Instruktur : DR. Tb.

Donny Syafardan
 Peranan Manajemen Keuangan

• Apa yang Dimaksud dengan

Manajemen Keuangan?

• Tujuan Perusahaan

• Organisasi dari Fungsi Manajemen

Keuangan
 Apa yang Dimaksud dengan
Manajemen Keuangan?

Berkaitan dengan Pengadaan, pendanaan,

dan pengelolaan aset dengan beberapa
yang telah ditetapkan.
 Kebijakan Investasi

• Berapa ukuran perusahaan yang optimal?

• Jenis aset apa yang perlu diadakan?
• Aset apa (jika ada) yang harus dikurangi
atau dijual?
 INVESTASI PERUSAHAAN 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Kebijakan Pendanaan

• Jenis pendanaan apa yang paling baik?

• Campuran pendanaan bagaimana yang
paling baik?
• Bagamana dengan Kebijakan Dividend?
• Bagaimana Dana tsb akan diperoleh?
 NILAI PASAR TOTAL HUTANG 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

350,000,000

300,000,000

250,000,000

200,000,000

150,000,000

100,000,000

50,000,000

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Kebijakan Pengelolaan Aset

• Bagaimana memanaje existing assets

efficiently?
• Manajer Keuangan memiliki tingkat
tanggungjawab yang berbeda-beda atas aset
perusahaan.
• Penekanan terbesar lebih pada current asset
management daripada fixed asset
management.
 NILAI PENGGANTIAN ASET 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

500,000,000

400,000,000

300,000,000

200,000,000

100,000,000

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Apa yang Menjadi Tujuan
Perusahaan?

Penciptaan nilai terjadi saat kita

memaksimumkan harga saham dari
pemegang saham saat ini.
 NILAI PASAR EKUITAS 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

600,000,000
500,000,000
400,000,000
300,000,000
200,000,000
100,000,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Beberapa Perspektif Berbeda dari
Tujuan Perusahaan

u Memaksimumkan Laba Setlh Pajak.

• Dapat saja meningkatkan laba saat ini

namun merusak nilai perusahaan (misal,
menunda maintenance, menerbitkan
saham biasa utk didepositokan, dsb.).
• Kurang memperhatikan tingkat risiko
perusahaan.
 Beberapa Perspektif Berbeda dari
Tujuan Perusahaan

u Memaksimumkan laba setlh pajak

dibagi dengan jml saham beredar.

• Tidak menentukan timing atau durasi dari expected

returns.
• Mengabaikan perubahan pada tingkat risiko
perusahaan.
• Cenderung menjalankan zero payout dividend policy.
 Kelebihan dari Memaksimumkan
Kemakmuran Pemegang Saham

• Telah Mempertimbangkan:
;
;
; serta faktor-faktor lain yang relevan.

• Jadi, dapat dipandang sebagai

barometer bagi business performance.
 GRAFIK INVESTASI DAN NILAI PASAR EKUITAS
200 EMITEN BEJ
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

500,000,000 40,000,000
35,000,000
400,000,000
30,000,000
300,000,000 25,000,000
20,000,000
200,000,000 15,000,000
10,000,000
100,000,000
5,000,000
0 0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

MVE INVESTASI
 Bentuk Perusahaan Modern

Modern Corporation

Shareholders Management

Terdapat PEMISAHAN antara pemilik dan

pengelola.
 Peran Management

Management betindak sebagai bagi

pemilik (shareholders) perusahaan.

• Seorang adalah individu yag diberi

wewenang oleh orang lain, yang disebut
principal, untuk bertindak atas nama
principal tsb.
 Teori Agency

u Jensen dan Meckling membangun sebuah

teori perusahaan yang didasarkan atas
.
merupakan cabang ilmu
ekonomi yang berhubungan dengan perilaku
para principals dengan para agents mereka.
 Teori Agency

u Principalsharus menyediakan
agar management bertindak bagi
kepentingan para principals dan
kemudian hasilnya.

