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Editor
Sartono Kartodirdjo
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Kata Pengantar
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P R E F A C E
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I
TABLE OF CONTENTS
HISTORIOGRAPHY
SOME REMARKS ON THE STUDY OF S O - C A L L E D
HISTORICAL TEXTS IN INDONESIAN LANGUAGES
by A. Teeuw 3
SEJARAH RAJA - RAJA RIAU ; SOME ASPECTS, AS
TOLD BY THE JAKARTA MANUSCRIPTS
by S.W. Rudjiati Muljadi , - 27
THE BALINESE BABAD
by H.I.R. Hinder , , . .. 39
BUSTAN - COPY AND THE JOHOR - HISTORIES
by Ulrich Kratz , 53
RELIGION
SHI'A ELEMENTS IN MALAY LITERATURE
by Baroroh Baried , 59
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAM IN THE
MALAY PENINSULA : SOME PROBLEMS FOR THE
HISTORIAN
by William R. Rolf 66
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIZATION OF
THE MALAY - INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO
by Syed Naguib Al-Attas 73
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA IN THE 19TH
AND 20TH CENTURIES
by Sartono Kartodirdjo 85
POLITICS
SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE IN
WESTERN INDONESIA
by A.J.S. Reid 107
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS,
1629 — C. 1655
by t>.K. Basset 126
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MOHAMMAD
DAUDSYAH AND THE DUTCH WAR
by Teuku Ibrahim Alfian 147
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL MOVEMENT IN THE
BANJAR WAR
by Soeri Soeroto 167
SOME REMARKS ON THE HARBOUR CITY OF
JAPARA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
by F.A. Soetjipto , . . . 178
TE OF f OK
HISTORIOGRAPHY
SOME REMARKS ON THE STUDY OF SO-CALLED
HISTORICAL TEXTS IN INDONESIAN LANGUAGES *
A. TEEUW
UNIVERSITY OF LEIDEN
T texts such as babads, sejarahs, silsilahs, etc. are of great interest for students
from various fields, not only historians, but also anthropologists, archeolo-
£ gists, linguists, students of religion, law, etc. Yet my main point of view
today will be that until now the consideration of these texts as first of all
specimens of literature has been largely neglected. This is not only to be
regretted because this species of literature forms an original and important
contribution of the Indonesian peoples to world literature, so that its
scholarly study should enrich the general and comparative study of literature.
It is also to be regretted because insufficient awareness of the special
character of this type of literature, for students from other fields of studies,
involves the risk of misunderstanding, misinterpreting and consequently
misusing these texts for their particular purposes. That this danger is not
merely hypothetical is obvious from certain studies in this field, which,
though highly meritorious and inventive, have not always done justice to
the texts as works of literature.
Of course, if anybody, it is the students of Indonesian literature
themselves who are first of all to be blamed for this state of affairs. So
far they have hardly begun to study these texts seriously in such a way
and with such methods as are in accordance with the present state and
development of literary theory, and consequently they have failed so far to
present scholars from o'lher fields with rehable comments, interpretations
and explanations of the texts under discussion.
This again has its specific reasons. For one thing, the study of
literature as a branch of science in the modern sense has developed much
later and slower than e.g., linguistics. Moreover, the study of literature
even until now has remained parochial to a very large extent, in the sense
that what is called algemene literatuurwetenschap in my language allgemeine
Literaturwissenschaft in German {until now a satisfactory English term has
yet to be coined for this field of studies) in practice has largely remained
Western literatuurwetenschap, as it is based to a large extent on the study
of European and modem American literature only.
Another reason why the study of Indonesian literature so far has
made little progress within the context of general literary studies is the
obvious fact that the number of scholars working in this field has always
been relatively small; moreover the purely philological study of these texts
(editing, translating, and commenting on them) has turned out to be a dif-
ficult and tedious job which so far has taken up most of the time and
energy of the scholars concerned.
However, as the more important texts in the field are gradually
becoming available in acceptable scholarly editions, as the number of scholars
working in this field, especially in Southeast Asia itself, is rapidly growing,
and as, moreover, these texts more and more draw the attention of scholars
from other field, the time has perhaps come to try and lay a satisfactory
theoretical foundation and to develop appropriate methods for the scholarly
study of this important group of texts. As historians for a long time already
have shown particular interest in these materials, it would not seem out of
place to ask their attention to some problems connected with the study of
these texts. This is especially the case now that this Congress is being held
here, in the country to the cultural heritage of which most of these texts
belong, in the region in which so many of them have been created, and at
the university which bears the name of the hero of some of the most im-
portant specimens of this historical literature.
However, 1 should wam my audience right at 'the beginning that I
do not pretend to give solutions for these problems today, nor do I feel
able 'to provide historians in particular with ready-made rules or tools,
enabling them to deal safely with such texts for their own purposes. But
hopefully something will already be gained if part of the problems can be
delimited a bit more sharply, some aspects of the meanings and functions
d these texts can be indicated somewhat more clearly and some possible
approaches can be suggested for further research.
In my discussion of these problems I will deal with the whole field
of historical literature written in Indonesian languages, specifically Old
Javanese, Javanese, Malay, Sundanese, Macassarese, Buginese, Balinese and
a few others. This does not mean that I pretend to have a first-hand scholarly
command of all 'the languages and hteratures involved. The number of texts
to which 1 have direct access is in fact very limited, partly because of the
circumstance that the number of languages which I know is limited, partly
because only a small part of the relevant texts are available in printed
editions. Therefore what I say is of necessity based on a limited and arbitrary
É
THE STUDY OP SO - CALLED HISTORICAL TEXTS
5
A. TEEUW
the totality of the novel, and from the literary point of view it is irrelevant
whether Tolstoy has handled the historical facts adequately as history. In
this way story or narrative as literary use of language may be opposed
to report as non-literary linguistic usage.,
This does not mean that the boundary is always sharp. We know
of the gerne of historical novels, and there are reports which are written
so well that they may acquire literary qualities, just as a scholarly paper
may possess literary qualities; in such a case we use the special term essay.
From these examples it is also apparent that apart from fictionality there
is another characteristic which should be present in a work of literary art;
through lack of a better term we usually call this the aesthetic quality. By
definition literature should fulfil aesthetic, qualitative requirements, even
though the specification of this qualitative or normative aspects of literature
bas given rise to endless problems and difficulties. The problem is also not
solved if we make the literary quality into an aspect of the structure of
the work of literary art, or paraphrase aesthetic as significant or meaningful.
However that may be, these short remarks should suffice as an in-
troduction to 'the problem of what we should call literature and how we
should define it; provisionally, and in fuU awareness of all the complications
involved we choose to indicate literature as briefly as possible as "significant
fiction", or with an older, 18th century definition given by the philosopher
Baumgarten we may say that the work of literary art isheterocosmic.Ni.e.
it creates "another world with its own self-consistent laws" (Hough, p. 12),
in which definitions the word significant or the morphüme-rasm/c in one
way or another, refer to what ordinary language calls beauty, the aesthetic
aspect of literature.
If we decide to paraphrase the term literature in this way it would
seem as if the adjective historical or historiographie is directly opposed to
this concept of literature. By definition, historical, used as qualification for
a text, indicates the fact that this text refers to the extralinguistic reality of
the past. In this sense the term comes close to being synonymous with re-
ferential, the more so as, e,g., in Indonesian historical texts the contempo-
rary reality does not remain outside the range of interest of the writer. One
could therefore also call these texts referential. Now in a recent book on
literary theory one of the leading scholars in this field in my country, Dr.
Maatje, (and he stands by no means alone in this conviction) has contended
that the non-referentiality of linguistic signs in texts which we call literature
is and should be no less than an axioma for the student of literature.
If this idea is correct the indication historical literature or referential
literature for a group of texts seems to contain a contradictio in terminis,
so that we will be forced to drop either the noun or the adjective, or to
deplete at least one of the two from its proper value. In that case my paper,
and also my presence at this congress would become altogether meaningless.
However, before drawing such a drastic conclusion, it would seem useful
to look at this apparent contradiction in some more detail, and to inves-
tigate both terms involved somewhat more closely, specifically with regard
to the Indonesian textual material which is the subject of this paper.
6
THE STUDY OF S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
7
A. TEEUW
S
THE STUDY OP S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
Brandes himself has already compared this inscription with the text
of the Pararaton. "Vergelijkt men het verslag van Raden VVijaya's zwerftocht
in de oorkonde, met hetgeen er in den tekst hierboven van staat, dan zegt
men dat dit laatste slechts een flauwe weerspiegeling is van het in het of-
ficieele stuk medegedeelde". (If we compare the report on Raden Wijaya's
wanderings in the inscription with what is said about it in the Pararaton,
it is obvious that the latter is only a vague reflection of what has been men-
tioned in the official document.) From his historiographie angle Brandes'
conclusion is doubtless correct. The historian is much better served by the
data in the inscription than by those found in the Pararaton. However, the
question seems warranted whether this is a fair comparison, whether both
texts can be considered from the same point of view, whether both can be
called a report, as Brandes does ("verslag"). The inscription indeed includes
a report, which is meant to be a registration of the events as they had hap-
pened. As such it is completely functional, because it serves as a public
motivation for the royal grant; for that purpose it had to be as accurate and
unambiguous and matter-of-fact as possible. Compared with this report, the
Pararaton tells a story, which is functional in its own right, within the context
oi the whole text. It is significant fiction which is not primarily intended to
tell the reader what has really happened at some point in the past, but which
is supposed to give him a coherent and meaningful representation of crucial
events in the past. It is therefore quite understandable that, e.g., many
toponyms and proper names from the inscription are lacking in the text.
However, there are other elements present in the Pararaton which are not
to be found in the inscription, elements which may be assumed, if not
proven, to have a function of their own in the story. I refer to the fight
of Wijaya with Kebo Mundarang, a combat de prestige as they are so typical
for this type of literature, and which in this case is preparing the way for
the final settling of accounts between the two; also to the presentation of
a gift of cloth, by Wijaya, to his loyal servants, a typical royal gesture
even in this most difficult situation; furthermore the attention paid to the
accidental finding of one of the daughters of king Krtanagara, destined
to be the bride of Wijaya, and her being carried along all during the flight;
this is also an element which ties the story together as a whole, and makes
the temporary defeat and wanderings of Wijaya functional in the larger
context. Then there is also Wijaya's great care for one of his followers,
Gajah Pagon, who is severely wounded. This care is another sign of Wijaya's
destination of being a great king. He does not leave Gajah Pagon behind
until he has provided him with a safe shelter. Finally and most convincingly
there is the curious story of what happened in Pandakan: when Wijaya
asks the buyut there for a kelapa muda, a young coconut to quench his
thirst, it turns out to be full of nasi putih, boiled rice, another illustration
of Wijaya's sekti. It is particularly this detail, when we compare it to the
sober, matter-of-fact information in the inscription about the food and
drink and beras which is offered to Wijaya by the head of Kudadu, which
makes it clear how different both 'texts are and why we have to call the
one a report, and the other a story. But this also implies that there is no
justification for a negative judgement about the Pararaton from the point
9
A. TEEUW
10
THE STUDY OF SO - CALLED HISTORICAL TEXTS
are not only Javanese. It is one of the fascinating aspects of this story that
all kinds of non-Javanese historical persons figure largely in it : apart from
the usual number of Indian protagonists, we meet in this text the Spaniards
and their king, the Dutch East India Company, perhaps Jan Coen, frater-
nizing with Alexander the Great in his Arab-Indonesian form of Iskandar
who is the title hero of the story. There can be no doubt about the story
bearing a fictional character in our sense of the word. Cohen Stuart himself
has characterized the work as "een oorspronkelijtk voortbrengsel van Ja-
vaansche fantasie, zonder andere grondslagen dan verwarde herinneringen
uit verschillende tijdperken der geschiedenis" (an original, product of Ja-
vanese fantasy, without foundations other than confused memories from
different eras of history).
In a beautiful and important paper of 1927 Pigeaud has pointed out
C that Cohen Stuart's qualification, if understandable from a Western distinction
]_ between history and fiction, is not adequate to the meaning and function of
this story within the framework of Javanese literature and history. The
C- Baron Sakender is certainly a work of histoiy, een geschiedwerk, in the
Javanese sense, but this is circumscribed by Pigeaud as "een rangschikking
en, zoodra het eenigszins mogelijk is, verklaring van feiten en ver-
halen, zooals men die vernam en in zich vermocht op te nemen, binnen
het grooter verband van eigen wereldbeschouwing" (an arrangement, and if
and when at all possible an explanation of facts and stories as they were
perceived and could be assimilated by the Javanese within the larger frame-
work of their conception of the world). Not facts and events were Important,
but the framework within which history, the course of events takes place
stereotypically. In historical persons and events,, elements of this stereotypic
_^ course of events are recognized, and in the ultimate representation the story
r ' is built up on the basis of these recognized and identified elements. Pigeaud
pointed out that in a culture such as the Javanese not only the representation
JJ of history, but also the preception and interpretation of actual events is
. , strongly determined by the prevailing world-view.
In this connection it is significant, as has been pointed out by various
authors, first of all by Brandes, and as was of course well-known to Ja-
vanese writers themselves, that a Javanese babad, which we today usually
call a history, often takes the form and structure of a wayang lakon, a story
of the Javanese puppet theatre. For the Javanese, the story of the wayang,
which in spite of all its formal variations is always basically the same,
represents the prototype of worldly events, the basic pattern of human
history, and as such it gives meaning to actual events. On principle, first
of all those facts, events and persons are real and relevant which can be
identified with and fitted into that essential story, which is the only true
human story, into that exemplary history which is the ever-recurring history
of mankind.
If this, then, is the way in which we have to look at Javanese his-
torical writings (and it may to a greater or smaller extent also be true for
other Indonesian historiography), the problem" of the boundary between
fictional and referential in Javanese literature is fundamentally different
11
A. TEEUW
from what we find in Western literature. On the one hand the Javanese
ascribe to the texts with which we are dealing a referential character : they
tell him about his reality, in past and present. On the other hand we tend
to recognize in these texts a world in words which in many respects, both
formally and in content, complies with all the requirements of fictionality:
as Cohen Stuart already said: "een oorspronkelijk voortbrengsel van Ja-
vaansche fantasie", an original product of Javanese fantasy — or should
I translate fiction ? For I tend to interprète Cohen's statement, within the
context of his overall analysis, less negatively than Pigeaud, who qualified
it as "vernietigende oordeelvellingen" (amiiiihilating judgments). A text such
as the Baron Sakender is both fictional and referential but the opposition is
irrelevant from the point of view of the writer and »he reader for whom
the text was written.
I do not wish to imply that the problem is unique for Javanese or
Indonesian literature. It. seems that, e.g., Homer too pretended to write the
true story of the battle of Troy, i.e.. its history, and to do it as accurately
as possible; only on the basis of this assumption certain aspects of the Iliad
can be explained satisfactorily, even if today and for modern research the
Il'ad and the Odysse from first of all stories in optima forma, stories, which
have to be read and interpreted as fictional texts, quite apart, from the
reality which they may reflect, or even have presumed to describe.
Comparable things might perhaps be said about msdieval Western texts as
well as about a great many forms of oral and written literature from the
noii-Western world.
These examples show that texts which originally have been written
at least partly with referential purpose, gradually may lose their referential
character, whereas by virtue of their aesthetic qualities they may lend
themselves to being read as "pure fiction", and consequently be analysed
through methods of literary criticism. But they also force us to take into
account the problem of the author's purpose and the social function of the
text. In the analysis of a modern novel we need not worry much about the
problem of function. It should become apparent from the analysis, and
literary criticism has been little interested in any explicit message or any
intentional social function of works of art. This is also occasioned by the
fact that writer, reader and critic work from a common cultural background
and possess a common knowledge. If, however, there is good reason to
assume that certain texts did have a specific socio-cultural function, that
writers by writing such a text did intend to play some role in the social
configuration of their time, if furthermore we may assume that the readers
(or hearers) of the text had similar expectations with regard to the effect
of its recitation or reading, if, finally, the cultural context in which writer
and reader or listener operated is quite different from the one in which the
critic lives and works, then it is inevitable for the critic to concern himself
explicitly with this function, at the risk of misunderstanding or misinterpre-
The first scholar who has occupied himself explicitly and fun-
damentally with Indonesian texts and their function, even if not primarily
12
THE STUDY OP S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
with historical ones, was W.H. Rassers. He has argued, especially for the
so-called Panji stories, and not without good reasons, that in order to
understand and interpret these stories correctly insight into their function
as myths in Javanese society was indispensable. Specifically he pointed
out that one of the main functions of this myth was to structure the way
ot thinking and the beliefs of the Javanese, and consequently to give shape
and direction to the way in which they experience and interpret reality.
Therefore Panji is not distorted or confused history, on the contrary, to the
Javanese history is the actualization of this central myth, in which the
eternal, stereotypic cycle of human events and experiences is expressed.
Apart from the question whether Rassers in detail was always
correct in his interpretations, his approach and his point of view has turned
out to be fruitful and useful. Pigeaud, e.g., in his article on the story of
Baron Sakender and subsequent interpretative activities with regard to
Javanese littérature, has made good use Rassers' basic ideas.
The scholar who most persistently has followed the lines laid out
by Rassers with regard to the study of Javanese literature generally, and
historical literature specifically is professor JC.C. Berg. Still unsurpassed,
according to my opinion and still of fundamental importance is his long
essay on Javaansche Geschiedschrijving, which somewhat out of place has
been included in the five volume Geschiedenis van Nederlansch Indie.
Fortunately this paper now is available again in Indonesian translation.
Starting from the king as the bearer of sekti, and as such bearer of the
vital power for his people;, Berg in his article has drawn the picture of the
pujangga, 'the writer of babads as the priest, the verbi minister, whose aim
and function is to support and strengthen the ruler and the realm, and
who is qualified to do so by virture of the power of the magic word. It is
this social function of the pujangga as a language priest, which determines
the nature and specific character of his work, not, e.g., the need to render
and evoke as accurately as possible the historical facts as they really
happened. The conception of development itself is alien to the Javanese
conception of history : past, present and future are essentially identical;
and meaningful significant stories about the past are fundamentally relevant
for the present and future as well.
If professor Berg is right — and according to my opinion his ideas
as developed in his 1938 paper still hold good, even if one may have
different opinions on many details — it is inevitable that for a proper inter-
pretation of historical texts their function will have to be taken into account.
Moreover it follows from his considerations, and those of Rassers, that
the distinction between historical and non - historical literature has only
a relative value; within the framework of Javanese culture a babad, a
wayang kulit lakon and a Panji story have essential traits in common.
The question of how to deal with function has turned out to be a
difficult one, if we try to do justice to the intentions of the Javanese
author and the expectations of his reader. This becomes clear from several
subsequent studies by Berg, and also from the book by professor Wolters
13
A. TEEUW
on the Fall of Sriwijaya. Both scholars have tried to elaborate and apply
the point of view that Nagarakrtagama and Sejarah Melayu cannot be
treated as Western works of history, or as sources for the study of the
history of Majapahit and Malacca and their predecessors respectively.
Basing 'themselves on the intention which the Indonesian writers are
supposed to have had when writing their works, they have tried to interpret
these texts from the angle of the writers, ascribing to them on one hand
a certain amount of factual historical knowledge, and on the other certain
mental processes. By retracing those mental processes, those chains of
thoughts of the original authors, these Western scholars ultimately hoped
to be able to reconstruct the factual knowledge which they supposed to have
been available to the writers, a knowledge which the latter, from their
priestly or genealogist's point of view have manipulated into what is called
X a distorted view of history. In this way it is thought, that the texts can
£ still be exploited as useful sources for the study of Indonesian history.
It cannot be denied that studies such I mentioned are fascinating,
and that their results and conclusions at 'times are spectacular. It is also
very difficult to disprove their conclusions. Yet at the same time the reader
cannot help having uneasy feelings when reading books such as the more
recent ones by Berg and also Wolters' study, which as far as it deals with the
Sejarah Melayu, reminds one so strongly of Berg's publications.
' If one tries to account for these uneasy feelings, one of the main
problems turns out to be that the texts themselves rarely, if ever, give
the means to check the intentions ascribed to the Indonesian authors by
these Western scholars. We may parhaps formulate the problem in this
v/ay : according to the method applied the Indonesian authors are supposed
to have transformed the historical facts available to them into a story,
the factor of transformation being the function, or : R X f — S,
R standing for report, f for function and S for story. The trouble is
that here we have one comparison with two unknown factors, which by
definition is unsolvable. What is done to solve the comparison never-
theless is to manipulate and stretch the factor f until there emerges a
factor R which is considered to be consistent and satisfactory as a historical
report. Once more I want to stress that the ingenuity and perseverance
with which such type of research has been conducted in the cases mentioned
is highly admirable. Yet the solution on principle remains arbitrary and
un verifiable.
Do we have to acquiesce in such unsolvable comparisons and do
we have to accept that so-called historical texts in Indonesian languages
for the historian have no other importance than as a means of illus-
trating that which is already known from other sources, or of explaining
the sociocultural pattern in which Indonesians live and think? I think it
would be too early to consider the case as hopeless, and I feel that it
may be possible to try and bring such problems closer to a solution,
even if it is true that no quick and ready-made solutions will ever be
found.
u
THE STUDY O F S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
J from the literary structure of the text is (P.J. Worsley, in his Leiden
dissertation of 1972. His edition and translation of the Babad Buleleng,
a Balinese babad of fairly recent origin is preceded by an introductory
chapter which is called : an aiudysis of form, theme and function. It is not
possible here to do full justice to Worsley's book, but his very convincing
conclusion, based on a most careful analysis of the text, is that the Babad
Buleleng is a dynastic genealogy of the ruling clan of Den Bukit, from its
first ancestor, Ki Gusti Ngurah Panji Sakti up till the time of the author of
the Babad, somewhere in the 19th century. The genealogy, which is given in
great detail in the text, functions structurally as a frame, linking one
narrative passage to another. As the genealogical succession primarily
concerns the ruler, it is he, the king, who dominates the story; a prominent
role in the narrative element is given to the evocation of the ideal image
of ruler and realm. This forms a dominant motif, structuring and propelling
the course of events. The figures in the story are abstract and anonymous
men who behave in a way wholly predictable within the logic of the image
in which they have been formed. Not only are the figures in the story
depersonalized, they, and the story itself, are also detemporalized. The
course of time which is very clearly marked in the babad 'exists only
within the babad; it endures only as long as 'the genealogical sequence 15
A. TEE U W
vink's .diachronical analysis of the Sejarah Melayu this text developed out
of a genealogy, which has gradually been expanded and ornated with
narrative elements, anecdotes, moralistic expositions and information on adat,
until finally it acquired its present form, or rather forms. I do not want
to detract from the importance of Roolvink's study, and I think that he
has brought forward strong arguments in favour of his conclusions. Yet it
will also be necessary to undertake a „synchronical investigation into the
structure of the text as we have it now, because it shows a literary unity
of its own, which cannot be satisfactorily explained by a study of the
various elements of which it consists. Special attention will have to be given
to the relation between genealogical and narrative elements and to their
respective function in the total story. It would be unsatisfactory to approach
the text as if it were an uncritical farrago of heterogeneous elements. It is
clear that the Sejarah Melayu has precisely 'the form which according to
Malay norms such a text is supposed to have. It represents indeed a model
of Malay historiography.
In the Hikayat Patani the relation between narrative and genealogical
element is different; the difference is first of all a quantitative one, the
genealogies being much more limited in scope and length; only facts regard-
ing the ruling dynasïy itself are being offered to the reader, casually as -
it were, in between the narrative parts which seem to dominate. The Hikayat
Patani is much more a specifically dynastic text than the Sejarah Melayu,
if only because the bendaharas hardly occur in it. This difference probably "/
does reflect a difference in socio-political structure between Patani and
Malacca. It is remarkable that this socio-political difference is reflected
both in the structure of the narrative and in the amount of genealogical
information contained in the text. Yet, the Hikayat Patani strongly under-
lines in its own way the literary function of the genealogy, by 'telling twice,
in two different ways, as an introduction and as a conclusion, the story
of the divine origin of the dynasty. It is this divine origin which sets the
tone for the story and rounds it off. It is the framework in which the story
is caught.
Very different again is the structuration of the story, and the role
played by the genealogical element in it, in the Hikayat Aceh as it has been
edited by Dr. Teuku Iskandar. There the focus of interest is not the dynasty
as such, but the ruling king Iskandar Muda and his greatness, and all the
genealogical information, all the narrative elements are ultimately intended
to glorify this king. Dr. Iskandar was doubtless right in stressing the point
that Indian literary traditions, probably from the Mogul court, have provided
the model for this text, but even if foreign influence is unmistakable, it
would seem worthwhile to investigate its literary structure more carefully.
Only when such an analysis is available can we hope to discuss more pro-
fitably the historicity of various details in the text. One may have much
appreciation for Penth's efforts to investigate the historical background of
certain elements in the Hikayat, and still at the same time feel that essen-
tially his approach is likely to fail if we do not first of all try to understand
the relevance of such elements in the story as a whole.
Iff
A. TEEUW
18
THE STUDY OF S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
in order not 'to have the story overgrown completely by these genealogies.
It is an interesting problem whether, and to what extent, in the case of
this text also, as in 'that of the Babad Buleleng, closer analysis would give
better insight into the function of 'the genealogical fragments of the text.
A text of a very different type is the Sejarah Banten. Thanks to
the dissertation of professor Hoesein Djajadiningrat we are quite adequately
informed about this text. He has presented his readers with an exemplary
analysis, both from the viewpoint of philology and literary history and of
history, he has given an accurate and erudite analysis of this text within the
whole of Javanese historiography, and the aspects of the text which he called
legendary have also been studied carefully by him, including much compa-
rative material. In view of the time in which this book was written (1913)
it should be called a masterful achievement, after Brandes' edition of the
Pararaton the second highlight in the study of Javanese historiography.
Yet it seems obvious that in the case of this text too, a new approach
is warranted. For one thing, this Sejarah is rather remarkable within the
context of Indonesian historical literature because it is one of the few
examples of a so-called Rahmenerzählung, Trame-story^The story is told
by a teacher to a student, and his purpose is to inform the pupil, as a
piospective servant at the court, about all he needs to know about the
rights and obligations of ruler and servant; specifically the student asks
him to tell about the genealogies of kings, in order to make him well
informed about dynastic relationships between past and present.
This literary form is maintained throughout the story : sometimes
the pupil is admonished not to ask too much, sometimes the storyteller
admits that he has forgotten a story, at some points he mentions a special
source for certain factual information. This information is not restricted
to historical data: the final part of the text contains lessons on the jihad,
the holy war. At the end the pupil asks what happened after the Pajakarta,
but the teacher asks to be excused, he is too tired — which is of course
a literary device for ending the story at this point. It is physically impossible
for 'the guru to have recited the whole preceding text in one session anyway.
The Guru explains that he has only got a draft of the subsequent events,
which he preserves in his chest together with mystical books, but as yet
he has not had an opportunity to transpose the draft into tembang (poetry).
In our terms; to transform the report into fiction, by giving meaning to
the historical data by way of literature,. This remark by the author of the
Sejarah by itself already shows clearly how such a text aims at being
literature in our sense of the word, and this is strongly underlined by the
specific structure of this story. We are indeed not far away from all kinds
of moralistic-didactic texts in Javanese literature for which this form of a
dialogue between guru and murid has often been chosen.
It is also for that reason that Hoesein's division of the text into one
part which has nothing to do with the history of Banten proper, and another
which deals with it specifically, is not adequate to the character of the
text as a narrative, much though we understand Hoesein's motive for doing
19
A. TEEUW
20
THE STUDY O F S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
21
A. TEEUW
22.
THE STUDY OF SO - CALLED HISTORICAL TEXTS
23
A. TEEUW
determined the shape of a particular text, in other cases more than one
model may have had its influence on a certain text. It is moreover obvious
that the models mentioned — and others — cannot be considered in iso-
lation, because there is partial overlapping or coincidence or even conver-
gence between certain literary motifs and types : Rama and Panji themselves
— and perhaps also Iskandar — at some point may have been identified
one with another, even if I would not tend to go as far as Rassers who
virtually has suggested that the Panji story in essence is the model for the
greater part of traditional literature in Indonesia. There is certainly more
tiian Panji, and Panji himself has been influenced by other models just in
the same way as he has influenced others.
Just one example how difficult it will be to determine clear boun-
daries between literary genres or types. This example is formed by the
rather large group of Middle-Javanese poems which we use to call kidungs.
According to the opinion generally received there are two main types
within this group of kidungs : First there are the Panji stories among which
Malat was the most popular while Wangbang Wideya is the one now easiest
available through the recent edition with English translation by Dr. Robson.
Secondly we have the so-called historical kidungs of which Rangga Lawe
and Kidung Sunda in its various versions are the best known, whereas the
Babad Buleleng may also belong to this same type. This classification into
two groups rests mainly on the fact that we know or presume to know
that the main heroes of the latter group are known to have existed in
reality, and that certain episodes in these stories seem to reflect historical
events. It is based on the assumption that stories in which so-called his-
torical figures appear are typologically different from stories in which
mythical or legendary figures occur. However, the distinction between the
two in itself is already precarious, because it has been argued by various
authors that Panji himself after all may be the literary representation of a
specific king in ancient Java, whether Kamadewa or another one. But even
if the distinction between the two types of heroes could be maintained
from the point of view of their historicity, it is still not warranted from
a literary point of view, and closer investigation of these texts may well
show that as far as literary structure is concerned the distinction is quite
irrelevant, and that all these texts in fact may represent one and the same
type, This suspicion is strengthened when we read a text such as the Kidung
harsawijaya which on the one hand seems to deal which historical figures,
but which on the other gives the strong impression that it largely follows
the model of a Panji story. Continued research along the lines of Worsley's
dissertation may well lead to the conclusion that there is only one literary
genre, even if some of the stories may perhaps display deviations from
the model, caused by pieces of a referential character which are still pre-
served in it.
