PERAN POLRI DALAM THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN

PENANGANAN TERORISME NATIONAL POLICE

PERAN DI POLRI DALAM
INDONESIA 1 PENANGANAN TERORISME DI INDONESIA1
IN COUNTERING TERRORISM
THE ROLE OF INDONESIAN NATIONAL POLICE IN COUNTERING
Oleh: IN INDONESIA1
TERRORISM
Jenderal Pol. Prof. H. Muhammad Tito IN INDONESIA1
by:
Karnavian, M.A., Ph.D. by:
Police General Prof. H. Muhammad
Prof. H. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, M.A., Ph.D.
Tito Karnavian, M.A., Ph.D.
PENDAHULUAN PREFACE

Dalam perkembangan kehidupan In the world life development

dunia terdapat 3 (tiga) paradigma there are 3 (three) international
hubungan internasional yang
relations paradigms which influence the
mempengaruhi relasi antar negara yaitu
relationship between states, namely
paradigma realisme yang berkembang
menjadi paradigma liberalisme Paradigm of Realism which evolved
dan kemudian menjadi paradigma into Paradigm of Liberalism and later
konstruktivisme2. Paradigma realisme becoming Paradigm of Constructivism2.
dengan negara (Nation State) sebagai Paradigm of Realism is where a nation
aktor utama dalam sistem dunia yang state as a single actor in the anarchical
anarkhi di mana tidak adanya suatu world system, where there is no
pemerintahan dunia (single global
single global government. In broader
government). Dalam pengertian yang
sense, anarchy is not only defined as
luas anarki tidak hanya diartikan
sebagai “kekerasan” (violence), namun “violence”, but also a “disorder”, which
juga “terjadinya ketidakteraturan” can be seen from the emergence of
(disorder), yang dapat dilihat conflict, dispute, and even war. In the
dari munculnya berbagai konflik, anarchical world system, there are no
perselisihan, bahkan peperangan. rules or norms that bind to be obeyed
Dalam sistem dunia yang anarkhi, tidak by every country, so that every country
ada aturan atau norma-norma yang
can expand its influence to other
mengikat untuk dipatuhi oleh setiap
countries which usually accomplished
1 Disampaikan pada pengukuhan Guru Besar Ilmu Kepolisian
dari Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (STIK)- Perguruan Tinggi 1 Conveyed during the conferment of Professorship of Police
Ilmu Kepolisian (PTIK) di Jakarta, 26 Oktober 2017 Science College (PTIK/STIK) in Jakarta, October 2017.
2 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 2 Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The So-
Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46.2 cial Construction of Power Politics’, International Organization,
(1992), 391–425 (p. 425). 46.2 (1992), 391–425 (p. 425).

