issued on 9 July 1996, stipulating that the SKBRI153 (Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republic Indonesia-Indonesian Citizenship Certificate) would no longer be necessary. The KTP (Kartu Tanda Penduduk-Identity Card) was sufficient proof of citizenship. To show the commitment of the government in eliminating racial discrimination, Indonesia ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination154 on 25
Suara Pembaruan, 21 Sepember 1998 In a recent interview to the Taiwan media, Habibie declared that since he came to power, Indonesia has eliminated discrimination against ethnic Chinese and now adheres to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 152 Indonesias 1945 Constitution recognizes the human rights of its citizens where it is embedded in the fifteen principles. However, a more exclusive term orang Indonesia asli or loosely translates as native Indonesian, is also introduced in the Constitution. It states that only an Indonesia asli person is eligible to become a president of the republic while in fact Article 27 of the Constitution stated that All citizens have the same position before the law and the government. See Winarta, 2004:68 153 Minister of Justice Decree No.JB. 3/4/12 Year 1978 regarding SKBRI particularly on Article 1 stated that each citizen of Indonesia must prove his citizenship by applying for a SKBRI to the Ministry of Justice. This decree applies to all Indonesian individuals of foreign descent as it provides legal certainty for those who do not have other evidence of Indonesian citizenship. However, in practice it applies only to ethnic Chinese. Ibid:71 154 The definition of racial discrimination includes distinction exclusion, restriction, or preference based on race, color, descent, national, or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise on an equal footing, of human rights, and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, or any other field of public life. The convention guarantees everyone the following rights, among others: The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice; The right to security of person and protection by the state against violence or bodily harm; Political rights, particularly, the right to participate in elections, to take part in the government as well as in the conduct of public affairs in any level and to have equal access to public service; Other civil rights, in particular (i) the right to freedom of movement and residence; (ii) the right to leave any country; (iii) the right to nationality; (iv) the right to marriage and choice of spouse; (v) the right to own property; (vi) the right to inherit; (vii) the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; (viii) the right to freedom of opinion and expression; (ix) the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: (i) the right to work, to equal pay for equal work; (ii) the right to form and join trade unions; (iii) the right to housing; (iv) the right to public health, medical care, social security, and social services; (v) the right to education and training; (vi) the right to equal participation in cultural activities; The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public. Ibid: 75 90
151 150
June 1999. In practice, the government must ensure the civil rights and allow the practice of their own religion and language. Any discriminative treatment would receive sanction in accordance to the appropriate legislative, laws and regulations.
6.1 Discourse and the notion of Scapegoat For over thirty-two years, Soeharto maintained prejudice and anti-sinicism through the policy and sentiment of Indonesian ruling elite. In Peristiwa May 1998, the magnitude of violence against ethnic Chinese was so great that it raised questions on what had been the underlying reason behind the turbulence. The obvious explanation lied in the economic crisis where Anthony Reid in his paper Outsider Status and Economic Success in Suhartos Indonesia compared the 1997 crisis to those happened in 1930s Europe. In 1998, Indonesia reached a 15 per cent GDP loss which was compared to the 24 per cent GDP loss suffered by Germany over the whole period of 1929-1933. Historically speaking colonial policy had no doubt affected the status of ethnic Chinese community which was determined primarily by wealth; while the indigenous status hierarchy was dependent on birth and level of position at the governmental agencies. The social gap between the status-conscious Dutch colonials and Javanese aristocrats was filled by ethnic Chinese. As Shirashi put it the Chinese were no longer needed as the states financiers, they became vulnerable to violent popular hatred, and they were politically powerless even as they became an economically prosperous middleman minority in a society neatly structured along racial lines.155 As immigrants and foreigners, ethnic Chinese were considered different from the native Indonesians. Furthermore the historical fact that Dutch law had placed the Chinese as foreign Orientals, superior than the indigenous people, had simply strengthened the difference. From early on, the treatment of Soeharto towards ethnic Chinese had been systematically discriminatory. Mely Tan argued that continuous process of labeling to change the referral of ethnic Chinese from Tionghoa to Cina156 helped to justify the kind of policy applied to them. In the case of ethnic Chinese, this type of labeling a person became a stigma that meant different as usually occur in the context of conflict. The anti-Chinese violence in May riots showed how