While it is true that there are many cases in Indonesian literature
where texts with a different content or referential value may have similar
if not identical structure, there are also quite a few cases where the same
or similar themes and referential materials have been represented in different
24
THE STUDY OF S O - C A L L E D HISTORICAL TEXTS
literary forms. Such cases provide very useful material for comparison and
delimitation of literary genres. To mention only a few examples : Ras has
given a fascinating comparison of the two versions of the Hikayat Banjar,
one being the palace or chancellary version, the other the wayang version.
Berg has already pointed out the correspondences and differences between
the Pararaton tradition and the so-called historical kidungs. Another case
where a comparative study would render useful materials for 'the study of
this problem is that of the historical materials from Wajo' which were
discussed briefly by Noorduyn for comparative purposes, in his comment
on the chronicle which he published. An edition of such other Wajo' ma-
terials would greatly improve our insight into the range of variations in
literary actualisation of similar referential material. Alongside the Sejarah
Melayu we have the fascinating story of the Hikayat Hang Tuah, which
so far has been greatly underestimated as a piece of literature. This re-
presentation of Malaccan history from the quite unusual viewpoint of the
servant is now the subject of literary research by Mrs. Sulastin Sutrisno
here in Yogyakarta. In general Malay histories would provide us with
excellent materials for contrastive studies in view of the wide range of
variations which they display on the basis of an underlying similarity. Not
to mention 'the Javanese babads. It is more than time that students of
literature start making their contribution to the problem of how to bring
some order and system in the confusing and indeterminate mass of texts
which bear the name of babad. They will certainly not be able to solve
all the problems involved, but it would seem that an approach on the basis
of the achievements of literary theory and literary criticism might create
some clarity also with regard to other problems concerning this literature.
I have come to the end of — what should I say : my report ? my
story ? or simply my text ? In any case I am aware that I have contributed
little in terms of solutions of actual problems. I have perhaps rather evoked
pioblems where until now they have not always been recognized, and in
that sense I may have disturbed some people in my audience. I am also
aware of the fact that due to limits of space and time I may not always
have done justice to earlier students in this field, 'the more so as I had
to write 'this paper in Tugu, in western Java, where I did not have access
to my books or library facilities. For all these shortcomings, saya minta
maaf. What I have tried to do, is to design, in bare outline some kind
of a program, a program which should be undertaken by students of In-
donesian literature. It may seem an ambitious program, but perhaps the
time has come for ambitious programs in this fields. I consider myself
fortunate to have been able contribute this paper to a conference in this
town where interest in traditional literature and in older regional history
is so great and so rapidly growing. I also consider it fortunate that the
interest in these problems is not only growing in circles of people directly
concerned. It is obvious from Indonesia's second five year plan that the
Government considers the opening up of traditional literature, both oral
and written, for larger groups of society, as well as the development of
the study of Indonesia's history as urgent priorities. This gives me hope
25
A. TEEUW
that a program such as the one formulated above, even in this rough outline,
may be of some help in stimulating the discussion, both at this congress
and elsewhere, as to the most appropriate ways and means of furthering
these studies, both on the national level of the countries concerned in
Southeast Asia and on the international level.
26
SEJARAH RAJA - RAJA RIAU
SOME ASPECTS, AS TOLD BY THE JAKARTA
MANUSCRIPTS *
S.W. RUDJIATI MULJADI
27
S.W. RUDJIATI MUL JADI
A. Jakarta10
1. v.d.W. 195 — now missing
2. v.d.W. 62, VI
3. v.d.W. 62, I
4. v.d.W. 62, V
5. v.d.W. 197
6. v.d.W. 62, VII — included in v.d.W. 62, VI
B. Leiden
1. Cod. 1724(2)"
2H
SEJARAH R A J A - R A J A RIAU
2. Cod. 1741(1) i a
3. Kl. 37
C. London 13
1. R.A.S. 119
The whole v.d.W. 62 manuscript consists of writings about Riau.
The other parts besides A. (2), (3), (4), and (6) are the "Riau Contracts" 14 :
a. v.d.W. 62, II — 18 pp., 26 sections,
b. v.d.W. 62, III — 12 pp., 8 sections,
c. v.d.W. 62, IV — 15 pp., 20 sections.
(a) and (b) cover as far back as the contract made in 1784 between the
East India Company and Sultan Mahmud, the ruler of Johor, Pahang, and
Riau; (c) is a contract replacing the contracts made in 1818, but the date
of the contract is not mentioned. However, Staatsblad 19 of 1829 is men-
tioned in Section 13.
Like most manuscripts, although it is here dealing with history
— in the classical eastern sense of the word — we know only the dates
of copying in five manuscripts of the ten we have in Jakarta, Leiden, and
London. None of 'them seem to be earlier than the 19 t h century.
These dated manuscripts are :
a. v.d.W. 197 : 1325 H. (1907 A.D.)
b. v.d.W. 62, I : 19 Jumadilawal 1274 H.
(January 6, 1858 A.D.)
c. v.d.W. 62, VII : 20 Dzulhijah 1274 H.
(Agustus 3, 1858 A.D.)
d. Cod. 1724 (2) : 1234 H. (1827 A.D.)
e. Cod. 1741 (1) : 1844 A.D.
After going through all the transcriptions done by the staff members
of the Literature Department of the Lembaga Bahasa Nasional, and after
comparing them with the originals, and by using 'the summary of the missing
manuscript,] r> the Jakarta manuscripts can be classified into two groups :
Group I :
A. v.d.W. 195 — 35 pp. (missing)
B. v.d.W. 62, VI — 39 pp.
Group II
C. v.d.W. 62, I — 43 pp.
D. v.d.W. 62, V — 30 pp.
E. v.d.W. 62, VII — 6 pp.
F. v.d.W. 197 — 6 pp.
29
S.W. RUDJIATI MULJADI
Virginia Matheson classified into the same group as v.d.W. 62, VI,
all the manuscripts kept in Leiden and London [Cod. 1724 (2), Cod. 1741
(1), Kl. 37, and R.A.S. 119]. a o
Almost no Malay manuscript is the same. The copyist had the
freedom — or felt to have 'the freedom — of alternating words or phrases
which he might not understand, or simply because he thought 'they were
unnecessary or too difficult 'to be copied. He could also skip words or
phrases — even pages — either on purpose or not.
It is unfortunate that the two manuscripts of Group I cannot be
compared, since one of it is lost. After comparing (B) with Winstedt's sum-
mary, 17 it can be noted that the second part of (A), is the same as (E).
In other words, (A) consists of 2 parts, whose contents are almost equal
to (B) and (E) together.
A sub-thesis by Virginia G. Lee 18 contains also a transcription and
a translation of a Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau, from a microfilm of Cod. 1724
(2). 10 It goes as far as p. 25. The text here is almost the same as (B),
but it covers the first 10 pages only.
After comparing the contents of (C), (D), (E), and (F), it can be
stated that (C) and (D) are almost the same. The first pages are both
divided into pasah. (C) has at the end a post-script stating that it is copied
in Penyengat, on 19 Jumadilawal 1274 H. (January 6, 1858 A.D.).
(E) is a shorter version, and it covers as far as page 11 of (C),
or page 10 of (D).
(F) tries to give a short account of ancestry from Sultan Sulaiman
up to Sultan Mahmud.
These two groups show two different methods of writing historical
events.
The first group shows a more narrative style of telling historical
events, without mentioning either dates or years, except, once in the second
part of (A).
The second group deals with the pledge of loyalty between the
Malays and the Bugineses. Every time it is marked with seals, mentioning
names and sometimes years.
Both groups start with events around the crowning of Sultan Su-
laiman in 1103 H. (1691 A.D.). Kratz mentioned the year 1722 as the
year of Raja Sulaiman's crowning (1699-1760).20
,—, ,
is Virginia Matheson, op. cit., p. 391.
» R.O., C.M.G. Windstedt, op. cit., pp. 157 -160.
is Virginia G. Lee, Johor, the Bugis, and Raja Kecik (Camberra : Department
of Indonesian Languages and Literature, Australian University, n.d.),
App., pp 8 - 3 3 .
i» H.H. Juynboll, op. cit., pp. 233 - 234.
ÎO E.U. Kratz, Peringatan Sejarah Negeri Johor : Eine Malaiische Quelle zur
Geschichte Johors im 18 Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden : Otto Harrassowitz, 1973),
pp. 5, 6, 144, 149, 150.
30
SEJARAH R A J A - R A J A RIAU
Let us now consider the first group with the so many interesting
figures in it. This group gives you an account on local alliances, wars,
foreign policies, conspiracies, palace's intrigues, personal outstanding atti-
tudes and influences. Bottom said, " history certainly can be extracted
by the expert historian who has a knowledge of the facts, fancies, and
documents of his area and period and who by this knowledge is properly
equipped to check constantly the wilder flights of fantasy of the Malay
historian of the past." 21
This group is a story, narrated by Tengku Bungsu, the father of
Tengku Awuk di Dungun, to the writer (p.2). In the following pages Tengku
Bungsu was also called Tengku Tua several 'times.
Tengku Bungsu was very angry with yang Dipertuan Trengganu,
and this caused him to move to Dungun. Yang Dipertuan Trengganu has
made Yang Dipertuan Raja Ismail, who fled to Trengganu after he lost
the battle, son in law. This Raja Ismail was Raja Kecik's grandson (p.2,
see p.37).
The most outstanding persons mentioned were no doubt the Ben-
dahara Tengku Husein, Raja Kecik, Raja Haji, Yang Dipertuan Kecik
who was also called Yang Dipertuan Trengganu. The Bugineses' role in
this group was given such an important place, whose special figures were
Kelana Jaya Putra, and Daeng Kemboja, who was later called Raja Muda
Janggut. Both of them were once the strong Raja Muda's of Riau.
The Datuk Bendahara Tun Husein was somewhat a strange person,
with his ill heart and ceaseless vengeance stemmed from his jealousy; but
he was a person of a strong will. He was the elder brother of Marhum
Yang Mangkat di Kuala Pahang, and was born when their father was still
Bendahara. When Marhum Yang Mangkat di Kuala Pahang was born,
their father had become king, and was called Marhum Besar. When their
father passed away, Marhum Yang Mangkat di Kuala Pahang was crowned,
while Tun Husein was appointed Bendahara. As an elder brother, Tun
Husein had to bow before the younger. He became so upset, and was
very jealous of his brother ever since. He had nothing good in his mind
but evil plans for betraying Marhum, hidden in his good manners (p. 2).
When Raja Kecik arrived to propose Tengku Bungsu, Marhum's
daughter, by the agreement of Datuk Bendahara, Marhum accepted the
proposal. But during the marriage, Datuk Bendahara started spreading
slanders about Raja Kecik.
It was said that Raja Kecik was not a Minangkabau knight but
only a son of a commoner. Some said that he was Marhum's son with
Encik Pung by adultry, who fled when Marhum died. She was kept by
a Minangkabau, who was called Panglima Bebas, and later Raja Kecik
was born.
33
r-
S.W. RUDJIATI MULJADI
34
SEJARAH R A J A - R A J A RIAU
35
S.W. RUDJIATI MULJADI
fulfilled his duty as admiral who managed to occupy Malaka, and to drive
away the Bugineses from Riau. 27 In that year Raja Haji, 'the Raja Muda
since 1765, died in the battle of Malaka. He was known as the great Malay
hero who fell in the battle against the Dutch in Teluk Ketapang.28 But
this is not mentioned at all in the Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau.
So far for the contents of the first group. A translation of v.d.W.
62, VI or (B) is attached to this paper.
The second group as stated above contains the pledge of loyalty
between the Malays and the Bugineses started since Sultan Sulaiman's
installation as king of Johor and Pahang in the year 1103 H. (1691 AD.)
by Daeng Manumpuk and Kelana Jaya Putra. Kelana Jaya Putra was
installed Raja Muda, and was regarded as brother by the king. He was
responsible for 'the administration of Johor and Pahang and all the colonies
and the land-properties.
Manuscript (F), although placed in this group tries in fact 'to write
the ancestry of persons mentioned in the Sejarah Raja-Raja Riau. But
unfortunately in certain places it can not be read — not even guessed —
because of its bad condition. It starts here with the year 1134 H. (1735 A.D.),
when the Bugineses came in Riau after defeating Raja Kecik. Then they
crowned Sultan Sulaiman, and the pledge of loyalty was made. This
kinship line ended with Sultan Mahmud.
This is somewhat different from the other parts of the second group,
but it cannot form another different group.
As stated above (C) and (D) are almost the same. After comparing
them more thoroughly, (C) can be taken as the representative of this group.
After the installation of Sultan Sulaiman an alliance was made
between Raja Johor and Raja Bugis. This was an oath of loyalty which
was to last for generations. If superior to the Malays, it would be superior
to the Bugineses, and on the contrary if there were enemies of the Malays,
they would be enemies to the Bugineses.
The Malays were equal to the Bugineses. When a Buginese did
wrong, Yang Dipertuan Muda should solve it wisely; and on 'the contrary,
v/hen a Malay did wrong, it was Datuk Bendahara's task to solve it wisely.
When the Bendahara could not solve something concerning the Bugineses,
he should consult ihe Datuk Bendahara.
Whoever denied it, he and all his offsprings would be punished
by Allah taala, and they would be not free from troubles until the doomsday.
This oath of loyalty was every time renewed and restreng'thened
especially when a new Raja Muda or Bendahara or a Raja Tua was in-
36
SEJARAH R A J A - R A J A RIAU
stalled, for instance in 1141 H. (1745 A.D.), when Daeng Pali succeeded
Kelana Jaya Putra as Raja Muda, when in 1147 H. (1734 A.D.) Tun
Abdullah was appointed Raja Tua, then when Daeng Kemboja was ap-
pointed Raja Muda, and 'then in 1161 H. (1748 A.D.) when Raja Indra
Bungsu became Datuk Bendahara.
Without any reason mentioned here, Daeng Kemboja moved to
Linggi, which caused 'the people to have divided feelings.
In the meantime Duli Yang Dipertuan Besar (Sultan Sulaiman)
passed away.
This pledge of loyalty is repeated as often as 13 times in this ma-
nuscript. Each repetition is ended with names and years, which are some-
times encircled, but sometimes not.
These are found on
p. 11 — a. Al Imam al-Mahmud ibn as-Sultan Abdul Jalil 1214 H.
(1799 A.D.)
b. Sultan Alauddin ibn Opu
repeated in pp. 16, 19, and 21.
p. 23 — a. Sultan Ahmad Riayat Syah ibn as-Sultan Abdul Jalil
b. Sultan Alauddin Syah bin Opu
p. 25 — a. Sultan Jamaluddin lnayat Syah ibn as-Sultan Alauddin
Inayat Syah
b. Sultan Abdulrahman ibn Sultan Mahmud
c. Raja Muda ibn almarhum fi sabilillah, 1221 H. (1806 A.D.)
d. Raja Muda ibn Sultan Baharuddin Raja Tua, 1128 H.
(1715 A.D.)
p. 32 — a. Engku Syarif Muhammad Zain
b. Sayid Ali Suliwatang Ibrahim ibn Bandar Husein
c. Syahbandar Muhammad ibn Bandar Husein
d. Abdulmanan
e. Keluk
f. Panglima Perang Jamal
2. a. Sultan Mahmud Syah ibn Sultan Abdulrahman
b. Raja Muda ibn Almarhum fi sabilillah, 1221 H.
(1806 A.D.)
p. 34 — Raja Muda ibn Yang Dipertuan Muda Raja Ja'far, 1248 H.
(1832 A.D.)
p 35 — Sultan Mahmud Syah ibn Sultan Abdulrahman, 1248 H.
(1832 A.D.)
37
S.W. RUDJIATI MULJADI
38
THE BALINESE BABAD *
H. LR. HINZLER
39
H. I. R. HINZLER
40
THE BALINESE BABAD
The MSS of the "Usana Java", originally written in the late 16th
or beginning of the 17th century, mention a king of Wilatikta in Java,
whose kraton is in the land of Trik and whose Arya's are Damar, Buleteng,
Waringin, Belog, Kapakisan, Binculuk and Sentong, all of whom are settled
in a place called Tulembang. Arya Damar and Patih Gajah Mada sail on
the kings' orders to Bali intending to deliver the disobedient vassal king
Pasunggrigis. Although expressly ordered not to kill him, he is nevertheless
slain. Arya Damar and Patih Gajah Mada, arriving back in Wilatikta, then
hear accounts of the exploits of a destructive king Mayadanava in Bedahulu
en Bali. The king of Java decrees him to be subjugated. Again Gajah Mada
goes to Bali, accompanied by the Arya's (Damar, Sentong, Buleteng, Wa-
ringin, Belog, Kapakisan, Binculuk). The cruel king is subdued. His domain
is then apportioned among the Ârya's. A. Sentong is granted Pacung, Bu-
leteng Pinatih, Waringin Kapal, Belog Kaba-Kaba, Kapakisan Abian Semal,
Binculuk Tengkas. The referent of these placenames, although currently
desa's, is unknown for that time. It must be stressed that here Kapakisan
is considered as an ordinary Arya, who, like the others, is granted part of
the domain. The story continues with Arya Damar, who changes his name
into Kenceng and establishes his residence in Tabanan. He has two sons,
Arya Yasan, who procures Bangsul for himself and Arya Bagus Alit, who
assists one of the Gélgél kings in getting rid of a disturbing bird. In ad-
dition to that the text tells stories concerning gods and holy men and also
the story of a certain Mpu Kuturan, who goes to Basukih. This Basukih
is said to be under the patronage of the house of Gélgél.
Finally there is the "Pamancangah", the kidung version of which
was edited in 1929 by C.C. Berg. This kidung is ascribed to Nirartha,
who is said to have written it, as well as the "Usana Bali", under orders
from king Watu Renggong of Gélgél. The dating of this text is circa J 550
A.D,. It treats the arrival of Gajah Mada and the Arya's, in the beginning
of the 15th Century, from Majapahit to Bali, but in another version than
that given in the previously mentioned texts. The vassal king of Bali, Pa-
sunggrigis, is deposed by the Javanese and replaced by Kapakisan, the sun
of a brahman, Mpu Kapakisan. His kraton is in Samprangan, where he
resides and reigns over his vassals, who are Arya Kanuruhan, Arya Da-
lancang, Arya Wangbang, Arya Kenceng, Arya Pangalasan, Tan Wihan,
Manghuri, and perhaps another Wangbang, and Kuta Waringin. He is also
accompanied by Patih Gajah Mada, Kuta Wandira and three wesya's,
namely : Tan Kober, Tan Kawur and Tan Mundur. They restore order in
Bali. During the pacification, there being strong resistance from particular
groups of Bali Aga, Kapakisan desires to return to Java, but is refused
permission to do so by the king of Java. As recompence he is given a
magic-weapon, the kris Ki Lobar. The "Pamancangah" concludes with the
defeat of the Samprangan dynasty and the subsequent transference of the
court to Klungkung (ca. 1710 A.D.). It should be stressed, however, that,
41
H . I . H. HINZLER
43
H. I. R. HINZLER
44
THE BALINESE BABAD
14th and the end of the 17th Centuries. They largely employ the same
fragments of those basic texts. After this the babad's treat of the descend-
ance of a given figure, often up to and including the end of the 19th
and the beginning of the 20th Centuries.
These basic texts are, for the ksatriya and arya, who claim to descent
from king Kapakisan, the Kidung Pamancangah and the Babad Dalem. The
latter is a proze version of the kidung, but has been enlarged by various
indigeneous Balinese kings, ruling before Kapakisan. There are Masula and
Masuli, twins, from Pejeng, who were assisted by a Mpu Kulputih, known
from the Usana Bali, as well as the king of Bedahulu, who at a given
moment was in possession of a pig's head in place of his own, and whose
court functionaries were among others Kebo Iwa and Pasung Grigis. This
stands in contradiction with the Usana Java, which presents Pasung Grigis
as a Javanese vassal in Bali. These same Balinese kings are also exten-
sively mentioned in the various Rajapurana texts, written, according to
the Wariga Kusuma Dewa, by a Mpu Kuturan, like the Usana Bali. On
the contrary the Usana Bali avers that Mpu Kulputih is the author. Mpu
Kuturan, is, apart from the already mentioned Kusuma Dewa, refered to
in the Usana Java and the Calon Arang.
Due to lack of time it was not feasible to investigate the extent
to which Babad Dalem, Pamancangah and Rajapurana exhibit parallelisms
and differences.
We also find babad's of royal families who by following the Usana
Java, consequently not acknowledging the authority of Kapakisan and the
later Gelgel kings, trace back their genealogies 'to Java. This we see in
the Babad Pinatih, K 1134, the Babad Sukahet, and the Babad Arya Ta-
banan, K 1792. In one babad, that of Gusti Celuk, the fact that the family
doesn't acknowledge the Gelgel supremacy any longer, is even openly
mentioned.
The third basic text is part of the Usana Bali. It is an important
source for pasek, and bendesa genealogies, as confirmed in the already
mentioned Wariga Kusuma Dewa, in so far that they consider Kulputih as
their founding ancestor. These texts rarely contain any reference to the
Gelgel kingdom.
The arrival of Mpu Bharadah in Bali, is an important episode in
the 4th basic text, in the Calon Arang. In some Balinese versions, instead
of Bharadah, Wahu Rauh appears. It is to him and to a not yet traced
king Subali, that the Bangli Nyalian Babad, and the Babad Ksatriya Tainan
Bali refer, also without noting the supremacy of Gelgel. In some babad's
of the pande's for instance in Prasasti Pande Besi, Mpu Bharadah is con-
sidered as founding ancestor.
Babad's of the brahmans, some pasek and pande groups, as well
as other groups, reach back to the god Brahma, who, by meditating, created
an empu, who is a brahman, or a resi, who is a pasek. From either of
whom spring the various brahman and pasek branches. In an analogue,
but more complicated way, 'the pande groups came into being. The story
45
H . I . R. HINZLER
of Mayadanava, like it is told in the Usana Bali, is given, but on the other
hand 'the Mpu Kuturan is mentioned, known from the Usana Java.
Shortly said, we are able to define up till now 4 texts as basic.
First, the Pamancangah, but mixed with fragments of Babad Dalem and the
second part of the Rajapurana. Second, 'the Usana Java, third, the Usana
Bali, and jourth, the Calon Arang. A jijth one, dealing with the meditation
cf the god Brahma, or another god, is not yet traced. Thus, all of them,
except the Calon Arang, belong to the group B of our classification made
in the beginning of this paper, and can be postulated to have been written
during the 16th and 17th Centuries. For a better grasp of these basic texts
and their fragments in the babad's, a thorough comparison of the texts is
required, which falls beyond the preview of this paper.
The babad's use differing languages. First there is Tengahan, based
on the 16th Century Javanese, as in the Kidung Pamancangah. Secondly
there is a mixture of simplified Tengahan and Balinese, which the Balinese
themselves call Kawi. This Kawi language is even up till now still written
as well as spoken for instance by stage actors and performers of the shadow
play. As a third there is Balinese, primarily high Balinese, but where
necessary mixed with low Balinese, A babad written in verse generally
contains an elder and more litterary Balinese, which is difficult even for
the people of today. This lis for instance the case in the Kidung Nderet,
on the battle of Mengwi, which was, according to babad specialist, Ida
Bagus Made Lepeg, from Panarukan, written on behalf of the 12th king
of Tabanan, in the middle of the 19th Ceritury. Four, there is the Sasak
language, used in the babad texts originating from Lombok, which was
long ruled over by the kings of Karang Asem.
According to the same Ida Bagus Made Lepeg, the language of a
babad has to be Kawi or Tengahan proze, and a pamancangah ought to
be in verse form. Texts, written in Tengahan are considered as older (may
be 16th Century) than those in a mixture of Balinese and Kawi, or in
literary Balinese. Usually 'Che texts are written a long time after the events
mentioned in them. As a consequence one may assume that the oldest of
the babad texts in Balinese-.Kövw' date from the late 18fh Century.
A model babad could be said to contain the following parts :
1. sloka
For instance :
Ong pranamya sira sang dewam bukti mukti hitar tayam
prawakaye tatwa wijneyah brahma di pata ya swarab.
This is the beginning of the Babad Andul.
"Sloka" means here "verse", and does not refer to the Sanskrit con-
ception of sloka.
2. pangaksama
We find : pangaksama ninghulun ring pada batara hyang Mami, sang
ginelar ing sarining ongkaratna mantram, hredaya sunilapam
siddhia yogiswarani
46
THE BALINESE BABAD
of. Therefore, genealogy and place of origin, not chronology or facts are
important for the Balinese.
The question if babad's are still being written at present, can be
answered positively. There is a tendency for groups, in the past considered
of lower rank, to have a babad composed, due to the fall of the kingdoms
and the founding of the Indonesian Republic, which formally does not
recognize ranks of nobility. The same tendency exists among the lower
ranking descendents of the royal families, who did not have a babad of
their own up till now, but used those of higher ranking relatives. These new
babad's are not as complete as older ones. They consist mainly of geneo-
logies.
Finally I would like to give an example illustrating how 'the Babad
Arya Tabanan of Krambitan, was written. Data concerning this were received
in 1972, from I Gusti Ngurah Ketut Sangka. There were reasons to have a
new babad written. There had been a BAT, the original of which was placed
in the main Puri in Tabanan and a copy of which was in a Jro. At the
end of 'the 19th Century, due to fire in the main puri of Tabanan, the
original text was lost. This was considered a great loss by the prince of
Tabanan. A transcription of the older copy, placed in the jro, was made
and again deposited in the main puri. It is not certain whether this new
text was completely parallel to the older copy, or not. Possible elaborations
were added. When the Dutch conquered Tabanan in the beginning of this
Century (1906), the BAT was confiscated by them and was later placed
in the Kirtya in Singaraja, on the authority of I Gusti Putu Jelantik, a
member of a branch of the Buleleng princes. It was returned sometime during
the thirties to pun' Anom in Tabanan. The above mentioned two texts might
be the numbers K 940 and K 850 of the Kirtya.
By that time, the Krambitan branch of the Tabanan princes wanted
to have a babad of their own. Already in 1917 Gusti Putu Oka, father
of I Gusti Ngurah Ketut Sangka, started to collect those babad's bearing
reference to Tabanan, as the Pararaton, the Usana Bali, the Babad Blahbatuh,
Dalem, Badung, Mengwi, Buleleng, not neglecting the "Geschiedenis van
Java" by Fruin-Mecs. Old people, who were considered as experts in the
field of genealogy were also consulted. All this was written down in a
notebook. In this notebook he further added corrections on to the old BAT
from Puri Anom, which he had used as a stafting point for the new babad.
In 1937 he began to arrange his notes, although having become blind in
the mean time, and to dictate these to a certain schoolteacher, who was
known for his elegant hand Kawi, the language of the old BAT, was so
much as possible maintained as a language for the new edition. The rough
draft took six months. Having been submitted to various specialists in the
fields of babad, genealogy and language, corrections having been entered
by them, a brahman scribe was sought to transfer the text on to lontar
leaves. The "pamahbah" was composed by I Gusti Putu Oka and a member
of The royal house of Tabanan. Herein the texts consulted are listed.
Hereafter comes a "pangaksama", written by a brahman priest, who later
s
THE BALINESE BABAD
also consecrated the text. However, in most babad's the order of pamahbah
and pangaksama is reversed.
In the new B A T only seven generations of ancestors are enumerated
after which one continues with the more recent generations. Consequently,
not all the ancestors of the old BAT were taken up in the new. The number
of 7 is noteworthy..
The babad having been written, it was consecrated (mlaspas) by
Ida Padanda Gde Rai, of griya Kedampal in Krambitan. Mlaspas is a
process employed after the making of various objects, such as sculptures,
masks, houses, etc. In a mlaspas a sloka and/or pangaksama of the priest
may appear in the babad. Apart from the original BAT, two copies were
made. These were also consecrated. The original, bound in black and white
crossed material was deposited in the pavillion named "saren tegelï' in Puri
Gede, Krambitan. Other relics are also kept in this pavillion. The original
may not be loaned out. One copy, placed in a chest with other lontars
may be borrowed and copied. The second copy was given to a fro.
A babad, unlike a kakawin, is not reqited in public, rather it is
more usual that two or three members of the family meet, read and discuss
its contents. Generally speaking jaba's and women are said not to read
babad's.
Authors of babad's and babad specialists are usually brahmans. This
is because they represent the highest, religious rank, which makes the babad
most valuable, and because they have a good knowledge of Kawi and litera-
ture and often have memorized many genealogies.
Summary — conclusions
Each royal house, group of brahmans or other recognized group or
sect desires to honour and to localize their ancestors. This can be done
by having a written genealogy, termed babad, in their posession. Of these,
there are various kinds.
A. the older babad's, presumably of the 17th, 18th and beginning of the
19th Centuris, which have extensive episodes concering the ancestors
who immigrated to Bali from Java. Royal families, descended from the
kings of Gelgel, or who have a relation with them via one of the Arya,
consider as a basic text of their babad the 16th Century Kidung
Pamancangah, or its later adaptions. Other families, not wishing to
exhibit their dependency on the kings of Gelgel use the Usana Java,
the Usana Bali or other texts as starting point. Brahmans, pande's,
and other groups, refer back to the Usana Bali and Calon Arang as
well as to texts not yet traced.
49
H. I. R. HINZLER
B. the later babad's, written since the end of the 19th Century, which refer
to one of the later princes or ancestors be it that they originate io
Gelgel or elsewhere, and from these personages trace their descent.