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 1

negara sehingga setiap negara dapat
memperluas pengaruhnya ke negara
lain yang biasanya dilakukan dengan
dominasi kekuatan militer atau perang.
Dalam paradigma liberalisme
pemain utama dalam hubungan
internasional tidak hanya negara tetapi
juga non-state actor3. Paradigma
liberalisme lahir dari hasil trauma
Perang Dunia I yang menyebabkan
kerusakan masif di Eropa serta kerugian
material dan korban jiwa dalam jumlah
besar. Perang di Eropa menyebabkan
jatuhnya korban di kedua belah pihak.
Korban dari salah satu pihak dapat
terjadi di wilayahnya sendiri ataupun di
wilayah pihak lain, namun kedua pihak
memiliki kepentingan yang sama yaitu
menyelamatkan warga negaranya di
manapun berada. Hal ini menimbulkan
kesulitan dalam melakukan evakuasi
dan pertolongan ketika korban jatuh
di wilayah yang dikuasai oleh pihak
lain. Oleh karena itu, muncul pihak
ketiga yang mengurus korban-korban
perang dari kedua belah pihak yaitu
International Committee of Red Cross
(ICRC). ICRC merupakan lembaga
internasional atau Non-State Actor
3 Non State Actor adalah aktor bukan negara tetapi mampu
mempengaruhi hubungan antar negara. Tidak jarang, Non State
Actors memiliki kekuatan yang dapat mengalahkan kekuatan
negara. Setelah International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC)
kemudian bermunculan beberapa Non State Actor dengan
aktivitasnya yang beragam di bidang sosial, keuangan, dan
olahraga.
2 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
by the dominance of military force or
war.
In the Paradigm of Liberalism, the
main actor of international relations is not
only a nation state but also a non-state
actor3. The Paradigm of Liberalism was
resulted from the trauma of World War
I which had caused massive damage
in Europe including a large numbers
of material losses and casualties. The
war in Europe had caused casualties
on both sides. Casualties of one of
the parties could be at one’s territory
or opposite territory, but both parties
have the same interests that is to
protect their citizens wherever they
are. This situation had created difficulty
in conducting evacuation and rescue
when the casualty was at opposite
party’s territory. Therefore, a third party
emerged to take care of casualties of
the two parties, that is International
Committee of Red Cross (ICRC).
ICRC became the first international
organization or a Non-State Actor who
appeared due to situational needs4.
3 Non State Actor could affect relationship between states.
Quite frequent that Non State Actors have powers to defeat the
power of a state. After the International Committee of Red Cross
(ICRC) later emerged several Non State Actor with a diverse
activity in the field of social, finance, and sports.
4 When Indonesia was hit by monetary crisis in 1997, Non State
Actor could “defeated” the power of state actor, that was whe
Indonesia was forced to submit to the will of the International
yang pertama kali muncul karena
kebutuhan situasional4.
Perkembangan ke arah
konstruktivisme ditandai dengan
upaya berbagai aktor negara dan non
negara untuk membentuk nilai-nilai
dan norma-norma yang diberlakukan
secara universal. Kekuatan aktor-aktor
ini telah mampu membuat berbagai
aktor negara untuk tunduk terhadap
norma-norma tersebut, sehingga
meski suatu pemerintahan dunia tidak
muncul, dunia menjadi lebih tertib
karena adanya penghormatan dan
ketaatan terhadap konstruksi norma-
norma tersebut.
Menguatnya aktor non negara
telah membuat konflik dan kekerasan
yang melibatkan aktor non negara
semakin mudah terjadi. Aktor non
negara dapat berkonflik dengan
aktor non negara lainnya, dengan
aktor negara, bahkan dengan aktor
kelompok negara. Konflik kekerasan
antar kartel narkotika di Amerika Latin
adalah contoh bentuk konflik antar
aktor non negara, pemberontakan
di Filipina Selatan oleh Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) adalah bentuk
4 Pada saat Indonesia dilanda krisis moneter tahun 1997, Non
State Actor dapat “mengalahkan” kekuatan negara yaitu ketika
Indonesia dipaksa tunduk pada kehendak International Monetary
Fund (IMF). Untuk mengatasi krisis tersebut, pemerintah
Indonesia meminta bantuan kepada IMF dan disetujui, namun
dengan syarat Indonesia harus mematuhi semua rekomendasi
IMF yang tertuang dalam Letter of Intent, salah satunya
melakukan reformasi di bidang hukum perekonomian nasional.
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
The development towards
constructivism was marked by the
measures taken by state actors and
non-state actors to form values and
norms which applied universally.
The power of these actors has made
state actors became subject to the
applicable norms, so eventhough
world government does not appear,
the world have become more orderly
due to respect and obedience to the
construction of these norms.
The strengthening of non state
actors have easily created conflict
and violence which involved non
state actors. Non state actors can be
conflicted with other non-state actors,
state actors, and even with a group of
state actors. A violent conflict between
drug cartels in Latin America is an
example of conflict between non-state
actors, insurgency in the Southern
Philippines by Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) is a form of conflict
between non-state actor and state
actor5, while terrorism act by Al Qaeda
Monetary Fund (IMF). To overcome the crisis, the Indonesian
government requested assistance to the IMF and approved, on
contion Indonesia must comply with all IMF recommendations
contained in the Letter of Intent, one of which undertook reforms
in the field of national economic law.
5 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, ‘The Regional Fraternity:
Collaboration Between Violent Islamic Groups in Indonesia and
the Philippines’, in Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in the
3
konflik antara aktor non negara dengan
negara5, sedangkan aksi terorisme Al
Qaeda yang menyerang kepentingan
Barat menjadi bukti adanya konflik
kekerasan antara aktor non negara
dengan sekelompok negara6.
Perubahan paradigma dunia
yang lebih liberalis dan konstruktivis
juga berpengaruh terhadap potensi
konflik di kawasan Asia Tenggara.
Adanya lembaga regional ASEAN
yang semula tidak berorientasi pada
bidang keamanan, perlahan telah
membuat Asia Tenggara menjadi salah
satu kawasan yang paling stabil di
dunia. Terlepas dari adanya sejumlah
sengketa di antara negara anggotanya,
tapi sejak ASEAN didirikan tahun 1967,
tidak ada lagi perang antar negara
ASEAN7. Sedemikian berhasilnya
ASEAN mengkonstruksi sejumlah
norma tata pergaulan yang dipatuhi
5 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, ‘The Regional Fraternity:
Collaboration Between Violent Islamic Groups in Indonesia
and the Philippines’, in Terrorism in South and Southeast Asia in
the Coming Decade, ed. by Daljit Singh (Singapore : New Delhi:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 117–25.
6 Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), p. 172; Russell Howard,
‘Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism’, in
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Readings and Interpretations, by Bruce Hoffman
and Russell Howard, 4 edition (New York (N.Y.): McGraw-Hill
Education, 2011), pp. 75–85.
7 Beberapa konflik yang terjadi antara negara ASEAN antara
lain: konflik Pulau Sipadan dan Ligitan, antara Indonesia dan
Malaysia, Perbedaan pendapat antara Malaysia dan Brunei
mengenai batas wilayah tak bertanda di daratan Sarawak
Malaysia Timur serta batas wilayah perairan Zona Ekonomi
Eksklusif dan konflik antara Malaysia dan Singapura tentang
pemilikan Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca) di Selat Johor.
4 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
who attacked Western interest was the
evidence of violent conflict between
non-state actor with a group of state
actors6.
A change of world’s paradigm
that is more liberalist and constructivist
has influenced the potential conflict in
South East Asia region. The existing of
ASEAN regional body, which was initally
not security oriented, has slowly made
South East Asia into the world’s most
stable region. Despite some disputes
happening between its member
states, since ASEAN establishment
in 1967, there has been no more war
between ASEAN states7. The success
of ASEAN in constructing a number of
norms of the association on its member
states to adhere to, many observers
consider that ASEAN will gradually
become a Security Community and
Coming Decade, ed. by Daljit Singh (Singapore : New Delhi:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 117–25
6 Walid Phares, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2014), p. 172; Russell Howard,
‘Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism’, in
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security
Environment, Readings and Interpretations, by Bruce Hoffman
and Russell Howard, 4 edition (New York (N.Y.): McGraw-Hill
Education, 2011), pp. 75–85.
7 Some of the conflicts between ASEAN countries include:
Sipadan and Ligitan Island conflict between Indonesia and
Malaysia, Differences of opinion between Malaysia and Brunei
on unidentified territorial borders on the mainland of Sarawak
East Malaysia and boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone
territorial waters and conflict between Malaysia and Singapore
about the possession of Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca) in the
Johor Strait.
negara anggotanya, sehingga banyak can be a model for other regions in
pengamat menganggap bahwa creating regional security8. However,
ASEAN perlahan akan menjadi South East Asia has not escaped the
suatu komunitas keamanan (Security potential of violent conflict by non-state
Community) dan dapat menjadi model
actors, for example the Philippines
bagi kawasan lain untuk menciptakan
keamanan regional8. Namun demikian, whose government is still struggling to
Asia Tenggara tidak terhindar dari resolve separatism movement in the
munculnya potensi konflik kekerasan southern part of its country, as well as
oleh aktor non negara, contonhya Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia.
Pemerintah Filipina yang hingga kini Considering the potential conflict
masih berjuang untuk menyelesaikan done by non-state actors, especially
separatisme di bagian selatan
related to radicalism and terrorism
negaranya, demikian juga Thailand,
which are parts of insurgency, this
Myanmar dan Indonesia.
Berangkat dari masih adanya Professorship Inaugural Speech will
potensi konflik yang dilakukan oleh aktor focus on the role of Indonesian National
non negara, khususnya radikalisme Police as the main state’s institution
dan terorisme yang merupakan in maintaining domestic security to
bagian dari aksi insurgensi, maka counter terrorism in Indonesia which is
pada Pidato Pengukuhan Guru Besar conducted by non-state actor.
ini akan difokuskan pada bagaimana
Peran Polri sebagai institusi negara
utama pemelihara keamanan dalam
negeri, dalam penanganan terorisme
di Indonesia yang dilakukan oleh non-
state actor.

8 SHOJI Tomotaka, ‘ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative 8 SHOJI Tomotaka, ‘ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative
for Peace and Stability’, NIDS Security Reports, 3.4 (2008), 17–34 for Peace and Stability’, NIDS Security Reports, 3.4 (2008), 17–34
(p. 18). (p. 18).