• Incentives tsb antara lain mencakup

serta .
 DIVIDEND YANG DIBAYARKAN 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

14,000,000

12,000,000
10,000,000

8,000,000

6,000,000

4,000,000
2,000,000

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 ARUS KAS 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

60,000,000

50,000,000

40,000,000

30,000,000

20,000,000

10,000,000

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
-10,000,000
 PENJUALAN BERSIH 200 EMITEN BEJ TAHUN 1999-2004
(DATA DALAM JUTAAN RUPIAH)

400,000,000
350,000,000
300,000,000
250,000,000
200,000,000
150,000,000
100,000,000
50,000,000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
 Tanggung Jawab Sosial

• Memaksimumkan kemakmuran pemegang

saham tidak bertentangan bagi perusahaan
untuk memiliki .
• Karena produk / jasa yang dihasilkan
perusahaan bersifat baik private maupun
social.
• Oleh karena itu
tetap merupakan tujuan yang
sesuai dalam mengelola perusahaan.
 Pengorganisasian Fungsi
Manajemen Keuangan

Board of Directors

President
(Chief Executive Officer)

Vice President VP of Vice President

Operations Finance Marketing
 Pengorganisasian Fungsi
Manajemen Keuangan

VP of Finance

Treasurer Controller
Capital Budgeting Cost Accounting
Cash Management Cost Management
Credit Management Data Processing
Dividend Disbursement General Ledger
Fin Analysis/Planning Government Reporting
Pension Management Internal Control
Insurance/Risk Mngmt Preparing Fin Stmts
Tax Analysis/Planning Preparing Budgets
Preparing Forecasts
 Checklist Manajemen Keuangan

• Investment
– NPV, IRR, PI, GPM, NPM
• Performance
– MVE, EPS, PBV, PER, ROI, ROA, ROE
• Financing
– DER, DTA, TIE, DPR
• Asset Management
– Likuiditas dan Aktivitas Turnover
EXTENSION TO
THE SLIDES
Corporate Finance Theory
William L. Megginson
 1. Savings and Investment in
Perfect Capital Markets
1. Irving Fisher (1930) shows how capital markets increase the
utility both of economic agents with surplus wealth (savers) and
of agents with investment opportunities that exceed their own
wealth (borrowers) by providing each party with a low-cost
means of achieving their goals.
2. The Fisher Separation Theorem demonstrates that capital
markets yields a single interest rate that both borrowers and
lenders can use in making consumption and investment
decisions, and this in turn allows a separation between
investment and financing decisions.
 2. Portfolio Theory
1. Harry Markowitz (1952): “don’t put all your eggs in one basket”.
2. Markowitz shows that as you add assets to an investment portfolio the total risk of
that portfolio – as measured by the variance (or standard deviation) of total return –
decline continuously, but the expected return of the portfolio is a weighted average
of the expected returns of the individual assets. In other words, by investing in
portfolio rather than in individual assets, investors could lower the total risk of
investing without sacrificing return.
3. His primary theoretical contribution was to prove that the unique, individual
variability in an asset’s return (unsystematic risk) shrinks to insignificance as that
asset’s weight in a portfolio declines, and in a well-diversified portfolio the only risk
that remains is that which is common to all assets (systematic risk). It is this
covariance risk remaining after diversification has washed out the effects of
individual asset risk that an investor must bear and be compensated for, because
there is no effective method of eliminating it.
4. Efficient Portfolio: risk is minimized for any given level of expected return or,
conversely, where return is maximized for any given level of risk.
5. The theory, however, did not in and of itself constitute a useful positive economic
theory describing how capital markets quantify and price financial risk. That
achievement would come a decade later, when Sharpe (1964) would add two
critical pieces to the Markowitz efficient portfolio to develop (with Lintner (1965) and
Mosin (1966)) the Capital Asset Pricing Model, or CAPM.
 3. Capital Structure Theory

