- AMKDP / HFMECA
Arjaty/ IMRK 2
RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES DIFFICULTY &
LONG TERM EFFECTIVENESS
Types of actions Degree of Long term
difficulty effectiveness
Easy Low
1. Punitive
2. Retraining / counseling
3. Process redesign
4. Paper vs practice
5. Technical system enhance
6. Culture change
Difficult High
Arjaty/ IMRK 3
STRATEGI REDUKSI RISIKO
Definisi Proses
Transformasi input menjadi output yg berkaitan dgn
Kejadian, aktivitas dan mekanisme yg terstruktur
Arjaty/ IMRK 4
STRATEGI REDUKSI RISIKO
RISK
POINTS /
COMMON CAUSES
RENCANA
REDUKSI RISIKO
Variable input
Complex systems
Non standardized systems
Tightly coupled systems
Systems with tight time constraints
Systems with hierarchical
Arjaty/ IMRK 6
Variable input
Pasien
Penyakit berat
Penyakit penyerta
Pernah mendapatkan pengobatan
Usia
Pemberi Pelayanan
Tingkat keterampilan
Cara pendekatan
Arjaty/ IMRK 7
Complexitas
1 langkah -- error 1 %
25 langkah -- error 22%
100 langkah -- error 63%
Arjaty/ IMRK 8
Lack of Standardization
Standard - -- proses tidak dapat berjalan
sesuai dengan harapan
Individu yang menjalankan proses harus
melaksanakan langkah langkah yang telah
ditetapkan secara konsisten
Variabilitas individual sangat tinggi -
Arjaty/ IMRK 9
Heavily dependent on human Intervention
Ketergantungan yang tinggi akan intervensi
seseorang dalam proses dapat menimbulkan
variasi penyimpangan.
Tidak semua improvisasi bersifat buruk, dikenal
Arjaty/ IMRK 10
Tightly Coupled
Perpindahan langkah dari suatu proses sering sangat
ketat, kadang baru disadari terjadi penyimpangan
pada langkah yang telah lanjut.
Arjaty/ IMRK 13
What is FMEA ?
Adalah metode perbaikan kinerja dgn
mengidentifikasi dan mencegah potensi
kegagalan sebelum terjadi. Hal tersebut
didesain untuk meningkatkan keselamatan
pasien.
Arjaty/ IMRK 14
FMEA Terminology
ProcessFMEA - Conduct an FMEA on a
process that is already in place
DesignFMEA Conduct an FMEA before
a process is put into place
Implementing an electronic medical records or
other automated systems
Purchasing new equipment
Redesigning Emergency Room, Operating
Room, Floor, etc.
Arjaty/ IMRK 15
FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS
Arjaty/ IMRK 16
Why should my organization
conduct an FMEA ?
Can prevent errors & nearmisses protecting
patients from harm.
Can increase the effectiveness & efficiency of
process
Taking a proactive approach to patient safety
also makes good business sense in a health
care environment that is increasingly facing
demands from consumers, regulators & payers
to create culture focused on reducing risk &
increasing accountability
Arjaty/ IMRK 17
Where did FMEA come from ?
FMEA has been around for over 30 years
Recently gained widespread appeal
outside of safety area
New to healthcare
Frequently used reliability & system safety
analysis techniques
Long industry track record
Arjaty/ IMRK 18
LANGKAH2 FMEA, HFMEA, HFMECA
FMEA HFMEA HFMECA
Original By : VA NCPS By IMRK
1 Select a high risk process & Define the HFMEA Select a high risk process &
assemble a team Topic assemble a team
2 Diagram the process Assemble the Team Diagram the process
8 Implement & monitor the Analyze & test the new process
redesigned process
9 Arjaty/ IMRK Implement & monitor the 19
redesigned process
What is HFMEA ?
Modified by VA NCPS
Team membership V V V
Diagramming V V V
process
Failure mode & V V
causes
Hazard Scoring V V
Matrix
Severity & Probability V # V
Definitions
Decision Tree V V
Responsible person V # V
& management
concurrence
HACCP : Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
Arjaty/ IMRK 22
TIME LINE AND TEAM ACTIVITIES
Judul Proses :
__________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
LANGKAH 2 : BENTUK TIM
Ketua :
____________________________________________________________
Anggota 1. _______________ 4.