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 5

PEMAHAMAN TENTANG
INSURGENSI
Di dalam literatur strategic
studies, salah satu anak cabang
ilmu politik internasional, insurgensi
merupakan salah satu bentuk "irregular
warfare", yang berbeda dengan perang
konvensional atau "regular warfare".
Menurut Bard O'Neill, insurgensi
adalah "....a struggle between a non-
ruling group and the ruling authorities
in which the non-ruling group
consciously uses political resources
(e.g, organizational expertise,
propaganda, and demonstrations) and
violence to destroy, reformulate, or
sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or
more aspects of politics9", sedangkan
Wilkinson menyebutnya dengan istilah
"revolutionary warfare" yaitu, "...a
struggle between a non-government
group and a government for political
and social control of people in a given
national territory"10. Dengan demikian,
insurgensi ditandai dengan hadirnya
aktor non negara melawan aktor
negara dengan menggunakan sumber
daya politik dan militer dengan tujuan
mengambil alih kekuasaan negara.
Ada empat strategi utama
9 Bard E. O’Neill in Leonard Weinberg, The End of Terrorism?
(Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), p. 72.
10 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal
State Response (Milton Park: Taylor & Francis, 2011), p. 15.
6 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
UNDERSTANDING
INSURGENCY
In the literature of strategic studies,
one of the branches of international
political science, insurgency is one of
the forms of "irregular warfare", which
is different from conventional warfare
or "regular warfare".
According to Bard O'Neill,
insurgency is"....a struggle between
a non-ruling group and the ruling
authorities in which the non-ruling group
consciously uses political resources
(e.g, organizational expertise,
propaganda, and demonstrations) and
violence to destroy, reformulate, or
sustain the basis of legitimacy of one
or more aspects of politics"9, while
Wilkinson calls it "revolutionary warfare"
that is, "...a struggle between a non-
government group and a government
for political and social control of people
in a given national territory"10. Thus,
insurgency is characterized by the
presence of non-state actors against
state actors using political and military
resources with the aim to take over
state power.
9 Bard E. O’Neill in Leonard Weinberg, The End of Terrorism?
(Milton Park: Routledge, 2013), p. 72.
10 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal
State Response (Milton Park: Taylor & Francis, 2011), p. 15.
insurgensi yaitu: konspirasi, perang There are four main strategies of
kota, gradual, military-foco11. insurgency, those are conspiracy, urban
Strategi konspirasi dilaksanakan warfare, gradual, military-foco.11 The
tanpa melibatkan massa, namun conspiracy strategy is implemented
cukup dengan melakukan aksi
without mass involvement, it is enough
pengambilalihan kekuasaan dengan
cepat di tingkat elite, misalnya kudeta. by conducting a quick take over at
Perang kota (urban warfare) banyak the elite level, e.g. coup d’etat. Urban
dilakukan dengan cara teroris dan warfare is mostly done with terror and
sabotase di perkotaan, memanfaatkan sabotage in urban areas, exploiting
kompleksnya kehidupan perkotaan the complexity of urban life as shelter
untuk berlindung dan sekaligus and source of logistics. The gradual
sumber logistik. Strategi gradual
strategy is done in stages consists of
dikerjakan secara bertahap yang
three main stages, namely: strategic
meliputi tiga tahapan utama, yaitu:
strategic defensive, strategic stalemate defensive, strategic stalemate and
dan strategic offensive. Contoh strategic offensive. A classic example of
klasik insurgensi gradual ini adalah this gradual insurgency is the struggle
perjuangan komunis Mao Tse Tung of communist Mao Tse Tung when
ketika mengambil alih kekuasaan dari he took over power from nationalist.
nasionalis12. Pada tahap strategic 12
At strategic defensive stage, Mao
defensive, Mao membentuk organisasi,
formed an organization, recruited
merekrut massa petani di pedesaan
rural peasants by selling communist
dengan menjual ideologi komunis,
membangun jaringan kekuatan militer ideology, built a network of military
dan melakukan serangan terbatas forces and carried out limited attacks
dengan taktik terorisme dan gerilya. with tactics of terrorism and guerrilla.
Pada tahap strategic stalemate, saat At the strategic stalemate stage, as the
kekuatan militer menguat, Mao mulai military strengthened, Mao began to
menantang negara secara terbuka challenge the state openly to fight with
untuk berperang dengan taktik
conventional and guerrilla tactis, while

11 Christopher A. Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars 11 Christopher A. Lawrence, America’s Modern Wars
(Philadelphia: Casemate, 2015), p. 140. (Philadelphia: Casemate, 2015), p. 140.
12 John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the 12 John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the
Contemporary World (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2013), p. 178. Contemporary World (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2013), p. 178.