See Shirashi, In Reid and Chirot, 1997:190 The term Cina originally had racial connotations, i.e., the offspring of the union of an Indonesian and a non-indigenous Indonesian, Chinese. However, the term is frequently used to describe Chinese who were born and brought up in the country and who use Indonesian language or dialects as their mother tongue and the medium of communication. In this sense, the term is largely a cultural rather than a racial concept. See Suryadianata, 2004 91
156 155
angers were directed to them simply because they were seen as different. Different by means of exclusiveness where ethnic Chinese preferred to socialize within their own kind thus creating distance between them and the pribumi. Furthermore the labeling of big businessmen using the term conglomerate highlighted the close relations of wealthy ethnic Chinese with the Cendana family. The term was popularized by the media in the mid 1980s which had in many ways reinforced the stereotypes that all ethnic Chinese were rich.157 Ariel Heryanto pointed in his article that for the general Indonesians, ethnic Chinese are not only morally questionable, but also ideologically threatening and culturally unattractive: Sino-Indonesians are indiscriminately considered rich and notoriously industrious, but also cunning and stingy. In the common stereotyped image, they have the worst taste in culture and aesthetics. Socially they may have strong in-group feelings, but politically seem to have no patriotism. The perception is different when it comes to the pribumi government officials. Though their wealth does not always escape criticism and hostile comment, they enjoy special exemption by virtue of being indigenous Indonesians and formal representatives of the nation-statethe poor majority see these officials as belonging to the same group as themselves and as providing achievement models for their offspring.158 The looting and burning of shops indicated the existing tensions between ethnic Chinese and the pribumi which were rooted in the economic context. Frustrated by the unfair treatment, the pribumi accused ethnic Chinese for the increased level of poverty. Opposition had come from prominent Muhamadyah leaders, Lukman Harun, who believed that as long as ethnic Chinese remained protected by the government, the Muslim pribumi could not stand the chance in the business competition. 159
6.2 Ethnic Chinese and Nationalism During Soekarnos era, the Indonesian nation (Bangsa Indonesia) was based on the pluralist model. Indonesia was defined in terms of the people, consisting of indigenous Indonesian suku (ethnic groups) such as suku Java (Javanese), suku Sunda (Sundanese), suku Batak (Bataks), suku Aceh (Acehnese) and suku Peranakan Tionghoa (Peranakan Chinese).160 It was important to note that the Peranakan Chinese (not Totok) were considered as an Indonesian suku. The term
157 158
See Mely Tan, 2008:245 See Heryanto, 1999:161 159 See Schwartz, 2004:123 160 For the speech of Soekarno, refers to Suryadinata, 1993:32
92
Peranakan was used by the Indonesian government as early as 1947 by Siauw Giok Tjhan161 who later became the chairman of Baperki and was appointed as the Minister of State for Peranakan Affairs in the Amir Sjariffudin cabinet. According to Soekarnos concept of nation, Totok Chinese were not part of the Indonesian nation. Thus, with Peranakan Chinese included in the Indonesian nation concept, it had some indigenous cultural elements.162 When Soeharto came to power, he adopted the indigenous model where it only recognized the indigenous ethnic groups as components of the Indonesian nation. Peranakan Chinese were not considered part of the Indonesian nation unless they were absorbed into the indigenous population. Soeharto saw the Chinese problem as a problem of assimilation.
163
After the civil war against communism in 1965,
in an effort to severe the ties between overseas Chinese in Indonesia and the Chinese in Mainland China, the government made several policies to assimilate the Chinese into the native communities. In 1968, the government issued a regulation that ordered the Chinese to drop their Chinese name. Anything related to Chinese culture and ways of living were forbidden, from the use of Chinese character to rituals and traditions. The effort to take away their Chinese identities could be interpreted as the effort to blend the Chinese with the rest of the nation. The policy was clearly discriminative as other ethnic groups such as the Balinese or the Javanese were not required to abandon their ancestral culture, language, dress, dances or religion. Echoes of that debate are still being heard from time to time, although the circumstances which prevailed in the early 1960s have changed substantially since then. Nearly all ethnic Chinese hold Indonesian nationality and have a
Siauw Giok Tjhan succeeded Tan Pa Goan, who was said to be Amir Sjarifudins political guru in 1947-1948. The Ministry of Minority Affairs was formed to convince the Chinese population to support the new Republic. One consequence of Siauws success in combating racially discriminatory measures was the increased determination of some government leaders to make as many Chinese in Indonesia as possible, foreigners. The efforts were centered around the replacement of Passive Citizenship Law with Active Citizenship Law which provided that all Chinese had to apply for Indonesian citizenship and prove that their parents were also born in Indonesia. This would nullify the implementation of the 1946 Citizenship Law which by December 1951, resulted in most of the Chinese to become Indonesian citizens (only some 300,000 rejected Indonesian citizenship). Sunario, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Ali Cabinet (1953-1955) was the champion for the Active citizenship Law. See Siauw Tiong Djin, 1999:4-6. For further readings on influential ethnic Chinese leaders in Indonesian history, refer to Leo Suryadinata, 2004. Peranakans Search for National Identity: Biograhical Studies of Seven Indonesian Chinese. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic. Also see Tang Beng Kok, 2009. Memoar Ang Yan Goan 1894-1984: Tokoh Pers Tionghoa Yang Peduli Pembangunan Bangsa Indonesia. Jakarta: Yayasan Nabil dan Hasta Mitra 162 See Suryadinata, 2004 163 H. Junus Jahja on his book wrote that the question of non-pribumi or Chinese became irrelevant as he converted into Muslim. As a Muslim, he believed that he must follow the teachings of the prophet Muhammad SAW to love his religion and his birth country. See Jahja,1988. For further readings on assimilation, refer to Soe Hok Gie, 1993. Catatan Seorang Demonstran. Jakarta,LP3ES 93 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.