1. Modigliani and Miller (1958)

2. The central point of the M&M model is that the economic value of the
bundle of assets owned by a firm derives solely from the stream of
operating cash flows those assets produce. It is the stream of
operating cash flows (profits) expected to be generated by those
assets that creates value – market participants will forecast the
average level of those flows and then compute a present value based
on the perceived riskiness of the cash flows.
3. M&M’s Proposition I:”the market value of any firm is independent of its
capital structure and is given by capitalizing its expected return at the
rate ρ appropriate to its risk class”.
4. M&M’s Proposition II: If the expected return on the firm’s assets is the
constant ρ, then the required return on levered equity must increase
directly and linearly as risk-free debt is added to the firm’s capital
structure.
5. Taken together, the two propositions establish that capital structure is
irrelevant in a perfect capital market and the required return on a given
firm’s equity is computed directly from its debt-to-equity ratio and the
required return for firms of its risk class.
6. Since 1958, finance theorists have examined how relaxing first one
and then another assumption affects the capital structure irrelevance
results. The model held up well until corporate taxes, personal taxes,
and deadweight bankruptcy costs were included – these all change
the model’s implications, but in predictable ways.
7. The development of agency cost and asymmetric information models
in the 1970s also led to a modification of the basic M&M model, but
even today – after almost five decades of intensive theoretical and
empirical research – we can offer no simple, unambiguous answer to
the question, “does capital structure matter?”
 4. Dividend Policy

1. Miller and Modigliani (1961)

2. M&M shows that holding a firm’s investment policy fixed, the

payment of cash dividends cannot affect firm value in a
frictionless market because whatever the firm pays out in
dividends it must make up by selling new equity.

3. Cash flow identity: total cash inflows must equal total cash
outflows, that drives the M&M dividend irrelevance model.
 5. Asset Pricing Models
1. Finance became a full-fledged scientific discipline in 1964 when
Sharpe published his paper deriving CAPM.
2. The CAPM assumes that investors hold well-diversified portfolio
within which the unsystematic risk of individual assets is
unimportant. Systematic risk, o.t.o.h., refers to an asset’s (or
portfolio’s) sensitivity to economy wide factors such as interest and
exchange rates, inflation, and business cycle fluctuation.
3. Sharpe’s main contribution was to uniquely define systematic risk
and to specify exactly how investors can trade off risk and return.
He did this by assuming investors can either invest in risky assets,
such as common stocks, or in a risk-free asset, such as T-bill.
4. Sharpe’s other contribution was to point out that, in equilibrium,
every asset must offer an expected return that is linearly related to
the covariance of its return with expected return on the market
portfolio. Mathematically, the CAPM can be expressed as:
E(Rj) = Rf + βj (Rm - Rf)
5. Ross’s (1976) Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) holds that the
expected return on a given asset is based on that asset’s sensitivity
to one or more systematic factors.
6. The sensitivities of an asset’s return to each factor’s realization
were called factor loading, and preliminary research suggested that
most common stocks were significantly influenced by between
three and five factors.
7. A major problem with the APT, which is still not solved, is that there
is no prior specification of exactly what economic variables the
factors represent.
8. Fama (1970) presents both a statistical and a conceptual definition
of an efficient capital market, where efficiency is defined in terms of
the speed and completeness with which capital markets
incorporate relevant information into security prices.
9. In a weak form efficient market, security prices incorporate all
relevant historical information. In other words, there is nothing to
be gained by studying past trends in security prices because there
is no prediction that can be drawn from them about the future
course of prices changes.
 6. Efficient Capital Market Theory

