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EKSISTENSI LEMBAGA MAHKAMAH AGUNG

SEBAGAI PELAKSANA PERADILAN YANG
INDEPENDEN DALAM REKRUTMEN HAKIM

Zuhdi Arman*1, Padrisan Jamba*2

1
Fakultas Hukum Universitas Muhammadiyah Sumatera Barat
2
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Humaniora Universitas Putera Batam

Korespondensi: zuhdiarman1@gmail.com

Abstrak
Masalah utama yang dibahas dalam penelitian ini adalah sejauh mana kekuasaan Mahkamah Agung
otonom dalam merekrut hakim dengan status pejabat publik untuk organisasi peradilan di bawah yurisdiksinya.
Karena legislasi merupakan sumber informasi utama, penelitian ini mengambil pendekatan hukum normatif. Hasil
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kerangka hukum saat ini belum sepenuhnya mampu mengatur, menerapkan dan
memastikan sistem peradilan secara akurat, serta sifat dan status hakim sebagai pejabat publik. Sistem dan
struktur rekrutmen hakim saat ini terus menunjukkan kurangnya transparansi dan ketidakpastian mengenai aturan
hukum yang mengatur perekrutan hakim dengan status pejabat publik. Norma-norma yang ada mempertahankan
legitimasi yang lemah, karena tidak diatur oleh Konstitusi, yang membentuk peradilan independen yang
bertanggung jawab untuk menegakkan hukum dan keadilan. Oleh karena itu, di masa depan perlu mengadopsi
aturan dan peraturan baru yang mengatur sistem dan prosedur rekrutmen hakim sesuai dengan kekhususan
jabatan hakim sebagai pejabat publik untuk memastikan kinerja dan akuntabilitas tugas peradilan.
.
Kata Kunci: Peradilan, Mahkamah Agung, Rekrutmen Hakim

Abstract
The main issue discussed in this study is the extent to which the Supreme Court's power is autonomous in
recruiting judges with the status of public officials for judicial organizations under its jurisdiction. Since legislation
is the main source of information, this study takes a normative legal approach. The results of the study indicate that
the current legal framework is not yet fully capable of regulating, implementing and ensuring the judicial system
accurately, as well as the nature and status of judges as public officials. The current system and structure of the
recruitment of judges continues to show a lack of transparency and uncertainty regarding the legal rules governing
the recruitment of judges with the status of public officials. Existing norms maintain weak legitimacy, as they are not
regulated by the Constitution, which establishes an independent judiciary responsible for upholding law and justice.
Therefore, in the future it is necessary to adopt new rules and regulations governing the system and procedure for
recruiting judges in accordance with the specificity of the position of judges as public officials to ensure the
performance and accountability of judicial duties.

Keywords: Judiciary, Supreme Court, Judge Recruitment

1. PENDAHULUAN

Administrative life in Indonesia in 1998 during the reformation period introduced changes to the
dualism of the development of judges and courts by the judiciary and the government as well as efforts to
apply the principle of judicial independence by amending the Law on the Judiciary to create a one-roof
judiciary. Previously, Law no. 14 of 1970 concerning the main provisions of the judiciary places the
judiciary under two roofs between the Government in this case the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme
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Court (Ispriyarso, 2019).