161
stronger sense of identity with Indonesia, their birthplace, than with China. But yet, the concept of indigenism has remained unchanged even after the fall of Soeharto. The effort to amend the clause was met with no success. In the 1945 Constitution, the clause stated that the Indonesian president had to be an indigenous Indonesian (Indonesia asli). In August 2000, however the requirement for Indonesian presidency was eventually amended so that both indigenous Indonesians and third-generation citizens of foreign descent are eligible. Nevertheless, the term asli in Article 16 regarding citizenship has been retained.164
6.3 Solving Chinese Problem The almost laissez-faire strategy adopted by Soeharto towards the Chinese problem since 1967 have been abandoned by President Abdurrahim Wahid in January 2001.165 In February 2002 Megawati Soekarnoputra, Wahids successor declares Chinese New Year to be a national holiday. Despite these symbolic gestures, efforts to amend victims of May 1998 including ethnic Chinese are never realized leaving them as the minority in the Indonesian society.166 Until today, the perpetrators who have committed crimes against humanity are never brought to justice in Trisakti killings167 and May 1998 riot. On the recent meeting with President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Komnas Ham chair Ifdhal Kasim makes an inquiry on the complete investigation based on the reports that have been submitted to the Attorney General Office (AGO) in 2003. According to Djoko Suyanto, the Minister of Politics and Security, the president is not
See Suryadinata, 2004 From 1966-1967, Soeharto introduced a series of laws and policies to suppress expressions of Chinese identity and culture while at the same time highlighting Chinese-ness. These laws and presidential instructions banned Chinese language characters and cultural festivals and strongly encouraged ethnic Chinese to adopt Indonesian sounding name. 166 Lee Kuan Yee, the founding father of Singapore and currently serves as the ministers guru of the cabinet, made a racial comment regarding the Chinese problems in Malaysia and Indonesia on a 15 September 2006 meeting. He said They (ethnic Chinese) are successful people. They are hard workers. That is the reason why they are systematically marginalized. In New Straits Times, the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Syed Hamid Albar, demanded an apology while the Indonesian Ambassador in Singapore had been asked to clarify Lees statement. Lee had also mentioned that both countries, Malaysia and Indonesia would like to treat Singaporean whose majority were of Chinese descendent as another minority group. See Kompas, 29 September 2006 167 On the Trisakti killings, 18 policemen from Anti-Riot Police Brigade had been blamed for the riots but no one had been charged with the deaths. The officer insisted that the 18 police suspects, including 12 members of an elite anti-bomb squad, each carried three black rounds and 12 rubber bullets in their rifle magazines, but did not have live ammunition. Meanwhile the students were not aware live rounds were being fired. All the victims were hit in the head on upper body, indicating the presence of snipers firing from a nearby flyover or other high vantage points. The students could not confirm police sightings of 10 mystery men, carrying Steyrs weapon and dressed in police uniforms, jogging along the opposite end of the flyover soon after the shooting. Far Eastern Economic Review. Shadow Play, 23 July 1998 94
165 164
abandoning the case, but takes the matter seriously. To show the commitment by the government to resolve these cases, Suyanto is assigned by the president to discuss the matters and other cases concerning the violations of human rights with Komnas.168 In January 2008, the Constitutional Court had ordered the government to set up an ad hoc court to process a series of atrocities during 1998 to 1999, including the May 1998, the Trisakti shooting, the 1998 Semanggi I and the 1999 II incidents. However, the court had to first be established with a recommendation from the House of Representatives. On 2 April 2008, as the House had yet to issue the recommendation, the AGO returned reports filed by the rights body and refused to formally investigate the cases. The House said it could not issue the recommendation before the AGO submitted complete investigation reports on the case.169 Thirteen years after the May riots, there have not been any remedy for the victims. Those who have lost their businesses in the riots must incur the damage costs on their own as no amends are granted by the government. 170 While official gestures have allowed the celebration of Chineseness in the contemporary Indonesia, CSIS intellectual, Harry Tjan Silalahi and ethnic Chinese Moslem leader H. Junus Jahja are concerned with the underlining extravagant celebration during the Imlek season, which only highlights the economy gap between the s and haves not and therefore can be seen as being parallel with the racial difference.171 Others commemorate the loss of their love ones by building a Rumah Kenangan, Memory House for the May riots victims. Roeminah who had lost her family members in the riots felt that the house would help her and other mothers to cope with their sorrow after the loss of their children. groups and ethnic Chinese organizations