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 7

gerilya dan konvensional, sedangkan
pada tahap strategic offensive, Mao
melakukan serangan militer besar-
besaran sehingga pemerintah dapat
ditaklukkan13.
Perjuangan Che Guevara di
Amerika Latin, termasuk membantu
Fidel Castro untuk merebut Kuba,
merupakan contoh klasik aplikasi
strategi military-foco atau military
focus.14 Strategi ini tidak memerlukan
pembentukan organisasi untuk
merebut basis massa dan membangun
kekuatan militer besar. Guevara hanya
membentuk unit kecil militer, namun
fleksibel, mobilitas tinggi, memiliki
kemampuan sabotase dan gerilya
serta menyerang sasaran unit militer
pemerintah dengan metoda hit and run.
Keberhasilan unit ini mengalahkan unit
militer pemerintah dan kemampuan
untuk lolos dari penangkapan telah
membuat pemerintah frustasi dan
menjatuhkan kredibilitas kekuatan
pemerintah di mata publik. Akibatnya
kelompok perlawanan lain menjadi
13 Kebijakan Mao yang paling fundamental adalah Revolusi
Kebudayaan (1966 – 1969) yang mengusung konsep
pembangunan yang mendasarkan diri pada mobilisasi
politik, bukan pada prinsip teknokratisme. Mobilisasi politik
inipun masih mendasarkan pada dialektika materialis yang
mengutamakan transformasi individu sebagai alat dan tujuan
pembangunan sosialis. Menurut Mao pembangunan ekonomi
akan mencapai sasaran apabila dilakukan secara merata dan
seimbang sehingga seluruh anggota masyarakat dapat mengambil
keuntungan bersama.
14 Joshua Johnson, ‘From Cuba to Bolivia: Guevara’s Foco
Theory in Practice’, Retrieved October, 24 (2006), 2008 (p. 26).
8 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
at the strategic offensive stage, Mao
conducted massive military attack so
that the government was conquered.13
Che Guevara’s armed struggle
in Latin America, including helping
Fidel Castro to seize Cuba, is a classic
example of the applied military-foco
or military focus.14 This strategy
does not require the establishment of
organization to seize the mass base
and build military force. Guevara was
only formed a small military unit, but
flexible, high mobility, skilled in sabotage
and guerrilla capabilities as well as
attacked government’s military unit
with hit and run method. The success
of this unit outshines the government
military units and its ability to escape
arrest had frustrated the government
and overthrown government’s
credibility in the public eye. As a result,
other insurgents became more daring
and formed small units to attack the
government. The snowball was keep
13 Mao’s most fundamental policy is the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1969) which carries the concept of development based
on political mobilization, not on the technocratic principle. The
mobilization of politics is still based on a materialist dialectic
prioritizing individual transformation as a tool and goal of
socialist development. According to Mao economic development
will achieve the target if done equally and balanced so that all
members of society can take advantage together
14 Joshua Johnson, ‘From Cuba to Bolivia: Guevara’s Foco Theory
in Practice’, Retrieved October, 24 (2006), 2008 (p. 26).
lebih berani dan membentuk unit-unit
kecil menyerang pemerintah. Bola
salju terus bergulir sehingga unit kecil
militer ini membesar dan mengalahkan
kekuatan militer pemerintah, hingga
pemerintah menyerah.
Dari literatur gerakan terorisme
radikal Islamis kontemporer, kedua
strategi terakhir di atas mirip dengan
strategi Qital Nikayah dan Qital
Tamkin.15 Qital Tamkin yang digagas
oleh Abu Muhammed Maqdisi,
pendiri Tauhid Wal Jihad Irak sebagai
cikal bakal ISIS dan tokoh radikal
Islam yang sangat berpengaruh,
mirip dengan strategi gradual yang
memerlukan pembangunan basis
massa perjuangan, sedangkan Qital
Nikayah yang dicetuskan tokoh Al
Qaeda lainnya Abu Musab Zarkawi
menyarankan bentuk perjuangan yang
tidak memerlukan basis massa, namun
menyerang terus menerus lawan
dengan kekuatan kecil sehingga lawan
menjadi lemah.
Terdapat beberapa prinsip penting
yang harus diperhatikan oleh pemerintah
dalam menghadapi insurgensi. Perang
insurgensi sebenarnya perang untuk
15 Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in
Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset (Singapore:
Springer, 2014), p. 196; International Crisis Group, Indonesia:
Jihadi Surprise in Aceh (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis
Group, 20 April 2010), p. 1 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/
south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-jihadi-surprise-aceh>
[accessed 13 September 2017].
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
rolling until those small units expanded
and defeated government's military
forces, until finally the government
surrendered.
From the literature of
contemporary radical Islamic terrorism
movements, the latter two strategies
are similar to Qital Nikayah and Qital
Tamkin strategies.15 Qital Tamkin
which was initiated by Abu Muhammed
Maqdisi, the founder of the Tauhid Wal
Jihad of Iraq is the forerunner of ISIS
and a very influential Islamic radical
figure, similar to the gradual strategy
that requires the building of a mass
base, while Qital Nikayah which was
coined by another Al Qaeda leader,
Abu Musab Zarkawi, suggested a form
of struggle which does not require
a mass base, but continuosly attack
the opponent with little force until the
opponent is weaken.
There are several important
principles that the government should
be aware of in dealing with insurgency.
Insurgency war is actually a war
15 Kumar Ramakrishna, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in
Indonesia: The Power of the Manichean Mindset (Singapore:
Springer, 2014), p. 196; International Crisis Group, Indonesia:
Jihadi Surprise in Aceh (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis
Group, 20 April 2010), p. 1 <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/
south-east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-jihadi-surprise-aceh>
[accessed 13 September 2017].
9
mendapat dukungan publik (public for public support. Whichever party
support). Pihak mana yang berhasil wins the public support will also be
memenangkan dukungan publik maka the winner of the war. Insurgency
akan menjadi pemenang perang. can only survive if there is public
Insurgensi hanya dapat bertahan jika
support, because public is the source
ada dukungan publik, karena publik
merupakan sumber logistik, rekrutmen, of logistics, recruitment, hideout, and
tempat persembunyian, dan lain- so on. Therefore, the key to defeat
lain. Oleh karenanya, kunci utama insurgents or terrorists is that the state
untuk mengalahkan insurgen atau must be able to win public support, both
teroris, negara harus mampu merebut locally and internationally16. The next
dukungan publik, baik lokal maupun principle is to use minimum force to
internasional.16 Prinsip berikutnya
avoid unnecessary collateral damage
adalah menggunakan kekuatan
in the community so that they do not
minimum untuk menghindari korban
kolateral anggota masyarakat yang antipathy towards the state. Another
tidak diperlukan sehingga masyarakat important principle is the effectiveness
tidak antipati terhadap negara. of propaganda and counter-
Prinsip penting lain adalah efektifitas propaganda, because propaganda will
propaganda dan kontrapropaganda, greatly influence public opinion and
karena propaganda akan sangat insurgent mass to support or not to
mempengaruhi opini publik dan massa
support insurgency.17
insurgen untuk mendukung atau tidak
A debate between Marc Sageman
mendukung insurgen.17
Debat antara Marc Sageman18
18
and Bruce Hoffman19 on the strategy
dengan Bruce Hoffman19 tentang of handling terrorism could also inspire

16 Tim Benbow and Rod Thornton, Dimensions of Counter-
Insurgency: Applying Experience to Practice (New York:
Routledge, 2013), p. 39.
17 Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the
Vietcong to the Islamic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 9.
18 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the
Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011), p. 83.
19 Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why
Osama Bin Laden Still Matters’, Foreign Affairs, 87.3 (2008),
133–8 (p. 134).
16 Tim Benbow and Rod Thornton, Dimensions of Counter-
Insurgency: Applying Experience to Practice (New York:
Routledge, 2013), p. 39.
17 Seth G. Jones, Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the
Vietcong to the Islamic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016), p. 9.
18 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the
Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011), p. 83.
19 Bruce Hoffman, ‘The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why
Osama Bin Laden Still Matters’, Foreign Affairs, 87.3 (2008),
133–8 (p. 134).

10 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

strategi penanganan terorisme the counter insurgency strategy.
juga dapat menginspirasi strategi Sageman claims that addressing the
penanggulangan insurgensi. Sageman root cause is more important than
mengklaim bahwa penyelesaian cracking down the terror networks,
akar masalah lebih penting dari pada
while Hoffman believes that destroying
menindak jaringan teror, sedangkan
Hoffman yakin bahwa menghancurkan networks and organizations, such
jaringan dan organisasi, seperti jaringan as Al-Qaeda network, will neutralize
AI Qaeda, akan dapat menetralisir terrorist disruptions.
gangguan terorisme. The idea of Louis Richardson20
Pemikiran Louis Richardson20 becomes another option in dealing
menjadi pertimbangan lain dalam with insurgency. Richardson, who had
menangani insurgensi. Richardson
been conducting research on dozens
yang telah melakukan penelitian
of terrorists and insurgency groups in
terhadap puluhan kelompok terorisme
dan insurgen di dunia menyatakan the world, says that there are 3 (three)
ada 3 (tiga) penyebab munculnya causes of terrorism and insurgency i.e.:
terorisme dan insurgensi: disaffected disaffected persons, enabling group,
persons, enabling group, dan and legitimizing ideology. Therefore,
legitimizing ideology. Oleh karenanya to neutralize them, there are needs to
untuk menetralisirnya, perlu ada upaya resolve the discontentment of those
untuk menyelesaikan ketidakpuasan
people, dissolve their organization,
orang-orang tersebut, menghentikan
and neutralize the ideology which
organisasinya, dan menetralisir
ideologi yang membolehkan serta allows and encourages them to commit
menganjurkan mereka melakukan aksi violence.
kekerasan.