________________________________________
2. _______________ 5.
________________________________________
3. _______________ 6.
________________________________________
Notulen? _________________________________________
Apakah semua Unit yang terkait dalam Proses sudah terwakili ? YA / TIDAK
Tanggal dimulai ____________________ Tanggal selesai ___________________
Arjaty/ IMRK 24
Arjaty/ IMRK 25
Arjaty/ IMRK 26
Arjaty/ IMRK 27
ANALISIS HAZARD LEVEL DAMPAK
DAMPA MINOR MODERAT MAYOR KATASTROPIK
K 1 2 3 4
Kegagalan yang tidak Kegagalan dapat Kegagalan menyebabkan Kegagalan menyebabkan
mengganggu Proses mempengaruhi proses kerugian berat kerugian besar
pelayanan kepada dan menimbulkan
Pasien kerugian ringan
Pasien Tidak ada cedera, Cedera ringan Cedera luas / berat Kematian
Tidak ada Ada Perpanjangan Perpanjangan hari Kehilangan fungsi tubuh
perpanjangan hari rawat rawat secara permanent (sensorik,
hari rawat lebih lama (+> 1 bln) motorik, psikologik atau
Berkurangnya fungsi intelektual) mis :
permanen organ tubuh Operasi pada bagian atau
(sensorik / motorik / pada pasien yang salah,
psikcologik / Tertukarnya bayi
intelektual)
Pengunju Tidak ada cedera Cedera ringan Cedera luas / berat Kematian
ng Tidak ada penanganan Ada Penanganan Perlu dirawat Terjadipada > 6 orang
Terjadi pada 1-2 org ringan Terjadi pada 4 -6 pengunjung
pengunjung Terjadi pada 2 -4 orang
pengunjung pengunjung
Staf: Tidak ada cedera Cedera ringan Cedera luas / berat Kematian
Tidak ada penanganan Ada Penanganan / Perlu dirawat Perawatan > 6 staf
Terjadi pada 1-2 staf Tindakan Kehilangan waktu /
Tidak ada kerugian Kehilangan waktu / kecelakaan kerja pada
waktu / keckerja kec kerja : 2-4 staf 4-6 staf
Arjaty/ IMRK 29
HAZARD SCORE
TINGKAT BAHAYA
KATASTROPIK MAYOR MODERAT MINOR
4 3 2 1
SERING 16 12 8 4
4
KADANG 12 9 6 3
3
JARANG 8 6 4 2
2
HAMPIR TIDAK 4 3 2 1
PERNAH
1
Arjaty/ IMRK 30
Decision Tree
Gunakan Decision Tree utk menentukan apakah modus perlu tindakan lanjut
diProceed..
Does this hazard involve a
sufficient likelihood of
occurrence and severity to NO
warrant that it be
controlled?
(Hazard score of 8 or
higher) Is this a single point weakness in
NO
YES the process? (Criticality failure
results in a system failure?)
CRITICALY
YES
Does an effective control measure YES
already exist for the identified hazard? STOP
CONTROL Do not proceed
NO to find potential
causes for this
Is this hazard so obvious and readily failure mode
apparent that a control measure is not YES
warranted?
DETECTABILITY Proceed to
NO Potential
Causes for
Arjaty/ IMRK this failure 31
mode
Arjaty/ IMRK 32
Arjaty/ IMRK 33
What is HFMECA
Modified by IMRK :
Brainstorming : Failure mode, Effect, Causes
(Da X P) x K X De, Bands
Arjaty/ IMRK 34
LANGKAH -LANGKAH
ANALISIS MODUS KEGAGALAN, DAMPAK & PENYEBAB
(AMKDP)/
HEALTHCARE FAILURE MODE EFFECT & CAUSES ANALYSYS
(HFMECA)
BENTUK TIM
Ketua :
____________________________________________________________
Anggota 1. _______________ 4.