1. Research has unambiguously supported weak form efficiency in

almost all major U.S. financial markets.
2. In a semi-strong-form efficient market, security prices reflect all
relevant, publicly-available information. This is stronger than
weak form efficiency, in that it predicts that security prices will
always reflect relevant historical information, and will react fully
and instantaneously whenever new information is revealed in a
public medium such as television, newspapers, government
documents, or a wire service report.
3. In a strong-form efficient market, security prices incorporate all
relevant information – public and private.
 7. Option Pricing Theory
1. Black and Scholes (1973) published an article describing the model for
pricing stock options.
2. The Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model (OPM) was a genuine
breakthrough because it provided a closed-form solution for pricing put
and call options that relies solely on five observable (or at least readily
calculable) variables; the exercise price of the option, the current price of
the firm’s stock, the time to maturity of the option, the variance of the
stock’s return, and the risk-free rate of interest.
3. Very quickly it was discovered that a variety of systematic biases were
present in the pricing model, particularly when it was used to price deep
in-the-money and out-of-the-money options (where the current stock price
was, respectively, much greater than or much less than the exercise price
of the option.
4. The basic OPM assumes that stocks do not pay dividends, and can yield
significant pricing errors if applied to stocks making large nominal dividend
payments.
5. The OPM was developed for European options – which can only be
exercised on the day the option expires – but virtually all real options
traded are American options that can be exercised at any time prior to and
including the expiration date.
6. Since an option gives the owner the right, but not the obligation, to
exercise a trade, it is an ideal tool to use for many hedging activities
(protecting company costs or revenues from adverse price movements).
 8. Agency Theory
1. The fundamental contribution of the agency cost model of the firm
put forth by Jensen and Meckling (1976) is that it incorporates
human nature into a cohesive model of corporate behavior. In the
Jensen and Meckling model, the “firm” is a legal fiction that serves
merely as a nexus of contracts for agreements between managers,
shareholders, suppliers, customers and other parties. All the parties
are consenting adults who act in their own self-interest, and fully
expect all other parties to act in theirs.
2. It is a model that relies on rational behavior by self-ineterested
economic agents who understand the incentives of all the other
contracting parties, and who take steps to protect themselves from
predictable exploitation by these parties.
3. Residual loss, the dollar value of the total agency costs remaining
after the monitoring and bonding expenditure, is the irreducible cost
of separating ownership and control in large modern corporations.
4. Jensen and Meckling fleshed out their model by demonstrating both
how issuing outside debt can help overcome the agency costs of
issuing equity, and how the presence of too much debt can generate
an entirely different set of agency problems. This helped convert their
work into a full-fledged model of corporate capital structure, as well
as one of corporate governance; and this theory also helps explain
why investors demand – and corporations are willing to pay – regular
cash dividens.
5. Perhaps the most important application of the agency cost model is
in explaining the corporate control contests that burst on the scene
so dramatically during the 1980s. By viewing the takeover battles of
this period as contests between rival management teams for control
of corporate resources, it is easy to understand (1) why firms might
be undervalued in the first place (because they are controlled by
inefficient but entrenched managers);
6. (2) why potential acquirers might be willing and able to pay such a
high price for the target’s shares (investors value the target to reflect
the poor performance of incumbent management and would value
the firm more positively with a more competent management team in
place); and (3) why target firm managers often resist takeover bids
so vehemently (since they stand to lose both the financial and
personal benefits that come with controlling a large corporation).
7. Several aspects of the takeover battles of the 1980s, especially the
frequency with which target firm managers and directors adopted
value-reducing defenses such as ”poison pills” and other ”shark
repellents,” can only be explained with an agency cost model that
explicitly recognizes the conflict of interest between corporate
managers and shareholders.
8. Another very important vein of academic research concerning
agency costs has examined the potential of compensation policy to
overcome agency problems between corporate investors and
managers.
 9. Signaling Theory
1. Signaling theory was developed in both the economics and finance
literature to explicitly account for the fact that corporate insiders
(officers and directors) generally are much better informed about the
current workings and future prospects of a firm than are outside
investors. In the presence of this asymmetry of information, it is very
difficult for investors to objectively discriminate between high-quality
and low-quality firms. Statements by corporate managers convey no
useful information.
2. Because of the asymmetric information problem, investors will
assign a low average quality valuation to the shares of all firms. In
the language of signaling theory, this is referred as a pooling
equilibrium since both high and low quality firms are relegated to the
same valuation “pool”.