20 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding
the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House
Publishing Group, 2006), 40. (Richardson adalah penguji penulis
saat ujian Thesis Ph.D di NTU tahun 2012 dan sekarang menjadi
Vice-Chancellor (Rektor) The University of Oxford, Inggris)
20 Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding
the Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House
Publishing Group, 2006), 40. (Richardson is the writer’s tester/
examiner during Ph.D. examination session in NTU in 2012. He
is now the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University, UK)

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 11

 TERORISME DI INDONESIA
Mengacu pada pemahaman
tentang insurgensi sebagaimana
diargumentasikan oleh O'Neill dan
Wilkinson21, saat ini Indonesia juga
menghadapi setidaknya dua kelompok
insurgen, yaitu: jaringan Islamis
radikal dan separatis (etno-nasionalis).
Namun dalam Pidato Pengukuhan
ini pembahasan akan dibatasi pada
jaringan Islamis radikal dan terorisme.
Pemikiran Islam radikal tidak
dapat dilepaskan dengan adanya
keinginan untuk kembali menegakkan
segala ketentuan yang ada di dalam
Al Qur’an dan Hadist. Hal ini didasari
oleh adanya pandangan bahwa
perkembangan Islam sudah dianggap
banyak menyimpang dari Al Qur’an
dan Hadist dengan adanya berbagai
kegiatan keagamaan yang tidak diatur
dalam Al Qur’an dan Hadist atau yang
disebut dengan bid’ah. Selain itu juga
muncul pandangan bahwa masyarakat
atau negara yang tidak menerapkan
hukum Islam dianggap sebagai
masyarakat jahiliyah dan kafir.
Terkait dengan munculnya
Islam Radikal, Oliver Roy dalam
bukunya The Failure of Political Islam
menegaskan bahwa Islam radikal
kontemporer berasal dari 2 (dua)
organisasi keagamaan yakni kelompok
21 Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 15; Weinberg, op. cit., p. 72.
12 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
Refers to the understanding of
insurgency as argued by O'Neill dan
Wilkinson21, Indonesia is currently
facing at least two insurgent groups:
they are radical Islamist network and
separatist (ethno-nationalist). But in
this inaugural speech the discussion
will be limited to the radical Islamist
network and terrorism.
Radical Islamic thought can not
be separated from the desire to re-
enforce the provisions contained in
the Qur'an and Hadith. This is based
on the view that the development of
Islam has been deviated from the
Qur'an and Hadith with the existence
of various religious activities which are
not regulated in the Qur'an and Hadith
or so-called heresy (bid’ah). In addition
to that, other view also argues that the
people or countries who do not apply
Islamic law are regarded as ignorant
and infidel society.
In line with the the rise of Radical
Islam, Oliver Roy in his book The
Failure of Political Islam affirms that
contemporary radical Islam comes from
2 (two) religious organizations namely
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Hasan Al Banna
21 Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 15; Weinberg, op. cit., p. 72.
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Hasan Al Banna in Egypt in 1906-1949) and Jamaat AI
di Mesir tahun 1906-1949) dan Jamaat Islami (Abu A'la al-Mawdudi in Pakistan
AI Islami (Abu A’la al-Mawdudi di in 1903-1979).22 In the development,
Pakistan tahun 1903-1979).22 Dalam those two organizations became
perkembangannya, kedua organisasi
movements that spread throughout
tersebut menjadi gerakan-gerakan yang
menyebar ke seluruh dunia. Pemikiran the world. Thought and ideology of
dan ideologi Islam radikal yang ingin radical Islam which want to restore
mengembalikan implementasi Islam the implementation of pure Islam have
secara murni menjadi daya tarik bagi attracted some of the Muslims to join,
sebagian Muslim untuk bergabung, including from Indonesia.
termasuk dari Indonesia. Radical Islam23 has existed
Islam radikal23 sudah ada
in Indonesia for a long time, even
di Indonesia sejak lama, bahkan
before its independence there were
sebelum kemerdekaan sudah terdapat
elemen-elemen yang menginginkan elements who wanted to establish
dibentuknya Indonesia sebagai Indonesia as their own version-Islamic
negara Islam versi mereka sendiri. state. Although the founding fathers
Meskipun founding fathers akhirnya finally chose the form of Indonesia
memilih mendirikan negara Indonesia as a national state, but efforts to
sebagai negara nasional, namun establish the Islamic State was still
upaya untuk mendirikan Negara
ongoing. After the Dutch officially
Islam masih terus berlangsung.
recognized Indonesia's independence
Setelah Belanda mengakui secara
resmi kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan and sovereignty, the government was
Indonesia, pemerintah dihadapkan confronted with armed insurgencies
pada berbagai pemberontakan such as DI / TI in the period of 1949-

22 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994), pp. 1–2.
23 Kerangka pemikiran islam radikal pada dasarnya adalah:
Islam harus menjadi dasar negara, Syariat harus diterima
sebagai konstitusi negara, Kedaulatan politik ada di tangan
Tuhan, Gagasan tentang negara-negara bangsa (nation state)
bertentangan dengan konsep umat yang tidak mengenal batas-
batas politik atau kedaerahan, Prinsip syura (musyawarah)
berbeda dengan gagasan demokrasi. (Lihat: Khamami Zada,
Islam Radikal: Pergualtan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras Di
Indonesia (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 11.)
22 Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1994), pp. 1–2.
23 The framework of radical Islamic thought is essentially: Islam
should be the basis of the state, Shari’a must be accepted as the
constitution of the state, the political sovereignty is in the hands
of God, the notion of nation states is contrary to the concept of
people who do not know political boundaries or The principle of
shura (musyawarah) is different from the idea of democracy (See:
Khamami Zada, Islam Radikal: Pergualtan Ormas-Ormas Islam
Garis Keras Di Indonesia (translated; Radical Islam: The Struggle
of Islamic Hardline In Indonesia) (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 11.)