________________________________________
2. _______________ 5.
________________________________________
3. _______________ 6.
________________________________________
Notulen _________________________________________
Apakah semua Unit yang terkait dalam Proses sudah terwakili ? YA / TIDAK
Tanggal dimulai _________________ Tanggal selesai _______________________
Arjaty/ IMRK 36
STEP 2 DIAGRAM THE PROCESS
PROCESS STEPS :
Describe the process graphically, according to your policy & procedure for the activity and number each one
If the process is complex you may want to select one process step or sub process to work on
1 2 3 4 5
Prescribing, Preparing
Selection & Storage
Ordering, &
Procuremen Administration
Trancribing Dispensin
t
g
Failure Mode Failure Mode Failure Mode Failure Mode Failure Mode
Penulisan Obat R/
tdk R/
Dlm formularium Wrong frequence
Wrong route
administration
Arjaty/ IMRK 37
Arjaty/ IMRK 38
RATING SYSTEM
(Modified by IMRK)
Arjaty/ IMRK 39
Sample Severity Scale
(Modified by IMRK)
Arjaty/ IMRK 42
Arjaty/ IMRK 43
STEP 5 IDENTIFY ROOT CAUSES OF FAILURE MODES
Failure Potentia Poten Severity Probabilit R Risk Control Detection RPN
Mode l effect tial y is Categor (5X8
cause k ies / X9)
s S Bands
c
o
r
e
(3
X
4)
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1- L MH E 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5
2
5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Wrong Death No X X 1 E X X 40
route Traini 0
administrat ng
ion
Wrong Injury No X X 1 E X X 24
frequency with recor 2
perman d in
ent loss Chart
of
function Arjaty/ IMRK 44
>
STEP 6 CALCULATE TOTAL RPN
No Failure RPN Potential RPN Potential RPN Total Rank
Mode Failure effect effect Causes Causes RPN
Mode
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Arjaty/ IMRK 46
PREPARING TO REDESIGN
TAKE A DEEP BREATH
Conduct a literature search to gather
relevant information from the professional
literature. Do not reinvent the wheel
Network with colleagues
Recommit to out of the box thinking
Arjaty/ IMRK 47
LANGKAH 8
ANALISIS DAN UJI PROSES BARU
The team again completes steps 2
(diagram the process), step 3 (brainstorm
potential failure modes & determine their
effect) and step 4 (prioritize failure modes)
of the FMEA process
Then the team should calculate a new
criticality index (CI) or RPN.
Design improvements should bring
reduction in the CI / RPN.
Ex: 30 50% reduction ?
Arjaty/ IMRK 48
LANGKAH 9
IMPLEMENTASI DAN MONITORING PROSES
Arjaty/ IMRK 49
REDISAIN PROSES
Decreasing variability
Variable input
Simplify
Complex Standardizing
Nonstandarized Loosen coupling of process
Tightly Coupled Use technology
Dependent on Optimise Redundancy
human intervention Built in fail safe mechanism
Documentation
Time constraints
Establishing a culture of
Hierarchical culture teamwork
Arjaty/ IMRK 50
AMKD / HFMEA
Proses lama
yg high risk
Alur
Potential Cause Efek / Decision Tindakan
Proses
Dampak Tree
Failure K
K
Mode HS
K
E
D
T
Desain Hazard
Proses baru Kritis Kontrol
Score Kontrol Eliminasi
Deteksi Terima
Arjaty/ IMRK 51
AMKDP / HFMECA
Arjaty/ IMRK 52
KESIMPULAN
Building a safe
healthcare system
C K
L S F K D O
U R A R O
L T E E E N
E N T E
T P E A V M T T
A R K E R
U O A R E U
R L A U K O
R M N R N
E I I E I S L
T W I I
I S N N K I
O N
N I T I S A
R G
G S Y N I S
K
G I
L E A D E R S H I
Arjaty/ IMRK 53
P
Safety begins with you
Dont wait for someone else
Arjaty/ IMRK 54