At the moment there is a revived interest in the making of babad's,
especially among groups previously considered to be of low rank.
As concerns the babad's of group A and their basic texts, further
research is indicated. This will be possible only when the collection of
MSS is as complete as possible. There are also new texts found daily and
many MSS in posession of the University Library of Leiden, the Kirtya of
Singaraja, or the Fakultas Sastra in Den Pasar, of which there are no
copies elsewhere. It is to be hoped that a fruitfull exchange of copies of
aiese MSS can take place in the near future.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
50
THE BALINESE BABAD
51
H. I. R. HINZLER
rtuA
52
BUSTAN - COPY AND THE JOHOR - HISTORIES *
ULRICH KRATZ
UNIVERSITY INDONESIA
53
ULRICH KRATZ
the way of writing, they were written by different persons. Their writers
and/or copyists are unknown.
A comparison of the two manuscripts with the other known copies
as well as with Tuhfat al-Nafis and Silsilah Melayu dan Bugis led to
the conclusion, that they do not contain just another copy of the Hikayat
Negen Johor, in fact they present another version of the same story, i.e.
the conflict and power - struggle between Bugis, Johor - and Siak-Malay.
If we regard the picture which is given by Tuhfat al-Nafis and Silsilah
Melayu dan Bugis as the Bugis - version of this struggle, the Hikayat Negeri
Johor tells the story from a Siak-point of view, whereas those two
manuscripts contain a different version, namely the sequel of events as
Sultan Sulaiman and his followers liked it to be seen.
But this is not the only fact, which makes the manuscripts Kl 24 B
and yon de Wall 196 different from the others. Afthougil they don't give
the impression that their text consists of two parts, their beginning is
different, as it is taken from the Bustan.
The two manuscripts don't give us the complete fasal, but some
excerpts about life and reign of Sultan Iskandar Thani, the successor of Sultan
Iskandar Muda, as well as some passages with reference to Johor. Com-
paring contents and spelling of this part of the manuscripts with each
other, they can be said to be almost identical. Only at one instance manu-
script von de Wall 196 contains two sentences which are not included in
manuscript Kl 24 B, but which can be found in the printed edition of
this fasal, which was arranged by Teuku Iskandar. Regarding the spelling,
the manuscripts show only minor differences. At cases manuscript von
de Wall 196 seems clearer and we have added a name or word missing or
misread in Kl 24 B, but which can be found in de edited text.
When comparing the contents with the text edited, it has to be
said, that, the passages quoted are literal copies. Only a few summarizing
sentences are the exception.
Since these two manuscripts almost certainly were copied in Riau,
a special comparison was made with T. Iskandar's description of his manu-
script C, an incomplete copy of the Bustan, which is kept in the Library
of the University of Malaya and which, according to T. Iskandar has been
copied in Johor court-circies in 1231 hijra (ca. 1816). Following T. Iskandar's
description and his annotations, we find with one exception toe same pecu-
liarities, i.e. 'hilang' become 'mangkaf or 'kembali ke rahmat ul-llah' and
'alalhi'-salam' and 'salla'lahu 'alaihi wasalam' are written in their complete
form and not shortened. The difference only concerns the speling ot the
words 'manusia' 'perkasa', which are not spelt as in manuscript C 'manushia'
and 'perkakasha'. Only once von de Wall 196 shows the spelling 'tuha'
as found in edited text. Ommissions and/or additions in their contents
don't seem to correspond, except that the three manuscripts miss the des-
scription of the wedding-ceremonies of Sultan Iskandar Thani. Apart from
that, the time-period covered by manuscript C and the Jakarta and Leiden
manuscripts differs from each other. Whereas manuscript C ends with the
54
B U S T A N - C O P y AND THE JOHOR - HISTORIES
55
ULRICH KRATZ
reading those passages from the Bustan it not only can be seen that the
compiler(s) of these manuscripts made a selection, but also how they
choose their material. The writer(s) copied most of the factual information
and omitted most of the descriptive passages. This again throws an
interesting light on the following Johor-text, which is very similar in style
and which also contains at several places a phrase, that the writer does
not not want to continue a certain story, in order not to lengthen the whole.
It now becomes even more obvious than before, that this Johor-text repres-
ents a compilation and abstract from other sources. Direct speech and
descriptive language of the original, which still can be found in both texts
have been reduced in our present copies and don't count any longer as
stylistic means on their own. Here they stay as last remnants of another
text and serve as indicators of their text's origin. They show, that this
text still is close to its original source, as is proved in the case of the
Rustan-exceipts, which are reported literally. On a very small scale, here
we can see, how certain kinds of historical manuscripts by way of simple
reduction rather than concentration gained their present shape. This in
contrast to another possible development of texts, which tends to enlar-
gement rather than to reduction, depending on which purpose a text was
to serve, being a historical narrative or a mere compilation of historical
facts. There is to discern between texts like the ones on Johor, which
contain an enumeration of Facts, selected in accordance wi;h the
intentions of a certain writer, compiler and/or royal patron and which
are simple excerpt-copies and, in contrast to those just mentioned texts
as for example the Tuhfat and the Bustan, which represent a category on
its own, with a capable, inspired mind as its author, who sets out with
the well-defined purpose, to write something new.
Two questions concerning 'this excerpt of the Bustan remain
unsolved : Which were the reasons for this specific selection and why do
these excerpts precede the Johor-text? There is of course a historical
sequel in this set-up. These are the events which chronologically precede
the following happenings; and after Acheh's decline it. was Johor, which
at least for a few decades gained in power. But if we regard this part
of the manuscripts written from a Johor point of view, it must be said,
that those two references to Johor are too meagre in their essence, to
justify this long historical enumeration beginning with Sultan Iskandar
Thani's youth. Furthermore, for Johor vital events as for example the
defeat of the Acheh-fleet in 1628 and the recovery of Malacca in 1641
are not mentioned. Unnecessary to say, this was none of the aims of the
Bustan. From that it is impossible to galm the impression of a purposeful
draft. But if nevertheless this part of the Bustan was inserted intentionally,
there still remains the final question, why those thirty years until 1672,
which showed a prospering Johor are not mentioned whatsoever, and why
this text as well as the others which deal with the history of Johor,-only
begin with a defeat.
56
RELIGION
SHI'A ELEMENTS IN MALAY LITERATURE *
BAROROH BARIED
GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY
Introduction.
There are a few documents in the catalogues of Van Ronkel 1 and
Juynboll2 of which the contents are stories reminiscent of the Shi'a order,
that is, a sect considered3 in Islam, in origin dating back to the time when
Prophet Muhammad was still alive. These documents relate stories about
Ali bin Abi Talib, his wife Fatimah, and both his sons Hasan and Husein.
The length of 'the narratives vary as can be seen from : Hikayat Nur Mu-
hammad VI,4 Hikayat Nabi I,a Hikayat Nabi mengajar Ali,a Hikayat
Raja Handak I, II, IV, V, and VII,7 Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyah 8
and Cerita Tabut. 9 Part of these documents are either translations from
the original language, if not Arabic then Persian, or they are essays about
an episode in those narratives. Ali, his wife and sons, are often referred
to as ahl'l-bait, which means they belong to the house of Rasulullah.10
'The attention of the story is focussed on incidents in their life, and not
on Shi'a teaching. In this matter it differs from documents of which the
contents or trends are sufistic, Sufism being a sect in Islam that has left
deep imprints in Malay literature,. Sufism is dealt with and discussed in
many Malay documents. This sect has developed in the Indonesian ar-
chipelago and its leaders have left their writings in the form of books or
documents which deal with Sufism. Among them are, for example : Tabyan
fi ma'rijati'l adyan,n Mir'at utullab,12 Mir'at ul-mukmin.13 So much
about Sufism. As to Shi'a, this sect has developed and come into full
growth after its penetration of Persia.14 It has many followers in that
59
BAROROH BARIED
country, and has since the sixteenth century even been the officially accepted
madzab there. This tradition is still being closely observed and is perpetuated
in the Constitution of Iran.15 Sufism too has come to its full growth and
bloom on Iranian soil. 16 Many of its leaders have written essays or books
on Sufism in Arabic and Persian, such as Al-Ghazali, Ibn'l Arabi and
Jalalu'ddin Rumi. 1T Indonesia has also witnessed Sufism in its development.
It has been written about and discussed. In North Sumatra this kind of
writing occurred in the 16th and 17th century, of which there are docu-
ments available.18
As sects in Islam, Sufism and Shi'a came into Indonesia together
with the advent of Islam in the 13th century after having passed through
Persia and India. 19 Worthy of note is the fact that Shi'a as a sect is less
well-known in Indonesia than Sufism. About Shi'a, Malay literature pos-
sesses documents only in the form of stories about the first leaders, never
about the doctrine itself. A few traditions which are considered as origi-
nating from the Shi'a sect are extent in certain areas, such as the com-
memoration of Husein's death in Karbella which is yearly observed in
Aceh, 20 Minangkabau and Java. To my knowledge no profound study
has as yet been undertaken as regards this aspect.
60
SHI'A ELEMENTS IN MALAY LITERATURE
other hadis of the same contents, the Shi'a adherents are convinced that
actually it was Ah who had a right to the Caliphate after the Rasulullah.
And afterwards this office should be held by Ali's descendants. However,
another group had decided in favour of Abu Bakar as Caliph. AU submitted
to this decision, but his followers persisted in fighting for his right.
After Abu Bakar's demise, Umar assumed the office, to be later
on succeeded by Usman. Only after Usman the office came open for Ali.
When Ali fell a victim to a murderer's hand the Shi'a group appointed
his son, Hasan, as successor. Another group preferred Mu'awiyah governor
of Syria to succeed Ali to the calipathe. 23 Mu'awiyah's followers managed
to poison Hasan. The Shi'a group appointed Husein as successor. After
Mu'awiyah's death, his son Jazid, was chosen as the heir to the Calipathe
by the followers. Many people did not agree 'to this choice, Jazid being
a sinner, one who was ignorant of law, a man who neglected to do good
work. At length Jazid could manage to kill Husein at Karbella while on
his way to Kufa. Husein's death is considered a martyr's death. It is com-
memorated every year by the Shi'a group in all Islamic countries where
Shi'a influence is felt, including Indonesia.
The Shi'a leader is called Imam. Ali is considered the first Imam.
This position should be occupied by Ali's descendants about whom there
are two opinions among the Shi'a adherents themselves. Persia Shi'ites assert
that only descendants from Ali's marriage with Fatimah — Muhammad's
daughter — are entitled to be Imam. The Arab Shi'ites have the opinion that
the office of Imam is indiscriminately open to all Ali's descendants, ir-
respective of his wife. This difference of opinion has brought about discord
within Shi'a. It should be clear that in addition to Fatimah Ali had taken
another wife from 'the Hanafiyah tribe. By this marriage a son was born
by the name of Muhammad ibn Hanafiyah who avenged Husein's death.
He fought against Jazid but was defeated and with his men found death
ill a cave, having been surrounded by the enemy. The Arab Shi'a acknow-
ledged him as an Imam who was considered not dead but only hidden,
and who, from his hiding place continued leading his partisans. In the
future he would reveal himself again to return to the midst of his followers
to lead them direct.24 This group gave to Muhammad Ibn Hanafiyah's
teaching the appellation of the teaching of the hidden imam The Persian
Shi'ites do not acknowledge Muhammad Ibn Hanafiyah as an imam. To
them there are in all 12 imams as their leaders. These 12 imams begin
with Ali and end with Al-Muntazar in the 9th century. The last imam
is considered not dead. He has vanished momentarily to reappear in the
future to lead his followers. This group is called Shi'a Ithna 'ashariyah
or Shi'a Imamiyah, up to the present being dominant in Persia. 26
23 Ibid., p. 178.
2* Ignaz Goldziher, Vorlesungen über den Islam (Heidelberg, 1925), p. 217.
26 E.G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia (Cambridge, 1951), p. 295.
61
BAROROH BARIED
2« H.S.R. Gibb, Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (New York, 1955), pp. 538-540.
G2
SHI'A ELEMENTS IN MALAY LITERATURE
To make the first step in that direction I have tried to collect Shi'a
elements that are scattered here and there within Malay literature. The data
gathered will help in the furtherance of the study. These data are taken
from documents available in the catalogues of Van Ronkel and Juynboll,
and also from abbreviated documents found in Old Indonesian Literature
under the influence of Islam.2T
1. Hikayat Nur Muhammad. a8
It contains the story of a bird created from Nur Muhammad. This
Bird's head is Ali, its eyes Hasan and Husein, its neck Fatimah of Syria.
Mention is also made of Ali's descendants. The story ends in Ali's
death. Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyah and Hikayat Syah-i Merdan
also contain Hikayat Nur Muhammad. 20
2. Hikayat Bulan Berbelah. (Moon broken in two ?) 3 0
On pp. 21-48 entitled "Hikayat tatkala Rasulullah memberi sedekah
kepada seorang derwisy". The contents of the story are not in keeping
with its title, because the story depicts how Ali managed to defeat
king Sowail.
3. Hikayat Raja Khaibar. 31
This document contains the story of AU when he was dreaming. He
could subdue three viziers. He was able to spread Islam, after which
he returned to the Prophet.
4. Hikayat Pendeta Raghib.32
Ali has resolved to wage war with a Jewiah territory in Khaibar.
5. Hikayat Tamin Ad-Dari.33
In this story AU is requested to act as judge to give verdict in a
dispute between Tamin and a man who married Tamin's wife during
his absence. Ali's verdict is that the woman should be returned to
Tamin. Ali said, 'Every man should shake hands with Tamin'. Then
he told the woman to give back the dowry she received from that man.
6. Hikayat Muhammad Hanafiyah.34
The whole story is characteristic of Shi'a. The story related Ali's three
sons, viz. Hasan, Husein and Muhammad Hanafiyah. This is the only
Malay document in which the story dwells on Muhammad Hanafiyah.
The document opens with the story of Nur Muhammad. Later on it
proceeds to Muhammad's birth, his life, the life of the four Caliphs,
-' "Singkatan Naskah Sastra Indonesia Lama Pengaruh Islam". Bahasa dan
Kesusasteraan, Seri Khusus no. 18, (1973).
2H Ph. S. Ronkel, op. cit., pp. 222-225.
29 H.H. Juynboll, op. cit., pp. 202.
30 Ibid., p. 182.
31 Ph. S. van Ronkel, op. cit., p. 238.
32 Ibid., p. 239.
83 ibid., p. 244.
34 Ibid., pp. 250 - 254.
BAROROH BARIED
the story of Hasan Husein, and finally the story of Hanafiyah. This
story comprises 197 pages of which page 125 begins with the story
of Muhammad Hanafiyah.
7. Hikayat Ali Kawin.3S
Contains the story of Ali's marriage to Fatimah, with decorations sent
from heaven and angels among the guests during the wedding.
8. Hikayat Fatimah berkata dengan pedang AU. 30 (Fatimah talking with
Ali's sword).
Also called Hikayat Fatimah when talking Ali's sword, named Dzul-
fakar. The contents resemble Hikayat Nabi teaching his daughter
Fatimah.
9. Hikayat Nabi mengajar AH.37
Has in it the story of the Prophet teaching Ali about syariat, tarikai,
hakikat and ma'rifat.
10. Hikayat Nabi mengajar anaknya Fatimah.36
The Prophet teaches Fatimah woman's duties. This story is also called
Hikayat Nabi Muhammad mengajar anaknya Bibi Fatimah. 39
11. Cerita Tabut.40
It contains the story about the miracles in Husein's life and his death
at Karbella. This story is linked up with the Tabut celebration.
12. Hikayat Amh'l Mukminin Umar.41
Ah fights Kisra and succeeds in killing Rustam. Husein marries a
daughter of king Horman Syah.
13. Hikayat Raja Khondak.42
Because the story is almost entirely about Ali it is more proper for
this document to be entitled Hikayat Ali. In this story Ali holds the
most prominent role. He succeeds in conquering king Khondak, king
Ifrit, king Peranggi and king Badar.
14. Bustanussalatin.4S
The 6th chapter occurring on page 250 is about the Prophet's message
Aminu'l Mukmin Ali.
35 Ibid., p. 254.
30 Ibid., pp. 254-255.
3V Ibid., p. 228.
38 Ibid.
s» H.H. Juynboll, op. cit., p. 188.
& Ph. S. van Ronkel, op. cit., p. 188.
« H.H. Juynboll, op. cit., p. 200.
«2 "Singkatan . . . ", op. cit., p. 21.
« Juynboll, op. cit., p. 220.
64
SHI'A ELEMENTS I N MALAY LITERATURE
Conclusion.
These are rough and imperfect data with regard to Shi'a elements
in Malay stories. They are still rough in that they constitute only fragments
of stories about Ah and his family (Ahl'l-bait). No selection has been made
as to which of the data indicate real Shi'a elements. Nor are they perfect,
because they are derived, not from all the existing Malay documents, but
from a limited number which, in particular, show clearly that they carry
Shi'a elements. In fact, more careful study will bring to light that Shi'a
elements exist in stories other than those of which the contents have bear-
ing on Shi'a narratives. For example, there is in Hikayat Amir Hamzah an
episode dealing with Ali's war against the heathens, a fragment as well
about the Prophet teaching Fatimah what woman's duties are. 47 The names
Hasan and Husein are also sporadically interwoven in many stories. In
various stories whenever the name Ali is mentioned, we may every so often
read this term followed by the eulogy 'karrama'l-lahu wajhahu', which
means 'may God bless Ali'. As a summing-up, what has been gathered this
far forms but the first step towards more profound and further study.
^
«« "Singkatan . . . ", op. cit., p. 21.
« Ibid., p. 33.
*« Ibid., p. 44.
«T G.K. Niemann, Bloemlezing uit Maleische Geschriften ('s-Gravenhage, 1906),
65
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAM IN THE
MALAY PENINSULA : SOME PROBLEMS FOR
THE HISTORIAN *
WILLIAM R. ROFF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
66
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAM
67
WILLIAM R. R O P P
68
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAM
include many other kinds of official) was paid for partly out of slate
funds but also from what was at the time called the Muhammadan Religious
Fund, made up largely of Shari'a court fines; and the establihment was
overseen, initially, by the state Mufti, who thus became an administrator
and was put for the first time into the state payroll establishment. As this
latter functionary became increasingly powerful, however (for, it might be
observed, whoever controlled the village imam and village Islam controlled
the state), his functions were put into committee, with the creation in 1915
of the Sultan - appointed State Religious Council, in which no one person
dominated. Under the terms of reference of this council, in turn, organi-
zational institutionalization proceeded apace, machinery and officials being
set up to establish and run council madrasah (religious schools); the
judicial bureaucracy being extended to provide for district kathi's courts
outside the capital, with salaried kathi; and much of this activity being
funded out of a new source of revenue (for purposes of this kind) — the
organized collection from village imam of 'two-fifths of the total amount
of zakat and zakat al-jitr surrendered to them annually by their parishioners.
Although Kelantan was the first state to create such an all-embracing
organization, and totalize what was known as 'the Sultan's share' of zakat
(previously applied mainly to the upkeep of the state's three central
mosques), it was followed in due course by others. In Pahang, a central
'Kuranic Instruction Committee' set up in the early 1920s was expanded
into a Majtis Ugama on the Kelantan pattern, based on zakat cohection.
Treiigranu formed a Department of Religion within the apparatus of the
state government itself in the 1920s and Seiangor and Perak, though lacking
any single body prior to the Second World War, increasingly directed Islamic
affairs through Malay-member sub-committees of the colonial-sponsored
State Council. In all cases, the process of structural institutionalization
described (and again, this may readily be documented by, for example,
Kelantan), was much facilitated by on the one hand a contemporaneous
improvement, for other ends, of communications, principally road and rail;
and on the other by a changing rural economy with a stable cash base, which
allowed the commutation of the padi and beras (husked rice) in which
zakat and jitr had customarily been paid into money that could be sur-
rendered to the centre.
Where cultic institutionalization is concerned. I am less sure of the
analytical apropriateness of the term, especially as it seems at times to
overlap conceptually with doctrinal institutionalization. Perhaps, indeed,
these categories are not wholly appropriate, and I should welcome comment
on this. It is true that ritual worship in Malay Islam — to which, of
course, prayer (salat), and more especially Friday congregational prayer,
was central — was already well institutionalized in form at the beginning
of the period with which I am concerned, and did not differ in any impor-
tant respect from that in other Muslim communities. It is however very
marked tliat along with (and assisted by) the structural institutionalization
of the kind to which I have been referring went a new emphasis on (a)
regularity of attendance at Friday prayers (with fines for those failing to
69
WILLIAM R. ROFP
attend without adequate excuse, first to the imam and then through him
to the visiting inspectors of religion), and (b) on compulsion to attend at
one's defined local surau and not at a neighbouring oae. In the 1880s in
Selangor attendance requirements were, indeed, the first measures con-
cerning Islam to go on the statute book. In similar ways, public observation!
of the en joinder s related to the fasting month early became a matter for
substantive legislative provision, institutionalizing what had previously been
a matter for personal, or at most local, determination under the shari'a.
Correspondingly, perhaps, just as most of the Malay state religious establish-
ments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries paid special
attention to these aspects of the cult, so was considerable attention paid
to the cleansing of ritual practice from impurities associated with Malay
'custom' (adat) on the one hand, and of the alleged excesses of the Sufi
tarekat (the rather florid Naqsyabandiyya being prominent in Malaya at
this time) on the other. In all cases, the bureaucratic apparatus or organized
Islam was used to pursue renovation of practice and dispel bida'ah, or
innovation. In passing it may be remarked that it is not possible to make
any simple correlation between the state religious establishments and the
kaum tua - kaum muda (old and new faction) disputes of the time.
Though the functionaries of the Islamic bureaucracy were often drawn
among the kaum tua, it was also the case that, as with the urban-based
kaum muda whom they often castigated, they had 'reform' interests at
heart.
Finally, doctrinal institutionalization. Here again I should like to
turn to early twentieth century Kelantan, where, over a period of a decade
or so from about 1910, there may be observed increasing institutionalized
control (culminating in that exercised by the State Religious Council over
the intellectual or doctrinal content of Islam, through the publication of a
set of officially approved elementary text-books on, for example, adab and
tauhid for the use of local teachers; central examination and certification of
those teachers engaged to give religious instruction in secular government
schools; prohibition of all teachings not approved by the Council (two cases
here come to mind, one of a Syaykh Hassan al-Azahari who was
expelled from the state in 1919 for Sufistic teaching; the other of an
'Afghani' who taught fiqh from a comparative madzhab standpoint, Malay
Muslims being Shafi'e); and the publication of fatwa enunciated by the
Council of Ulama in a journal created at least partly for this purpose. At
the same time, moral laxity within the umat (exacerbated by the increasing
presence within the state of Chinese, Indians and Europeans) was attacked
by means of statute law intended to curb prostitution and adultery, the
consorting with members of the opposite sex not prohibited in marriage,
intoxication, gambling and the like — the statute law, it being held, giving
expression to the shari'a itself.
Other states, at different times during the same period, adopted
similar measures directed towards central control of the doctrinal content
of Islam and its expression in public (or indeed private) behaviour. Clearly,
such control was not always readily acceptable, and there is some evidence
70
THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ISLAM
71
WILLIAM R. ROFF
"
72
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIZATION
OF THE MALAY - INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO *
SYED NAGUIB AL-ATTAS
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
I. Preliminary remarks
The title of this paper indicates that the subject is to be treated
at length and in great detail. Such a work is in fact in preparation and
what follows is merely a skeleton outline. Within the scope and time-limit
ot this Conference, it is possible and necessary only to present such an
outline here. It is found unnecessary, however, to demonstrate here the
validity of some very important assertions by adducing detailed supporting
materials, since 'that is being done elsewhere within its proper scope and
perspective. An earlier paper which I had written1 may be regarded as a
part of this paragraph on preliminary remarks. A concise chronological
order of historical events pertaining to the coming of Islam to the Malay-
Indonesian Archipelago, which ought to form part of this paragraph, but
which forms merely a small part of 'the history of Islam in the Archipelago
and its historical and cultural role in the life of the Malay-Indonesian
peoples, is given in my article on Islamic history in the new edition of
the Encyclopaedia of Islam under the article "Indonesia."
The method of hypothesis and formulation of a theory that I have
adopted in my research on the subject emulates 'that of Socrates which
Plato developed in his Phaedo. An example of a result of this theoretical
methodology is my recently published work on the origin of the Malay
sha'ir. 2
The general theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian
Archipelago is based chiefly on the history of ideas as seen through the
changing concepts of key terms in the Malay language in the 16th and
17th centuries. Primary source materials used have all been of a literary
nature in the fields of religious law and jurisprudence (shari'ah and fiqh),
philosophy or rational theology and metaphysics ('Urn al-kalam and ta-
sawwuf). Almost all the evidence for the formulation of this general theory
has been used on these primary literary sources chiefly in the Malay
language. Apart from critical commentative interpretation of the texts, I
have also employed the methodological concepts and approach of modern
semantic analysis. The study of ideas and change of ideas bearing upon the
Malay-Indonesian Weltanschauung has never to my knowledge been under-
taken in the context of a general theory such as the one outlined here.
73
SYEDNAGUIB AL-ATTAS
r TO
II. General observations
Much of the history of Islam and its role in the Archipelago has
yet to be written. Due to the lack of data on the precise dates of the
introduction of Islam into the Archipelago, some of the dates traditionally
given could very well be put back. Several theories on 'the introduction
and expansion of Islam in the Archipelago, and the ways and means by
which it was spread, have been advanced. There have also been some
attempts made at presenting a cultural evaluation of Islam in the history
of the Malay-Indonesian peoples. The various main theories each emphasizes
singly the dominant role of
(i) trade in conveying Islam 'to the Archipelago ;
(ii) traders, officials connected with trade, among whom was the Shah-
bandar, and intermarriages in spreading Islam and effecting conversion
among the people ;
(iii) competition among Muslims and Christians, accelerating the spread
of Islam, particularly between the 9th/15th and llth/17th centuries
— this is conceived as a continuation of the crusade between Islam
and Christianity ;
(iv) political conveniences as being the motive for conversion to Islam ;
(v) Islam's ideological worth as being the main factor of conversion ; and of
(vi) the influence of Sufism and its tariqahs — the notion of autochthony,
however, is here emphasized.
Suggestions have been made that the above theories 'taken collectively
could be conceived as the basis for a general theory of Islam in the Ar-
chipelago. However, almost all these theories and elaborations pertaining
to them cannot strictly speaking be considered as having achieved the
scientific rank of theory, or even in some cases that, of hypothesis, and
most of them have been critically demonstrated as untenable while others
are simply guesswork and statements on what was already obvious.
Most of 'the scholars who have been influential in setting forth these
theories have been ardent admirers and scholars of Javanese culture and
civilization. Having been entranced by that culture and civilization, they
have apparently proceeded to elevate it above all else in the Archipelago,
making it a standard and criterion for the consideration of Malay culture
and civilization. Enthralled perhaps by the wayang, it would seem that they
saw history as if it were an operatic gamelan incessantly repeating the old
theme. They speak of the indigenous quality and character of what to them
only appears historically to be important cultural influences of Hinduism,
Buddhism and Islam: that some of the most important culture values,
characteristic world views, conceptions of being that Hinduism, Buddhism
and Islam impressed upon the Malay-Javanese civilization were already
present in that civilization — autochthonous; that only the outward form,
the name, is assumed; the spirit, the essence, the character remains the
same, impervious to alien innovations, inscrutable and mysterious. The
'autochthonous theory' has indeed affected a great number of influential
74
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMISATION
(f) From what has been stated above, it may be concluded that
Islam, as opposed to Hinduism and Buddhism, is a scientific and literary
culture. Added to this is the fact that it was Islam that first brought the
Malay-Indonesian Archipelago in contact with 'western' rationalistic thinking
in the form of Greek philosophy represented chiefly by the ideas of Plato,
Aristotle, and Plotinus.
From what has been stated in connection with Islam as being a
scientific and literary culture, stressing an acceptance of a unique con-
ception of Being by means of language, it is therefore manifestly erroneous
76
A GENERAL THEORY O F THE ISLAMIZATION
for scholars and historians in the past to look for 'the revolutionary changes
brought about by Islam in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago merely at
easily perceptible 'external' historical phenomena such as trade, and shifts
in economic and political power, and in art and such external forms of
religious manifestation. It is not merely by gazing at 'the volume of trade,
international or otherwise, the development of economic and political in-
stitutions alone, the Menduts, Prambanans and Borobudurs that they will
discover that they seek — if 'they seek that — for as far as Islam in the
Archipelago is concerned they have looked at the least reliable historical
evidence. They ought to have looked at the language of the Malay-Indo-
nesian Archipelago, which turned out to be the Islamized Malay language,
for it would be there that the revolutionary changes in world-view effecting
other changes would be preserved and reflected; for language is the silent
yet ever present living witness whose words and vocabulary still hold captive
the thoughts and feelings of centuries. It is equally erroneous to magnify
Java and the Javanese civilization; to cause it, by comparison with the
Malay-Indonesian civilization, to be the object of exclusive and reverent
study; to cast one's gaze always at enchanting India even when seeking
the answer to the provenance of Islam in the Archipelago.