The financial and administrative regulatory power rests with the Ministry of Justice, while the
technical judicial body is managed by the Supreme Court. This guidance, in the form of dualism, shows the
existence of a weak system related to the implementation of the principle of judicial independence. Then
Law no. 14 of 1970 was amended to ensure the strength of judicial independence through Law no. 35 of
1999 concerning the Judiciary (Mustika, Charlina, & Sinaga, 2016). To strengthen judicial independence
from time to time, this Law was later revoked and updated by Law no. 4 of 2004 concerning the Judiciary,
which regulates the transfer of coaching powers to judges and courts, transferring the entirety to the
Supreme Court (one roof of the judicial system). With the promulgation of Law no. 4 of 2005, the Minister
of Justice is no longer authorized to give instructions to judges and courts. In contrast to the leadership of
judges and military courts which are still two levels, technically the judicial system is under the Supreme
Court, while administrative and personnel development is still under the Ministry of Defense and Security.
In the drafting process to date, the changes to the rules governing the transfer of authority to
supervisory judges under one roof by the Supreme Court have not brought much change, as this only results
in the loss of the Minister's authority to train judges. The judge's staffing decision still refers to Government
Decree Number 41 of 2001 concerning promotion and position of judges (Goma, 2019). which defines the
status of judges as civil servants (GNA). The status and position of judges, on the one hand, has been
declared by public officials, but on the other hand, regarding the issue of promotion and rank of judges, they
are still equated with civil servants.
The consolidation by the Supreme Court of the leadership of judges and the judiciary under one roof
continues to leave other problems related to the Supreme Court's authority to direct and supervise judges;
The first relates to the question of the types of positions held by judges. The concept and understanding of
what exactly is meant by "public official" is still a matter of debate. The status of judges as public officials
is still not defined definitively, both from a normative perspective and from an implementation point of
view. Whereas the definition of a judge's position can be found in Law Number 5 of 2014 concerning State
Civil Apparatus. (ASN ACT), who assesses them as public officials. Other legal provisions that define the
status of various judicial offices, such as Law No. 28/1999 on State Administrators that are Clean and Free
of Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism, which stipulates judges as state administrators. While various
definitions can be found in Law no. 48 of 2009 concerning the Judiciary, which states that judges, as public
officials, exercise judicial power. The consequences of this difference in the definition of the position of
judges then affect the definition of the judge recruitment scheme, performance appraisal system, rank
system, rights to objects received from the state as civil servants in the form of wages, benefits, welfare
guarantees, security, protocols and others. In addition, those related to the promotion and transfer system as
well as pension rights still remain as ASN (Kurniawati, 2018).
The second relates to the issue of recruitment of judges. After the adoption of Law no. 49 of 2009
concerning General Courts, Law no. 50 of 2009 concerning the Religious Courts and Law no. 51 of 2009
concerning the State Administrative Court, it is explicitly stated that the recruitment of judges through the
practice of recruiting civil servants has been abolished. This provision raises legal issues that need to be
studied. to find answers to some questions. What is the status of a judge if he is administratively elected in
the recruitment of judges? Is the person concerned entitled to a salary or allowance during his education and
training as a prospective judge? If a judge in the future is entitled to salary and benefits, the next question is
whether it is his status as a public servant or a public official? The position mentioned above is not about
the status of civil servants or public officials, because the person concerned has not been appointed as a
judge? How to determine the remuneration system and its benefits from the newly declared one. A judge
has been trained and trained as a prospective judge and then officially appointed as a judge, because in
reality his salary and allowances are still part of the payroll system based on civil servant regulations
(novianto, 2016).
In addition to some of the recruitment issues from the perspective of future judges above, another
most important issue also concerns the strength of the institution that gets or selects prospective judges. Law
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No. 49 of 2009 concerning General Courts, Law no. 50 of 2009 concerning the Religious Courts and Law
no. 51 of 2009 concerning the State Administrative Court tried to consider the Judicial Commission in the
process of recruiting prospective judges, but over time this provision was revoked by the Constitutional
Court, which was submitted for judicial review by several parties with decision no. 43/PUU-XIII/2015.
Therefore, if the provisions regarding the selection and recruitment of judges are not accompanied by a
clear agreement in the law or other implementing provisions, it can be determined that the formal process of
appointing judges is not perfect (because it is not in accordance with the provisions of the law).
Based on the background of this problem, a temporary hypothesis is put forward that the nature of
the recruitment of judges is still unclear and biased, because the structure of the recruitment of judges has
not been fully regulated in a legal product that has a clear legal basis following the constitutional order to
carry out independent judicial functions to enforce the law and justice. For this reason, this article would
like to discuss in detail, what is the position and authority of the Supreme Court itself in recruiting
prospective judges with civil servant status for the judiciary below it?

