Perspektif Sejarah
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What is FMEA ?
• Adalah metode perbaikan kinerja dgn mengidentifikasi
dan mencegah Potensi Kegagalan sebelum terjadi.
Hal tersebut didesain untuk meningkatkan keselamatan
pasien.
• Adalah Proses Proaktif, dimana kesalahan dpt
dicegah & diprediksi.
• Mengantisipasi kesalahan akan meminimalkan dampak
buruk
• Analisis (A)
Penyelidikan secara detail suatu proses
• Mode (M)
Cara atau Perilaku yang dapat menimbulkan
kegagalan
• Kegagalan (K)
Saat sistem atau bagian dari sistem tidak sesuai
yang diharapkan baik disengaja maupun tidak
• Dampak (D)
Dampak atau Konsekuensi Modus Kegagalan 4
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FMEA
FMEA bisa dilakukan pada :
- Proses yang telah dilakukan saat ini mis proses
pengadaan dan penyimpanan gas medis di rumah sakit
- Proses yang belum dilakukan / baru mis.
Implementasi Elektronik Rekam Medis atau Pembelian
alat baru
- Proses klinis mis. proses pemeriksaan darah di
laboratorium
- Proses non klinis mis. proses mengkomunikasikan
hasil pemeriksaan (lab) kepada dokter atau proses
Identifikasi pasien yang berisiko jatuh
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FMEA vs HFMEA
1. Pilih Proses Berisiko tinggi dan 1. Tetapkan Proses
bentuk Tim 2. Bentuk Tim
2. Diagram / gambarkan Alur Proses 3. Gambarkan Alur
& Brainstorming Modus
Kegagalan Proses
4. Buat Hazard
3. Menentukan Dampak / Effects
4. Prioritas Modus Kegagalan Analysis
5. Identifikasi Penyebab / Causes 5. Tindakan dan
Pengukuran
6. Redesain Proses
7. Analisa dan Uji coba Proses Outcome
8. Implementasi & Monitor Proses
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baru
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• Sumber Internal
– Performance improvement data.
– Individual receiving care and staff feedback
– Reporting systems.
• Sumber Eksternal
– Data base JCI
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Membentuk Tim
• Multidisiplin
• Tidak lebih dari 10 orang (idealnya 4 – 8
orang)
• Memiliki pengetahuan tentang proses
yg akan dianalisis (subject matter /
process expert) & komitmen pada
“performance improvement”
• Mewakili bidang yg akan “dianalisis” dan
unit yang akan “terkena” perubahan
• Mengikutkan orang yang tidak terlibat dlm
proses tapi memiliki “analytical skill”
• Setidaknya ada satu pembuat keputusan
(leader)
• Satu orang yg memiliki “critical
thinking” saat perubahan akan
dilaksanakan Arjaty Daud/IMRK /FMEA 12
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2rd team meeting Kunjungi unit kerja untuk observasi proses, verifikasi semua langkah proses
& subproses apakah sudah benar (Langkah 3)
3 rd team meeting Brainstorming modus kegagalan, tugaskan anggota tim untuk berdiskusi
dengan peetugas pada unit yang terlibat dalam proses (Langkah 3)
4rd team meeting Identifikasi penyebab modus kegagalan, tugaskan anggota tim untuk
berdiskusi dengan petugas pada unit yang terlibat dalam proses untuk
memperoleh masukan tambahan (Langkah 3)
5th team meeting Tuangkan modus kegagalan dan penyebabnya pada lembar kerja HFMEA
(langkah 3). Lakukan analisa hazard (langkah4)
Identifikasi tindakan perbaikan dan tindaklanjuti tanggungjawabnya (Langkah
5)
6th,7th , 8th….η team Tugaskan anggota tim menindaklanjuti PIC untuk setiap tindakan perbaikan
meeting plus 1
1. Alur Proses
Buat Flowchart untuk Diagram Alur Proses, bila perlu dibuat
Subproses
Bila Proses Baru: Bagaimana seharusnya
Bila Proses Lama: Bagaimana saat ini
2. Modus Kegagalan
“Perilaku yang dapat mengakibatkan kegagalan”
-Tanyakan “bagaimana bisa gagal?”