But one can understand why, perhaps, this has been so. The in-
fluential scholars and historians who have been treating the subject have
themselves been the product and representatives of a civilization and culture,
of a world-view that has been and still is iin considerable measure firmly
rooted in aesthetic values. Religion in Western culture has always been
conveyed through the medium of art. Rational theology and philosophical
speculations on God were initiated later after greater acquaintance with
Greek philosophy became possible through the paradoxically significant
contact with Islam. Even then, religion remained in the firm embrace of
art, as it does now. Philosophy and science divorced themselves from
religion, though not from art, disenchanted from its lack of certainty. The
introduction of Christianity to Europe, just as that of Hinduism and Bud-
dhism to the Archipelago, has never been followed by a rationalistic
clarification of the conception of Being. This task as far as Christianity
was concerned, was left to philosophy which reduced religion to a mere
theory, and even then it occurred in comparatively recent times. Indeed,
it can be said, perhaps without exaggeration, that the very nature of the
problem which lay within the inmost ground of Western culture has its
roots in the frustrations in early Christian theological polemics and disputes
which in turn gave rise to all manner of "developments" in philosophy,
in science, in humanism, and in what is considered today as "modern".
Finally, another important and relevant general observation is what
appears to be an historical accident, a coincidence in the 'choice' of the
Malay language as the language of Islam in the Archipelago. It appears
to me that the occurrence might not necessarily have been entirely coinci-
dental and this because of several striking though not quite similar parallels
between 'the vicissitudes of Arabic and Malay after the impact of Islam
and before — enough indeed to have made the Arabs themselves feel that
77
SYED NAGUIB A L - A T T A S
Malay would have been the 'natural choice' within the Archipelago, with
which they had been acquainted since pre-Islamic times. Like the Arabic
language in Jahili times, Malay was not an aesthetic religious language.
Although we know that pre-Islamic Arabic was highly developed in folklore
in the oral tradition, particularly in poetry, we know practically nothing
about Old Malay except perhaps that in folklore it was also in the oral
tradition. Malay was used as a lingua franca in a limited sense in trade in
relevant parts of the Archipelago only. The Malay society, as opposed to
the Javanese seems, like Meccan Arab society before Islam, a mercantile
one. Pre-Islamic Arabic, not being an aesthetic religious language, whose
vocabulary is generally enriched or emburdened as the case may be by
the sophisticated and inevitably confusing mythological, mystical, metaphy-
sical and philosophical vocabularies, was comparatively 'pure' and unsophis-
ticated as far as the purpose of Islam was concerned in relation to the
Graeco-Roman and Irano-Persian languages that held sway in the
neighbouring regions. The Qur'an, when it came upon the Arabs, extolling
clarity and intelligence, declares itself to be in 'plain' and 'not devious'
Arabic. By relative comparison, as far as aesthetic religion was concerned,
the relationship between Arabic on the one hand and the Graeco-Roman
and Irano-Persian languages on the other, was like Malay and Old Ja-
vanese, the latter being the dominant aesthetic literary and religious language
of the Archipelago. Semantically, Old Javanese would have been less
susceptible than Malay of recognizing and accepting the Quranic teachings,
since its understanding of them would have been more clouded or confused
by the existing and firmly rooted concepts and ideas in its aesthetic reli-
gious vocabulary. Indeed, this was what actually happened with the problem
of Islam in Java : the notion, now still popular among scholars on 'Javanese
Islam', about the so-called 'conflict' between 'Javanism' and Islam, the
alleged 'rejections' on the 'encroachment' of Islam on the Javanese religion
is, in my opinion, exaggerated; what occurred in most important and re-
levant cases was more indicative of an attempt at clarification of Islam
on the one hand and difficulty in recognizing and understanding the
clarification on the other, precisely due mainly to the 'opaque' and 'semi-
transparent' connotations imposed by the Javanese language. For this
reason also, the Muslims resorted to making use of the aesthetic Hindu-
Javanese religious vocabulary in explaining Islam to the Javanese. One
must recognize such a method of explanation as being another aspect of
the ingenious missionary tactics the Muslims have employed in Java, ex-
celling by far their use of the wayang for similar purpose. The same con-
clusion could also be drawn in explanation of the continued preference for
poetry in Javanese-Islamic literature rather than prose. Much of Old Malay
folklore might also have been influenced by the hegemony of Old Javanese
in the latter's preference for poetry, but when Malay became 'the Islamic
language of the Archipelago, prose predominated in most aspects of its
literature. In poetry, the sha'ir is perhaps the only enduring and popular
Arabic legacy, though even in this domain, the prose commentary invariably
forms an integral and most important part — another succinct emphasis
on clarification almost never applied in Old Javanese.
78
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIZATION
79
BYED NAGUIB AL-ATTAS
that has no such clergy or priestly organization; that every Muslim is ex-
pected to know the essentials of his own faith and that he is potentially
a missionary of Islam, charged with that duty whenever possible, each ac-
cording to his own capacity. They should not, therefore, have expected
to find the clearly defined organisation of missionary activity they seek
at work during the process of Islamization of the Archipelago. Muslim
missionary activity was carried out at different levels, according to different
methods, coming from different directions, with different peculiar techniques,
depending upon the different cultural traits of peoples they strove to convert.
Perhaps the only identical essential content of Muslim missionary activity
throughout consisted in the persistent preaching of the unique conception
of the Unity of God (Allah) as revealed in His Revelations embodied in
the Qur'an through His last Prophet Muhammad, and the unity of the
Law (shari'ah). These different levels in which Islam was conveyed accor-
ding to the different spiritual and intellectual capacities of the various
missionaries were gradually, 'standardized', as it were, 3 by the saints or
walis and sups, the scholars and the learned doctors of rational theology
('ulama) and of jurisprudence (fuqaha) and their disciples (murid) among
the missionaries who in structural pattern somewhat similar to the schema
traced in genealogical tables (sing, silsilah) transmitted and clarified the
teachings to their disciples and followers right down to and among the
masses of the people. The means by which the missionary activity was
conducted was primarily the usual verbal exposition of the essential
doctrines; exemplary devotional practice; written expositions on religious
law, on philosophical mysticism (tasawwuf) and works of such nature and
these various means were conducted by individuals and by institutions such
as the Sufi Orders or tariqahs, the schools and colleges or madrasahs and
other probably indigenous (Javanese) institutions made use of by the Mus-
lims for their purpose, such as the pasantrens and pondoks. 4 Indeed, the
pondoks and tariqahs in the Malay Peninsula, whose conversion is little
known, reveal traces of Javanese missionary activity in their use of such
institutions. The method of payment due to the master of the pondok known
in Malaya, for example, seems to be patterned on that known in the
Moluccas in the 9th/16th century when the Javanese missionaries spread
Islam among the Ambonese, except that in Malaya the most valued product
like padi is used as payment as cloves was in Ambon. Finally, there seems
to have been, as far as the Archipelago is concerned, a final 'corrective
phase' following the 'standradization' just mentioned during which phase
tasawwuf played the dominant role and 'this 'final corrective phase' con-
stituted the consolidation of Islam which in Sumatra (and perhaps the
Malay speaking peoples) became apparent in the 10th/17th century and
in Java in the 12th/ 19th century.
St»
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIZATION
B The letter representing cha ( gj. ) is called jimi farsi or jimi 'ajami, i.e.
the Persian jim; the letter representing ga ( j£ ) is called kafi farsi
or kafi 'ajami, i.e. the Persian kaf. The letter representing nga ( £, )
pa ( ,J9 ), and nya ( c*> ) are indigenous inventions in accordance
with the phonetic lawB of the indigenous language (s).
e See below, pp. 82-83.
81
SYED NAGUIB A L - A T T A S
This new stream, probably originating in Barus, had its centre in Pasai
(later Acheh), the earliest centre of Islamic learning in the Archipelago,
whence its influence spread throughout the Archipelago. The new stream
is characterized by its terse, clear style, its Islamic vocabulary; it reveals
a language of logical reasoning and scientific analysis very much influenced
no doubt by its writers — Sufis, scholars, translators, and commentators —
who were themselves under the sway of the Qur'an which, as I have
already pointed out, extolls clarity and intelligence in speech and writing.
It is from this new stream 'that 'modern' Malay or the present-day Malay-
Indonesian language developed, since this was the stream that conveyed
and spread Islam in 'the Archipelago. The magnification of Peninsular
Malay as the 'paragon' of the Malay language is the fancy of Western
scholarship and the influence of Abdu'llah Munshi (c. 1211-71/1796-1854)
whom that scholarship sets up as 'the father of 'modern' Malay literature,
who in fact did emulate the style of the Malacca centred Sejarah Melayu.
The Malaccan Sejarah Melayu must in fact be considered the best literary
example of old court Malay — the earlier of the two streams of the Malay
language here conceived — whence flowed folklore, romance, epic and
quasi historical literature still reflecting traces of the old world view. The
Munshi must not be regarded as the father of modern Malay literature,
for he was in fact the last exponent of the dying 'Malaccan' style which
was gradually being displaced by the new stream pointed out above. Indeed,
quite significantly the Munshi had no followers to emulate his style. It
was, rather, Hamzah al-Fansuri (c. 9th/16th century) — the first man to
write intellectually systematic Malay on subjects of a highly rationalistic
order — who, I suggest, ought to be regarded as the true father of modern
Malay literature. The new stream in which Hamzah's influence is noticeable
emerged in the 9th"/16th — 10th/17th centuries. To 'this same period
must modern Malay historical writing be assigned (e.g. as manifested in
the historical writings of Nuru'1-iDin al-Ranliri (d. 1666) and not to the
12th/19th century as generally held (e.g. the first of such writing attributed
to Raja 'Ali Hajji (c. 1224-87/1809-70) by Western scholarship. There
has been a noticeable and significant tendency among Western scholars
to postdate important historic events such as the coming of Islam to the
various parts of the Archipelago and the 'modernization' of the Malay
language and literature — of the Malay-Indonesian world as a whole —
to coincide with the coming of the West and propagation and temporary
domination of Western culture here.
4 The process of Islamization underwent three phases.
Phase I : from approximately 579/1200-803/1400, jurisprudence or fiqh
played the major role of interpreting the religious law (shan'ah) in the
conversion of the Malays. The conversion was effected by strength of faith,
not necessarily accompanied by an understanding of the rational and in-
tellectual implications such conversion entailed. Fundamental concepts
connected with the central Islamic concept of Unity of God (tawhid) were
still vague in the minds of their old concepts overlapping and clouding
or confusing the new ones. This phase can well be described as the con-
version of the 'body'.
82
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE ISLAMIZATION
83
3YED NAGUIP AL-ATTAS
SI
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA IN
THE 19 TH AND 20 TH CENTURIES *
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY
I. Preliminary Remarks.
Perhaps no historical phenomena have been so thoroughly neglected
in Indonesian historiography as rehgious movements. Their history remains
outside the file of systematic exploration and historical writing. It con-
stitutes a sector which is still dark, although such movements loomed
large in Java of the 19th and 20th centuries and archival documents
related to them would permit their being illuminated. This lacuna can
easily be explained since within the framework of colonial historiography,
which bears the stamp of conventional historical writing, religious move-
ments have not been considered a subject fit to be studied by historians.
Millennial or messianic ideology of religious movements have how-
ever, not lacked attention and there are a number of scattered studies
of it, textual and philological.1 In most of these cases ideological forms
have been considered to be at the heart of research. More stress is laid
upon structures of millenarian or messianic beliefs than upon patterns
of development of religious movements. It should be pointed out that
religious movements in Java have been looked upon mainly as manifes-
tations of the much - examined phenomenon of mysticism or suf;sm.a
Millennial - style religious movements have not been given the attention
they deserve in their own right. Here, perhaps, by accumulating details
of the many milennial movements in Indonesia in general and in Java in
particular, one of the great gaps in Indonesian histoy can be filled.
In advancing whatever pertinent knowledge I have acquired of some
religious upheavals of Java in the 19th and 20th centuries, I am con-
85
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
i ITW*T~) HT 0 r ' CIW
strained to use the definitions and concepts that others have developed.
Religious movements with which we are concerned have been labelled in
a number of ways, namely as messianic, millenarian, nativistic, prophetic,
revitalization or revivalistic movements.3 The term 'religious movements'
has not always been used throughout with the same degree of precision
or with a great degree of conceptual rigour. Many social movements,
including riots, rebellions, sectarianism, may be classified as religious mo-
vements, since those phenomena generally tend to relate to movements which
are religiously inspired or which imply religious means in bringing about
their supernatural goals.4 Most of the upheavals no doubt had religious
overtones.5
The study of religious movements during the colonial period can
take advantage of ample source materials we inherit from colonial offi-
cials who were charged with missions of rigorous upheavals. For obvious
reasons there was much attention focused on dramatic-type movements ;
the millennial-style movements were a potential menace to the very foun-
dation of the colonial regime. This state of affairs has its dangers which
we must guard against: one is 'to assume that mliilennial-style movemnets
constituted the main style of religious movement, overlooking the fact that
the development of more peaceful movements was left umecorded ; the
other, to assume, that religious movements are a typical — if not
inherent — phenomenon in colonial society. ° In addition, it should be noticed
that colonial administrators' accounts of religious movements are often
distorted by ethnocentric prejudice and Islamo-phobia with the result that
there was a dispositional tendency to equate religious movements with
revolutionary, anti-foreign movements. To ass'gn every religious movement
a political, revolutionary character is, therefore, a fallacy.
For reasons of research strategy our line of inquiry will be confined
to some cases of millennial-style movements, describing their development
and seeking for generalization regarding their special features. The.e are
K For the term 'messianism' see W.D. Wallis, 'Quelques aspects de messianisme,
Archives des Sosiologie des Religious (ASR), V (1958), pp. 99-100; also G Ba-
landier 'Messianismes et nationalismes en Afrique Noire' Cahiers Interna-
tionaux de Sociologie, XIV (1953), pp. 41-65; for 'millenarism' see Norman
Cohn, 'Medieval Millenarism; its bearing on the Comparative Study of
Millenarian Movements' in Millennial Dreams in Action, Sylvia Thrupp, ed.,
The Hague, 1962; for 'nativism' see R. Linton, 'Nativistic Movements',
American Anthropologist, XLV (1943), pp. 230-240; for 'prophetic movements'
see Guarigha, Prophetismus und Heilserwartungs-Bewegungen als völkerkund-
liches und religionsgeschichtliches Problem, Horn-Wien, 1959; for 'revitali-
zation' see A . F . C . Wallace, 'Revitalization Movements', AA, LVITI (19591,
pp. 264-281; for 'revivalism' see P. Nash, 'The Place of Religious revivalism in
the Formation of the Intercultural Community on Klamath Reservation',
Social Anthropology of North American Tribes, Chicago, 1955, pp. 377-444.
4 For this definition see Bryan R. Wilson. 'Millennialism in Comparative Pers-
pective', Comparative Studies in Society and History (CSSH), VI (1963).
pp. 93-144.
5 See K.F. Holle in his missive of 20 August 1873, no. 126.
« See V. Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed, New York, 1963, P.
Worsley, The Trumpet shall sound, London, 1957; cf. G. Balandier, loc cit.
86
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
T G.W.. Drewes, op. cit.; J.M. van der Kroef, 'Javanese Messianic Expectation:
Their Origin and Cultural Context', CSSH, I (1959), pp. 299-323; also his
'Messianic Movements in the Celebes, Sumatra and Borneo', CSSH, Sup-
plement II (1962), pp. 80-121.
87
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
88
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
89
SARTONO KARTOPIRD.TO
foreign rule during the colonial period there was a tendency for religious
movements to be used as a cloak for political opposition. Other basic
tendencies of religious movements predispose them to develop more ex-
treme political orientations and to emerge as radical political movements.
A second feature we have to stress refers to the rejection of the
present situation and the expectation of the coming of a millennium.
Besides the revival of traditional values, millennium usually envisages
an ideal society and romanticises the time to come as a golden age.
The ideal world is pictured as follows : „When the time comes there
will be no more conflicts, injustice and suffering; people will be freed
from paying burdensome taxes, performing compulsory services. There
will be neither sickness nor theft; there will be abundance of food and
clothes; everyone will possess à house; people will live in peace." 10
There is testimony from the Javanese cultural realm that elements
of millenarianism were present before the impact of the West; Hindu-
Javanese myths and the Erucakra belief seem to indicate that millenarian
expectations were already there. The reign of Erucakra is associated
with the millennium.17 As we have frequently observed, leaders of
millenarian movements or of political movements with millenarian un-
dertones adopted the name of Erucakra. 18 Needless to say, such
movements speedily brought uneasy authorities down to them. In actual
fact, the millenarian vision instils in the movement a sense of extreme
urgency and throws it into spells of rebellious activity, during which,
as sometimes happened, people sought physical protection from the
catastrophic events which were alleged to precede the millennium.
For example, in the Bekasi affair of 1869 Bapa Rama referred to total
darkness1"; Amat Ngisa of Karangkobar (1871) awaited the coming
of Ratu Adil with his army of devils who would spread plagues;20 and
Wirasenjaya of Tambakmerang (1935) expected a great flood.21 These
eeuw' TBG, XXIII (1876), pp. 458-509; H.J. de Graaf, 'Het Kadjoran vraag-
stuk', Djawa, XX (1940), pp. 273-327; see also Th. G. Th. Pigeaud, Javaan-
sche Beschavingsgeschiedenis, MS H 717 a-c Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-,
Land-en Volkenkunde, 1943-1945.
16 On the traditional prophecies, see R. Tanojo, ed., Djangka Djajabaja. Weddha
Wakja, Sala, n.d. Bratakesawa, ed., Djangka Ranggawarsitan, Jogjakarta,
1959. Tjantrik Mataram, Peranan Ramalan Djojobojo dalam Revolusi kita,
Bandung, n.d.
IT See J. Brandes, loc. cit., p. 371; also A.B. Cohen Stuart, loc. cit., pp. 285-
288; Cf. G.W.J. Drewes, op. cit., esp. pp. 130-137.
i<* For the Diponegara rebellion, see Soemodidjojo, ed., Babad Diponegara, Jogja-
karta, 3953, esp. pp. 11-12; for an earlier Dipanegara rebellion, see Meinsma,
ed., Babad Tanah Djawi, The Hague, 1941, p. 333.
is» See missive of 5 August 1870, in Verbaal 31 August 1871, no. A.
-o Missive of the Resident of Banjumas, 14 June 1871, no. 2947
2i Harjaka Hardjamardjaja, op. cit., p. 34.
90
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
ai
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
2C See my The Peasants' Revoit of Banten in 1888, 's-Gravenhage, 1966, pp. 269-
271; cf. J. Groneman, Uit en over Midden-Java, Zutphen, 1891, pp. 66-67.
n L.E. Gerdessen, 'De Zamenswering in de Vorstenlanden', Tijdschrift voor
Nederlandsch Indie (TNI) II, (1871), r>. 207; cf. Verbaal 18 Oct. 1865, E 15
Kab.
a» Missive of the Resident of Surakarta 11 Oct. 1886, no. 32, in Mailrapport
1886 no. 664.
2» G.W.J. Drewes, op. cit., esp. pp. 19-38 cf. Report of the Resident of Ba-
njumas, 28 Sept. 1885 no. 3456/17 Geheim; see also Proces-Verbaal 14 Oct.
1886 and Oost-Indisch Besluit 14 Dec. 1886, no. 4.
so see 'De Poeloong-zaak (rustverstoring in Madioen in 1886), een ernstige
vingerwijzing' Indische Gids (IG), 1 (1886), pp. 231-238; also Koloniaal Ver-
slag 1886, fol. 2.
ai See rapport of the Resident of Surakarta of 14 Nov. 1888, no. 1; also 'Of-
ficeel relaas van de ongeregeldheden in Solo', IG, 1 (1889), pp. 216-221;
IG, 2 (1889), pp. 1768-1776.
«2 J. J. Samwel, 'De mislukte Djokjasche perang sabil' Weekblad voor Indie, 11
(1904), pp. 135-137; cf. 'De Djokjasche onruststoker Djalegong', Weekblad
voor Indie, 17 (1904), pp. 211-212.
sa See G.W.J. Drewes, op. cit., esp. footnote a t pp. 169-170.
8* G.W.J. Drewes, op., cit. footnote a t p. 192.
8« See W. Hoezoo, 'Het Javaansche geschrift "Achiring djaman", loc. cit., pp.
1 - 42 : on Mahdism in general, see C. Snouck Hurgronje, 'Der Mahdi',
Verspreide Geschriften, Vol. I. (Bonn, 1823), pp 147-181.
st G.W.J. Drewes, op. cit., esp. pp. 39-49.
37 See my 'The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888', 's-Gravenhage, 1966.
38 Oost-Indisch Besluit 21 April 1841, no. 3.
92
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
Daris affairs of Kedu in 1843;36 and the case of Haji Jena! Ngarip of
Kudus in 1847;40 all aiming at exterminating Europeans. In addition it is
important to note that the Cikandi Udjik affair in 1845 was strongly anti-
Furopean in purpose.41
Throughout most of the island, religious movements in the same way
rested their appeal to the people largely on the idea of the holy war.
It is sufficient here to refer to some upheavals that arose in the late
19th century and in the early 20th century : (1) the Ciomas affair in
1886; 42 (2) the Cilegon rebellion; (3) the Campa affair;43 (4) the
incident of Kyai Hasan Mukmin of Gedangan in 1904; 44 (5) the incident
of Pak Jebrak of Brangkal in 1919; 45 (6) the incident of Haji Hasan
of Cimareme in the same year. 40 Upon examining those religious move-
ments we find that the avowed anti-European attitude unmistakably comes
from the holy war idea, according to which the Muslim community is in
duty bound to wage war against infidels. Needless 'to say this very idea
not only promotes the sensitiveness of the people towards the rule of
infidels, but also accelerates religious movements in their radical and
revolutionary form.
The true significance of the religious movements of Java in the 19th
and 20th centuries cannot be appreciated unless we take into account
their nativistic aspect. And neither can they be properly evaluated except
in relation to social change brought about by Western domination.
Documentary sources reveal the idea of re-introducing some elements of
the society's pristine culture and rejecting the invading foreign culture.
Nativistic hopes promised the coming of a restored native earth on which
the white men would be no more, and which 'the old dynasty would rule
again. In 1840 an upheaval occurred in Yogyakarta which centered around
a certain Amat Sleman; he claimed to be a recipient of divine revelation
and also claimed the right to establish a new kingdom47, in 1843 Achmad
Daris of Kedu, mentioned above, adopted royal titles and announced that
the time had come to throw out all authorities.
93
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
4» See my The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888, passim; also Harry J. Benda
and Ruth McVey, eds., The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia :
Key documents, Ithaca, 1960, p. 42.
4» On historical instances of the Ratu Sunda movement, e.g. in 1830, 1832,
1841, 1853, 1863, see missive of the Resident of Priyangan, 20 Dec. 1871,
La A, Geheim.; for a more recent instance, see 'Ratu Sunda', in Weekblad
voor Indie, n (1905-1906), p. 22.
<0 Serat Babad Dipanegaran, op. cit., pp. 98-100.
94
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
95
SARTONO KARTODIRDIO
Urug, his place of origin. He had received some religious education, suc-
cessively in the pesantren of Malangbong, Garut, and later on in a number
of pesantren in East-Java, i.e. in Madiun and Kediri. In 1869, he returned
to his village and established himself as a religious teacher and as a
medicineman as well. He soon became quite well known to the local com-
munity; he was venerated by the people and was called kyai. Sometimes
he became possessed by the divine spirit and WUJ prophesied through his
mouth that the existing order would be overthrown and that Ratu Sunda
would be proclaimed. The content of this revelation was written down
as a piagem, later on better known as the surat tobat mentioned above.
Copies of it were distributed among devotees during religious gatherings
with a warning to keep them safely until — as they put it — "the time
is come",. It should be noted that the first copy was given to Nyi Aciah
on the occasion of her first meeting with Hasan Mohamad. The latter
recognized her as the very person whom he had been looking for quite
some time and spoke to her with the appellation "daughter". From that
time forward conferences were held between Hasan Mohamad and his
aident followers, among other the Naib of Malangbong, Mas Abdulmanan;
the Naib of Indihiang, Raden Haji Mohamad Sanusi; the Naib of Tasik-
malaya. Raden Achmad Mohamad; Bapa Enom and Bapa Asminem, both
from Cibiana; Bapa Naib and Ambu Aciah — parents of Nyi Aciah; Haji
Abdullah and Haji Abdullah Omar. It is remarkable that three religious
officials were to be found among the prominent participants of the move-
ment, namely the three naibs.
One of the extraordinary manifestations of the movement took place
when Nyi Aciah and her following visited Malangbong in May 1871.
She was received with great enthusiasm and pomp, and provisions were
collected to feast her and her large retinue. A procession to the holy
graves of Malangbong was held in which a large number of women took
part, among others the wife of the Wedana of Malangbong. It is also
noteworthy that among the members of Nyi Adah's retinue some petinggis
(subdistrict heads) were to be found. The goverment was then determined
to put an end to this movement and Nyi Aciah together with prominent
devotees were arrested. The whole movement subsided totally.
Thus the movement of Nyi Aciah, which stated as a movement
ol her devotees, consolidated into a powerful religious movement giving
its followers the millenarian hope for the coming of the Sunda kingdom.
Previous messianic movements, successively led by Raksapraja in 1841,
by Bapa Kantang in 1853 and by Mutayam in 1863, were all meant to
restore the realm of Ratu Sunda. In my opinion this messianic figure can
be regarded as the Sundanese counterpart of the Javanese Ratu Adil.
Our next example is the so-called Kobra (or Jumadilkubra)
movement, centered in the southern part of the Pekalongan district and
in the northern part of the Banyumas district of Central-Java.52 In 1871
96
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
97
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
he predicted the coming revolt. During the visit of three noblemen from
Yogyakarta his prediction referred to an insurrection which would break
out throughout Java, these noblemen being counted among what he describee
as the prominent heads of the movement ; they were to overpower Batang.
Then he came into contact with a certain Haji Brahim from Kedu during
the fasting period at the end of 1870, from whom he received various
inspirations, for example, to assume the name of Kobra and to intensify
his penitence. He began to tour the neighbouring places, like Bandar,
Segelap, Pekalongan, Blado, Senopo ; meetings were held in which prominent
local notables were present. Every command of his was promptly obeyed.
In fact, rumours were spread that he had secret communication with the
Regent, the Patih and the Wedana of Pekalongan. Later on these officials
had to face charges of incitement to insurrection. Comprising facts were
put forward against the Regent, who would not detect anyhting in the
movement. He was accused of supporting the rebels in order to bring
disgrace on the Regent of Batang, so that his own son — the Wedana of
Pekalongan — could be appointed successor. 56 In any case, as soon as
the Dutch authorities were on the scent of Jumadilkubra's mysterious
activities, he was quickly put in jail. According to the view mentioned
above, Jumadilkubra had only played into the Regent's hands, though it
was found later that this information was incorrect. ßT With the arrest ol
Jumadilkubra the movement died down.
The Jasmani affair which forms our third example took place in
Kediri in East-Java; it also extended to Madiun, west of Kediri. This
movement was inaugurated by a certain Jasmani of the village Sengkrong
in the district of Blitar. He was born in Sumawana (Kedu) ; he had received
some religious education, having attended pesantrens in various places, e.g.
in Yogyakarta, Madiun and Kediri; then he had lived for a while with Amat
Mukiar, a very well reputed guru to whose name an aura of holimess was
attached. Profoundly versed in the various branches of religious learning,
he established a religious school at Sengkrong. He began to adopt the life
of an ascetic, retiring mositiy for prayer and meditation. In the course of
lime he became venerated as a saintly character. People who were in need
of help or desired a boon, such as a good harvest, believed that he could
fulfil 'their desires. Jimats were also distributed.
In the beginning of 1887, Amat Mukiar held festivities for the
wedd'ng of his daughter, which actually became a big gathering of his
disciples; Jasmani also came and partook of the feast. All those who
gathered for this meeting listened to Amat Mukiar's prophecy, wh ch
referred to the coming kingdom of Sultan Adil; it would be established
in Birowo in the Lodoyo district at the end of the Javanese year Wawu.
O «
98
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
99
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
«i See my 'The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888' op. cit., esp. p. 272.
«2 For the data on this movements, see Rapport over de Tangerangsche Ratu
Adil of March 1924 (MS).
100
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
101
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
millennium. Dramatic situations did not always emerge in the life history
of religious movements since their career was too often cut short by
the suppressive action of authorities.
Here again it will be necessary to notice that our study of religious
movements does not readily lend itself to the sort of comparison we have
in mind — namely, an assessment of the same set of selective characteristics
of all or of most religious movements in a single society at specific epochs.
Such a comparison calls for a range of information currently unavailable.
In attempting to clarify the generic significance of religious movements
under study some outstanding tendencies should also be considered.
Recurring outbursts of religious frenzy are features of rural Java of
the 19th and 20th centuries. Without a doubt, socio-religious commotions
of that period mostly occurred in rural areas and seldom, if ever, had
their centre in urban areas. Of course, instigators of some upheavals
were occasionally to be found in towns, but the leaders, °3 the avant guard
and the rank-and-file alike were generally made up of peasants and other
segments of the rural population. As has been stated elsewhere, the
leadership was commonly in the hands of the rural elite, while the peasants
constituted the numerical strength of the movements.64 It was certain
categories of the religious elite who were able to convey traditional concepts
of the millennium to the peasants.
A concomitant aspect of religious movements which mainly appeared
in the rural scene is their unmistakeable stamp of what we may desig-
nate as traditionalism. It implies the intellectual expression of revivalism
as can be discerned in the nativistic traditionalism and was the conspicuous
form of reaction of the rural population. Xenophobia and anti-foreign
attitudes may be partly considered in terms of this traditionalistic ten-
dency. Thought of in terms of socio-cultural conflict, "reaction" is almost
synonymous with "protest", namely social protest against various inroads
of westernization. As Balandier put it, religious movements generally took
on the character of a total reaction,05 i.e. a rejection of the European
presence. In addition we may notice that millenarism usually includes
a rejection of the present, its attitude to which is radically negative. In
fact, millenarism is essentially of revolutionary character since it refers
to a total transformation of the status quo. We have shown that it was
the use of millenarian ideas which gave the people a means of expressing
their resistance.