2. METODE

This research uses regulatory research methods, with an analytical approach based on laws and
regulations relating to the main problematic issues, as well as other related legal principles (Djusfi, Abduh,
Sikumbang, & Nasution, 2014). The method of collecting data for the purposes of this analysis is carried
out through library research, by tracing legal books, court decisions, laws and regulations in the form of the
1945 Constitution, laws and regulations, government regulations and Supreme Court decisions governing
the problems of the Supreme Court system and organizational management. The nature of this research is a
descriptive legal study, namely research that describes and explains the results of research and then analyzes
the results using legal arguments (Rahmatillah, 2017).

3. HASIL DAN PEMBAHASAN

3.1. The Existence of the Supreme Court as an Independent Judicial Executor in the Recruitment of
Judges
The judiciary, reaffirmed in the Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of
Indonesia (UUD 1945), states that "the judiciary is the power of an independent State to administer justice
to uphold law and justice". This judicial power can also be confirmed in the provisions of Article 1
paragraph 1 of Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning the Judiciary, which states that the judiciary is the
power of an independent State to administer justice to uphold law and justice based on Pancasila and the
1945 Constitution for the implementation of the rule of law. Republic of Indonesia (Kansil, 2000).
The meaning of the judiciary, which is defined as an independent state power and independent of
other state authorities, is defined as an independent state power, which is then associated with the doctrine
of separation of powers, as well as judicial power as the main element in the exercise of the rule of law.
Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and carried out in accordance with the Constitution," as
emphasized in Article 1 paragraph 2 of the 1945 Constitution. The implication is that all citizens must
enjoy equal treatment before the law without exception (equality before the law) based on statutory
regulations. the law applies. Then the principle of an independent judiciary was born from the provisions
on the recognition of Indonesia as a state of law. Therefore, the question is to what extent is the principle
of an independent judiciary applied? independent judiciary, no State governed by the rule of law and an
enforceable democracy (Rizhan, 2017).
Article 24 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution states that "the judiciary is an independent
authority for the administration of justice with the aim of ensuring the rule of law and justice". In this
context, judges with noble professional status must be protected by law, along with guarantees of their
rights as public officials, so that a greater role of judges can be expected in line with the principles of the
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rule of law. in the context of the maintenance of law and justice. The position and position of judges as
public officials, as regulated in the provisions of Article 19 of Law no. 48 of 2009 concerning the
Judiciary, states that "judges and constitutional judges are public officials who exercise judicial power
regulated by law." Judges are personnel who exercise judicial power, so the status given to judges is not a
public servant. this principle becomes something absolute in the rule of law (rechtstaat), which is in
accordance with the principle of the "International Commission of Legal Experts", namely an independent
and impartial judiciary (independence and impartiality of the judiciary) (Mutiara, 2014).
In an independent study of judicial independence, there are two aspects that characterize the
existence of an independent and independent judiciary. The first aspect relates to institutional
independence or also called external independence and individual independence. In the context of
individual independence, there is independence that focuses on the judge as a central point. That is, the
judge in deciding a case must be free from influence, pressure or threats, either directly or indirectly, from
anywhere and for any reason. The principle of independence must be realized in relation to judges when
considering and deciding the cases they face. In addition, the independence of judges is also not only
related to their attitudes and behavior in carrying out judicial duties, but the independence of judges is
also reflected in various legal norms regarding objects and facilities supporting the work of judges
(institutional independence). For example, the selection of future judges determines the tenure of judges,
coaching (training), promotion and transfer systems, payroll systems, and dismissal of judges. This
institutional independence has not been fully realized, there is still interference from the executive branch
in regulating various issues related to the institutional independence of judges, one of which is related to
the nature of the recruitment of judges (Haris, 2019).