173 172
Support
have begun to emerge in the aftermath
of May riots to fight for the rights of ethnic Chinese. Komnas Antikekerasan terhadap Perempuan (National Commission for Anti-Violence Against Women), Kontras and Koordinator Jaringan Tionghoa Muda (Coordinator of Chinese Youth Network) demanded the integration of May 1998 riots into the national curriculum to teach the next generation the importance of tolerance, pluralism,
Jawa Post, 14 May 2011 Koran Tempo, 12 May 2008 170 Interview with victims of May riots, October 2007 171 See Paper by Budianta, 2004 172 Jakarta Post, 14 May 2008 173 Emerging ethnic Chinese organizations included INTI which was established on 5 February 1999. Its vision was to promote nation building. The leadership of INTI consisted mainly of ethnic Chinese. Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB) was another organization founded by Ester Jusuf. The group was a forefront of the fight towards eliminating all forms of discrimination. 95
169
168
kebhinekaan (unity in diversity), human rights issues, and elimination of all sort of violence. However, in a fragile political condition, fears for riots to occur remain a possibility. According to Indra J. Piliang in an interview with Tempo, as long as the government not fully committed to carry out reforms in all institutional layers there is little to be done.174
6.4 Recommendation The narrative of anti-Chinese violence presented in this study shows that economic underdevelopment175 is a major reason that hamper the acceptance
of ethnic Chinese. Triggered by economic or political crisis, May 1998 witnessed the acts of violence against ethnic Chinese. In an interview with a photo
journalist, anti-Chinese sentiments continued to exist long before she entered her profession: Whenever there is an angry Indonesian pribumi, ethnic Chinese remain their easy targets. Their businesses are destroyed simply because of jealousy and hatred towards their success.
176
As part of the economic recovery,
the government needs to reduce the existing social and economic gap between ethnic Chinese and pribumi which remain to be the root of the problem. Ethnic Chinese can no longer be blamed for any political or economic failures in the country. As found in the research, relations between ethnic Chinese and pribumi are socially determined. The common perception that all ethnic Chinese are rich while the pribumi are generally perceived as a menace support the arguments. That explains why some ethnic Chinese prefer to limit their interactions with the pribumi for reason of fear. For some, May 1998 riots heightened the feeling of mistrust towards the pribumi which is manifested among others in the building of tall iron gates in certain residential area in Jakarta. But for others, the riots have given them a valuable lesson that not all pribumis are what they perceived to be. As stated by Melanie Budianta that the challenge ahead is to remember this black moment in a way that both heals and transcends violence into solidarity.177
Tempo, 16-22 August 2004 According to Boenjamin Setiawan, economic recovery could only happen in there is security and stability (economic, monetary, political and social), which is conducive to new capital investments which will create greater employment opportunities and prosperity. By providing a more equitable distribution of equity through the application of progressive taxation, and fiscal/monetary incentives for small and medium scale enterprises, the government can stimulate entrepreneurship and innovation. See Paper by Setiawan, 1999 176 Interview with a photo journalist, November 2007 177 See Paper by Budianta, 2004 96
175
174
According to Maurice Halbwach, recollections are nothing but images that exist such as they are from the moment in which they have been lodged for the first time in our consciousness are not forgotten or lost in time. The tragedy must serve as a reminder that racial violent should not be tolerated at any rate and that the nation should bear responsibilities for its mistakes and failures. The study has shown that it is important to provide a platform for those whose voices are forgotten and therefore unheard of by presenting perpectives from the victims point of view in order to prevent this sort of violence from happening again in the future. History is not about those who stay in power but it should also be about those who are marginalized. Therefore, it is the responsibility of historians to be able to provide a well-balanced view from all sides as a means to refute false accusations made by the group of priviledge or by reporting found in the documents. By reconstructing the victims personal experiences, it is hoped that their voices are not forgotten or lost in time.
97
TABLE 2.1
Macro Economy Indicator As Indicated in the Additional Memorandum
Jan - Dec 1998 Inflation Figure GDP growth Estimated oil price Budget deficit Targeted rupiah exchange value 45% - 50% -
Fiscal Year 1998/1999 7% - 20% 4% USS$ 14.5/barrel 3.2% of GDP < Rp.6.000 per US$ 1
Source: Additional Memorandum on 10 April
Table2.2 NewPriceListForFuel
Fuel Super TT Premix Premium Solar Fuel Minyak Bakar Avgas Avtur Diesel Fuel Kerosene
Old price ( Rp) 900 850 700.0 380.0 240.0 420.0 420.0 360.0 280.0
New Price Increase in (%) ( Rp) 1.500 77.70 1.600 76.40 1.200.0 71.43 600.0 57.89 350.0 45.83 600.0 42.86 600.0 42.86 500.0 38.89 350.0 25.00
Source : Presidental Decree No .69/1198
Table 2.3
Action Taken By Foreign Companies