As we have frequently observed, political radicalism is often a con-
comitant of religious movements. ReUgious ideas and symbols were quite
effective in 'their appeal to the people, who were for most part religious
in their modes of thinking. In imposing the holy war idea Islam ra-
dically opposed foreign rule, shaped the existing conflict and facilitated
03 For insurrectionary movements instigated by the urban elite, see my The
Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888, pp. 122-127, on the Wachia revolt of 1850
also on the Koletet affair in 1866, pp. 129 -130.
6* See my The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888, p. 4.
«s G. Balandier, loc. cit., pp. 41-45.
102
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS OF JAVA
» See my 'The Peasants' Revolt of Banten in 1888', esp. pp. 157-165; chap. VI.
' Popular discontent was commonly excited by excessive demand of services
and the levying of various taxes; the issue of land use for sugar cultivation
and of compulsory contribution of paddy evidently had a direct bearing on
some social upheavals.
s On historical instances of social protest movements of a secular nature, see E.
de Waal, Onze Indische Financien, Vol. I, 's-Gravenhage, 1876, pp. 264-271.
Mention should be made of the institution of massprotest in the Principalities,
called pépé; see B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, New York, 3918 p. 76.
' See T. Bodrogi, loc. cit., p. 279.
103
SARTONO KARTODIRDJO
104
POLITICS
J
SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
IN WESTERN INDONESIA *
A.J. S. REID
UNIVERSITY OF MALAYA
who inhabited the island Langkapuri, made a wager with Suleiman (So-
lomon — lord of the animal world in Musjim literature), that he could
prevent the destined marriage between 'the son of Raja Rum and the
daughter of Raja China. Garuda succeeded in capturing the Chinese prin-
cess and bringing her to Langkapuri, and 'then sank the fleet which was
bringing the prince of Rum together with his escort, the hero Marong
Mahawangsa. The prince, however, drifted to Langkapuri and there married
the princess from China, bringing, frustration to Garuda. Meanwhile Marong
Mahawangsa established the kingdom of Langkasuka. Soon after he returns
to Rum, leaving Langkasuka to his son, who is the progenitor of the
dynasties of Siam (the eldest), Kedah, Patani, and Perak.
Equally fanciful tales are current among the Gayo, who now inhabit
the interior of Atjeh in Northwest Sumatra though they appear to have
come from the coast. They relate that a young child of Raja Rum was
conveyed to Sumatra, where the child was brought up by a local fisherman,
and in time became the progenitor of the Gayo people. °
The list of such traditions could certainly be lengthened. Suffice it
to say that when first Ottoman Turkey emerged as a power in the Indian
Ocean it became the focus of a considerable heritage of tradition about
a mighty kingdom in the West.
Only in Atjeh, however, do we find written accounts of contact
with Turkey which bear a historic character. The most reliable chronicle
oi sixteenth century Atjeh is the Bustanu's-Salatin, written in the Atjehnese
capital by the Gujerati Nurud-din ar-Raniri in 1638. In his usual factual
manner, Nurud-din ascribed the opening of relations with Turkey to the
Atjehnese Sultan Alau'd-Din Ri'ayat Shah al-Kahar (15377-1571) :
He it was who created the system of government of Atjeh Daru's-
Salam and sent a mission to Sultan Rum, to the state of Istanbul,
in order to strengthen the Muslim religion. The Sultan Rum sent
various craftsmen and experts who knew how to make guns. It
was at that time that the large guns were cast. It was also he who
first built a fort at Atjeh Daru's-Salam, and he who first fought
all unbelievers, to the extent of going to attack Malacca in person.8
« H.M. Zainuddin, Tarich Atjeh dan Nusantara (Medan, 1961), pp. 197-8.
For another reference to Gayo origins see A.H. Hill (ed.) 'Hikayat Raja-
Raja Pasai', JMBRAS 33, Pt. 2 (1960).
« Ia-lah yang meng'adatkan segala isti'adat kerajaan Aceh Daru's-Salam
dan menyuroh utusan kapada Sultan Rum, ka-negeri Istanbul, kerana me-
neguhkan ugama Islam, Maka di-kirim Sultan Rum daripada jenis utus dan
pandai yang tahu menuang bedil. Maka pada zaman itu-lah di-tuang orang
meriam yang besar-besar. Dan ia-lah yang pertama-tama berbuat kota di-
negeri Atjeh Daru's-Salem, dan ia-lah yang pertama-tama ghazi dengan
segala kafir, hingga sendiri-nya berangkat menyerang Melaka.
T. Iskandar (ed.), Bustanu's-Salatin Bab H, Fasal 13 (Kuala Lumpur,
1966), pp. 31-2.
108
SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
The most famous of the "large guns" to which Raniri referred was
known to the Atjehnese as lada sor-chupak — one (bamboo) measure of
pepper. It lay at the mouth of the A'tjeh-river until taken to Holland in
1874, and still bears a Turkish star-motief along the barrel. 7 Most of the
oral traditions which have been strongly preserved in Atjeh about a mission
'to Turkey are woven around this fine piece of artillery. At least one
chronicle, the Atjehnese epic poem Hikayat Meukota Alam,8 has preserved
this tradition in writing. It attributes the mission to Iskandar Muda
(1607-36), the Atjehnese roi-soleil traditionally credited with many of the
spectacular achievements of the early Sultanate. He decided to send an
envoy to Istanbul with money for the support of the holy places, because
the Sultan of Turkey was the greatest among Muslim rulers and had the
care of the holy places. He sent three ships, laden with padi, beras and
pepper respectively. But the crew had such difficulties that they only
reached Istanbul after three years, by which time they had eaten all the
rice, and sold most of the pepper to support themselves. Only sa-chupak
lada remained. The envoys were mortified, but Sultan Rum was magnani-
mous, and sent them back in state with the great cannon, which he named
himself. He also sent to Atjeh twelve pahlawans (war-leaders). These were
so skilfull that they anabled Iskandar Muda to build the great fort of Atjeh,
the palace, and even the famous Gunongan (more reliably credited to Is-
kandar Thani (1637-41). Sultan Rum had advised Iskandar Muda to kill
the pahlawans when they had finished their work. He was at first reluctant
to do so, but the Turks finally alienated everybody by their arrogance,
and were stoned to death. 9
The story of 'the pahlawans appears to be a special touch of this
poet, but in other respects the story is similar to those which have been
recorded more recently from oral traditions. The latter versions, recorded
by Snouck Hurgronje in 1891 1 0 and by Saffet in 1911, " have the Atjeh-
nese envoys wasting two years in Istanbul rather than at sea. They also
109
A.J.S. REID
stress the existence of a Turkish village in Atjeh named Bitay, which the
Atjehnese derive from Bait ul-mukaddis (Jerusalem). Its inhabitants were
said to be the descendants of Syrian artisans from that city, who were
sent out by the Sultan of Turkey. According to the version of Snouck
Hurgronje, the Ottoman Sultan exempted the Atjehnese from sending
regular tribute to him as their sovereign. Instead they should honour him
by observing the feast of Mohammad's birthday with special zeal. In this
way the latter-day Atjehnese explained their exceptional devotion to this
Mo'lot feast. Saffet's version also gives a religious character to the authority
of the Turkish Caliph. He was alleged to have sent a sermon to be read
in the Atjehnese great mosque every Friday.
This oral tradition was strong enough to form an important element
in the Atjehnese diplomatic offensive in 1873, when their country was
invaded by the Dutch. It even entered briefly into the calculations of the
Powers. Atjeh appealed to Turkey for protection on the strength of the
ancient connection between the two countries. The Porte took the idea
seriously, and stated in an official offer of mediation in the war, commu-
nicated to the Netherlands and other Powers :
When Sultan Selim 12 carried his victorious arms to the extremities
of the Arabian peninsula, of which he made the conquest, the echo
of his victories reached as far as the island of Sumatra. The Atjeh-
nese sent a deputation to the feet of the conqueror, recognized the
supremacy of 'the powers inherent in his title of Khalif, made an
act of submission into the hands of the famous Sinan Pasha, raised
the Ottoman flag in their ports and on their vessels, declared them-
selves vassals of Sultan Selim and asked in return for his high
protection. Sultan Selim received these offers favourably. By his
orders the Vezir Sinan Pasha sent to the vassal Sultan the cannons
and swords of honour which are still to be seen in Atjeh.13
While the date of the mission thus seems to have been pushed
back by the Turks to a period before Atjeh's appearance on the interna-
tional scene, other Atjehnese accounts prefer to credit it to the reign of
the great Iskandar Muda. But the mission takes on different shapes to
suit the chronicler's purpose. Thus the Hikayat Atjeh, a hymn of praise
to Iskandar Muda written during his lifetime, makes the incident an op-
portunity to show how "the account of Djohan Alam (Iskandar Muda)
110
SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
became famous throughout all nations of the earth". 14 The Turkish in-
cident is made to follow the story of an embassy from Siam, which resulted
in the greater glory of Iskandar Muda among the nations of the East.
Then a delegation arrived from Rum, via Yemen and Mocha, seeking
oriental balms to cure the illness of Sultan Muhammad (Muhammad III,
1595-1603?). The envoys arrived while Iskandar Muda was warring against
Deli (thus 1612), but 'they were splendidly received on his return. Later
the envoys reported back to Sultan Rum on the wonders of Atjeh, where-
upon the Ottoman ruler declared :
. . . in former times in the providence of God there were two
great kings in the world, the prophet Solomon and Raja Iskandar
. . . Now in our time also in the providence of God there are
two great kings in the world. In the west we are the great king,
and in the east Sri Sultan Perkasa Alam (Iskandar Muda) is the
king who is great and who upholds the religion of God and his
Prophet. 15
Later the Pasha of Yemen confirmed the envoys account of Atjeh
from some Atjehnese pilgrims in Medina,. It was these hajis who brought
back to the great Atjehnese religious teacher Sheikh Shamsud-din of Pasai
the story of all that had occurred in Turkey.10
For a yet more fanciful account we might turn 'to the ever-popular
Malay romance of Hang Tuah. This legendary hero of the last years of
the Malacca Sultanate is pictured on a variety of adventurous missions for
his Sultan. After visits to Majapahit, India and China, he is finally sent
to Rum to buy cannons for Malacca. Though much embroidered, the basic
story may well be borrowed from the Bust anu's-Salatin.1T
Thus the notion that diplomatic relations were established with
Turkey, and cannons received in exchange for tribute, is well established
in the indigenous literature. Of the sources mentioned, the Bustanu's-
Salatin is much the most reliable in matters of chronology. It would therefore
be reasonable on the basis of the Indonesian materials alone to assume
that a relationship of this type was established during the reign of Sultan
Alau'd-din Ri'ayat Shah al-Kahar (15377-1571), and that this became the
basis for differently dated stories in the other sources. As Professor Boxer's
article makes abundantly clear, the Portuguese (as well as Turkish) sources
regarding this contact also focus almost exclusively on the reign of al-Kahar.
It seems to the writer that the Portuguese material systematically
presented for the first time by Professor Boxer lends further support to
an interpretation giving to Turkey a substantial role in the fortunes and
alliances of the Muslim states of Southeast Asia during the sixteenth century.
14 T. Iskandar (ed.) 'De Hikajat Atjeh', VKI, XXVI (The Hague, 1958) p. 167
(p. 239 of MS).
15 Ibid. p. 167 (p. 238 of MS).
i« Ibid. pp. 62-4 and 157-69 (pp. 215-42 of MS). Also Djajadiningrat, pp. 177-8.
17 Hikajat Hang Toeah (2nd ed. Balai Pustaka, Batavia, 1948), II. 237-87.
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A.J.S. REID
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SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
more energetic period of expansion thus coincide with the major Turkish
enterprise in the Indian Ocean — Sulaiman Pasha's abortive expedition
co Diu in 1537-8.
Following Pinto's account,25 the major antagonist of Atjeh during
the late 1530's would have been an extensive Batak state which had access
to the north as well as the west coast of Atjeh, but whose centre was
probably in he region of the Singkil river (the s'till-Batak area of Tapanuli).
The warfare between Atjeh and the Bataks turned in favour of the former
only after :
There came to the Tyrant (Ala'ad-din) 300 Turks, whom he had
long expected from the Streight of Mecqua, and for them had sent
four vessels laden with pepper.
These hardy warriors with their up-to-date arms enabled Atjeh to
drive the besieging Bataks back to the hills with considerable losses. A
Batak emissary was thereupon sent for help to Malacca, where he awaited
the new Governor de Faria and Pinto in June, 1539. 20
This first recorded instance of substantial Turkish help for Atjeh
must have taken place sometime in 1537 or 1538. Thus either just before
or just after the great Turkish attempt to smash the Portuguese fleet under
Suleiman Pasha. We know that Suleiman despatched envoys to Gujerat and
the Arabian ports in 1537 to gain 'their support for the attack on the
Portuguese, 27 Did he also send envoys to Atjeh, which must have been
well known to him from its pepper shipments? If so, this might have
served as a stimulus for the first Atjehnese attack on Malacca in September
1537, and also for a correspondence between Johor and Atjeh in the autumn
of 1538 about a joint attack on the infidels at Malacca.28 It might, on
the other hand, be argued that the Turkish troops noted by Pinto were
a more fortuitous windfall for Atjeh from Sulaiman Pasha's unwieldy
army of 20,000 many of whom "dispersed because the people of India
had induced them away" during their abortive siege of Diu in September,
1538.20 In that case the dating of the events described by Pinto would
have to be compressed into a few months preceding his arrival, in Malacca.
Whatever the dating, it also seems likely that the Turkish contact may
have provided legitimation in Ala'ad-din's eyes for his seizure of the throne
from his elder brother.
25 Pinto's unreliability has been demonstrated in the case of his supposed
adventures in Siam and elsewhere, but not for matters in Sumatra which
were of more immediate concern to his probable informers in Malacca. His
account is confirmed in general terms by some other Portuguese references
(v. MacGregor, in JMBRAS, 28, ii, p. 82) and has been consistently followed
by historians of the area.
26 The Voyages and Adventures of Fordinand Mendez Pinto, the Portuguese,
trans. H. Cogan, introd. A. Vamberry (London, 1891), pp. 31-2.
2T Serjeant op c i t , pp 76-7 and 79-80. E. Denison Ross, "The Portuguese in
India and Arabia 1517-1538", JRAS, 1922, p. 15.
28 I.A. Macgregor, 'Johore Lama in the Sixteenth Century', JMBRAS, 28
ii. p . 8 i .
20 Hadhrami chronicle al-Sana al-Bahir, quoted Serjeant, p. 97.
113
A.J.S. REID
The utter defeat of the 1538 expedition and his own inability to
control his agents so far away must have decided the 'Grand Turk', Sultan
Suleiman 'the Magnificent, to concentrate his major designs on Europe.
Later Turkish initiatives in the Indian Ocean were of very minor signifi-
cance, with the possible exception of the fleet of Piri Bey, smashed by
the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf in 1551. 30
In Atjeh itself the influx of Turkish men and weapons enabled
Ala'ad-din Ri'ayat Shah al-Kahar to defeat the Bataks and then to turn
his forces against Aru, a once-mighty state in northeastern Sumatra. In
this he was again successful, according to Pinto's account, because of the
continued receipt of Turkish soldiers and weapons from Egypt. One of
Atjeh's war-leaders, Pinto recounts, was an Abyssinian called "Mamedecan",
who a meneth (or thereabout) before was come from Juda [Jidda],
to confirm the new league made by the Bassa of Caire, on the
behalf of the Grand Signior, with the Tyrant of Achem whereby
he granted him a custom house in the Port of Pazem [Pasai]. 81
Shortly afterward, however, probably still during 1540, the Atjeh-
nese were expelled from Aru by a combined force of Malays from Johor,
Riau, Siak, Perak and elsewhere led by the Sultan of Johor, who had
married the widow of the slain ruler of Aru. In the course of the battles
of 1540 for possession of Aru most of the Turkish elite troops on the
Atjehnese side appear to have perished.32 Thus once again Atjeh's
expansion was halted. During the 1540's and 50's we hear less of Sultan
Ala'ad-din al-Kahar, whose main concern appears to have reverted to
strengthening his economic position as the major supplier of pepper for
the Muslim trade. Pepper growing spread down the west coast of Sumatra
to the south of Minangkabau, and Atjeh's commercial control followed
with it.
The only major blow by Atjeh against the Christian intruders
during this period was an attack on Malacca in 1547, but this was not
large by Atjehnese standards. A detachment of Turks was again noted
among the assailants, but the Portuguese chroniclers do not mention any
specific alliance. These Turks may be explained in the context of the
steadily-expanding numbers of traders from the Red Sea who must have
been calling at Atjeh during the period.
Indeed it was the ruler of Johor, rather than Atjeh, who appeared
to the Malacca Portuguese as "the man most feared in this fortress", Or
"our capital enemy" during these two decades. '!3 The sources do not
provide evidence that the forces of international Islam began to look to
Johor to rally their eastern flank. But on a local level Johor did take
so M. Longworth Dames, 'The Portuguese and Turks in the Indian Ocean in
the Sixteenth Century", JRAS, 1921.
si Pinto, op. cit., p. 63.
32 Ibid. pp. 62-76.
38 Macgregor, pp. 84-5, quoting respectively Simao de Mello, 1545, and Luis
Frois, S.J., 1555.
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A.J.S. REID
116
SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
Calicut, and the Coromandel coast rulers seeking assistance. All sent help
except Demak, which was so afraid of the insatiable ambition of the Sultan
of Atjeh that it put his ambassadors to death.
All this, Couto continues, was communicated to the viceroy Antonio
Noronha when he assumed office in 1564. He immediately ordered rein-
forcements for 'the Malacca fortress to defend it against the Atjehnese.
Couto then immediately continues in the following chapter, to relate the
major Atjehnese attack of 1568. 42 It may therefore be reading too literally
to assume all the preparations attributed by him to Atjeh took place before
1564. 43 Rather may we assume that they were the preparations for the
1568 attack, but were sufficiently apparent already in 1564 to alarm
Noronha.
Couto is certainly not alone in referring to Turkey's help for Atjeh
earlier than 1568. According to Jesuit sources, a Turkish ambassador was
in Atjeh when some Portuguese vessels arrived there to trade during 1565.
Although Atjeh had previously not been at war with Malacca, the inter-
vention of the Turk resulted in the Portuguese being given the choice of
conversion to Islam or martyrdom.41 The same Jesuit letters, written in
Malacca at the end of 1566, indicate that an attack on Malacca was expected,
and that men and artillery for it had been supplied from Turkey, "for
the Turks merchandise with this king, who, every year, sends him many
loaded vessels to Mecca". 45
Couto is quite clear that during the attack of January-February 1568
the Atjehnese were aided by about 4U0 Turks, as well as some help from
Japara and Calicut. But the Jesuits insist that Turkish assistance to Atjeh
continued after the failure of that attack. A letter from Malacca at the
end of 1568 reported that the Malaccans were still living in fear, because
the Sultan of Atjeh was continuing his warlike preparations, and his al-
liances with Muslims in India, Malaya and Java. Because of his great
commerce with Turkey, "the Turk provides him with men, gunners and
artillery with which he makes war against us". 4 6 This pressure was main-
tained, and gave the Portuguese some of their most anxious moments in
117
A.J.S. REID
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119
A.J.S. REID
51 A clear example of this rivalry appears from the Turkish merchant the
Dutch encountered in Bantam in 1596, who was unable to return through
Atjeh because the Sultan was seizing all traders who came from Bantam.
J.C. van Leur, Indonesian Trade and Society (The Hague, 1955), pp. 3-4.
52 Letter of De Ribera (Macau), October 1568, in Wicki VII, p. 514.
53 W.E.D. Allen, Problems of Turkish Power in the Sixteenth Centurv (London,
1930), p. 30.
8« I.H. Uzuncarsili, Osmanli Tarihi H l / i (Ankara, 1951), pp 31-3
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SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
centre, leaving the Janissaries as the effective power.BS The last Turkish
enterprise in the Indian Ocean was the very individualistic one of Ali Beg
(1580-9) who relied more on bluff than power in gaining brief recognition
from a number of East African states. His capture by the Portuguese in
1589 ended Ottoman naval power east of Aden. 56 The deterioration of
Ottoman power in the Yemen, complete by 1635, removed even the base
from which earlier fleets had set out.
In Atjeh, too, a period of weakness was inaugurated by the death
of Sultan AU Ri'ayat Shah in June, 1578. After a rapid succession of
three rulers, Ala'ad-din Mansur Shah was called from Perak to assume a
more shaky throne, and was not well obeyed by his new subjects, according
to a Portuguese source.57 The alliance with Johor collapsed, and war
had broken out again by 1582. The Portuguese could again rely on the
passive support of one or the other of their Muslim neighbours.
In India too, the Portuguese were able to establish cordial relations
with the Moghul ports in Gujerat towards the end of the century, and to
dominate even more the trade of the western Indian ocean. The traffic in
Gujerati ships between Atjeh and the Red Sea evidently survived as late
as 1598. 58 With the coming of English and Dutch shipping to Atjeh,
however, it quickly dwindled. In their dealings with Atjeh both Britain and
Holland were careful to stress their opposition to Spain/Portugal, and their
friendship with Turkey. 59 Thus the simple opposition between the forces
of Islam and the 'Franks' which had been fought for a century on so
many fronts, no longer met the needs of the period.
Though the political link with Turkey appears to have been almost
completely broken after 1580, Atjeh at least retained a measure of Turkish
influence for some time to come. This was most notable in the military
field. Atjehnese military tactics, military engineering, and artillery were
famous long after their Turkish tutors had departed. An example was
their capture of Deli in 1612 by the use of trenches, even though the
town was skillfully defended by the Portuguese.00 The palace guard
maintained by Iskandar Muda (1607-36) was remarkably similar to the
Turkish body of Janissaries. It was composed of military slaves, captured
from the enemy when young and trained rigorously in the arts of war.01
»5 E.S. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks (London, 1878), pp. 224-5.
56 Allen, pp. 32-3. Longworth Dames, JRAS, 1921, pp. 25-8.
57 Macgregor, p. 88. Iskandar, p. 39.
58 Boxer, pp. 17-18.
58 The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the East Indies 1591-1603
(Hakluyt, London, 1940), pp. 94-5, and 97-8. The Voyages and Works of
John Davis the Navigator (Hakluyt, London, 1880), pp. 142-3.
6'i Beaulieu, 'Voyage to the E a s t Indies', in John Harris (ed.), Navigantium
atque Itinerarium Bibliotheca (London, 1705) I, p. 250.
t: Ibid. p. 251.
121
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SIXTEENTH CENTURY TURKISH INFLUENCE
APPENDIX
SOME TURKISH SOURCES FOR THE 'SUMATRA EXPEDITION'
The existence of Turkish references to the 'Sumatra expedition'
of the 1560's was first brought to the attention of Southeast Asian historians
by the article by Juynboll and Voorhoeve in the new edition of Encyclopedia
of Islam.1 Umortunately the effect of condensation and the misprint in the
conversion of the only Muslim date given make it in some respects a
misleading reference. Salih Ozbaran of SOAS and the University of Instanbul
was patient enough 'to go through some of the Turkish articles with me
providing a rough translation. As few Southeast Asian historians have a
knowledge of Turkish it may be useful to expand here on the content
of the various sources. I am very grateful to Mr. Ozbaran, and also to
Prof. Bernard Lewis, for the help they have given.
Much the most important source is article by the naval historian
Saffet Bey, which appeared in two parts in the standard journal of Ottoman
history during 1912. 2 Though not in scholarly form, it is based on some
letters in the Ottoman archives as well as some published sources available
to him. The article begins by retelling the lada sa-chupak story from
'European sources' — which can hardly be other than the English trans-
lation of Snouck Hurgronje's The Achehnese. Saffet then quotes in full
the text of Sultan Selim's first firman on the subject, dated 16 Rabi'ul-awal
(20 Sept. 1567). The firman first recapitulates petition of the Atjehnese
'Vezir', Husain. Atjeh, it is claimed, has been left alone to fight the kafirs
up till now, and requests the help of Turkey's experienced soldiers. In the
regions around Atjeh there are 24,000 islands, whose Muslim inhabitants
are oppressed by the kafirs. The Portuguese have also bombarded and
taken prisoner merchants trading between Atjeh and Mecca. Furthermore
"the kafirs of Calicut and Ceylon" are harming the Muslim inhabitants
ol those places. Husain believes that an Ottoman fleet in those parts would
be able to crush the kafirs. He also requests that gunsmiths be sent to
Atjeh, and that orders be given to the governors of Yemen, Aden, Mecca
and elsewhere to assist Turkish soldiers on their way to Atjeh. The firman
concludes by granting Husain's petition. Fifteen galleys (kadirqa) and two
barks (barqa) are ordered to proceed from Suez, with a master gunsmith,
seven other gunsmiths, some soldiers, cannons, and smaller guns (tufenk).
The High Admiral Kurt Oglu Hizir is given command of 'the expedition,
with orders to crush Atjeh's enemies, to defend the Muslim religion, and
to take the old fortress belonging to the kafirs. Kurtoglu should make
arrangements for paying the salaries of his men.
The remainder of the first part of Saffet's article is taken up with
some comments on this letter, followed by a description of Suleiman
Pasha's 1538 expedition and of Turkish-Portuguese relations.
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A.J.S. REID
The second part begins with some further comments about the
Atjehnese embassy, which appear to be based on some unnamed Turkish
books and the evidence of "a man here called Lutfy, who went to India
and returned". Saffet states that the Atjehnese ambassador stayed in
Istanbul for two years, in a special place for foreign envoys, while Suleiman
was away on the Szigetvar campaign. Selim II however welcomed the envoy
after his father's death, and sent him on a Turkish vessel to Alexandria.
From there he was accompanied to Aden by other Turkish officials. Later
the Atjeh expedition was prepared in Suez, consisting of altogether 19
galleys and three barks. Kurtoglu Hizir Reds was to be commander and
Mehmet Bey deputy commander. They were to be at the disposal of the
Atjehnese Sultan for as long as he required them, though they had salary
and provisions for only one year.
To reinforce this last information Saffet quotes two further letters
from the Ottoman archives. The first instructed Kurtoglu 'to besiege the
kafirs' fort by land while his deputy Mehmet remained with the ships. The
second, dated 5 Rajab 975 (5 January, 1568), advised Sultan Ala'ad-din
Ri'ayat Shah that the expedition had been delayed because of the rebellion
in Yemen. "God willing the rebellion will be crushed, and the expedition
will proceed next year".
These are the only archival sources given. Saffet goes on to describe
Kurtoglu's activities in the Yemen, about which, he says, there is abundant
literature.
He quotes two later Turkish writers of the mid-seventeenth century
who refer to Atjeh. These are the geographers Katib Çelebi and Ebu Bekr
Dimiski, in their works respectively entitled Cihannuma and Cografya. They
appear to say little about the Atjehnese save that they were good fighters,
who had learned how to make guns and swords from the Turks.
Saffet closes his article with two interesting informants of his own
time. The first is a member of the Atjehnese royal family who met Saffet
in October, 1911, and told him the following story: Long ago Atjehnese
ambassadors went to Turkey seeking help. Two ships were sent in return
to Atjeh, with many soldiers and craftsman. The guns and flags from these
two ships remained in Atjeh until the war against the Dutch. Neither ships
nor men ever returned to Turkey. They established a Turkish village in
Atjeh, whose inhabitants still regard themselves as Turkish, though they
have assimilated completely into the Atjehnese culture. With the two ships
there also came a firman, which was still in the hands of the last Raja. 3
There also came with the ships a sermon, subsequently read in the mosque
every Friday. There were numerous guns, large and small. A Turkish
3 Tuanku Daud, who resigned the Sultanate in submitting to the Dutch in 1903.
and was exiled from Atjeh three years later.
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CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS,
1629 - C 1655 *
D. K. BASSET
CENTRE FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES
HULL UNIVERSITY
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D.K. BASSET
of Johore, was the daughter of the Queen of Patani's younger sister. The
sister herself had then been married to the sultan of Pahang for twenty-
seven years. This did not prevent Johore threatening Pahang in 1612-13,
before the Achinese raid on Batu Sawar. A month after Batu Sawar fell,
the Sultan of Pahang, with his wife, paid a short visit to the Queen of
Patani. After Raja Bujang became Sultan Abdu'l-Jalal III of Johore in
1623, he seems to have made his authority good also in Pahang and may
have lived there in comparative safety, while the laksamana restored the
government in the Riau-Lingga archipelago. In 1629 the fleets of Patani,
Johore and Pahang came to help Portuguese Malacca against the Achinese,
and the Queen of Patani was at that time the aunt of Abdu'l-Jalil III of
Johore. When the Queen refused to acknowledge the overlordship of
Prasat T'ong, who had usurped the Siamese throne in 1630, Pahang, Johore
and the Portuguese were her allies. The Thai fleet, which should have
attacked Patani in conjunction with the army and a squadron of Dutch
ships in May 1634, turned back when confronted alone by the galleys of
the Portuguese, Johore and Pahang. It needed a second Siamese army and
the mediation of the sultan of Kedah to induce the queen of Patani to
send the bunga emas to Ayuthia again in 1636.
The resumption of formal political relations between Siam and
Patani did not weaken the links between Patani and Johore. Indeed, the
Siamese may have used the family ties between the latter states to extend
their influence to Johore. A Siamese envoy was at Bintang, visiting Abdul-
Jalil III and the laksamana, in December 1637. Ambassadors from Patani
who came to Batavia in December 1639 informed governor-general Van
Diemen that the Yang^di-Pertuan of Johore had married the Queen of
Patani. Abdu'l-Jalil III lived in Patani in 1639-41, returning to a new
capital on the Johore river opposite Batu Sawar only after the laksamana
had ensured Dutch protection against Acheh by assisting them to take
Malacca from the Portuguese. When envoys from Patani came to Ayuthia
in August 1640, bearing "gold and silver flowers" as tribute from the queen
Prasat T'ong, they were accompanied by an emissary from Abdu'l-Jalil,
also bringing a letter and present to the King of Siam. As we shall see,
the family links between Patani and Johore were maintained and perhaps
strengthened until 1645, when there was a reaction against the Johore
connection in Patani.