3. Obviously, high-quality firm managers have an incentive to
somehow convince investors that their firm should be assigned a
higher valuation based on what the managers know to be superior
prospects for the company. One way to do this would be for high-
quality firm managers to employ a signal that would be costly, but
affordable, for their firms but which would be prohibitively expensive
for low-quality firms to mimic (e.g. large cash dividends).
4. When investors understand the incentives, they would assign high
values to firms that paid high dividends and would assign low
valuations to firms that either paid low dividends or paid none at all.
This result is referred to as a separating equilibrium because
investors are able to assign separate, and economically rational,
valuation to high- and low-quality firms. It is also a stable equilibrium,
in spite of its deadweight cost in terms of foregone investment,
because high-quality firms are able to achieve the higher valuation
they desire and deserve, low-quality firms receive the valuation they
deserve (but do not desire), and investors are able to confidently
invest in firms with the most promising prospects.
5. Signaling models, however, have not fared well in empirical testing
because they typically predict exactly the opposite of what is actually
observed corporate behavior. For example, signaling models typically
predict that the most promising (in terms of growth prospects) firms
will also pay the highest dividends and will have the highest debt-to-
equity ratios. In actual practice, however, rapidly-growing technology
companies tend not to pay any dividends at all while mature
companies in stable industries usually pay out most of their earnings
as dividends. The same is true for capital structure – observed debt
ratios tend to be inversely related to both profitability and industry
growth rates.
 10. The Modern Theory of Corporate
Control
1. Motivated by M&A in the 1980s
2. The first major exposition of a truly modern theory of corporate control
was presented by Bradley (1980), who studies the stock price
performance of companies that are the targets of takeover bids.
3. B r a d l e y d o c u m e n t s t h a t t h e s e s h a r e s i n c r e a s e i n v a l u e b y
approximately 30% immediately after a tender offer (a publicly
announced offer to buy shares at a fixed price from anyone who
“tenders” their shares) is announced, and then stays at about that
same level until the acquisition is either completed or canceled.
4. Bradley also documents that those shares which are not purchased in
a successful takeover, as will always occur if a bidder only purchases,
say, 51% of the target’s shares, drop in price back towards their initial
value immediately after the takeover is completed.
5. Prior to Bradley’s work, most observers assumed that bidding firms
acquired majority stakes in target firms either to loot the assets of the
target company or to profit from an appreciation of the target firm’s
shares after the takeover is announced.
6. Bradley’s results are inconsistent with either of these explanations.
Since unpurchased shares remain above their pre-bid price even
after a takeover is completed, it is clear that successful bidders are
not looting their acquired companies because this would have
caused the price of unpurchased shares to fall far below their pre-
bid price. On the other hand, since the price of unpurchased shares
falls below the tender offer price once the takeover is completed, it
is obvious that bidders are suffering a capital loss on the shares
they purchased rather than a gain.
7. Bradley’s theoretical model assumes that bidding firm managers will
launch a tender offer primarily in order to gain control over the
assets and operations of a target firm that is currently being run in a
sub-optimal manner. Once the bidder gains control of the target, a
new, higher valued operating strategy will be implemented and the
bidding firm will earn a profit from operating the target more
effectively.
 11. The Theory of Financial
Intermediation
1. Financing through capital markets maybe costly and using financial
intermediation maybe the alternatives.
2. In academic circles, an early description of the informational
advantage of financial intermediation was provided in the article by
Leland and Pyle (1977). Several other articles that document large,
negative returns to shareholders following the announcement of new
security issues (particularly equity issues) by corporations reinforce
the idea that capital market financing is inherently costly and
disruptive.
3. James (1987) provides an important contribution to this literature by
documenting positive returns to corporate shareholders following the
announcement that a firm has obtained a loan from a commercial
bank.
 12. Market Microstructure Theory

1. Market microstructure is the study of how securities markets set prices,

compensate market makers, and incorporate private information into
equilibrium price level.
2. Microstructure research can be classified into two separable, though
related, streams of analysis. (1) Market structure/spread models which
study the relative merits of different market structure (monopoly
specialist versus multiple dealer markets, electronic order book versus
human dealer markets, etc.)
3. (2) Price formation models analyze how private information is
incorporated into securities prices, and study how trade size, aggregate
trading volume, and price levels are related.
4. Motivating articles: Ho and Stoll (1981), Demsetz (1968), Tinic (1972),
Branch and Freed (1977).
 SEVERAL BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. In pricing financial assets, only systematic risk

matters.
B. Emphasize investment rather than financing.
C. Emphasize cash flows rather than accounting
profits.
D. Remember that finance is now a global game.
E. Remember that finance is a quantitative discipline.