One of the issues regarding the definition of conditions, the mechanism for filling the position of
judges, especially judges, and the length of time a person has been a judge has become a sensitive issue in
the regulation of the judicial system. The reason is that the selection will affect, even produce, the type of
people who become judges, including the choices they make as jurors. The entire rule of law with regard
to requirements, mechanisms for filling positions and term of office of judges is intended to run an
independent judiciary and guarantee the freedom of judges. Theoretically, in the context of filling the
position of judge, it is strongly influenced by the current legal system in the country. Even though in
practice, what are the changes made by several countries regarding the filling of positions that are no
longer fully subject to the legal system. It is clear that filling the post of judge in a state has a major
impact on the independence and governance of the judiciary, as judges born in the selection process will
serve as the judiciary in the state. Of course, in this selection process, it is hoped that there will be judges
with qualifications and integrity to maintain the independence of the judiciary, which is a basic principle
in the implementation of the rule of law (Salviana, 2018).
Recruitment of judges as officials who will carry out judicial duties to receive, hear and resolve
cases based on the principle of justice based on "God Almighty" should be carried out professionally,
transparently through a very strict selection process with high standards of competence and intelligence.
Although the aspect of personal independence is considered in the Indonesian context, the provisions
regarding personal independence are regulated by Article 3 paragraph 1 of Law no. 48 of 2009, which
states that: In carrying out their duties and functions, judges and constitutional judges have an obligation
to maintain the independence of the judiciary. The independence of individual judges relates to:
appointment of judges; placement of judges; the term of office of the judge; career as a judge; dismissal
of judges from office; the welfare and safety of judges. This process of selecting and recruiting judges
must ensure the independence of the judiciary from any interference and other influences and pressures
from the authorities. Ensure judicial independence if the judges recruited and selected have competence
and integrity (Maulidiah, 2016).
It can be said that there is a correlation between the process of recruiting judges (appointment of
judges) and guaranteeing the independence of judges, as well as the process of dismissing judges and the
accountability of judges. Each of these systems has a major impact on the management of the justice
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system within the country. It can be understood that there are two basic principles in the judicial system,
namely (1) the principle of independence of judges and (2) the principle of impartiality of the judiciary.
These two principles are recognized as basic elements for a country that adheres to a modern legal
system. It can be repeated that the independence of judges is not only related to the attitude and behavior
of judges in the consideration and decision-making of cases, but also must be reflected in various
mechanisms related to issues that can improve their work. For example, the recruitment process,
seniority, coaching (training), promotion and transfer system, salary system and dismissal of judges
(Schmitz & Blossfeld, 2013).
In practice, until now, the scheme for recruiting and appointing prospective judges in the Supreme
Court's Framework for the Supremacy of Law stipulates that future judges start their careers with civil
servant status. In addition, if the next judge is declared to have been educated, the judge who will come
will be respectfully dismissed from the position of civil servants to be appointed as judges, as stipulated
in Article 13 paragraph 2, Law 3 of 2006 which amends Law No. 7 of 1989 concerning Judiciary.
Religion, which states: "For appointment as a judge, there must be a civil servant who is a member of the
future judge". In order to become a judge of the State Administrative Court, Article 14 paragraph 2 of
Law Number 9 of 2004 which amends Law Number 5 of 1986 concerning the State Administrative Court
is regulated as follows: "To be appointed as a judge, there must be a civil servant who is a candidate for
judge".
Article 14 paragraph 1 of Law Number 49 of 2009 concerning the General Justice System states
that: To be appointed as a court judge, a person must meet the following requirements: an Indonesian
citizen; loyal to God Almighty; loyal to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia;
Bachelor of Law; educated as a judge; spiritually and physically able to carry out the duties and
obligations; authoritative, honest, fair and bad behavior. But then, after Law no. 48 of 2009 concerning
the Judiciary stipulates that judges are public officials, the provision that prospective judges must first
become civil servants is removed, so the problem arises that in Law no. 48 of 2009 concerning the