The freedom enjoyed by Johore in its alliances with the Portuguese
and Patani after 1629 probably reflected an easing of Achinese pressure
down Malacca Strait after the Portuguese victory over the Achinese in
that year. The pressure might have been renewed eventually, to the detri-
ment of Johore, had not the finalization of Dutch plans to take Malacca
introduced a new element into the situation. The choice of an indigenous
ally made by the Dutch in the forthcoming siege was of crucial importance.
The most desirable ally was obviously Acheh, because of the unwavering
anti-Portuguese attitudes of Iskandar Muda and because the Dutch hoped
to secure incidentally exclusive privileges in the Achinese pepper-producing
dependencies on the west coast of Sumatra. Beginning with Dirck Statlander's
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CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS
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abortive attack on 1606, Johore had made peace with the Portuguese
again in October 1610 and had been their allies against Acheh in 1629
and in support of Patani in 1634. Protection against Acheh was the
fundamental need of Johore and the Dutch had failed to provide this
hitherto, whereas Portuguese support against Acheh was almost axiomatic.
For Johore to commit itself irrevocably to the Dutch side against the
Portuguese was therefore as great a shift in Johore's traditional foreign
policy as was Iskander Thani's short-lived peace with the Portuguese on
behalf of Acheh in 1637-8. The first intimation that Sultan Abdu'l-Jalil III
of Johore-Pahang wished for a Dutch alliance seems to have reached Ba-
tavia in March 1637. Van Diemen consistently preferred Acheh as an ally,
but he had no objection to a second ally. He sent Cornells Simonsz. van
der Veer to Bintang in December 1637 to assure Abdu'l-Jalil III and the
laksamana of Johore that the Dutch would give them every assistance
against the Portuguese. By the end of that year, Abdu'l-Jalil had banned
voyages by his subjects to Malacca, thus restricting Portuguese food supplies
even further. The key figure in committing Johore to an anti-Portuguese
alliance with the Dutch seems to have been the laksamana, whom Van
der Veer described as having "always been an instrument against the
Portuguese and a true friend of Holland". The Portuguese, Antonio Telles,
writing from Goa to Manuel de Souza Coutinho, the captain of Malacca,
in April 1640, emphasized the importance of recovering the good will of
Sultan Abdu'l-Jalil, "because our differences with the Malays have not
originated from them, but from the Laxamana, who wanted to stand up
against our Government". Abdu'l-Jalil III was certainly attracted by the
prospect of Dutch help to re-establish his capital at Batu Sawar, but the
laksamana took a considerable personal risk in pressing the new alignment,
because it seems to have incurred some criticism from orangkayas in
Johore.
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CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS
sultan's fears that the Dutch might assist Johore to retake Pahang, where
the Achinese laksamana and the local bendafiara were still entrenched near
the kuala. Compostel's vague reassurances had little long-term effect. In
November 1640 the tension and depression in Acheh was heightened when
an ambassador from Gowa-Tello (Macassar), who had touched at Beng-
kalis, brought news that the fall of Malacca was imminent. The likely
repercussions of this event were discussed almost daily in the Achinese
state council. On 13-14 December 1640 Iskander Thani released the
captive Portuguese ambassador, Francisco de Souza de Castro, on parole
within the palace and returned his side-arms to him. Thereafter, De Souza
was shown every courtesy, including daily access to the sultan, who
assured 'the overjoyed ambassador that his capture in 1638 had been
instigated by the Dutch. According to Compostel, Iskander Thani advised
De Souza of his intention to send him to Malacca or Goa to negotiate
an alliance with the Portuguese.
Taken at its face value — and in the absence of Portuguese ma-
terial it must be taken thus — this reversal of over a century of Achinese
hostility towards the Portuguese is a revealing commentary on Iskander
Thani's new fear of the Dutch. It must also cause speculation as 'to the
course of Achinese foreign policy had Iskander Thani lived. When he died
on 15 February 1641, however, his widow and successor, Taj-al-Alam
(1641-75), reimprisoned De Souza and later surrendered him to Schouten,
to be ransomed to the Portuguese by the Dutch. Taj-al-Alam, who seems
to have been markedly religious and pacifically minded, may have been
genuinely convinced of Dutch good faith, in view of her consistently
accommodating policy towards them in 'the next two decades. She may
also have been aware of the initial insecurity of her own position in the
state. It is also possible that she lacked the experience to initiate a volte
face in foreign policy and was influenced by the pro-Dutch rather than
the anti-Dutch faction among her leading state councillors. These internal
groupings at court were certainly influential in the Dutch-Achinese nego-
tiations of the 1640's an 1650's.
The time had now come for the Dutch to reconcile their obligations
to Johore with their earlier assurances to Acheh. The Johore 'troops had
made a considerable, if indirect, contribution to the Dutch capture of Ma-
lacca on 14 January 1641, by constructing entrenchments, destroying
neighbouring plantations and orchards, and impeding the flow of rice to
the Portuguese defenders from Rakkan in east Sumatra. That the Malays
played this subordinate role, and indeed were used in a feint attack on
the south side of Malacca on the day of the final assault from the north,
was deliberate Dutch policy. The Malays never entered the 'town and
fortress of Malacca after the victory, because the Portuguese, in their last-
minute parley, insisted that they be kept out. Anthonisz., before his death
during the siege, had again promised the Johore commanders that 130
pieces of artillery, captured by the Portuguese from Johore in an old battle
at "Biday near Rootsche", would be restored to them. In fact, when the
Malay troops were sent home by the Dutch a week after the victory, about
133
D.K. BASSET
50 small cannons and swivel guns were given them, together with presents
for the principal officers. It is doubtful that the new Dutch commander,
Kaartekoe, was deliberately ungrateful, but this limited required caused
resentment and exposed the laksamana of Johore to criticism from orang-
kayas who had opposed his pro-Dutch policy, or who now professed to
have opposed it.
The Dutch commissioner, Schouten, did not have an easy task, there-
fore, in persuading the laksamana of Johore to send envoys with him to
Acheh. Abdu'l-Jalil III was almost certainly not involved in this discussion,
because he was in Patani until November 1641. Schouten reached Malacca,
with the Achinese envoys returning from Batavia, and with the first Dutch
governor of Malacca, Joan van Twist, at the end of January 1641. Earlier,
Anthonisz. had promised Iskander Thani that he would convey a few tons
cf rice to the Achinese forces in Pahang. Early in February the Draak
left Malacca carrying the rice to Pahang, but also to land the Dutch
shahbandar of Malacca, Jan Jansz. Menie, in Johore to persuade the lak-
samana, to send envoys with Schouten to Acheh. During the siege of Ma-
lacca, the laksamana had moved from Bintang to Makam Tauhid (which
the Dutch rendered as "pleasant town"), opposite the ruined Batu Sawar,
to prepare a new capital for his sovereign. While Menie was en route to
Johore, the laksamana sent two envoys to Malacca to ask Van Twist for
the complete restitution of the Malay artillery held in Malacca and for
two yachts to escort Abdu'l-Jalil III to his new capital. Twist was unable
to comply, nor was he able to promote discussions between the laksamana's
emissaries and the Achinese ambassadors then with Schouten in Malacca.
As Schouten and the Achinese left Malacca for Acheh on 20 February,
letters of 14 February arrived from Menie and the laksamana in Johore.
The laksamana refused to send ambassadors to Acheh unless Iskander
Thani first initiated peace overtures and restored Deh, in north-east Su-
matra, to Johore. The laksamana cannot conceivably have consulted Sultan
Abdu'l-Jalil in Patani before making this reply, in a matter of days, and
his intention may have been to procrastinate rather than refuse. Menie,
who returned fruitlessly to Malacca on 24 February, was convinced that
the laksamana was being obdurate, encouraged by the artillery recently
sent him from Malacca, and that a full-scale Johore-Acheh war was likely.
Van Twist immediately pressed the laksamana very strongly to comply
with Dutch wishes, perhaps assuming again that the laksamana was the
de facto ruler of 'the Johore empire. On 8 March Tuan Said reached
Malacca from Johore to fulfil the embassy to Acheh and was later joined
by a second Malay. It is possible that the laksamana had consulted Sultan
Abdu'l-Jalil meanwhile, or that he considered this unnecessary, or that
he had risked acting on his own initiative under Dutch pressure. In any
case, the new role and enhanced prestige of the Dutch was as clear here
after the fall of Malacca as it was in Acheh.
to join him on that day. Long before Tuan Said and his colleague reached
Acheh, Schouten had induced Taj-al-Alam to conclude peace with Johore.
The Achinese insisted on representing the peace as a "pardon", graciously
conceded to please the Dutch, and declared that they would abide by it
only if the Johorese lived peacefully in their own lands and suspended
any additional embassies to Acheh. The envoys from Johore who joined
Schouten from Malacca were snubbed and shunned by the Achinese court
throughout their stay. This was partly intended 'to emphasize their lowly
status, but was also a device by the Achinese state councillors to discourage
another mission from Johore which might press for the marriage of Taj-
al-Alam and Abdu'l-Jalil III. This was not inconceivable. Indeed, it was
rumoured in Malacca in March 1641 that Orangkaya Bendahara of Acheh
had sent a message via Perak overland to Patani to invite Abdu'l-Jalil to
assume the Achinese throne. But such a marriage had an attraction only
for Johore, not for the Achinese state councillors, whose role in court
politics was likely to be less inhibited by a female ruler than it had been
under her two male predecessors. To succeed in his negotiations, Schouten
actually gave a pledge to the Achinese that the Dutch would not encourage
the marriage in any way. In return, Taj-al-Alam not only made peace with
Johore, but also granted exclusive privileges to the Dutch on the west
coast of Sumatra and surrendered, albeit grudgingly, Francisco de Souza
dc Castro, the Portuguese embassador, to Schouten.
Schouten's insistence on a peace settlement between Acheh and
Johore was barely tolerable to the Achinese, because the Achinese laksa-
mana and his forces were still isolated near Kuala Pahang, sustained by
rice bought from Chinese junks. About the middle of 1642 the laksamana
found his position untenable and fled, leaving behind his men and muni-
tions. The bendahara in Pahang appears to have transferred his allegiance
to Abdu'l-Jalil III of Johore, with strong support from the local aristocracy
and people. Pieter Sourij, the Dutch commissioner to Acheh, mentioned
in August 1642 that the bitterness and injured pride felt by the Achinese
court over this humiliation was so great that they could scarcely bear to
discuss it. Eventually, it became clear that Taj-al-Alam was intent upon
the reconquest of Pahang and it needed all Sourij's persuasive powers and
the denigration of Pahang as of little importance to prevent it. Taj-al-Alam's
letter to Van Diemen, brought to Batavia by Sourij on 26 November 1642,
declared that the Pahang nobility had the option of submitting to Acheh
or suffering the fate of traitors, bult implicitly recognized the futility of
these threats by suggesting that Van Diemen might induce the Pahang
rebels to return the Achinese troops and munitions, because "in my jud-
gement, Pahang and Batavia are like one country at present".
The interpretation of Malayan history in recent years has tended
to swing between a periodization based upon successive phases of domi-
nation by Portuguese, Dutch or British, on the one hand, and the rejection
of the first two groups of Europeans as "almost extraneous" to Malayan
history, on the other hand. In the sense 'that the current occupant of
Malacca, Portuguese or Dutch, was counterbalanced by equally powerful
135
M I
"
indigenous states, the political pattern of the area was infinitely more
complex and shifting than broad phases of European "domination" would
imply. On the other hand, the Portuguese and Dutch certainly became
part of the political fabric of the area, affecting the range of indigenous
suzerainty deliberately or inadvertently by their actions. Perhaps the clue
to the problem of interpretation hes in a negative rather than a positive
approach to European activity at this time, that is by recognizing the ways
in which the European presence prevented indigenous states from exercising
'their political power to the full, rather than by exaggerating the degree
cf political and commercial control achieved by the Europeans themselves.
By taking Malacca in conjunction with Johore rather than Acheh,
the Dutch replaced the Portuguese as a buffer behind which the Johore
empire could continue the recovery first made possible by the Portuguese
defeat of the Achinese in 1629. The peace between Acheh and Johore
imposed by the Dutch in 1641 benefitted Johore far more than Acheh in
the long run, because the Dutch subsequently prevented the reassertion
of Achinese authority in Pahang, which had been implicit in their earlier
pledges to Iskander Thani. The fact that the laksamana of Johore began
rebuilding the capital on the Johore river in 1640-1 suggests a new sense
of security. This was equally apparent in Indragiri, whose sultan wrote
to Van Diemen in May 1641, emphasizing the defensive unity of Indragiri,
Johore and Batavia. In April 1644 the sultan of Indragiri excused his
failure to send a mission to Batavia in the previous year on the ground
that he had been moving his capital back down river, presumably to the
site from which he had fled during the Achinese raid of 1624. If Johore
was safe after 1641, much of the credit must go to the laksamana, who
showed far more shrewdness in allying himself with the rising European
power and energy in implementing the alliance than Iskander Thani in
Acheh. Had the laksamana failed to develop the Dutch alliance in 1637-41,
had he adhered inflexibly to the Portuguese side, Johore would have been
on the losing side when Malacca finally fell. The Dutch ally would have
been Acheh and the Dutch might not then have felt obliged to prevent
an Achinese reconquest of Johore and Pahang.
These truths did not lessen the laksamana's sense of grievance in
1641-2 at the meagre booty acquired by the Malays at the siege of Ma-
lacca. In his letter to Van Diemen in August 1641 the laksamana noted
drily that the Malay troops had been employed in a feint attack during
the final assault. He pointed out less phlegmatically that the Dutch had
failed to restore all the Malay cannons recovered from the Portuguese;
that instead of Malay renegades being handed over to the Johore govern-
ment, as the Dutch had promised, one of them, Inche Chili, had not only
been allowed to settle in Dutch territory, but had carried off some of
Abdu'l-Jalil Ill's subjects from Muar; that the laksamana himself had
received "not a thing" from the Dutch in recognition of his loyalty; and
that the presents sent to Sultan Abdu'l-Jalil by the Dutch were less ex-
pensive than those they had received from him. These complaints were
not those of a greedy man, but of a minister who had to demonstrate
136
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS
conclusively the advantages of his alliance with the Dutch at court. The
laksamana admitted to Van Diemen that there had been considerable
criticism of the alliance when it was made and that the meagre booty
weakened his ability and inclination to justify it. In January 1642 Van
Twist, the governor of Malacca, received a report that the reaction against
the laksamana had led Abdu'l-Jalil III, who arrived in Makam Tauhid
from Patani in November 1641, to dismiss his minister.
This report stirred Van Twist's conscience, because like many
Dutchmen he recognized the courage and enthusiasm the Malays had
shown at the siege of Malacca. What weighed with him just as much,
however, was advice that a galley from Johore lay at Bengkalis, carrying
ambassadors to Acheh, whom he assumed were entrusted with a scheme
for the marriage of Taj-al-Alam and Abdu'l-Jalil III. Such a marriage,
as we have seen, was unlikely to be encouraged in Acheh, but the very
prospect of it disturbed Van Twist. Van Twist sent Menie and Willemsz.
to Makam Tauhid in January-February 1642 to restore good relations
with Johore, intercede for the laksamana, prevent the Malay embassy to
Acheh, and induce Abdu'l-Jalil to send a mission to Batavia instead.
Menie and Willemsz. discovered that there had been aristocratic
criticism of the laksamana, but that the sultan had supported his minister.
Indeed, in his letter to Van Twist of 3 February 1642, the sultan gently
rebuked the governor for listening to rumour, "because the laksamana is
a good and excellent man, of great intellect, and has always done me
excellent service, and still does so daily". Abdu'l-Jalil reiterated his minis-
ter's requests that all the Malay artillery in Malacca and the renegade,
Inche Chili, should be handed over by the Dutch, but simply as matters
for discussion with the mission he agreed to send to Batavia. He also
agreed that the vessels of his subjects sailing west of Malacca would call
there to receive Dutch passes, on the understanding that their cargoes
would be untouched and untaxed; that in future the fugitive slaves of both
parties would be restored for half their market value; that the mission to
Acheh would be suspended; and that it would not be resumed without
prior permission from the governor-general. It was also decided, in dis-
cussions with Menie, that subjects of either party who committed offences
against those of the other would be punished by their own governments.
The Menie-Willemsz. mission was an outstanding success and indicated
very clearly the basic goodwill in Johore towards the Dutch.
Subsequent strains on Dutch-Johorese relations arose from the
Dutch war with Rembau and Naning in 1644-6. Naning was a dependency
of the Malacca government inherited from the Portuguese by the Dutch
and Rembau was a neighbouring territory nominally subordinate to Johore.
The penghalus of Naning and other local villages had accepted the over-
lordship of the Dutch by a treaty signed with Van Twist in August 1641.
The treaty provided, interaVa, for the division of the estate of deceased
persons in Naning, the delivery of one tenth of the local produce to the
Dutch annually, and the restriction of Naning's external trade to Malacca.
137
D.K. BASSET
Although Van Twist closed the Panagie River in December 1641 to enforce
the treaty, he was able to relax the blockade in February 1642 after Menie
had reorganized the administration in Naning and staves captured from
the Portuguese had been ransomed. The real problem seems to have lain
in releasing Christian slaves held in Rembau, which was inhabited by
Minangkabau men, who rented their lands from Dato Bendahara of Johore.
After Menie's visit to Makam Tauhid in February 1642, Abdu'l-Jalil III
and Dato Bendahara instructed Gatip Itam, the shahbandar in Rembau,
'.c ransom to the Dutch the slaves taken from the Portuguese during the
1641 siege. The sultan also imposed a fine of 200 reals on Orangkaya
Maharaja Lela, who was responsible for Rembau at court, and the elders
of Rembau for their obstructive attitude towards the Dutch. It was Go-
vernor Jeremias van Vliet's demand that the remaining slaves in Rembau
and Naning be surrendered within three days that seems to have provoked
the killing of Menie, captain Forsenburgh, and 28 Dutch soldiers in March
1644, after Van Vliet had led an expedition into the area. The attack on
the Dutch seems to have originated in Rembau, not Naning, although Van
Vliet assumed equal culpability and involvement in Naning.
suggesting that the old type of monarchy had been restored. An envoy
from Patani came to Johore about August 1645, apparently to accomodate
differences, but there is no evidence that the Johore Malays ever recovered
their political influence in Patani.
It is most unlikely that Abdu'l-Jalil desired or risked embroilment
with the Dutch in 1644-6. There is no reason, to doubt the sincerity of
his letter to Van Diemen in May 1644. The sultan was genuinely shocked
and grieved by the murder of the Dutchmen in Naning and Rembau, parti-
cularly Menie, "an especially good friend of mine". Only a few days pre-
viously Abdu'l-Jalil had been assured by Orangkaya Lela Maharaja, who
supervised affairs in Rembau, that all outstanding differences with the
Dutch there had been composed. Although Abdu'l-Jalil sent two emissaries
immediately to Malacca to find out exactly what had happened, he sent
his trusted envoys, Sri Maharaja Lela and Raja Lela Wangsa, to Batavia
in May 1644. This was because he was perturbed by Van Vliet's general
attitude and wished to deal with and reassure the superior government.
While reminding Van Diemen of the understanding Reached with Menie in
February 1642 that each government retained the right to punish its subjects
who transgressed against the other, the sultan indicated from the outset his
willingness to take such measures as the Batavia government considered
appropriate.
Neither Governor-General van Diemen, his successor Van der Lijn,
nor the Dutch commissioner to Johore in July 1644, Pieter Sourij, believed
that Sultan Abdu'1-JaH was to blame for the tragedy in Naning and
Rembau. Van Vliet, however, incensed by his own difficulties at Malacca
in check:ng the rebels in 1644-5, saw the sultan in a much more sinister
role. He executed four Minangkabau men in Malacca in August 1644
because he claimed Abdu'l-Jalil had sent them to kill him in an amok.
To him, the import of rice to Rembau overland from Pahang and from
east Sumatra via Muar ind'cated complicity on the part of the Johore
government. When Jacinto Corea, a burgher of Malacca, was murdered in
Assahah in east Sumatra by a local chief, Raja Pena, Van Vliet attr buted
the deed primarily to some Malays from Muar, one of whom was the
brother-in-law of Gatip Itam, the shahbandar of Rembau.
In fact Sultan Abdu'l-Jalil probably needed time and considerable
tact if he was to give effect to his promises to commissioner Sourij that
the culprits in Rembau would be punished. By April 1645, despite Van
Vliets scepticism, Sri Paducca Raja and Sri Pardana Mantri had arrived in
Muar from Batu Sawar to deal with the Rembau men, but the palace
revolut:on against his brother in Patani forced Abdu'l-Jalil to recall them
in 'iihe general mobilization two months later. Van Vliet had already hinted
at a Dutch attack on Johore, but the news of preparations by Abdu'1-JaUl
for a naval expedition to Patani led him to suggest explicitly the destruction
of the Johore fleet at sea as a prelude to the attack on Batu Sawar. The
new governor-general, Van der Lijn, refused to take this step, because he
felt that Abdu'l-Jalil had done nothing to justify a Dutch declaration of war
139
D.K. BASSET
and because the Batavia government at least still felt some obligation to
Johore for its help in the siege of Malacca. The department of Sri Paducca
Raja and Sri Pardana Mantri from Muar, however, ended" Van Vliet's
restraint of the major expedition he had planned to send into Naning via
Pankolang. Almost Van Vliet's last act, before transferring the governor-
ship of Malacca to Arnold de Vlamingh in November 1645, was to send
a strong force under Johan Truijtman and Lt. Kreuger into Naning in Sep-
tember, which destroyed villages, rice stores and fruit trees. A second
expedition followed in March 1646. This devastation and the ravages of
smallpox forced the penghalus of Naning and Rembau to submit to the
Dutch at Malacca in the treaty of September 1646.
Fortunately for Johore, the Batavia government consistently regarded
Van Vliet as primarily responsible for provoking the troubles in Naning
and Rembau in 1644-6. They also recognized 'L'hait he was a most biased
interpreter of the actions of the sultan of Johore. The Naning-Rembau war
therefore remained what it probably was in fact : an embarrassing incident
for both the sultan and the Dutch. Dutch relations with Johore resumed
their amicable tenor in the later 1640's and the 1650's. Missions from
Johore came to Batavia in March 1648 and May 1653, seeking protection
against Mataram on the first occasion. The Malacca government sent an
ambassy to Johore in 1650 and the envoys from Johore who came to
Malacca in January 1651 promised that tin from Rembau and Ujong Saliâng
imported to Johore would be delivered to the Dutch. For some reason,
the Dutch seem to have felt less commercial resentment against Johore,
despite its flourishing trade with Indian shippers and junks from China,
than they did towards the tin producing states to the north of Malacca.
Indeed, it was not until 1685 and 1689 that the Dutch tried to monopolize
the external trade of Johore. Perhaps this was because a large part of
the pepper grown in Johore, Indragiri and other parts of east Sumatra
came freely to Malacca in the 1640's an 1650's. In any case, pepper,
unlike tin, was available to the Dutch in abundance in other areas of the
archipelago.
Dutch relations with Acheh followed a somewhat different course
after 1641. Although both powers generally observed the diplomatic
niceties during the subsequent 'twenty years, the Achinese were well aware
of their diminished stature after the Dutch capture of Malacca. The
contrast between the redoubtable Iskander Muda (1607-36), contemptuous
ol the "beggers of Europe" and unmoved by their resentment at his
tightening control of Sumatran pepper, and the placatory Taj-al-Alam is
striking. This new sense of insecurity showed itself in many subtle ways.
The keynote of Dutch-Achinese diplomacy in 1641-59 was the gradual
coercion of the Achinese through a war of nerves, maintained through an
annual exchange of ambassadors.
Schouten's schievements in 1641 have aheady been noted. The
delay between Schouten's departure and the arrival of the Dutch com-
missioner, Pieter Sourij, in the summer of 1642 gave rise to the wildest
misgivings about Dutch intentions in the Achinese court, which the Dutch
140
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OP MALAY POLITICS
141
D.K. BASSET
144
CHANGES IN THE PATTERN OF MALAY POLITICS
Patani troubles of the 1630's, Prasat T'ong hoped for full scale Dutch naval
assistance against the rebels, but the Batavia government had too many
commitments elsewhere and too little at stake in Singora itself. There was
more basis for joint action in Kedah, however, because of the Dutch naval
blockade there in 1648-52. In April 1648, ambassadors from Prasat T'ong
came to Batavia, seeking Dutch help against Singora and suggesting that
they might subsequently attack Kedah on his behalf. This danger, and
die Dutch blockade, probably explains the sultan of Kedah's overtures to
Malacca and Batavia in 1650-1.
pm$ »
As we have seen, the brawl at Bukit Tinggi, the Kedah capital, in
May 1652, placed Truijtman and the entire Dutch delegation unexpectedly
in the sultan's power and compiled the Dutch, grudgingly, to accept a
compromise settlement. Reniers, the governor-general, had not completely
relinquished the idea of revenge and revived the idea of invading Kedah
eventually on behalf of the King of Siam, but the needs of the Perak
blockade precluded immediate retaliation. On 20 May 1653, however,
envoys from Kedah arrived in Ligor, with proposals to resume sending the
bunga emas to Siam provided that the King of Siam returned to them
nine elephants for which they had already paid and 200 tons of rice which
they had previously loaned him. Balthasar Bort, who was in Ligor at the
time, doubted whether the envoys would recover the rice and elephants, but
anticipated that the governor of Ligor would grant the envoys safe conduct
to Ayuthia. In the absence of any other evidence, perhaps one can assume
that Prasat T'ong, with a still unsuppressed rebellion in Singora, would
have been content to come to terms with Kedah.
Enough has been written in this paper to suggest that if the Dutch
did not enjoy the unchallenged supremacy in the Malay Penisula that
earlier historians ascribed to them, they did at least, deliberately or
inadvertently, cause major shifts in the balance of indigenous politics and
themselves become part of the local scene. The other point that should
emerge is the invaluable nature of Dutch documents as supplementary
material for indigenous history. This paper has been written on the basis
of pubhshed material only, which must be a fraction of the documents
available.
m
D.K. BASSET
BIBIOGRAPH Y
Because of the need to submit this paper in time for the confer-
ence, it has not been possible to include the footnotes in the text. The
principal sources used were :
Boxer, CR. "The Achinese Attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in
contemporary Portuguese sources", in J, Bastin and R. Roolvink
(eds.). Malayan and Indonesian Studies, (Oxford, 1964).
Van der Chijs, J.A., H T . Colenbrander, J, de Hullu, (eds.). Dagh-Register
gehouden int Casteel Batavia, 1636, 1637, 1640-1, 1641-2, 1643-4.
1644-5, 1647-8, 1653, (8 vols), (The Hague, 1887-1903).
Coolhaas, W, Ph. (ed.). Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en
Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie,
vols I and II, (The Hague, 1960 and 1964).
Gibson-Hül, CA. 'On the alleged death of Sultan Ala'u'd-din of Johore
at Acheh, in 1613', JMBRAS, XXIX (1), (1956).
Heeres, J.E, and P.A. Tiele, Bouwstoffen voor de Geschiedenis der Neder-
landers in den Maleischen Archipel, vols. II and III, (Hague 1890
and 1895).
Leupe, P.A. 'The Siege and Capture of Malacca from the Portuguese in
1640-1641', (trans. Mac Hacobian), JMBRAS, XIV (1), (1936).
146
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MOHAMMAD
DAUDSYAH AND THE DUTCH WAR *
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY
147
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALF1AN
148
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
This was written in the message sent by the above mentioned four
leaders to Teuku (T.) Imam Chik Lotan, uleëbalang (hereditary chief) of
Geudong and all uleëbalang and to the ulamas (religious leaders) and the
hajis and to all Moslems at Krueng Pase area. This letter stated the
destruction of four mukims (minor subdivision of a district) and the sur-
render of half of mukim Meuraksa and the following message :
day out even if Acheh has become as large as a winnowing basket.
God willing, do not have a change of attitude toward Allah
and His prophet, Muhammad, but strongly fight the enemy, day in
This was, m fact, the result of an agreement reached by the
Achehnese people and the ulamas and the hadjis and all moslems. *
149
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
13 A report from Van der Heyden to GG, Kutaradja, January 5, 1880, dossier :
no. 9186, ARA Schaarsbergen.
n See, letter DGA to GG August 27, 1884, Secret, no. : 1398/1, in KG Oct. 17,
1884, R 20, ARA Schaarsbergen.
it« Note, AR of Great Acheh, Dec. 1, 1888, Exh, February 9, 1889, Kab. Lr.
L 3, ARA Schaarsbergen.
ie The only letter that fell into the Dutch hands was the letter from Keumala
to uleëbalang of Padang Keling which stated that Tuanku Muhammad
Daudsyah had been appointed Sultan and ordered to give alms to wage the
holy war. See, Letter, AR Acheh Westcoast, Van Langen, to DGA, January
11, 1884, in Kab. March 27, 1884, B 6, ARA, Schaarsbergen.
17 Letter, DGA to GG, February 4, 1884, Kab. Juna 18, 1884, ARA, Schaars-
bergen.
18 He had two European soldiers and some other Indonesians coming from
the other islands, deserters from the Dutch troops. They were trusted by
the Sultan to call and fetch certain people for his audience in Keumala.