In Respond To The Attacks On Ethnic Chinese

COMPANY VE Wong Corp President Enterprise Chinese Petroleum Corp Sanyo
Country Of Origin Taiwan Taiwan Taiwan
Action Taken Postponed investment projects Cancelled plans for investments
Japan
Refused to install downpayment for the crude oil and gas order from Indonesia Shut down 5 factories
Sony
Japan
Shut down 2 audio and television factories
Sharp
Japan
Shut down 1 factory
Toyota
Japan
Shut down 2 factories
Nissan
Source: Kompas, May98
Japan
Shut down 1 factory
APPENDIX A
Cases of Violence against ethnic Chinese, 1996-99
DATE
1996 27 July 10 October 26 December
LOCATION
PDI headquarters, Jakarta Situbondo (East Java) Tasikmalaya (West Java)
1997 January 27 January 30 January 18 February 27 March 23 May 9 September 15 September Sanggau Ledo (West Kalimantan) Tanah Abang (Jabotabek) Rengasdengklok (West Java) Bandung (West Java) Pekalongan (Central Java) Banjarmasin (South Kalimantan) Tangerang (Jabotabek) Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi)
1998 5 January 12-16 January 24 January 26 January-3 February Bandung (West Java) Jember and surrounds (East Java) Probolinggo (East Java) Rembang,Kragan,Tuban(Central,East Java) 2 February 1-2 February 2 February 4 February Pasuruan (East Java) Donggala (Central Sulawesi) Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi) Sukarame,Bandar Lampung (West Sumatra) 6 February 6 February 8 February 11 February Bima (West Sumbawa) Brebes (Central Java) Ende (Lombok) Palu (Central Sulawesi)
12-16 February
Purwokerto,Brebes (Central Java) & Bandung, Cirebon (West Java)
13 February 13 February 14 February 14 February 14 February 16 February 10 May 13-14 May 14-15 May 15 June 26 June 28 August 2 September 7-9 September 8-9 September 15 September 22 November 4 December 8 December 25 December
Pamanukan (West Java) Padang Siampuan (North Sumatra) Praya (Lombok) Kendari (Sulawesi) Sentani (West Papua) Pagaralam (South Sumatra) Medan (North Sumatra) Jakarta Solo (Central Java) Tegal (Central Java) Purworejo (Central Java) Cilacap (Central Java) Medan (North Sumatra) Kebumen (Central Java) Pontianak (West Kalimantan) Bagansiapi-api (Riau) Ketapang (Jakarta) Pare (South Sulawesi) Luwu (South Sulawesi) Poso (South Sulawesi)
1999 9 January 8 March 28 July Karawang (West Java) Bandung (West Java) Ambon (Maluku)
APPENDIX B
Members of the Joint Fact Finding Team about the 13-14 May 1998 Riots
Chairman: Marzuki Darusman SH (Komnas HAM: National Commission for Human Rights) Vice Chairman I: Maj. Gen. Pol Drs Marwan Paris MBA (Mabes ABRI: Armed Forces Headquarters) Vice Chairman II: K.H. Dr. Said Aqiel Siradj (NU) Secretary: Dr Rosita Sofyah Noer MA (Bakom-PKB) Vice Secretary I: Zulkarnain Yunus SH (Depkeh: Department of Justice) Vice Secretary II: Asmara Nababan SH (Komnas HAM: National Commission for Human Rights) Sri Hardjo SE (Kantor Menperta: Office of the Minister for the Role of Women) Drs Bambang W. Soeharto (Komnas HAM: National Commission for Human Rights) Prof Dr Saparinah Sadli (Komnas HM: National Commission for Human Rights) Mayjen TNI Syamsu D SH (Mabes ABRI: Armed Forces Headquarters) Mayjen Pol Drs Dai Bachtiar (Mabes ABRI: Armed Forces Headquarters) Abdul Ghani SE (Deplu: Department of Foreign Affairs) I Made Gelgel SH (Kejakgung: Attorney Generals Office) Dunidja D (Depadgri: Department of Internal Affairs) Romo I Sandyawan Sumardi SJ (Tim Relawan: Volunteers fo Humanity) Nursyahbani Katajsungkana SH (LBH-APIK: Legal Aid Institute, Indonesian Womens Association for Justice) Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara SH, LLM (Elsam: The Institute for Policy Reaseach and Advocacy) Bambang Widjojanto SH (YLBHI: Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation) Ita F. Nadya (Tim Relawan: Volunteers fo Humanity, resigned from the beginning)
Sub-teams and Chairs Sub-team for Verification: Sri Hardjo SE (Chair) Sub-team for Testimony: Dr Bambang W Soeharto (Chair) Sub-team for Victims Facts: Prof Dr Saparinah Sadli (Chair)
Source: Joint Fact Finding Team, Final Reports About the 13-15 May 1998 Riot, Jakarta, 23 October 1998
APPENDIX C
Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 26 1998 The President of the Republic of Indonesia
Considering
: that in order to raise the level of equality of status in the law and in government administration,to give equal rights in employment and lifestyle, rights and obligations of citizens and protection of human rights, and to strengthen the union and unity of the nation, it is seen as necessary to give directive for the means to carry this out;
Remembering:Article 4 subsection (1), Article 27, Article 28, Article 19, Article 30, Article 31 and Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution;