-Identifikasi semua modus kegagalan
-beberapa langkah dapat tidak memiliki modus kegagalan
-beberapa langkah dapat memiliki banyak modus kegagalan
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Severity Scale
Severity
Skala 10 Scale
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© Copyright, Joint Commission International
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Arjaty/RM/2017
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10
© Copyright, Joint
Client name/ Presentation Name/ 12pt - 17
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Severity Scale
Likelihood Scale
Likelihood
Skala 10 Scale
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18
Detectibility Scale
Detectability
Skala 10 Scale 9
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© Copyright, Joint Commission International
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Arjaty/RM/2017
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Jika Nilai RPN berada di bawah Cut off point tapi Nilai
Severity nya tinggi (8 atau lebih / 4 atau lebih) maka perlu
pendekatan kuantitastif & kualitatif : tetap di prioritaskan
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Failure Mode and Effects Analysis in Health Care: Proactive Risk Reduction
Failure
Effect Sev Prob Det RPN Crit Rank
mode
FM #1 Effect 1a 3 6 7 126
FM #2 Effect 2a 3 3 2 18
Effect 2b 7 3 2 42 60 2
FM #3 Effect 3a 10 5 3 150
Effect 3b 3 5 3 45 195 2
■ When there is disagreement on ratings, the individuals should transfer these numbers to the FMEA worksheet. At this
representing each viewpoint should present their ration- time, the team might choose to consider other factors associat-
ales for a specified and finite period of time. Team mem- ed with the failure mode, such as the cost of fixing it, timing,
bers can then cast their votes for the rating they would related performance or quality improvement initiatives, and
prefer. The leader then calculates the mean rating to deter- availability of resources.
mine a score that represents the average rating. The team
discusses the rating. Prioritizing Failure Modes
■ If one or more team members still do not agree on the rat- At this point, the team is ready to prioritize the failure modes.
ing, the team might want to invite a process expert who is Failure modes must be ranked to establish priorities for
not currently on the team to join the conversation and pro- actions. With limitless resources, teams could pursue root
vide additional information. This person should not pro- cause analysis (RCA) and improvement or redesign of each and
Risk Priority
vide the ranking determination, Number
but rather offer additional every (RPN)
failure mode. In reality, few organizations have the
information that the team might not otherwise have. resources to do this. Because RCA takes time, it makes sense to
■ Consider the failure modes or effects relative to each other prioritize the failure modes to make the most efficient use of
Detectab
by placing the modes or effects in order from the highest the time spent by the team on proactive risk reduction. The
FM # Failure Mode Severity Frequency ility RPN
severity to the lowest severity. Then indicate the ratings for team must concentrate on those failure modes most likely to
each.2 Choose incorrect medication result in10adverse occurrences,
7 thereby negatively7 affecting490 the
■ Avoid assigning a rating arbitrarily because this could safety of individuals served. These failure modes are ranked
6 No double check 10 7 7 490
result in a decision not to focus on the failure mode. high on the list of items requiring action because they involve
4 Error due to Baker Cells 10
When the ratings are multiplied, a small point difference the greatest degree of risk. 8 6 480
can1havePoor
a significant impact on the RPN.
flow of refilling process Talk out sticky 7 10 6 420
issues until they are resolved. Several tools can help the team prioritize failure modes. The
Cuttof Dispense not documented in
■ If resolution or consensus still cannot be reached, the team team should feel free to use whatever tool is most helpful to
point
10 computer 7 10 5 350
might agree to bias the decision toward the safe side by achieving the objective, which is to identify those failure
5 Labeled
assigning Incorrectly
the higher rating. 7 8 3
modes that are most in need of attention. For example, Pareto 168
7 Illegible initials charts illustrate
4 the relative
10 ranking of failure4modes in a visu-
160
Once the FMEA team determines quantitative and/or qualita- al way. In other cases, simple numeric order rankings can pro-
tive values
9 forNoeach failure mode,
double check based
ofonbagsuchcontents
factors as vide all 7the help that is needed.