judiciary is not fully regulated in relation to procedures or mechanisms in the procurement and
recruitment of judges, so that since the 2009 Judicial Law until 2017, there has never been any
recruitment of prospective judges, especially in the Supreme Court.
The emergence of this normative vacuum with regard to the recruitment of judges then led to a
debate about how the mechanism for recruiting judges functioned, whether to use a recruitment system
like other public officials, or to use other methods in accordance with the position of judges as public
officials. Meanwhile, the judicial commission's authority to participate in the recruitment process for
judges was abolished by the Constitutional Court. This level of vacancy was then considered by the
Supreme Court as the agency authorized for the procurement and recruitment of judges, issued by
PERMA No. 2 of 2017 concerning the procurement of judges. The pattern in PERMA is not clear because
the Supreme Court is once again using a civil servant recruitment system. As we see in PERMA No. 2 of
2017, which stipulates that the need to form judges is determined by the government, namely the Minister
of State Empowerment and Bureaucratic Reform. The selection and appointment of judges is also carried
out by the government. This provision is the same as in the civil servant system, those who pass the
selection will be appointed first, becoming candidates for civil servants (CPNS). Article 1 paragraph 3 of
the Anti-Money Laundering Law states that "prospective judges must become candidates for civil
servants and/or civil servants before being appointed to the position of judge". In addition, paragraph 4 of
Article 1 states: "Procurement of judges is an activity to meet the needs of judges received from civil
servants." Paragraph (2) Article 2 PERMA No. 2 of 2017 states: "The procurement of judges as referred
to in paragraph (1) is carried out after obtaining a determination of the need for civil servants by the
Minister who carries out public affairs in the field of using state apparatus."
The provisions mentioned above make it clear that there is no clear separation of powers in the
process of recruiting prospective judges to ensure that judges as public officials continue to be subject to
interference by the executive. The normative impasse over the nature of the recruitment of judges as
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public officials has had a serious impact on the functioning of the judicial service. The number of judges
in the courts of first instance and appeal is vacant. Meanwhile, based on the workload of the Supreme
Court in 2015, the need for judges to be met in the courts of first instance and appeals totaled 12,847
judges. Currently, the Supreme Court needs about 5,858 judges. This figure is calculated based on the
workload and the needs of judges to fill 86 new jobs in the General Courts, Religious Courts and State
Administrative Courts. Meanwhile, in 2017, the Ministry of State Empowerment and Bureaucratic
Reform approved the need for the recruitment of only 1,684 judges.
As a result of the vacuum of norms governing the powers of recruitment agency judges since 2017,
the Supreme Court has experienced a shortage of judges. Ideally, there should be about 11,000 first-
degree judges. The Supreme Court's desire to gain the power to recruit judges on constitutional and socio-
legal grounds is fully justified. In the context of realizing the highest judicial independence, the
recruitment of independent judges (the appointment of the judiciary itself) is very justified to run an
independent and impartial judiciary. The Supreme Court seems very quick to address the shortage of
judges. The recruitment of judges that the Supreme Court wants to carry out today seems to emphasize
the reluctance of the Supreme Court to carry out judicial reform. through transparent and participatory
recruitment of judges, because the House of Representatives (DNR) is still debating the draft law (PDP)
on the position of judges regulating the position of judges as public officials, including the procedures for
recruitment and administration of judges. The Supreme Court must ask the DPR to immediately pass the
bill on the administration of judges. Of course this requires lobbying and communication between the two
institutions. Lobbying and communication between the DPR and the Supreme Court have been
effectively built in the form of mutual understanding of functions and powers between institutions, as
well as a commitment to upholding judicial independence as an important part of implementing the rule
of law and democracy.
In addition, in the context of the principle of correspondence between the types of material
hierarchies, the content of laws and regulations. Without a clear source of legitimacy regarding the
recruitment of judges, which will be carried out by the Supreme Court, it will only undermine the values
of legal certainty. Since the PERMA governing the procurement of judges can be found to be in conflict
with the Supreme Court Law, which clearly defines judges as public officials, the process of appointing
judges currently underway could be called formally erroneous.