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 13

bersenjata seperti DI/TII pada periode
1949-1962. Pemberontakan bersenjata
untuk mendirikan negara Islam pada
saat itu dilakukan untuk mendirikan
Darul Islam dipimpin oleh Sekarmaji
Kartosuwiryo24 yang akhirnya dapat
ditumpas pemerintah dengan kekuatan
bersenjata pula.
Pada masa pemerintahan Orde
Baru di bawah kepemimpinan Presiden
Soeharto, gerakan radikalisme dan
terorisme tidak dapat berkembang
dengan baik meski masih survive.
Rezim Soeharto yang memerintah
secara semi otoriter melakukan kontrol
yang ketat untuk menekan munculnya
gerakan tersebut antara lain dengan
menggunakan intelijen yang kuat
dan undang-undang Subversif.
Dengan kontrol yang ketat, elemen-
elemen gerakan Islam radikal tidak
menampakkan aktifitas dan tidak dapat
menunjukkan eksistensinya secara
terbuka, sehingga bermetamorfosis
menjadi gerakan rahasia atau tertutup
sebagai Negara Islam Indonesia (NII).
Tekanan yang kuat membuat beberapa
tokoh gerakan Islam radikal lari ke luar
negeri, antara lain Abu Bakar Baasyir
dan Abdullah Sungkar ke Malaysia.
Meskipun demikian, selama periode
tersebut, kelompok Islam radikal
24 Holk H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: langkah
perwujudan angan-angan yang gagal (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar
Harapan, 1995), pp. 111–13.
14 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
1962. An armed rebellion who aimed for
the establishment of an Islamic state at
that time was formed to establish Darul
Islam led by Sekarmaji Kartosuwiryo24
which ultimately crushed by the
government with armed forces as well.
During the New Order government
under the leadership of President
Soeharto, radicalism and terrorism
movements could not develop well even
though they were still survived. The
semi-authoritarian Soeharto regime
exercised strict controls to suppress
the movement, among others, by using
strong intelligence and Subversive
Law. With the strict control, elements
of the radical Islamic movement did
not expose their activity and could not
show their existence openly so that
they morphed into a secret or closed
movement as Indonesian Islamic State
(NII). Strong pressure made some
prominent figures of Islamic radical
movements to flee abroad, including
Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah
Sungkar who went to Malaysia.
Nevertheless, during that period,
radical Islamic groups succeeded in
24 Holk H. Dengel, Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: langkah
perwujudan angan-angan yang gagal (translated; Darul Islam
and Kartosuwiryo: the steps of illusory manifestations that fail)
(Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995), pp. 111–13.
berhasil melakukan aksi kekerasan
sebagaimana terjadi dalam peristiwa
pemboman Candi Borobudur pada
21 Januari 1985, dan pembajakan
pesawat Garuda “Woyla” rute Jakarta-
Medan pada tanggal 28 Maret 1981.
Aksi kekerasan oleh jaringan
Islamis radikal yang mulai marak
kembali di era Pasca-Suharto sering
dipandang sebagai fenomena terorisme
semata. Namun bagi penulis, aksi-aksi
tersebut tidak sesederhana itu, aksi-
aksi yang dilakukan oleh suatu jaringan
yang saling terkait ini lebih tepat dilihat
sebagai suatu gerakan insurgensi.
Insurgensi lebih luas dari pada
terorisme. Jika terorisme didefinisikan
sebagai "the use of force or threat use of
force against civilians/non-combatants
for political or ideological purposes",
maka sebenarnya terorisme tidak
lebih dari taktik insurgensi dengan
memilih target sipil atau non kombatan
sebagai sasaran antara.25 Taktik ini
dipilih umumnya karena kekuatan dan
sumber daya yang dimiliki terbatas,
tidak sebanding dengan kekuatan
lawan/pemerintah, sehingga dengan
menyerang sasaran sipil, pemerintah
akan kehilangan wibawa dan legitimasi
untuk mampu melindungi warganya.
Dalam jangka panjang, publik akan
25 Ariel Merari in ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency” Gérard
Chaliand, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS
(Oakland: Univ of California Press, 2016), p. 14.
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
conducting violent actions such as the
bombing of Borobudur Temple on 21
January 1985, and the hijacking of the
Garuda Airlines "Woyla" route from
Jakarta to Medan on 28 March 1981.
Violent action by radical Islamist
networks which began to bloom again
in post-Suharto era was often seen
as a mere phenomenon of terrorism.
But for the writer, those actions were
not that simple, the actions taken
by interconnected network are more
accurately seen as an insurgency
movement. Insurgency is broader than
terrorism. If terrorism is defined as "the
use of force or threat of force against
civilians / non-combatants for political or
ideological purposes", then terrorism is
actually nothing more than insurgency
tactic by selecting civilian or non-
combatant as intermediate targets.25
This tactic is generally chosen because
of the lack of strength and resources,
unequal opposing forces / government,
so that by targetting civilian, the
government will lose its authority and
legitimacy for not able to protect its
citizens. In the long term, the public
25 Ariel Merari in ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency” Gérard
Chaliand, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS
(Oakland: Univ of California Press, 2016), p. 14.
15
mengalihkan dukungannya kepada
teroris yang memiliki posisi tawar
lebih tinggi karena mampu menekan
pemerintah.
Jaringan Islamis radikal di
Indonesia tidak hanya menyerang
sasaran sipil dengan motif ideologi
jihad. Dalam beberapa insiden mereka
menyerang sasaran aparat keamanan,
termasuk militer kombatan. Mereka
juga memiliki tujuan politik yang jelas
yaitu ingin mengambil alih kekuasaan
dan merubah negara Indonesia yang
dipandang sekuler, menjadi suatu
negara Islam yang didasarkan pada
syariat Islam versi mereka.26 Untuk
mencapai tujuan tersebut, jaringan
ini menggunakan sumber daya politik
termasuk mendirikan organisasi resmi
(above ground) dan aksi kekerasan
terutama dengan taktik terorisme oleh
jaringan tertutup (under ground).
Dari berbagai dokumen yang
disita, dapat disimpulkan bahwa
jaringan ini menggunakan dua
strategi utama untuk mencapai tujuan
politik menegakkan negara Islam
versi mereka, yaitu strategi gradual
(qital tamkin) dan military-foco (qital
nikayah)27. Di dalam dokumen utama
26 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Catatan dari penjara: mengamalkan dan
menegakkan Dinul Islam (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2006), p.
61.
27 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist
Insurgencies:The Case of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah and the
Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007 (London: ICP,
16 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
will divert their support to terrorists
who have a higher bargaining position
because they are able to pressure the
government.
Radical Islamist network in
Indonesia is not only targetting civilian
with ideological motive of jihad. In
many ocasion they would attacked
security apparatus, including military
combatant. They also have clear
political purpose, that is to take over
the power and change the secular
Indonesian state into an Islamic state
based on their own version of Islamic
Shariah.26 To achieve these objectives,
the network uses political resources
including establishing above ground
organization and performing violent
acts by using terrorism tactics which
conducted by under-ground network.
From various documents which
were confiscated, can be concluded
that this network uses two main
strategies to achieve its political
objectives to establish their version of
the Islamic state, i.e. gradual strategy
(qital tamkin) and military-foco (qital
26 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Catatan dari penjara: mengamalkan dan
menegakkan Dinul Islam (translated; Note from prison: practise
and establish Dinul) (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2006), p. 61.
Jl, Pedoman Umum Perjuangan al nikayah).27 In Jl’s main document,
Jamaah al Islamiyyah28 (PUPJI) yang General Guidelines for the Struggle
disita Polri tahun 2003 dapat dicermati of Al Jamaah al Islamiyyah/ Pedoman
bahwa Jl menerapkan strategi Umum Perjuangan al Jamaah al
gradual. Tertulis bahwa ada 3 tahapan
Islamiyyah (PUPJI)28 which seized
perjuangan mereka (Al Manhaj Al
Horakiy Li iqomatid Dien) yaitu tahap by the INP in 2003 can be observed
persiapan untuk penegakan Negara that Jl has been implementing gradual
Islam, tahap realisasi penegakan strategy. It is written that there are
Negara Islam dan tahap mendirikan 3 (three) stages of the struggle (Al
kekhalifahan dunia29 . Manhaj Al Horakiy Li iqomatid Dien)
Pada tahap persiapan untuk those are, preparation stage for the
penegakan Negara Islam dilakukan
enforcement of the Islamic State,
melalui upaya mendirikan organisasi,
realization stage of the enforcement of
pengembangan kekuatan dan
penggunaan kekuatan. Upaya untuk
30 Islamic State and stage of establishing
mendirikan organisasi (taqwinul the world caliphate29.
jamaah) terdiri dari upaya penentuan The preparation stage for
kepemimpinan, pembentukan the enforcement of Islamic State
kelompok inti, pendirian organisasi is conducted by establishing
rahasia (tanzim siri), penerapan organization, developing strength
prinsip amar maruf nahi munkar, dan
and using force30. The effort to
pendirian lembaga untuk menegakkan
establish an organization (taqwinul
disiplin agama (hisbah). Dalam upaya
untuk mengembangkan kekuatan jamaah) consists of appointment of
(taqwinul quwwah), dilakukan melalui
27 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist
kegiatan pendidikan, dakwah dan Insurgencies:The Case of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah and the
hijrah, mengembangkan doktrin Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007 (London: ICP,
2014), p. 70.
28 Andrew T. H. Tan, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency
2014), p. 70. in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009),
28 Andrew T. H. Tan, A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency pp. 76–77.
in Southeast Asia (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009), 29 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: pengakuan
pp. 76–77. mantan anggota JI (translated; Uncover Jamaah Islamiyah:
29 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: pengakuan confession of ex JI member) (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu,
mantan anggota JI (Jakarta: Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005), pp. 2005), pp. 106–10.
106–10. 30 Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam.,
30 Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam., ed. by Risalah Kongres Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam.
ed. by Kongres Mujahidin dan Penegakan Syariah Islam (translated; The Congress of Mujahidin I and the Enforcement of
(Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001), pp. 79–90. Islamic Sharia) (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001), pp. 79–90.