7 3 147
severity, probability of occurrence, and detectability, the team
3 Count incorrect quantity 2 7 10 140
8 Prescription bagged incorrectly 4 4 1 16
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LANGKAH 5
IDENTIFIKASI PENYEBAB MODUS KEGAGALAN
Tipe Variasi
Variasi melekat dalam setiap proses. Terdapat 2 jenis variasi :
• Variasi penyebab umumà(Common Cause):
Stabil, Sistemik dan endogen. Kegagalan dapat di cegah
dengan Redesain proses. Mis variasi dalam waktu tunggu RJ
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Special
Cause
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Kebijakan
Kegagalan Potensial:
Individu - Status diabetes pasien tidak dikonfirmasi
Kegagalan Potensial: pada saat pemberian Consent
- Pasien tidak ditanya Riwayat DM Penyebab potensial:
Penyebab potensial:
- Tidak ada kebijakan pelayanan pasien DM
- Tidak ada Reminder / pertanyaan dalam sebelum prosedur intervensi
form
Solusi Potensial:
Solusi Potensial: - Buat kebijakan
- Tambahkan pertanyaan spesifik dalam - Sosialisasi Kebijakan kepada staf
form - Tambahkan pertanyaan ke formulir IC, Form
instruksi, dan formulir permintaan
pemeriksaan
- Dokumentasikan status diabetes
Perbaikan proses skrining
pasien DM sebelum prosedur
intervensi
Supply Equipment
Kegagalan Potensial: Kegagalan Potensial:
- Tidak ada alat monitor glukosa darah - Troli emergency tidak tersedia
Penyebab potensial: Penyebab potensial:
- Tidak ada lokasi yang diidentifikasi untuk - Tidak ada lokasi standar troly emergency
supply dan monitoring alat 11/22/19
Solusi Potensial: Solusi Potensial:
- Buat ceklist harian supply di ruang intervensi
- Standarisasi lokasi troli emergency dan
- Dokumentasikan check list harian monitoring alat
- Standarisasi lokasi untuk supply
- Cek list harian dan troli emergency dan
monitoring alat
Arjaty/RM/2017
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1D. Tulis order untuk banyak bayi yang lahir sehingga tertukar 2 9 10 180
bayi yang salah
3. Perawat melakukan 3A. Order tidak Diabaikan di antara beberapa item baris 9 10 10 900
order ke dalam sistem dimasukkan
IT
the pharmacy medication record; the nursing staff can use the and the number of handoffs can be reduced to decrease the risk
data for the medication administration record. With a single of failure; perhaps time constraints can be loosened or an
source for the data, the risk of transcription errors is reduced. alarm system can be introduced to increase detectability of fail-
ure when it does occur. Sending e-mail and mailing letters in a
Reducing Coupling postal box are tightly coupled processes. Once the sender has
Another redesign strategy that deserves consideration is reduc- clicked on the send button or dropped the letter in the mail-
ing the force with which the process steps are coupled, or less box, there is no way to undo the command or reclaim the let-
tightly coupling the process steps. One goal is to reduce the ter. Perhaps an additional step could be added to each process.
speed of step sequencing so that when a variation occurs in one Another redesign strategy involves tightening time constraints to
step or link, it can be responded to before the next step or link
occurs. Perhaps the number of steps can be reduced and the
help decrease failures that result from boredom, inattentiveness,
or fatigue. Perhaps the basic design of the process steps needs to 17
process simplified; perhaps the number of persons involved be examined and additional steps considered.
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Pendekatan Redesain
■ Mengurangi variabilitas
■ Proses standardisasi : PPK, CP
■ Proses penyederhanaan : pengurangan jumlah langkah proses &
hand off
■ Mengoptimalkan redundansi : verifikasi double check
■ Menggunakan teknologi untuk mengotomatisasi :CPOE
■ Membuat desain gagal-aman (fail – safe) : konektor N20 & 02 beda
■ Dokumentasi : multipel entri / duplikasi meningkatkan risiko
■ Mengurangi kopling
■ Menyediakan pendidikan komprehensif
■ Membangun budaya kerja tim
LANGKAH 7 :
ANALISA & UJI COBA PROSES BARU
sesudah redesain
Arjaty Daud/IMRK
/FMEA
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LANGKAH 8 :
IMPLEMENTING & MONITORING THE NEW
PROCESS
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Arjaty Daud/IMRK
Chapter 8: Implementing
/FMEAand Monitoring the New Process
Case Study
Conducting FMEA on the Opioid Prescribing
Process at the University of Texas
M.D. Anderson Cancer Center
Since implementation, the team has been relying primarily on internal incident reporting to determine whether the
redesigned processes are working.
“We think that we made a favorable impact because we’ve had reduced rates of patients being dangerously over-
sedated and needing to be in the ICU,” says Allen W. Burton, M.D. “We’re not sure yet if this is a short-term observation
or if it’s a long-term change. We don’t have a significant amount of long-term data. We need more data. We’re also still
Omission errors secondary Change 7-day ASO to 30- No reported omission errors
to automatic stop order day ASO for Schedule II Short term involving opioids since
(ASO) Controlled Substances September 2008
“Education Before
Promote use of comprehen-
Suboptimal patient involve- Medication” Patient Safety
sive Patient Home Short term
ment in medication histories Campaign launched
Medication List
October 2008
Presentation at Clinical
Orient current staff to real- Manager’s Forum
Lack of electronic medica- Short term
time “Pharmacy” folder in Faculty Road Show
tion administration record Long term
electronic record Researching EMR capabili-
ties
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600
500
Sebelum redisain
400
RPN
200
100
0
2 6 4 1 10 5 7 9 3 8
FAILURE MODE
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Arjaty Daud/IMRK /FMEA
Contoh FMEA
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AMKD / FMEA
Proses lama
yg high risk Alur
Modus RPN Redesain RPN
Proses &
Kegagalan Dampak baru
Sub
proses
Failure
Mode Penyebab
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