3.2 Strengthening judicial independence through the power of the Supreme Court to recruit judges
in the Law on the Status of Judges
An independent and impartial judiciary, otherwise known as an absolutely free judiciary, must exist
in a country where the law is supreme. This confirms that judges in carrying out their judicial duties are
not influenced by anyone, free from interference from other authorities, including the executive, so that
there is a guarantee for the formation of law and justice. The task of receiving and considering cases in
court requires judges to demonstrate their independence and impartiality so that they cannot take sides
with the pressures of various interests, both morally and materially, except truth and justice (Hidayat,
2016). The third amendment of article 24, paragraph 1, of the 1945 Constitution states that, with regard to
the judiciary, it is stated that "the judiciary of an independent state must administer justice for the purpose
of upholding law and justice". With regard to the status of judges as public officials, a number of laws
clearly state that judges are no longer civil servants and judges are public officials, as regulated in Law
no. 43 of 1999 which amended Law No. 8 of 1974 on the principles of employment. Article 19 of Law no.
48 of 2009 concerning Justice states: "Judges are public officials who carry out judicial functions." Then
article 122 (e) of the ASN Law states: "The public officials are the President, the Vice President, the
chairman of the supreme court and the chairman of the Supreme Court, as well as the president, deputy
chairman and judges of all judicial organs except ad hoc judges."
The determination of the status of State officials does not guarantee the independence of the
judiciary, but the independence of the Supreme Court's power must also include the institutional
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independence of the Supreme Court, so that the power to regulate the recruitment of judges and the
mechanisms related to salaries and benefits, infrastructure and security becomes fully the authority of the
Supreme Court. This step is carried out as part of the realization of the independence of judges. According
to the Supreme Court, the realization of the independence of the judiciary of course requires an
independent institution to ensure that judges, in carrying out their duties and functions, are regulated by
article 21 paragraph (1), Law Number 48 of 2009 concerning the judiciary, which states that "the
organization, The administration and finances of the Supreme Court and its subordinate judiciary are the
responsibility of the Court.The Supreme Court's demands for institutional independence have been
repeated for a long time, but at the implementation level it is difficult to implement in various technical
rules relating to the recruitment of judges.
As the vision and mission of the judiciary as articulated by the Supreme Court on September 10,
2009, which affirmed that "The implementation of the Indonesian Supreme Court of Justice." If it follows,
the vision of the Supreme Court is taken from the preamble of the 1945 Constitution, particularly in the
second and fourth paragraphs, which emphasize the goals of the Republic of Indonesia. Then it is
regulated in terms of judicial reform in 2010-2035 as an effort to improve the implementation of the
highest judicial body in Indonesia. The criteria for the Indonesian Supreme Court of Justice can ideally be
implemented as follows:
1. To perform judicial functions independently, effectively and fairly.
2. Supported by independent results-based budget management, which is distributed proportionally in the
APBN.
3. Having the right organizational structure and clear and measurable organizational management.
4. Organize the management and administration of a simple, fast, timely, inexpensive and proportional
case review process.
5. Manage infrastructure to support a safe, comfortable and supportive working environment for the
administration of justice.
6. Effective oversight of the conduct, administration and administration of justice
7. Management and development of competent human resources with objective criteria in order to create
honest and professional judicial staff.
8. Focusing on excellent public services.
9. Have information management that ensures accountability, trust, and transparency.
10. Modern with integrated IT infrastructure.
The vision is then translated at a practical level through the judicial mission of 2010-2035,
including: (1) Maintaining the independence of the judiciary; 2) provide fair legal services to people
seeking justice; (3) improving the quality of judicial administration; and (4). Increase the credibility and
transparency of the judicial system (Irawan, 2019).
Because of the important points of the goals of the Supreme Court's vision and mission above, there
is an important correlation with the discussion of the position of judges, especially with regard to judicial
independence. The Judicial Reform Plan states that the basic requirement of an objective judicial process
is the independence of the institutions that regulate the judiciary, namely the independence of the
judiciary as an institution (institutional independence) and the independence of the judiciary in carrying
out its functions (individual/functional independence). Independence is the key word in the effort to
effectively perform the core duties and functions of the judiciary.
Judicial independence, which is the main effort in realizing the vision of the Supreme Court, is
designed not only to be limited to the institutional aspect (equalizing the executive and legislative
branches with the executive and legislative branches), but also to cover individuals, namely individual
judges. Because judges are functionally the main force of law enforcement agencies in conducting trials.
To measure the parameters of whether a judge is independent in carrying out judicial functions, he can be
examined by the ability and diligence of the judge in maintaining moral integrity and commitment to the
freedom of his profession from interfering with other powers and powers in the judicial process.
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In the previous description and explanation, it was determined that, on the one hand, judges were
confirmed as public officials, but it turned out that, on the other hand, in the context of hiring prospective
judges, judges were positioned as civil servants. Thus, in such a provision it can be stated that there is a
potential for interference by other authorities, including the executive, directly in the independence of the
judiciary. Likewise, policies related to wages, benefits, infrastructure facilitation, housing, protocols,
protection, security, etc. are still within the scope of the government (executive branch), so that arguments
about government intervention in the judiciary cannot be heard institutionally (Neyasyah, 2019).
In the context of the independence of judicial institutions, the Supreme Court must be empowered
to regulate and manage the recruitment of judges on its own. These steps to empower the Supreme Court
to recruit judges should primarily be regulated and strengthened in the Law on the Status of Judges,
including salaries, allowances, and other benefits that are the rights of judges. The adoption of the old
rules regarding the recruitment of judges with CPNS status has nothing to do with the principles of
judicial independence. This power to recruit judges, if they are studied within the framework of a socio-
legal approach, is particularly relevant, as there are vacancies for judges in all courts of first instance and
appeals, so it is very likely that, in a state of urgency, the Government may issue a law on recruitment
judges within the framework and functions of the Government in other fields, including the judiciary. This
step is certainly still a stretch, but considering the fact that there is a massive vacancy of judges that can
lead to the functioning of public services, the Presidential Regulation that gives the Supreme Court the
power to recruit judges is very important for the establishment of an independent judiciary.