One of them, named Usin got married at Keumala and had many children.
He taught the Sultan some Dutch songs, as "Wiens Neerlandech Bloed",
and "Slaap kindje slaap". See, Note, E. van Assen, op. cit.
i» Ibid.
o Letter, Van Langen to Snouck Hurgronje, Kutaradja, August 14, 1893,
Private, Oostersch Instituut Leiden.
150
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
to settle the conflict amongst the uleëbalangs and that of the people in
other parts of the country. The Dutch tactic of giving support to the
persuaded uleëbalangs had made this duty the harder for him. The Dutch
efforts, however, had come to no avail since some of the cooperative
uleëbalangs were secretly giving the Sultan and the Achehnese fighters
their moral and material support.21
As to the extent of the loyalty of these uleëbalangs a special study
is necessary. The establishment of cooperation between the Sultan and
most of the secular and religious elite and the strong influences of the
latter upon the people of Acheh had caused the Dutch to have many
difficulties and long years to conquer Acheh.
Who were these people around the Sultan who were also govern-
ment executives in the emergency of war with the Dutch?
Attention is first paid to Tuanku Hasyim. He was, like Sultan
Muhammad Daud, a descendant of Sri Sultan Alauddin Ahmad Syah
(1728-1735). -2 Tuanku Hasyim was very anti-Dutch. The Dutch said that
it was Tuanku Hasyim that made Tuanku Muhammad Daudsyah the like. -a
Nya' Lingke, an ex-follower of Habib Muhammad from Peudawa Besar,
after his return from Keumala, told the Dutch that Tuanku Hasyim had
very great influence on the Sultan and as long as Tuanku Hasyim was
on his side he wouldn't have the slightest idea of surrendering to the
Dutch.24
Tuanku Hasyim's son in law, T. Maharaja Muda from Lho' Seumawe
declared that his father-in-law would carry on his being anti-Dutch for
long and there was no person who had enough influence to change the
situation.2S T. Maharaja Muda himself was afraid of coming to Keumala,
since he had recognized the Dutch sovereignty.2ti Nya' Bakoj, the man
who once sent the letter of Assistant Resident Sol to Tuanku Hasyim,
said that Tuanku Hasyim was, then, taking oath to keep on fighting the
Dutch as long as pumpkins grow in the soils of Acheh. 2T
Further knowledge of what had been the background of this is
considered necessary to relate here. With the signing of the Siak treaty
in 1858, the Dutch influence in East Sumatra was spreading fast. To
stop this, the Sultan of Acheh sent top officials — one of them was
151
J Au a u TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
as Nota omtrent der Algemeenen toestand ter Westkust van Atjeh, Kutaradjr.
Nov. .20, 1887, KG April 6, 1885/D 5, ARA, Schaarsbergen.
2» Ibid.
*o ibid.
3i Letter, DGA, C. Deykerhoff, no. : 55D/K. Secret, op. Cit.
s* Ibid.
33 Nota omtrent de reis van T. Nek, Panglima Polem es. naar Keumala, from
DG, F. van Teijn in KG, February 7, 1880 L 1, ARA, Schaarsbergen.
152
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
can be learned from the fact that T. Nek cs. was — upon his return —
taking along with him the water which had been used in washing the
Sultan's feet, and give it to their friends and relatives who did not come
with them. "
The most important and very near to the Sultan amongst the secular
elite group was Panglima Polem chief of sagi mukim XXII. He was a
descendent of the earlier Achehnese Sultan, but from a common mother.36
The first Panglima Polem had seven sons; one of them went to Kedah
(Malaya), one Geudong (Samudra-Pase), one to Peusangan, and the fourth
son went to Keumangan (Gigieng) and the fifth one went to Glieng (Acheh
Proper).
They did not abandon their tradition and they maintained a close
brotherhood. These were, in some way or other, the causes of Panglima
Polem's great influence in Acheh.
After the death of Panglima Polem Raja Kuala in 1891, Raja Daud,
his son, succeeded him as Panglima Polem. He was assisted by his two
commanders, his brother-in-law T. Alibasyah of Geudong and T. Ibrahim
Montasik. He worked well with his father-in-law, Tuanku Hasyim. While
in his region, mukim XXII, he was collecting "holy money" and alms
from the people that almost reached $ 35,000.— to wage the fight against
the Dutch, Tuanku Hasyim was collecting gun powder at mukim VII
Pidie. 36 Working together with the ulamas, Tgk. Mait Tiro, Tgk. Klibeut,
Habib Lhong and Tgk. Pante Geulima, he built fortresses to face the Dutch
attack on mukim XXII.
In the year 1889, (16 years after the outbreak of the war), there
were also other hereditary chiefs, besides Panglima Polem, who had great
influence and were faithful disciples of the Sultan at Keumala. They were
(I) The chief of sagi mukim XXVI, T. Cut, about 17 years of age, stayed
at Keumala; (2) The chief of sagi mukim XXV, T. Sri Ulama, who stayed
at Patti, West Acheh; (3) T. Umar who was appointed as amirul bahri
(panglima laut, navy admiral) by Sultan Daud in West Acheh; (4) T. Man-
syur of Meulaboh; (5) Laksamana Andjung; (6) T. Cut Muda Latief
Syamsul bahri, the Sultan's war commander of North and East Acheh (he
was brother of uleëbalang Meureudu); (7) T. Bintara Cumbok, uleëbalang
mukim III Pidie, who together with T. Ben Titeuh became the reliable
153
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
advisers of the Sultan; (8) A number of hereditary chiefs and other im-
portant people within Acheh Proper and without.37
It was a pity that beside the good cooperation between the secular
elite and their fellow men, and between the religious elite and the secular
there were also some notable conflicts. One of them was the case of T. Ben
Keumala, chief mukim II Keumala had anak seudati (dance boys). Sultan
Muhammad Daud regarded seudati in war time as contrary to the teachings
of Islam.38 Since T. Ben Keumala did not yield to the frequent remindings
of the Sultan, the latter then sent his envoy to Ben Keumala. And when
they were ordered to stop the dance, a fight resulted where some persons
were killed and some other wounded. Tension arose accordingly. When
the Sultan went to Acheh Proper in 1888, T. Ben Keumala strengthened
his fortress to face him with the support of T. Ben Keumangan, the head
of the federation of the six mukims. Then the Sultan instructed T. Bintara
Cumbok to face T. Ben Keumala and punished him by giving the admi-
nistration of mukim II to Cumbok. The Sultan's attitude is in accordance
with the Achehnese custom because it is his right to do so.
In 1893 T. Umar surrendered to the Dutch and helped them to
destroy the "muslimin", the Achehnese troops. This event did not weaken
the fighting spirit of the Achehnese.
In the South-East area of mukim XXVI people kept on their fight
against the Dutch under their leaders as T. Husin Lueng Bata and Pocut
Mat Tahir; both were the Sultan's chief commanders; as for the East coast
of Acheh, T. Nya' Makam was appointed chief commander.
The Sultan, Tuanku Hasyim, and Tuanku Mahmud, sent letters to
T. Umar 30 telling him that his taking side wjlh the Dutch meant that he
had apostatized the religion of God and the Laws of the Prophet and the
head of the state, and had fought against Tgk. di Tiro and all other
moslems.
37 Note, E. van Assen, op. cit.
38 Ibid.
3» See, the copies of their letters to T. Umar, together with van Langen's to
Snouck Hurgronje, dated : Kutaradja, Oct. 3, 1893, Private, Oostersch
Instituut Leiden. The content of the Sultan's letter is as follows :
Sjahdan, maka kami memberi maklum akan tuan maka adapun seperti
kami ada mendengar chabar jang sahih akan hal tuan telah duduk ber-
paling tekuk bergisa akan agama Allah dan sjari'at Muhammad s.a.w. dan
akan kami jang ulil amri kedhahiran sjaichuna Tgk. di Tiro dan sekalian
muslimin dan mukminin dan mudjahidin dan murbatin bersama tuan dengan
Belanda maka pada pikir kami terlampaulah sangat kerugian diatas tuan
oleh karena terlampau lama tuan mendirikan agama dan sjari'at menger-
djakan perang sabilillah mengikuti sjaichuna Tgk. di Tiro (Tgk. Sjeeh
Saman) jang telah kerahmatullah 'alaihi h a t t a sampai kepada anaknja
ia tiba-tiba dengan sedikit berselisihan sudah kebalikan hati tuan melepas-
kan agama dan sjari'at dan adat pusaka turun temurun sekalian kita Islam
mendjadi sangat ter'adjiblah hati kami tuan punja perusahaan maka se-
karangpun hendaklah tuan ingat akan kuasa Allah dengan Rasul lazimlah
tuan kembali iktikad kepada djalan jang sebenarnja hanjalah jang segianja
[ sic. ] fiddunja wal achirah.
154
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
The letter further stated that T. Umar's action meant a great harm
to himself, because he had long been struggling to establish religion and
its law and waging the holy war in the example of the late Tgk. di Tiro.
Moreover, he was advised to return to take the right way (that is back to
waging the holy war, tagether with other moslems).
T. Umar left the Dutch and went back to fight for his country in
March 1893. The real reasons of his attitude was still a question. Probably,
he was afraid of the ulamas who made him their enemy; or he was not
well-treated by the Dutch or it was very likely because of the 'nfluence
of his wife, Cut Nya' Dhin who was very anti Dutch, i0 and the hostile
attitude of a great ulama, Tgk. Tanoh Abeë who qualified T. Umar and
his troops as "Kafir" or infidels. In a conference attended by the Sultan,
the uleëbalangs and the ulamas at Keude Male on July 25, 1898. decided
to re-appoint T. Umar as the field commander, and those who did not
participate in the fight had to contribute to the war expenses. T. Umar
died in the battle at Meulaboh on February 10, 1899.
How was the relation between the Sultan and the ulamas ? The two
letters to T. Umar previously discussed in the preceding pages had abviously
revealed the close relation between the Sultan and the ulamas and the great
respect the Sultan was harbouring towards Tgk. Ci' di Tiro Muhammad
Saman (died in 1891).
Through his sermons, this great ulama invited the people to wage
the holy war and, on behalf of the Sultan, to keep on fighting the Dutch.
In the case of the cooperative uleëbalangs forbidding their people to wage
the holy war, they would certainly disobey them, since Tgk. Chi' di Tiro
also spoke on behalf of the Sultan, and thus his legitimacy is always
felt. "
He wrote many letters to the Kompeni to leave Acheh, and to the
uleëbalangs and the Achehnese people to keep on fighting the Dutch. To
those who had cooperated with the Dutch, he wished them back to the
right way. *2
The Achehnese Sultan also had some authority on Tgk. Chi' di Tiro
Muhammad Saman. In early 1888 some of his followers were killed by
T. Cut Tungkob for the accusation of robbing his goods. 48
To prevent a serious conflict, the Sultan had asked Tgk. Chi' di
Tiro not to take revenge; and Tgk. Chi' di Tiro complied with him. 44
The cooperation between the Sultan and Tgk. Chi' di Tiro Muhammad
Amin, son of Tgk. Chi' di Tiro Muhammad Saman, was very good too.
40 Cut Nya' Dhin, because of her blindness, could no longer lead the fight.
She was captured and sent to Sumedang Pasundan (West Java) and died
there.
: Note, AR of Great Acheh, Goossens, Kutaradja : Dec. 1, 1888, Exh., Fe-
bruary 9, 1889. Kab. Lr. L / 3 , ARA Schaarsbergen.
a Letter of Teungku Chik di Tiro, University Library Leiden, Code Or. no. 7321.
i" Letter, DGA, Van Teijn to GG no. 107/K. App. A, April 14, 1888. KG, Sep-
tember 27, 1888 K 14, ARA Schaarsbergen.
i 4 Ibid.
155
TEUKU D3RAHIM ALFIAN
n
In order to run the course of the governmental administration
parallel with custom, it was one of the Sultan's duties to issue edicts of
recognition or sarakata under "the nine fold seals" (Cap sikureung) to
hereditary chiefs. Despite of the emergency of war and the lack of good
communication at that time, an attempt was made, besides keeping on
fighting, to settle all domestic affairs as far as it was possible. It is im-
practicable to write on all these, but a few cases taken from outside Acheh
Proper will be here considered sufficient for examples.
In the year 1886, Tuanku Mahmud was sent to West Acheh as
the Sultan's representative; he had tried to solve the existing conflict
between Muda Kuala, uleëbalang of Kuala Lambesi, and T. Umar of Daya
region. Tuanku Mahmud invited the Datuks, the ulamas and other influen-
tial people of this region to a consultation about the solution of the
existing problems and this was accepted by them all. 47 This means that
the Sultan had still a great influence.
To maintain the administration of mukim V Reubeë, the Sultan
granted a sarakata, officially appointing T. Bintara Udjong chief of the
district. 4a In 1889 another sarakata was also granted to T. Chik Ali Basjah
of Samalanga whose father was given the like in 1846.
156
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
157
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
Beginning with the Van Swieten - system wanting to destroy the Achehnese
Sultanate, Pel's programmes with its so called "posten-Unie", systematic
attrition, civil governmental system, divide et impera policy up to the
approach of Sultan, which will be the object of the discussion below, these
all were no powerful means for the Dutch to conquer Acheh. A notable
case may be presented here for further illustration. The capture of the
British ship "Nisero" in 1884 and the arrest of its crew by Raja Teunom
had been a real problem for the Dutch. Not being able to settle 'this with
the English, the then Dutch Assistant Resident had accepted the suggestion
ol a certain Nya' Haji, i.e. allowing him to kill Raja Teunom with a
reward of $ 2,000,— 54 This had provoked a formal protest from the
British realizing the Dutch incompetency in administrating Acheh.
As the efforts of conquering Acheh was felt to be the harder, the
Dutch Governor in Acheh, Laging Tobias launched an on-the-spot proposal
to overcome the critical moment. In January 7, 1884, he suggested to the
Governor General the "restoration" of the Achehnese Sultanate, keeping
the Sultan as the Dutch puppet, s5 but The Hague refused it.
In August 20, 1884, the Dutch learned about the existing conflict
between the Sultan and Tuanku Hasyim. They assumed the conflict as
originating from Tuanku Hasyim's refusal to give "the nine fold seals"
to the Sultan. The Dutch used this effectively. Where there was a chance
the Dutch would seize every opportunity to separate the two since this was
considered strictly necessary if they should conquer Acheh. 56 The Dutch
then sent the cousin of [the Sultan, Tuanku Husin from Kutaraja, to Pidië
to make a plot with T. Pakeh, chief of Pidië, for the Dutch interest. 57
The Dutch Governor also sent a letter to the Sultan hoping him to have
a milder attitude towards the Dutch and to come to Kutaraja where he
would be received as a friend, and that his status would be arranged later. 58
There were no fixed promises in this letter. Soon after Tuanku
Husin left, the Dutch learned of the reconciliation between Tuanku Hasyim
and the Sultan and that the most important attribute of the Achehnese
Sultanate, "the nine fold seals" was already in the hands of the Sultan;
Husin came back unsuccessfully.
Realizing this situation, the Dutch official, Assistant Resident E.
van Assen was so desperate that he sent a letter to the Dutch Minister
of Colonial Affairs saying that the only thing that would help the Dutch
54 Letter DGA to GG no. : 641/Secret, April 12, 1884, in KG June 18, 1884,
R 11, ARA Schaarsbergen.
s;> Letter, no. : 67/stricly confidential, KG, June 18, 1884, R 11, ARA Schaars
bergen.
sfl Note, van Assen, op. cit.
57 Letter, DGA to GG, Kutaradja, August 27, 1884. Secret, no. : 1398/1, KG
October 17, 1884, op. cit.
s* Ibid.
158
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
to get a good hold in Acheh was the death of Tuanku Hasyim.59 But
despite of the death of Tuanku Hasyim, the hero of the Achehnese people,
in January 16-17, 1897 at Padang Tiji, G0 the Sultan of Acheh did not
even think of surrendering himself to the Dutch; he kept on fighting.
In his secret decree of December 20, 1886, Governor General
Otto van Rees, ordered the Dutch Governor of Acheh, Demmeni, that
politically he should seize every opportunity to contact the Sultan and
other influential people around him, but should avoid revealing the im-
pression of the Dutch eagerness for a contact. 01 Besides, the course of
policy in 1888 was that the governor should avoid interference with any
affair outside Acheh Proper, as long as the Sultan in Keumala did not
want to surrender.62 Even so, to oppose T. Umar and Tuanku Mahmud
and T. Jusuf, the representative of Tgk. di Tiro in West Acheh, the Dutch
navy would — as far as it was possible — close certain parts of the coast
of Acheh for import, export and fishing.03
In response to the suggestions of the Dutch Governor General in
Acheh, the Minister of Colonial Affairs in the Netherlands sent a letter
agreeing on the giving out of allowances to some of the hereditary chiefs
outside the "posten Unie" in order to secure the surrender of the Sultan
and of other chiefs. 64 The minister further trusted the Governor General
to carry out his task as far as it would not upset the financial resources
ot the Government in the Netherlands-Indies.or'
The Dutch officials had started thinking of other tactics, because
thus far, they had not had any success at all. Three years before Snouck
Hurgronje arrived at Acheh, Assistant Resident Goossens in his note,
dated December 1, 1888, had suggested that the Dutch should isolate
the anti Dutch ulamas as Tgk. Chi' di Tiro cs. and support the moderate
ulamas by helping them spread their influence and power.fi0 The suggestion
was based on the facts that the religious elite were very influential in
raising the holy war and their being loy^il partners of the Sultan in fighting
the Dutch.
In the meantime the Sultan, Panglima Polem, T. Umar, who in
early 1898 were at Garot and Areë, called the hereditary chiefs of Pidië
region for consultation about the means of fighting the Dutch. Those who
159
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
did not come, would be repudiated by the Sultan and their ranks would
be handed to other loyal chiefs. When the meeting took place on April
1, 1898, there were only a few who did not come; while T. Bintara Cumbok
and many other uleëbalangs declared their loyalty to the Sultan and prom-
ised to keep on waging the holy war. °7
To solve the intricate problems of Acheh, Dr. Snouck Hurgronje
came with his proposals68 — one of which was similar to that of
Goossens — then formulated in an order coming from Governor General
W. Rooseboom in 1898 to Van Heutz, the figure who was considered to
be capable of carrying it out with "iron hands". It contained prohibitions
for any one to have personal contact with either the Sultan, or the
uleëbalangs or the ulamas. As long as they would not surrender, there
was one policy only, it was to master them, and to fine those who helped
the Achehnese fighters in accordance with their income. 8U Van Heutz,
accompanied by Snouck Hurgronje and backed with powerful troops and
some ships attacked Pidië which were then the stronghold of the Sultan
and many other Achehnese leaders. This attack had struck a heavy blow
on the Achehnese, it had also forced the surrender of many of the
uleëbalangs.
In November 1899, P. Polem and the Sultan retreated to Gajo,
where the fighting spirit was very high. It was also from here that the
Sultan was provided with supply and fighters.
But the fight was kept continuing; and the leading characters
(in 1900) were as follows : (1) The Sultan of Acheh, (2) Tuanku Raja
Keumala, son of Hasyim, (3) Tuanku Manyapayet, (4) Panglima Polem,
(5) Tgk. di Lam U (teacher of P. Polem), (6) T. Johan Lampaseh, (7)
Ulama Tgk. Lam Seunong, (8) Ulama Tgk. di Krueng Kale, (9) Ulama
Tgk. Tanoh Mirah, (10) Pocut Mat Tahir, (11) Ulama Tgk. Haji Cut
Plieng, (12) T. Ben Peukan Meureudu, (13) T. Muda Cut Latif, (14) Ulama
Tgk. Pante Geulima from Meureudu, (15) T. Muda Lateh from Blang Me,
(16) Nya'Mat from Peureulak, (17) Ulama Tgk. di Mata Ië, (18) Ulama
Tgk. di Barat (at Pasei), (19) Tgk. di Beureueh, (20) Ulama Tgk. di Krueng
Cot (Senagan, west Acheh), (21) T. Ben Biang Pidië (West Acheh), and
(22) Teungkus from Tiro, Tgk. Chi' Mayet and Tgk. di Bukit.
A more callous tactic was then launched by the Dutch. In November
1902, their troops captured the two wives of the Sultan and their children.
An ultimatum was then sent by the Dutch Governor to the Sultan stating
that the wives would be exiled if the Sultan did not surrender within one
month's time.
0T "Mededeelingen betreffende de Atjehsche Onderhoorigheden", op. cit., (1903),
p. 59.
6i< Two other proposals were : not to contact the Sultan, as long as he had
not yet surrendered, and to get the confidence from those who had surren-
dered the Dutch developed, among other things, the trade and agriculture.
Gobee and Adriaanse, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
e» Letter of GG to DGA, no. 1/Secret, September 9, 1899, in Kab. March 5,
1900, P3, ARA Schaarsbergen.
160
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
The Sultan had nothing but to stop the open war after instructing
Tgk. Chi' di Tiro and Panglima Polem to keep on fighting. Before he
surrendered in January 10, 1903 the Dutch had already proclaimed that
"the restoration of the Sultanate" referred to before was now out of ques-
tion. Using the same tactics — i.e. the capture of Panglima Polem's
family — the Dutch secured his surrender in September of the same year.
Captain H. Colijn (later : Dutch Premier) was the eyewitness to this event.
Agreeing upon Snouck Hurgronje's opinion, the Dutch stated that
the Sultan's capitulation did not much affect the Achehnese warriors, but
otherwise, that of P. Polem 70 did,. Hjis surrender was decisive to the
Achehnese defeat, even if it was later than the Sultan's. Opposing the Dutch
the writer here is of opinion that it was the Sultan's capitulation which
had really affected many Achehnese and their surrender to the Dutch.
This is based on the statement sent by T. Nanta, uleëbalang of mukim
VI to Laging Tobias, which can be translated as follows :
I am old enough and will die soon. I want to die at mukim VI,
where I was born and had lived, that 's why I am ready to sur-
render, but I can not, because I have taken my oath not to sur-
render. All of us have taken the same oath. Those who surrendered
were not because of their willingness, or if they did indeed willing-
ly, what can be expected from those people, who have denied their
oath to the Sultan ? I will try to deliver the Sultan to you; if he
has surrendered, and I will do the same. 71
III
161
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
Assistant Resident asking his cooperation had all been in vain. His life
here was far better than that of his geurilla years when he had to fight
through jungles and hills, but he was by no means happy. His fighting
spirit and his anti Dutch feeling were still great as ever.
Since his surrender the Sultan was still permitted to go to every
place he liked in Acheh Proper, but otherwise a special permission should
be obtained from the Dutch. In the earlier years of his capitulation he
often went to Pidië and Lho'Seumawe, where he sometimes stayed for three
months. The Dutch intelligence service revealed that Sultan had succeeded
in making contact with the guerilla leaders, who were his former second
commanders in his troops or who were related by marriage. His messengers
were Panglima Nya'Hasan and Nya'Abas, whom he supported with money
and other materials to keep on fighting. He also sent some money to
Tgk. di Pidië who was then arrested at Sigli.72 He maintains good relations
with fighters of lower class.
When the Dutch searched his house on August 1907, a bundle of
letters was found, two of which came from people who were about to
be executed by the Dutch; one asking him to notify his wife as well as
give him a "kenduri" (funeral feast) with recitation of the Quran for the
benefit of the dead, in three days and three nights; and the other one
told him who the convincing witnessess were and requested him to notify
his wife of his death at the gallows.73
The Dutch stated that it was a general knowledge — also of the
Achehnese — that the Sultan could easily order with a single word the
surrender of the guerilla leaders, Keuchi' Seuman and Keujruen Truseb.74
This is another proof of the Sultan's authority. But the Sultan did not
do such a thing.
In March 6, 1907, there was a night attack on Kutaraja. The
Dutch realized after months of investigation, that this attack was led by
Keuchi' Seuman and Panglima Usuh, who had been supported with money,
food supply, shelter and guidance by Panglima Nya' Hasan, Nya' Abas
and Keuchi' Syech, and planned by Sultan Daud, T. Johan, Panglima
Nya' Hasan and Nya' Abas stated above.
Surely, every one would feel the nesessity for the Dutch to bring
the Sultan to court; but Governor van Daalen, in his secret letter 75 sent
to the Governor General, requested that the case should be avoided since
the position of the Sultan in the eyes of the Achehnese people was still
high; the Sultan's trial in court would only excite the Achehnese. The letter
72 See, the letter of Sultan Muhammad Daud to Tgk. di Pidië as a supplement
of the letter of van Daalen to GG no. 13/secret, Kutaradja : February 10,
1908, in MR no. 455-38, V. Oct. 12, 1908. T 19, Ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken, Den Haag.
73 See, their letters, ibid.
74 See, letter of Gov. van Daalen to GG, no. 131/secret, Kutaradja : July 16,
1907, in MR 1218, in V November 29, 1907, X 23, Ministerie van Binnen-
landso Zaken, Den Haag.
75 ibid.
162
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
also stated the fear that witnesses might have no courage to speak or they
would deny their statements for fear of revenge or harm coming from the
Sultan's side. Besides, van Daalen also stated that the Sultan's prosecution
at Padang,76 would only give a verdict of brief exile from Acheh whereas
considering the Sultan's position and his past actions, van Daalen agreed
on his being exiled from Acheh for good.
Furthermore, van Daalen suggested that the Sultan and his son,
Tuanku Ibrahim and T. Johan, Panglima Nya' Hasan, Nya' Abas and
Keuchi' Syech should be exiled off Sumatra, but still within the area of
the Netherlands Indies and in separate places. The Dutch Government
accepted the suggestions and carried them out.
The Sultan's being in his native country was regarded as endangering
the security and order of the state since he had struggled against the Dutch
for more than 30 years.
The year 1907 brought a bright prospects for the ulamas and
moslems in general. Their attack on Seudu and Peukan Bada (Acheh
Proper) this year, was also due to the influential activities of the Sultan.
How was the public opinion on the Sultanate? The Dutch stated
that in Acheh Proper, the Achehnese strongly believed that Tuanku
Ibrahim, the son of the Sultan, upon finishing his study at Bandung would
be made Sultan.77 In relation with this, one of the Sultan's relatives,
Tuanku Husin, said to Pocut Meurah that if Ibrahim Po was made a
Sultan, his son, Sulaiman, would be the prime minister.78 In one of the
court sessions, to solve a case at Lam Nyong near Kutaraja, the Dutch
District Officer would not conform with the Achehnese Customary Law.
Accordingly T. Daud Silang told the people outside the court building
that Achehnese law was abandoned. He declared further that the uleëbalangs
would be able to abide by their custom as before upon Tuanku Ibrahim's
return from Bandung and thus carrying out the orders of the true king.7*
Such were the hopes of the return of the Achehnese Sultanate to power
which then existed.
Some letters had already been mentioned, i.e. those found when
the Dutch searched the Sultan's home. Some of them had led to an
assumption of the existing contact with Japan asking for help. 80
Acheh was indeed harbouring some hopes of getting arms from
Japan. The letters from the two ulamas at Pase, Tgk. di Mata Ië and
Tgk. di Matang Ubi 8 1 were proofs enough. It seems to be true that t h e
victory of an Asian country upon Russia, a western country, had its in-
fluences too upon Acheh. Another letter was the secret letter of T. Husin
Uleë Gajah to the Sultan telling him that upon Snouck Hurgronje's
investigation T. Kadli Malikul-Adil had told the Dutch of the Sultan's
effort, together with Tuanku Mahmud, T. Panglima Polem and Keram Yusuf,
asking Tuanku Raja Keumala to contact Japan. 82 As whether the in-
formation about Kadli Malikul-Adil was based on facts or not it is still
arguable.
Two other letters came from two Indians, Mana Pakir and Ghulam
Ghouse asking expenses from the Sultan and discussing help from Japan.
Was it true that the Sultan had his part in this?
In Singapore, the Dutch Consul General had made photo-copies
ol some letters pawned by a certain Indian, Ghulam Ghouse, to a European.
These letters were assumed as originating from Sultan Daud. One of them
was written to the Japanese Emperor, dated Sigli and Kutaraja, Rajab
10, 1323 (September 20, 1905) consisting of 12 points, of which the most
important were as follows : (1) The Sultan of Acheh has given full power
and authority to his plenipotentiary Mr. Ghouse to transact on his behalf,
to the extent of entering into any treaty, borrowing money, or even to
submit the whole of the territories of Acheh to another power. (2) The
Sultan has not failed to prosecute the war against the Dutch and any
concessions made to them of agreements entered into have been merely
to relieve the distress of his subjects who are crying out under the op-
pression of the Dutch rule. (3) The Sultan rejoices at the successes by
land and sea of the Japanese arms, and prays that the Japanese Emperoi
will have pity upon the people of Acheh and will come to the assistance
of the Sultan and free the country of Acheh from the Dutch rule, to
which it has never submitted after over forty years of war. 83
There was also an indenture of statory mortgage from the Sultan,
dated January 2, 1898, pawning Acheh for $ 500,000. to Ghulam Ghouse
at Penang for ten years, which amount bearing an interest of 24% and
after maturity of ten years at 36% per annum.
In his letter to the Secretary of States, Colonial Offices in London.
Ghulam asked the protection of the British Government for the acquisition
of the main amount and its interest from the Sultan. 81 He also stated
that he had supplied the Sultan with goods, cattle and general provisions
in 1897 of $ 500,000.— worth.
Upon close examinations, however, the Sultan's seal in Ghulam
Gheuse's documents did not conform with the original.85 The original seal
has eight small circles around the big one in the middle and read clockwise
from the top would reveal the names of the following Sultans : (1) Ah-
164
ACHEH SULTANATE UNDER SULTAN MUHAMMAD DAUDSYAH
86 See, letter DGA to GG, June 16, 1908, no. 87/secret, V Oct. 12, 1908 — T 19.
loc. cit.