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 17

jihad perang (qital), pengembangan leadership, formation of core group,
kekuatan militer (tajnid), menentukan establishment of secret organizations
daerah aman (qoidah aminah), (tanzim siri), implementation of the
melaksanakan latihan militer (i'dad), principle of amar maruf nahi munkar,
membangun sistem keuangan
and establishment of the institution to
(tomwil), membangun jaringan intelijen
(jasus), dan berkolaborasi dengan uphold the religious discipline (hisbah).
kelompok sejenis (tansiq bainal Their effort to improve their strength
jamaat)31. Kemudian dalam tahap (taqwinul quwwah) is done through
penggunaan kekuatan (istikhdamul educational activities, da'wah and
quwwah) dilakukan dengan cara hijra, developing the doctrine of war
memberikan peringatan kepada pihak jihad (qital), strengthening military
yang bertentangan untuk tunduk dan
force (tajnid), determining a safe base
tidak menghalangi pembentukan
(qoidah aminah), carrying out military
negara Islam serta melaksanakan
jihad (jihad musallah) ketika exercises (i'dad), building financial
peringatan tersebut tidak diindahkan. systems (tomwil), forming intelligence
Akhirnya, pada tahap pembentukan network (jasus), and collaborating with
negara Islam dilaksanakan dengan similar groups (tansiq bainal jamaat)31.
membentuk otoritas negara, membuat Then, in the use of force stage
aturan hukum, angkatan bersenjata, (istikhdamul quwwah) they conducted
dan meneruskan jihad perang hingga
by giving warning to the opposite
terbentuknya kekhalifahan dunia.32
parties to submit and not hampering
Meskipun PUPJI ini dibantah the establishment of Islamic state and
oleh beberapa tokoh Jl, seperti Abu to perform jihad (jihad musallah) when
Bakar Baasyir, namun interview the warning is ignored. Finally, the stage
dengan sejumlah tokoh Jl sendiri of establishment of the Islamic state is
seperti Nasir Abas33, Ali Imron, Abu conducted by forming state authority,
Rusdan, Ahmad Roihan, Hambali making the rule of law, armed forces,
dan masih banyak lagi, serta tulisan
and continuing jihad war until the world
31 Abas, op. cit., pp. 106–10 caliphate is established.32
32 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, The Global Jihad Movement
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015), pp. 100–102;
Abas, op. cit., pp. 109–10. 31 Abas, op. cit., pp. 106–10
33 Abas, op. cit., pp. 102–5. 32 Rohan Gunaratna and Aviv Oreg, the Global Jihad Movement

18 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

para tokoh yang membantah tadi34, Even though PUPJI was denied
mengkonfirmasi kebenaran isi PUPJI by some Jl figures, such as Abu Bakar
tersebut sebagai dokumen strategi Baasyir, but from interviews with other
perjuangan Jl. Dengan demikian jelas Jl's figures such as Nasir Abas33, Ali
bahwa Jl mengadopsi strategi gradual
Imron, Abu Rusdan, Ahmad Roihan,
insurgency untuk mencapai tujuan
politiknya mendirikan suatu negara Hambali and many more, as well as
Islam versi mereka sendiri. writings of the figures who denied
Dengan menggunakan kerangka earlier34, confirmed the truth of the
teori tiga tahapan strategi gradual contents of PUPJI as a strategy
insurgency sebagaimana dijelaskan document of Jl struggle. Therefore it
oleh O'Neill, maka sebenarnya is clear that Jl has adopted a gradual
Jl masih pada tahap awal yaitu
insurgency strategy to achieve its
strategic defensive. Pembangunan
political objectives of establishing their
organisasi baik rahasia atau terbuka
telah dibentuk, pengembangan own version Islamic state.
doktrin radikal, rekrutmen, pelatihan By using theoretical framework
militer (seperti di Aceh tahun 2010)35, of three stage gradual insurgency
penguasaan senjata api amunisi dan strategy as described by O'Neill, then
bahan peledak, serta upaya merebut actually Jl was still at its early stage,
dukungan massa telah dimulai, dan that is strategic defensive. Either
hanya melakukan serangan terbatas
secret or open organizations has been
untuk menjatuhkan wibawa pemerintah
established, development of radical
dan Barat. Jika mereka berhasil melalui
tahap ini, dan menjadi besar, tidak doctrine, recruitment, military training
menutup kemungkinan akan berlanjut (as in Aceh in 2010)35, mastery of
ke tahap berikutnya yaitu strategic weapons ammunition and explosive, as
stalemate dan strategic offensive. well as any effort to win public support
Strategi kedua yang dilakukan had been started, and only carried
oleh jaringan Islamis radikal adalah out limited attacks to bring down the
military- foco. Penerapan strategi ini
ditandai oleh adanya sejumlah aksi (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015), pp. 100–102;
Abas, op. cit., pp. 109–10.
yang dilakukan oleh kelompok kecil 33 Abas, op. cit., pp. 102–5.
34 Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, op. cit., p. 47.
34 Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, op. cit., p. 47. 35 International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 7.
35 International Crisis Group, op. cit., p. 7.