4. KESIMPULAN

The current legal framework that regulates the system and procedure for recruiting judges and
regulating the status of judges as public officials is not fully capable of regulating adequately, completely
and effectively so that the implementation of judicial functions is different. For example, those related to
the rank and classification system of judges in the future will be further related to the recruitment,
appointment, training, promotion system and model and and transfer of judges in determining the existing
court class. The current judicial recruitment system and pattern continues to reveal the chaos and
uncertainty of the rule of law governing the scheme for recruiting judges with the status of public
officials. The existing norms still have a fragile basis of legitimacy because they do not depend on the
Constitution, which provides for an independent body to exercise judicial power to enforce law and
justice. This requires commitment from all stakeholders, including the executive and legislature, to put
forward a rational approach to understand the importance of regulating the recruitment of judges within
the framework of the institutional independence of the Supreme Court. It is very important that the Law
on the Office of Judges is prioritized for adoption. The adoption of this bill is very important to eliminate
the chaos of the rule of law in relation to the structure of the recruitment of judges. regulated in the Bill
on the Office of the Judiciary, which is the power of the Supreme Court. The draft Law on the Office of
Judges can be adopted immediately so that it will provide the right impetus to support the establishment
of a holistic and comprehensive system for managing the recruitment of judges within the Supreme
Court's power independently of each other, so that judicial power is maintained and maintained, taking
into account the potential for internal interference and outside the law.

5. SARAN

It is hoped that the commitment of all stakeholders, including the executive and the legislature, to
put forward a rational approach to understand the importance of regulating the recruitment of judges
within the framework of the institutional independence of the Supreme Court.
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DAFTAR PUSTAKA

[1]
Djusfi, A. R., Abduh, M., Sikumbang, J., & Nasution, F. A. (2014). Kajian Hukum Normatif Terhadap
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[2] Goma, B. N. (2019). Pengawasan Dan Pengamatan Pelaksanaan Putusan Pengadilan Dalam Perkara
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[3] Haris, K. (2019). Evaluasi Program Praktik Pengabdian Masyarakat Dalam Pengembangan Sikap
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 Jurnal Niara Vol. x, No. x x 2022, Hal. xx-xx

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[14] Rahmatillah, N. (2017). The views of The Indonesian Medical Association and The Council Of
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