INSTRUCTS: To :1. Ministers; 2. Leaders of Non-Departmental Government Organizations; 3. Leaders of the Secretariats of the Highest/High National Organizations; 4. Governors Regional Heads Level I and Mayors Level II;
In order FIRST
: : To put an end to the use of the terms pribumi and non-pribumi in all formulations and in the implementation of policy, planning of programmes, or in carrying out government activities.
SECOND
: To give the same treatment and service to all Indonesian citizens in carrying out government services/duties, social and developmental, and to abolish
differentiation/discrimination of all forms including attitudes towards Indonesian citizens based on ethnicity, religion, race in carrying out the service mentioned.
THIRD
: To consider going back and adjusting/reconciling all regulations and laws, policy, programmes and activities which until now have already been determined/passed and implemented, including amongst others the service of the distribution of permits for enterprise, finance/banking, residency (habitation),
education, health, work opportunities and wage formulation/determination of earnings and other workers rights in accordance with this Presidential Instruction. FOURTH :Ministers, Leaders of Non-Departmental Government Organisations; Leaders of the Secretaries of the Highest/High National Organisations; Governors Regional Heads Level I and Mayors Level II should carry out the implementation of this Presidential Instruction in each sector and district in support of universal ideals and of society that carries out activities on the basis of competence. FIFTH :The Minister for the Coordination of Politics and Security shall coordinate the implementation of this instruction by Ministers and other figures mentioned in this Presidential Instruction. This Presidential Instruction comes into effect immediately upon the date of its release.
Issued in Jakarta On the 16 September 1998 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Signed
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie
Source: Himpunan Peraturan Perundang-undangan RI tahun 1998, Jakarta: Eko Jaya, 1998
APPENDIX D
Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Number 4 1999
The President of the Republic of Indonesia
Considering : a: that in order to speed of eup the creation and strengthening of the union and unity of the nation as well as to increase the level of equality in the law and in government administration, equal rights for work/employment and lifestyle, rights and obligations as citizens and protection of human rights, the Government has already issued policy through Presidential Decree no.56 1996 and Presidential Instruction no.26 1998; (i) that in order to main continuity, and that the Government policy mentioned should be directly effective and its objectives formed immediately, it is seen as necessary to issue this Presidential Instruction for use in carrying this out;
Remembering : Article 4 subsection (1), Article 27, Article 28, Article 19, Article 30, Article 31 and Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution;
INSTRUCTS:
TO
: 1. Ministers; 2. Leaders of Non-departmental Government Organizations; 3. Leaders of the Secretariats of the Highest/High National Organizations; 4. Governors Regional Heads Level 1 and Mayors Level II;
In order
FIRST : a. To implement with certainty Presidential Decree No.56 1996 about Evidence of Republic of Indonesia Citizenship and Presidential Instruction No.26 1998 with full responsibility and in accordance with each duty and authority which amongst others determine that:
(i)The Presidential Decree about granting citizenship and its agend stipulated that the act of taking an oath, was the basic necessity in order to complete the administrative requirements for residency. (ii)The issuing of Kepres no.56 1996, dated 9 July 1996, declared that all regulations and laws which mentioned the condition of the Letter of Evidence of Republic of Indonesia Citizenship (SKBRI) would cease to apply; b. Based on the Instruction of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 26 1998, laws which prohibit and limit the study of Chinese immediately revoked. SECOND: The Minister for the Coordination of Politics and Security to coordinate the implementation of this instruction and report on its progress to the President. This Presidential Instruction comes into effect immediately upon the date of the its release. language were
Issued in Jakarta On the 5 May 1999 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
Signed
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie
Source: Himpunan Peraturan Perundangan-undangan hasil reformasi di bidang politik tahun 1999, Jakarta: Media Karya Nusantara, 1999
Source: Agus Wahyudi, Jawa Post
Source: Agus Wahyudi, Jawa Pos
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KATA PENGANTAR/UCAPAN TERIMA KASIH