87 Letter, Borger, July 17, 1905, no. 347/U secret, quoted from ibid
8S Letter, Ghouse to Sultan Daud, MR 455-08, loc. cit.
s» Letter, Ghouse to GG, May 15, 1908, MR 1266/08, ibid
»o Letter, DGA to GG, July 29, 1908, 124/Secret in V October 12, 1908, T 19.
loc. cit.
»l Ibid.
165
TEUKU IBRAHIM ALFIAN
The fact that he was still in his exile in 1935 had not even reduced
his influence amongst the Achehnese. When A.J. Piekaar, then District
Officer, visited uleëbalang Cumbok on the occasion of Idulfitri that same
year he saw the Sultan's picture on the wall. Surprisingly the uleëbalang
told him that it was the picture of his leader. 92
To sum up, the Sultan has obviously had much influence upon the
Achehnese politics and did, indeed, do much harm to the Dutch. The
weaknesses of the Achehnese were really due to first, the antagonism
amongst them which arose as response to the challenge from the West,
and secondly the lack of coordination and modern tactics and strategy.
02 Interview with Dr. A.J. Piekaar (now Director General of the Sciences,
Ministry of Education) at The Hague, March 7, 1968.
166
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL MOVEMENT IN
THE BANJAR WAR *
SOERI SOEROTO
GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY
I
The Banjar War manifests itself as the struggle between the people
of the Banjar Sultanate in South Borneo and the Dutch colonial power
with its political expansion toward the establishment of the Pax Neerlandica
in the nineteenth century. The war can be divided into two main periods :
(1) the period of 1859-1863 which is characterized by big skirmishes
and (2) the period of 1863 -1905 which consists of sporadic and defensive
resistance by the Banjarese. Of these two periods the focus of discussion
will be given on the first one, particularly the short episode at the end.
What is interesting to present, is the appearance of the religious elites on
the scene to take directly the command of the combat. Before the appearance
of this phenomenon these ehtes had already participated actively in the war
where the secular elites played their predominant role.
The resistance led by this religious group was in the so-called The
Beratib Beamaal movement. 2 Beraub, which is similar to dhikir, means
originally glorifying the Greatness of the Almighty, while beamaal conveys
the idea of the performances of good works. But in the historical setting
of the Banjar War these words had the connotation of "a petition to the
Almighty to obtain invulnerability" to enable to fight the infidels.8
The purpose of this paper is to explain the Beratib Beamaal mo-
vement as a historical phenomenon both within the context of the Banjar
War in general and as a unique movement itself in particular.
il
It seems appropriate to illustrate briefly the course of the events
before the emergence of the movement. The actual fighting of the Banjar
War openly broke out at the end of April 1859, when mass assaults, led
by Prince Antasari and Sultan Kuning,4 were simultaneously launched
upon Dutch establishments at Kalangan, Gunung Djabuk, Pengaron and
Tabanio. Following these assaults successive attacks were directed to other
Dutch positions at Muarabahan, Pulo Petak and Banjarmasin itself, as
the center of the Dutch administration; foreign missionary stations at
Tangohan (in the Kapuas area) and Buntas (in the Lower Kahajan area)
were also assailed. The assailants, thousands in number, were recruited
mainly from the local villages by the Banjarese traditional leaders, especially
the secular ones. These secular as well as the religious groups were working
towards a similar goal, and that was to drive out the Dutch, both as a
colonial political power and infidels.
The offensive strikes of the mass movements lasted only for about
eight months since the outbreak of the armed conflict. The Dutch at the
outset were very surprised because of their misunderstanding of the real
situation and suffered a heavy shock when they heard about the horrible
slaughter of the whites in the attacked establishments by the armband.6
But after having succeeded to consolidate their forces and got ad-
ditional troops from Java, ° the Dutch were easily able to alter the military
situation. Though relatively small in number compared with the Banjarese,
they were in some respects superior which later became determinant factors
in the course of the war. Their troops were well-trained. They were well-
armed, well-organized and maintained a high standard of military discipline.
* Prince Antasari was a descendant of the ousted Prince Amir in 1787, who
was supposed to be the successor of the throne. Accordingly Antasari was
isolated from the royal family and had no official occupation. Sultan Kuning
was the name of a revolutionary leader of peasant origin who had been
successful in stirring up his followers to take up arms. He was going to
set up a new, just and prosperous kingdom and was one of the prominent
figures in the Muning movement. His followers were strongly convinced
that he possessed a supra-natural power. J.J. Meijer, "Voor "veertig Jaren
te Banjarmasin" (For forty Years in Banjarmasin), I.G., XXI (1899), p. 668.
* Information that a revolt would break out had been received by the Dutch,
but they did not consider it seriously and thought that the rebellion would
be directed to the sultan. In Gunung Djabuk seven, in Tabanio three and
in Kalangan twenty-one Dutch were killed. E.B. Kielstra. De Ondergang
van het Bandjarmasinsche Rijk (The Decline of the Banjar Kingdom)
(reprinted out of the Indische Gids, 1893, Leiden : E.J. de Brill, 1892)
pp. 140-151; 152; W.A. Van Rees, op. cit. I, p. 64.
« In April 1859 additional troops of 230 men and in June one battalion in-
fantry enforced by artillery landed in Banjarmasin. W.A. van Rees, op cit
I, pp. 63; 67.
168
THE BBRATIB BEAMAAL. M O V E M E N T
The Dutch took over gradually the initiative of the combat and started
to launch decisive strikes, primarily against the forces of Prince Antasari
and Sultan Kuning.
The Banjarese were forced to make a continuous retreat from the
Banjar Proper area in which the previous eight months long drama had taken
place. Their defense positions were one by one conquered. Both sides suffered
heavy losses, particularly among the Banjarese. The fall of one fortress
was quickly replaced by another new one, hastily built up for renewed
consolidation and defense. The battle ground was gradually removed to
Tanah Laut in the south and Hulu Sungei in the north. 7 But even in
these new areas the Banjarese could not feel themselves secure against
successive assaults of the Dutch.
To command the vast combat area in which the Banjarese replaced
their open fighting system with guerrilla warfare, the Dutch developed the
fortress system supported by intensive military operations. After Major
Verspijck in 1860 had both the civil and military government in his hand,
more expeditions were sent far into the hinterland to constitute heavy
blows to the concentration bases of the enemy. This intensification of
military operations made the defensive positions of the Banjarese very
difficult. All their defense system, in fact, did not prevent the advance
of the Dutch. They were pushed back toward the mountainous hinterland
and isolated from the rural areas where they obviously obtained important
material support. In general, by the end of 1861 their resistance underwent
a serious crisis. The spirit of fighting was declining. Many ceased to fight
and returned to their villages. On the other hand the Dutch were also
successful in persuading most of the people not to take part in the struggle
any longer. Peace and order to a certain extent was restored. Heavy
punishment was imposed on those who kept fighting or disturbed the peace
and order that had been recovered.
The successive defeats were one of the main condition that caused
such a crisis among the Banjarese. But meanwhile a new burst of fighting
started again. Mass assaults were launched against Dutch positions. These
new armed activities were in fact organized by the religious rural elites.
They directly took the command. Their fighting was characterized by pre-
dominantly religious sentiments and carried out by the Beraub Beamaal
movement.
Ill
After having performed the beraub beamaal ritual the participants
were usually ready to fight. They were sometimes hundreds in number,
equipped with spears, swords and several fire-arms, and wore white cloaks
T Through Tanah Laut the Banjarese brought in fire-arms from abroad; Hulu
Sungei, which is on the Negara river plain, is a fertile, and densely populated
area which at that time was engaged actively in agriculture, industry and
trade. The population were well-known for their strong warlike character.
169
SOERI SOEROTO
and turbans. 8 As a fighting force they were just armed bands similar to
what the Banjarese had been previously during the war. But there are some
features that distinguished them from the previous fighting forces. First,
they were led by religious rural eûtes instead of secular ones. In iden-
tifying themselves, these leaders wore yellow cloaks and turbans. Second,
they were cohesively tied by the charisma of their leaders. But once they
lost them the cohesiveness of the bands would break down. Third, being
strongly convinced that they were invulnerable after having participated
in the beraub beamaal ritual, they were very courageous. Moreover, the
magical or supra-natural power of their leaders was regarded also as to
give them protection any moment they were with them.
Once these fanatic moslems took part in the movement they would
blindly obeyed their religious leaders and ready to carry out any order
given to them. In a battle they would storm into the enemy without caring
of being shot down. Sometimes to raise the fighting spirit before launching
an attack, the vanguards performed a careless dance in front of the enemy.
After they were close to their opponents, in a very highly emotional state
and shouting "Lila ill'allah" or "Allah u Akbar" they stormed into the
enemy's front line. °
They were used to fight in an open battle instead of fighting behind
the wooden fortresses. In some circumstances, after the ritual, they had
not been able to move out of the mosque, so that they had to utilize it
as a bastion to counter the assaulting enemy.
In general, however, they were mobile, moving from one village
or one area to another. They emerged sporadically. The villagers were
dragged and forced if they refused to join the movements. The districts
of Kaluwa, Amuntei, Allei, all are located in the northern part of Hulu
Sungei, became their operation fields. The movements obtained here a lot
of followers, who were wellknown as firm fighters.10 This means that to
a certain extent some of the villagers were still willing to take up arms.
Although the movements lasted only for about one year, and were
then successfully crushed down, the fanaticism and blind courage of their
adherents caused a serious concern to the Dutch. The sporadic and moving
positions forced the colonial government to raise again intensive military
expeditions. Skirmishes took place everywhere these two confronting parties
encountered each other.
« Such costumes were also worn by' the members of the Padri Movement
in West Sumatra. By wearing them they looked tall and impressive. H.M.
Lange, Het Nederlandsch Oost-Indisch Leger ter Westkust van Sumatra
(1819-1845) (The Netherland East Indish Army in the Westcoast of Sumatra
(1819-1845) ('s Hertogenbosch : Gebroeders Muller, 1954), I, p. 15.
» P.J Veth, "Het Beratib Beamaal in Bandjarmasin" (The Beratib Beamaal
in Banjarmasin), TNI, II (1869), p. 197. The right verse is as follows :
"La ilaha ilia 'illahu".
io W.K.H. Feuilleteau de Bruijn, "Aanteekeningen over de Maleiers en Dajak-
kers van Hoeloe Soengei" (Notes on the Malaya and Dajaks of Hulu Sungei)
(Koliniaal Tijdschrift, 23st jaargang, 1933), p. 284.
170
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL M O V E M E N T
171
SOERI SOEROTO
IV
Since the sixteenth century the Banjarese embraced Islam and were
then assumed as faithful followers of this religion. It was adopted as the
state religion which had given them a strong cultural identification. In such
religious society religious sentiments could be easily raised, even for non-
religious aims as long as it could be related to its religious interests. In
the Banjar War these kind of sentiments had been successfully integrated
into matter which was originally socio-political in nature. Accordingly the
Banjar War was successfully transformed into a holy war in order to achieve
both secular and religious purposes. In such a case, the politico-religious
atmosphere strongly aroused the fighting spirit of the people.
The Batang Balangan affair is very indicative of this situation. Tu-
menggung Djalil, a district chief of this region, was dismissed by the
sultan. 13 He refused the dismissal on consideration that it was entirely
unjust. When action was to be taken against him, he felt to loose his
sense of security and decided to fight the authority. He stirred up his
people to take up arms. In a gathering held in a mosque, a religious
official, Panghulu Abdulgani, inflamed the people by stating that the Sultan
had been treating his subject very unjustly; he exploited them as he liked.
Beside this social aspect, Abdulgani added that throughout the country,
except in Benua Lima, their religious life was deteriorating. The teaching
of Islam was ignored, while the sultanate was not in a state to give her
protection. The sultan was not their leader to be obeyed and given their
allegiance.iA
The Muning affair, at the outbreak of 'the war, also contained
religious elements. A very pious, blind peasant of eighty years old, called
Aling, after having practiced a tapa (ascetism), claimed to receive a re-
velation to set up a new kingdom, which would bring forth prosperity and
justice. Kumbayau, his village, became the center of the movement and
got its new name of "Tambai Mekka", which meant "as holy as Mecca".16
The cooperation of the secular and the religious elites in the war
was the condition reflecting the social structure and status system of the
Banjarese society, which arranged both their social role. Below the ruling
family we find the religious group.1U Although only a small number of the
members of this group were incorporated in the bureaucracy, they were
very influential among the people, primarily in the rural areas. A large
part of the them lived among the villagers and possessed a social status
as rural elites. Beside those who occupied the teaching position, a large
number of them were actively engaged in commercial enterprises. This
occupation provided them with large wealth which increased largely their
13 The sultan, called Tamjidillah who was the last king of this kingdom, was
appointed by and in favor for the Dutch contrary to the people's wish.
His reign was far from being efficient.
U W A . van Rees, op. cit., I, p 34-35.
if- J.J. Meijer, op. cit., pp. 661-670; W.A. van Rees, op. cit., I, pp, 41-47, E,B,
Kielstra, op. cit., p. 141.
in Van der Ven, "Aanteekeningen omtrent het Rijk Bandjarmasin" (Notes Oli
the Banjarmasin kingdom), TGB, IV (1860), p. 116.
172
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL M O V E M E N T
173
SOERI SOEROTO
174
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL MOVEMENT
175
SOERI SOEROTO
The psychological and social development had put the religious elites in
a state to bring in a new life in the struggle. With these promises they
had given new hopes to the people in certain rural areas to achieve their
longings for social improvement. Accordingly they enthusiastically welcomed
the inducement of these rural religious elites to take part in the beratib
beamaal.
This rural agrarian society seems to maintain its primitive mentality,
which emphasized the significance of divination and magic. Instruments,
weapons, tools or process employed although indispensable, are considered
to play but a subordinate part. It is in accordance with this conviction
that they acted to face the Dutch.28 First these religious elites convinced
their adherents that by eating the meat of an albino taken from Sihong,
they would be invulnerable and easily to obtain high position in the
bureaucracy. They also declared themselves of having magical power to
alter palm-leaves into crocodiles which would swallow all the whites who
were found on the rivers. Hence they also introduced the beratib as being
considered to be the shortest way instead of a tapa to obtain that invul-
nerability or a magical power.27
Based on all these facts this movement seems to emerge initially
within the rural societies as an archaic and magico-mystical means merely
to relieve their social grievances. It did not contain any political objectives.
This indicates that they did not have the idea yet to build up a poütical
power and a political organization. What they really wanted seems to be
limited to getting away from their grievances by driving out the infidels.
But the secular eûtes likely saw in this rural upheavals a good
opportunity for continuing their poütical struggle. The combative nature
of the movement provided them with a means to fight the Dutch. Accor-
dingly they issued on behalf of the Panembahan an order to the village-
chiefs to encourage the Beratib Beamaal movement. They emphasized that
the main goal of this movement was to obtain invulnerabitity to fight the
infidels, to defend their reügion from infidels' intrusion, as well as to release
the country from foreign domination and last but not least to restore the
kingdom.2S In taking this way the secular elites succeeded to give the
Beratib Beamal movement its poütical goal, which was previously still
vague or absent, so that it then became a part and an extension of their
own political struggle.
176
THE BERATIB BEAMAAL MOVEMENT
* YflL /32 B AflA«iAl
V
The Beratib Beamaal movement can be thought of as a religio-social
movement, which emerged with the breaking down of the Banjarese resis-
tance under the secular eûtes. Originally it emerged out of the social
grievances of the rural societies intensified by the war itself. These social
grievances were brought about by several factors such as the declining and
corruptive sultanate, the failure of the resistance under the secular elites'
leadership to fight the infidels and the presence of the colonial power with
its poUcy which had caused disadvantages to the native traders as weU as
constituted feelings of fear and frustration among the people.
The failure of the struggle under the secular leaders brought about
a crisis of leadership among the Banjarese. Within this vacuum of leader-
ship the reügious elites emerged on the scene. They organized a religio-
social movement, called the Beratib Beamaal movement, as a means to
remove their social grievances by applying magico-mystical ritual in con-
formity with the primitive mentality maintained by these agrarian societies.
Beratib was assumed to be the shortest way to obtain magical power. Sin-
cerely convinced of the magical virtue, they became very aggressive and
miütant. But this archaic way of fighting did not help them to accomplish
their aim.
The secular eûtes encouraged the movement by emphasizing the
significance of the holy war against the intruding infidels. To meet theii
own interests they directed the movement toward the achieving of a po-
litical goal, namely the release of the country from foreign domination
and the restoration of the abolished kingdom.
In its historical context the Beratib Beamaal movement can be seen
as a continuation of the Banjarese struggle against the poütical expansion
of the Dutch colonial power. It is, however, an attempt by the rural
societies under the leaderhip of the rural reügious eûtes in order to get
rid of their social grievances by driving out the Dutch, whose political
existence had played as additional factors to the Banjarese own internal
ones in creating poütical and social changes within their society.
177
SOME REMAKS ON THE HARBOUR CITY OF
JAPARA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY *
F.A. SUTJIPTO
GADJAH MADA UNIVERSITY
I
The coastal town Japara is supposed to have been in existence since
earlier periods. During the rule of the Majapahit Kingdom, Tuban and
Ganggu were the most important sea-ports. According to the Chinese
chronicles of the Yuan period three naval commanders were sent with
armed forces with the task to punish King "Ka-ta-na-ka-la'' (Javanese :
Kertanegara) : they anchored at those seaports.1
The mentioning of the three harbour cities as being important at
the time seems not to be striking, since East-Java was the site of the
supreme power of Majapahit. Several coastal towns scattered along the
north-coast of Java had good opportunities to flourish. Their strategic
location on the commercial sea-route between Moluccas-Malacca afforded
them much support to develop.
During the last period of Majapahit, however, the previously small
fishing town Japara among the other towns became more and more
prominent. At the same time the to the Islam converted coastal regents
along the northcoast of Java became bolder and bolder in ignoring the
faded interior Hinduistic power. It was in the turn of the fifteenth century
that a new Islamic power reached its maturity to proclaim itself as in-
dependent kingdom. In connection with the rise of this new supremacy,
which had Demak as its royal seat, Japara with its good potency as sea-
port got a new atmosphere in striving its peak. The ruler of Demak paid
great attention to sea-trade and the harbour of Japara consequenly developed
to a main seaport.
In the latter half of the sixteenth century, after several court in-
trigues, the Demak dinasty crumbled. The central power was then to be
moved to the hinterland, first to Pajang and afterwards to Mataram. Pri-
marily in the beginning of the Moslem Mataram period, in the latter quarter
of the sixteenth- and in the seventeenth century, the harbour city of Japara
remained to be the main sea-port of the kingdom. Javanese chronicles
and Dutch documents provide a great deal of data informing the role of
Japara's sea-port in commercial as weü as in miütary activities.2 It is quite
178
SOME REMARKS ON THE HARBOUR OF JAPARA
obvious that the king's officials of Japara, like the other cities of the north-
coast of Java, rendered much support in financial income to the royal
treasury.
The bureaucratic relations between coastal chiefs and the court was
feudalistic in character. The present account attempts to treat in more
detail about it, answering several questions like : how much potential power
Japara city had in order to develop into a prominent sea-port at the time;
in what place Japara was located in the Mataram territorial system; what
about Japara's functionaries and how to appoint and to dismiss them;
what were their principal duties and to what extent they might have in
exercising their duties.
The well situated harbour city of Japara, as had been pointed out
by Rach in his on the spot drawing,s and the prosperous interior rich in
foodstuffs and other forests product were among other factors why the
king adopted it as the main royal sea-port. Rice and valuable kinds of
wood were abundantly found in the Mancanegara — as well as in the
Negara Agung4 regions. Records of journeys of several Dutch ambassadors
to the court of Mataram in the course of the first half of the seventeenth
century such as Dr. De Haen (1622 and 1623), 5 Pieter Franssen
(1630)° and Ryckloff V. van Goens (1648-1653),7 gave a good colourful
description about population, villages, mountains, roads, rivers and rice-
179
F. A. SOETJIPTO
fields in those areas. They often reported along 'their way large cultivated
lands producing a great quantity of rice. 8 Teak forests were mainly to be
found along the mountainous areas extending from Central-Java eastwards.
The Dutch regarded the teak of Japara as being of good quality, that it
became an invaluable export commodity. Besides rice and teak and other
kinds of wood, other food-stuffs were also exported from Japara's harbour,
namely salt, dried and salted fish, onions, garlic, ° brown —, white —, and
black sugar10 as well as other forest product such as honey and drugs. n
Daghregisters give detailed records of the proas laden with food-
stuffs from Japara arriving at Batavia's port. 12
III
During the Moslem Mataram period, probably since the rule of the
Demak dinasty,13 the royal realm had been divided into, the Kutagara
(Royal City State) headed by one or two Tumenggungs14 of Mataram;
the Negara Agung 15 (literally means the 'Greater Area', i.e. an area im-
mediately surrounding the kraton (court) area), divided into eight territories,
each headed by a Wedana;1 ö the Mancanegara (areas lying outside Negara
Agung, not including coastal areas), divided into the western (kilen) and
the eastern (wetan) half, consisting further of small areas, each ruled by
a Tumenggung or Ngabehi;17 the Pasiskan (coastal areas), also divided
into western (kilen) and the eastern (wetan) half, each ruled by a Wedana
Bupati Pasisir (coastal governor) with a title Tumenggung.
s Rice fields areas reported by ambassadors along their way are among others :
Pakis, Suba, Juma Kedu, Pari (De Opkomst, TV (1869), pp. 294; ibid., V
(1870), p. 31); in the surrounding of Demak (ibid., p. 43; Sesanga, Pulu
Watu) W. Fruin-Mees, op. cit., pp. 409 - 411.
« See M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence, in the
Indonesian Archipelago Between 1500 and about 1630. The Hague, 1962,
p. 286.
io Daghregister, 1670, pp. 78, 103.
i l M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofsz, op cit. p. 287.
is For examples see Daghregister, 1670, p. 78; p. 52; 1625, p. 131, 146, 188.
i!' The eighteenth century Serat pustaka raja puwara gives a detail description
about royal realm division since Demak up to Mataram period. This Ja-
vanese scripture is contained in J. Brandes, ed., "Serat pustaka radja
puwara" (The Book of Kings), appendix two of his writing "Register op
de proza omzetting van de Babad Tanah Djawi (uitgave van 1874)" Index
to the Prose Version of the Babad Tanah Jawi (1874 Edition), VBG, LI
(3900), p. 140 ff.
3 4 Tumenggung is a title of high Javanese official.
ii> Negara Agung formally consists of four regions. According to the aforemen-
tioned Serat pustaka raja puwara Sultan Agung, the third king of Moslem
Mataram (1613-1645), had divided the current four regions into eight
divisions; see J. Brandes, ed., op. cit., pp. 151, 152.
3,6 Wedana literally means 'face' or 'head'; in the Javanese bureucracy he
functioned as minister of crown under the Patih (vizier).
17 Rouffaer is of the opinion, t h a t the word Nga.behi has a meaning of 'head
over all', see O.P. Rouffaer, "Vorstenlanden" (The Principalities), Adatrecht-
180
SOME REMARKS ON THE HARBOUR OF JAPARA
181
F. A. SOETJIPTO
-aW liziasl
rv
uibtooo büß
The principal duties of the coastal chiefs were among others : (a)
to exercise local civil administration, (b) to arrange export and import
trade via its harbour, (c) to levy port custom duties and to collect other
coastal revenues, a part of which was to be rendered to the court treasury,
(d) sometines to act as the Sunan's representatives in negotiations with
foreign authorities and entrusted to supervise subdued areas outside Java,
(e) to recruit coastal army and to provide contingents of armed men and
proas during war-time.
Civil administration of the coastal cities followed the current feudal
pattern. The Wedana Bupati Japara, as other coastal chiefs, had a staff
of civil servants, having hierarchically respective rights and duties wearing
a fixed title. Japara proper was headed by a 'stadhouder' under the title
of Kiahi Lurah. In his letter to the Dutch Government at Batavia, dated
May, 1670, the governor of Japara Tumenggung Wiratmaka mentioned
his two officials named 'Keey Loera Marmagatty' and 'Keey Loera Ima
Raxa' (Kiahi Lurah Marmagati and Kiahi Lurah Imareksa), who brought
the letter themselves to Batavia.28
The title Kiahi Lurah was not only worn by officials governing a
town's administration, but also by those who led a certain bureau. Both
Kiahi Lurahs might be officials in the diplomatic service. This title was
also commonly used in the other coastal cities. Pieter Franssen's journal
said, that at his arrival in the harbour of Semarang on May 16, 1631
he was met by Kiahi Lurah Yuda, who introduced him to Tumenggung
Warganaya. He was then travelling to the court of Mataram accompanied
by this Tumenggung.20 Kiahi Lurah Yuda was certainly stadholder of
Semarang proper, while Tumenggung Warganaya was a Bupati of the Se-
marang coastal region. It was also indicated in Dr. De Haen's record,
that in 1622 Pemalang coastal town was under jurisdiction of prince
26 Ibid., p. 202.
2T See "Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando lndicum", p a r t III, in BKI, XCT
(1934), p. 40.
28 Daghregister, 1670, pp-69.
w W. Fruin-Mees, "Pieter Franssen's Journal", pp. 407-408.
182
SOME REMARKS ON THE HARBOUR OF JAPARA
183
F. A. SOETJIPTC
King's favour. In connection with the import trade the Wedana Bupati had
the duty of arranging what kinds of merchandise should be imported, which
would meet the needs and taste of the consumers.
The port custom revenues produced respectable income to the
coastal administration. For that reason the Pabeyan (custom office) was
installed and placed under the direct control of the Syahbandar. Part of this
income after having been reduced for financing administrative needs had
to be transmitted to the royal treasury. Taxes of fishing, salt making,
markets etc. formed other invaluble revenues to the coastal cities. The
Wedana Bupati Japara and the other coastal Bupatis were expected to
render this income regularly to the court. Court officials might be sent
reminding the coastal chiefs, who forsook this duty. Dutch documents said,
that in 1664 Sunan Amangkurat I had ordered a high official of the
Kutagara named Nitinegara to visit several harbour cities from Gresik to
Japara with the task of urging the coastal chiefs to collect custom reve-
nues, taxes and other coastal revenues and trasmit them to the court of
Mataram.34 It will not be exaggerating to say, that the Wedana Bupati
Japara and other coastal Bupatis (Bupati pasisiran) offered indispensable
support to the kingdom.
As stated above, the Wedana Bupati Japara was once the King's
delegate 'to arrange contracts with the Dutch. This fact demonstrated the
great reliance of the ruler to the coastal chief. The contract made between
the ruler of Mataram and the Dutch in the course of the seventeenth
century clearly shows the role of the Wedana Bupati Japara in the diplo-
matic field. It does not mean, however, that he could do this freely. The
contract arranged by the Wedana Bupati should have the approval of the
King. Daghregister reported, 'that in 1631 the governor Leksamana of Japara
was called to the court and then arrested under the suspection that he
had on his own account demonstrated an unfriendly attitude towards the
ruler of Bantam. 35
It was also indicated, that the Sunan had dismissed the governor
of Japara Tumenggung Wiradikara, because without the King's approval
the latter opened negotiations with the Dutch and promised to offer them
some beneficial facilities.36 His function was then rendered to his successor
Tumenggung Wiratmaka. This evidence may lead us to draw a conclusion,
that the diplomatic role of the Wedana Bupati Japara was strongly con-
trolled by the central government.
Several coastal chiefs were also entrusted to supervise some tri-
butary regions outside Java. The Wedana Bupati Japara was once entrusted
184
IL
SOME REMARKS ON THE HARBOUR OF JAPARA
to be the supervisor for Jambi, the coastal chief Demak for Palembang
and the chief of Semarang for Sukadana (in Kalimantan). Contact with
the Dutch at Batavia was the task of Tumenggung of Pati, but once it
was entrusted to the Tumenggung Japara :!7 The frequent mutations
among 'the coastal chiefs and the unstable function they have sometimes
led to competitions among them to gain the King's favour.
The next duty of the Wedana Bupati Japara was that of recruiting
coastal armed forces and providing ships during war-time. The function
of the Japara sea-port as military base was clearly indicated in historical
sources. Even during the Demak supremacy Japara played an important
role as being the royal naval base. 3S The Babad Tanah Jawi relates, that
Sunan Amangkurat II ordered the Mancanegara people to march to battle
under commander Raden Panji Karsula in order to defeat the Macassarese
Kraeng Galesung troops which settled in East-Java. The failure of this first
expedition forced the Sunan to summon the Pasisiran subjects led by Pra-
wirataruna (Dutch records called him Wiratuna) to launch a second attack.
The two expeditions are all said to be arranged in and started from the
Japara sea-port. 89 The duty of supplying contingents of armed troops in
the frequent expeditions might have sacrificed the welfare of the population.
The going away of men from home to wars might cause the ripening crop
of rice uncut and unharvested. The coastal products suffered as a result
of being neglected.
Besides recruiting armed men the Wedana Bupati Japara had the
obligation of providing proas. In 1624, as Dutch sources said, the King
of Mataram requested for 2000 proas of various types from coastal regions
to attack Batavia, Bantam and Surabaya.40 While in 1631 the King had
given instructions to coastal people to provide him with proas. It was said
further, that in 1647 all proas along the northern coast should be assembled
in Japara, since a general inspection would be held. 41
Based on all these evidences it could be assumed, that the Wedana
Bupati of Japara during the rule of Moslem Mataram in the course of
the seventeenth century had a heavy task, which should be well fulfilled
in order not to fall in the King's disfavor.
'
'