Sebagian besar penelitian mengenai hal ini mengarah pada satu paradigma
ekonomi yaitu efficient markets hypothesis (EMH). Asumsi pasar efisien:
EMH adalah teori tentang mekanisme harga pada pasar sekuritas, sedangkan
capital market research (CMR) adalah penelitian empiris yang menggunakan
metode statistik untuk menguji hipotesis yang berkaitan dengan perilaku pasar
modal. Kebanyakan CMR menggunakan market model. Asumsi dalam market
model:
Salah satu tujuan teori akuntansi positif adalah mempelajari informasi yang
dimiliki laba akuntansi terhadap harga saham. Ball & Brown melakukan
pengujian terhadap manfaat laba historical cost bagi investor. Peningkatan laba
akuntansi yang tidak diestimasi sebelumnya merupakan informasi baru bagi
investor. Dalam pasar modal efisien, setiap perubahan aliran kas dari yang
diharapkan akan mempengaruhi harga saham.
Laba akuntansi historis mengandung informasi yang cukup berarti. Dari hasil
penelitian diketahui adanya informasi yang berkelanjutan di pasar, jadi akuntansi
bukan satu-satunya informasi mengenai perusahaan. Pasar secara konsisten
mengantisipasi informasi laporan akuntansi. Berikut adalah Ketidakseimbangan
informasi dan besarnya perusahaan:
2. CONTRACTING THEORY
management contracts
debt contracts
3. AGENCY THEORY
Jensen & Meckling (1976) Contract where one party (the principal) engages
another (the agent) to act on their behalf e.g. where there is a separation of
management and control. Managers have remuneration contracts Utility
maximisation by both parties Agent may act on her/his own behalf (self-interest)
Agency costs, Due to self interest, the agent might act in his/her own interest
rather than that of the principal (moral hazard) Agents may undertake certain
Divergent Behaviours This agency problem gives rise to Agency Costs
(monitoring, bonding and residual loss). Agency costs can be categorised into:
1. Monitoring Costs the cost of observing the agents behaviour:
Auditing costs
2. Bonding Costs Costs borne by the agent (e.g. manager) as a result of
aligning their interests with the principal (e.g. owners):
Manager has to prepare financial reports (a cost to the manager in terms of
time and effort).
3. Residual Loss loss associated with not being able to fully align the
interests of the principal with the agent.
Ex post settling up (ex post after the fact e.g. at the end of each year):
37. POLITICAL PROCESSES The firm and parties interested in the firm Political
market v. capital market Less demand for information in political market Less
benefit from information gathering Heterogeneity of interests
39. EMPIRICAL TESTS Testing the opportunistic and political cost hypothesis
Watts & Zimmerman Zmijewski & Hagerman provided little insight
40. EMPIRICAL TESTS Empirical tests tests using contract details (Healy)
Figure 10.1: Allocation of funds to the bonus pool, based on accounting profit
41. EMPIRICAL TESTS Empirical tests tests using contract details (Healy)
Figure 10.2: Accounting accruals as a function of bonus plan specifications
42. EMPIRICAL TESTS Refining the specification of political costs Liberty &
Zimmerman Godfrey & Jones DeAngelo Wong Lemke & Page
Panchapakesan & McKinnon Ali & Kumar