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Nama Study Program Title

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i ii iii iv v vi vii ix x xi xii 1

IB. HERMENETIKA PAUL RICOEUR.................................. 12-15 1C.METODOLOGI PENELITIAN..................................... 15

2.PERISTIWA MEI 1998:KRISIS EKONOMI DAN IMF SEBUAH KRONOLOGI..........................................................

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x Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

Macro Economy Indicator As Indicated In the Additional Memorandum........................................................................................

New Pricelist for Fuel...........................................................................

Action Taken By Foreign Companies In Respond to the Attacks on Ethnic Chinese.................................................................................

xi Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

Dokumentasi Dokumentasi Kerusuhan Mei 1998 di Jakarta

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See Suryadinata, Leo, 1978 See Suryadinata, Leo, 1997

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See Ricoeur, 1991

13 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

14 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

ibid ibid 32 See Gubrium and Holstein, 2002

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See Thung Ju Lan, 1998:106

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See Koentjaraningrat, 1986 See Lysa, 2000:74 36 See Prins, 1991:133

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is to support, to correct and to refute collective

See Burke, 1991:234-246 See Sharpe, 1991:32-33 42 See Turner, 2002

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Peristiwa May 1998 contains all the stereotypes of persecution when

1.7 Limitation and Delimitation of Study

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25 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

26 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

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Asiaweek, Now The Hardest Part, 14 November 1997

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See Van Dijk, 2001 ibid

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See Djiwandono, 1999

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Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

Gatra, Setelah Serangan Pagi di Markas PDI, 3 August 1996, p. 21-29

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Republika, 27 May 1997 See Van Dijk, 2001

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See Luhulima, 2001

47 Universitas Indonesia Peristiwa Mei..., Gian Kartasasmita, FIB UI, 2011.

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Kompas, 14 May 1998; Media Indonesia, 14 May 1998

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CHAPTER IV PERISTIWA MAY 1998: Rise of Anti-Chinese Sentiments: Late 1996-1998