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 19

tanpa perintah langsung dari organisasi.
Sejumlah kasus yang terjadi dengan
model ini diantaranya operasi oleh
Noordin M. Top dan Dr. Azahari pasca
Bom Bali 2002 yang menurut kalangan
internal Jl tidak direstui oleh mereka.
Perkembangan radikalisme
Islam dipicu oleh terjadinya perang
di Afganistan di mana para pejuang
Mujahidin yang didukung oleh Amerika
dan sekutunya bertempur melawan
tentara Uni Soviet.36 Isu yang
dimunculkan dalam perang tersebut
adalah penjajahan Soviet yang
direpresentasikan sebagai kelompok
komunis terhadap Afganistan yang
mayoritas penduduknya beragama
Islam. Sebuah buku karangan Robert
Dreyfuss berjudul The Devil’s
Game : How The United States
Helped Unleash Fundamentalist Islam,
dijelaskan bahwa justru Amerika-
lah yang membantu melepaskan
ajaran radikal ini, sebagai cara
untuk memukul Soviet. Semangat
Islam melawan komunis menjadi
sentimen yang mampu mengundang
para pejuang Islam (Mujahid) dari
36 Perang Soviet-Afganistan berlangsung dari tahun 1979-
1989 di mana Uni Soviet berusaha mempertahankan
pemerintahan Marxis Afganistan, yaitu Partai Demokrasi Rakyat
Afganistan, dalam menghadapi mujahidin Afganistan yang
ingin menggulingkan pemerintahan. Uni Soviet mendukung
pemerintahan Afganistan, sementara para mujahidin mendapat
dukungan dari beberapa negara, antara lain Amerika Serikat.
Dalam konflik ini, diperkirakan sekitar satu juta warga sipil
tewas, 90.000 pejuang Mujahidin, 18.000 tentara Afghanistan,
dan 14.500 tentara Soviet.
20 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
prestige of government and the West.
If they succeed going through this
stage, and become big, it doest not
rule out the possibility to continue to
the next stage, the strategic stalemate
and strategic offensive.
The second strategy by radical
Islamist networks is military-foco.
The implementation of this strategy
is characterized by the existence of
number of actions conducted by small
groups without direct orders from
the organization. Some cases which
occurred using with this model, among
others is an operation by Noordin M.
Top and Dr. Azahari after Bali Bombing
2002 which according to internal source
of Jl was not approved by them.
The growth of Islamic radicalism
was triggered by the war in Afghanistan
where US-backed Mujahideen fighters
and its allies fought against the Soviet
army.36 The issue which was raised
in the war was the Soviet occupation
which representes a communist group
36 The Soviet-Afghan war lasted from 1979-1989 where the
Soviet Union sought to defend the Afghan Marxist government,
the Democratic People’s Party of Afghanistan, in the face of the
Afghan mujahidin who wanted to overthrow the government.
The Soviet Union supported the Afghan government, while the
mujahideen got support from several countries, including the
United States. In this conflict, an estimated one million civilians
were killed, 90,000 Mujahideen fighters, 18,000 Afghan soldiers,
and 14,500 Soviet troops.
berbagai negara untuk secara sukarela
bergabung.37 Selama perang tersebut,
sebanyak 197 WNI yang turut berjuang
di Afganistan sebagai mendapatkan
pelatihan militer dan turut bertempur.
Mereka yang bergabung di Afganistan
mengadopsi ideologi Islam radikal
yang dikembangkan oleh Ayman Al
Zawahiri. Setelah perang usai para
WNI kembali ke Indonesia dengan
membawa ideologi Islam Radikal,
memiliki kemampuan militer dan juga
jaringan dengan Al Qaeda. Mereka
juga menemukan wilayah konflik di
Mindanao untuk bergabung dengan
MILF sebagai wilayah perjuangannya.
Secara umum perkembangan
terorisme di Indonesia dapat dibagi
menjadi 2 (dua) gelombang yaitu:
Gelombang pertama dari tahun
1999 sampai dengan 2014 dengan
Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah (JI) yang
berhubungan dengan Al Qaeda dan
gelombang kedua sejak tahun 2014
sampai sekarang dengan munculnya
Jamaah Ansarut Daulah (JAD) yang
berhubungan dengan ISIS.
Sejak didirikan pada tahun 1993
sampai serangan yang pertama di tahun
2000, keberadaan JI dengan ideologi
Radikal Islamnya masih belum banyak
diketahui dan disadari oleh otoritas
37 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped
Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2006), p. 11.
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
against Muslim majority population
Afghanistan. A book by Robert
Dreyfuss entitled The Devil's Game:
How the United States Helped Unleash
Fundamentalist Islam, explained that
it was the United States who helped
to unleash the radical teaching, as
a tool to hit the Soviets. The spirit of
Islam against communism became
a sentiment which abled to invite the
fighters of Islam (Mujahid) from various
countries to voluntarily join.37 During
the war, there were 197 Indonesians
fighting in Afghanistan following military
training and join the war. Those who
joined Afghanistan war adopted the
radical Islamic ideology developed by
Ayman Al Zawahiri. After the war after
the Indonesians returned to Indonesia
brought home the radical Islamic
ideology, skilled in military capabilities
and linked with Al Qaeda network. They
also found conflict areas in Mindanao
to join the MILF as thir fighting base. In
general, the development of terrorism
in Indonesia can be divided into 2 (two)
waves: The first wave was from 1999
to 2014 with Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah
37 Robert Dreyfuss, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped
Unleash Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2006), p. 11.
21
negara-negara di Asia Tenggara
sehingga JI mampu melakukan
konsolidasi, memperluas pengaruh
dan organisasinya serta menyusun
struktur organisasi dengan membagi
wilayah dalam 4 (empat) mantiqi, yaitu:
Mantiqi I dengan wilayah Malaysia dan
Singapura, Mantiqi II dengan wilayah
Jawa dan Sumatra, Mantiqi III dengan
wilayah Kalimantan, Sulawesi dan
Filipina Selatan dan Mantiqi IV dengan
wilayah Australia.
Perkembangan Islam radikal
di Indonesia didukung oleh situasi
dalam negeri di mana terjadi transisi
kekuasaan dari semi otoriter menjadi
demokrasi liberal sebagai hasil
reformasi tahun 1998 yang membuka
ruang kebebasan (freedom of speech
and freedom of assembly). Menguatnya
demokrasi liberal sesuai dengan
pendapat Fukuyama dalam bukunya
The End of History and The Last Man
yang mengklaim bahwa sejarah konflik
ideologi besar telah berakhir dan
semua peradaban dunia akan menuju
pada satu tatanan demokrasi liberal38
memberi ruang jaringan Islamis radikal
untuk berkembang pula. Nilai-nilai khas
demokrasi liberal yang mengutamakan
supremasi hukum, pemerintahan sipil,
perlindungan hak asasi manusia, dan
liberalisme di berbagai bidang telah
38 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 42.
22 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
(JI) associated with Al Qaeda, and the
second wave was started in 2014 up
until now with the emergence Jamaah
Ansarut Daulah (JAD) which associated
with ISIS.
Since its founding in 1993 until
its first attack in 2000, the existence of
JI with its radical Islamic ideology was
still little known and recognized by the
authorities of the countries in Southeast
Asia so JI was able to consolidate,
expanded its influence and organization
and formed the organizational structure
by dividing region into 4 (four) mantiqi,
namely: Mantiqi I with Malaysia and
Singapore, Mantiqi II with Java and
Sumatra, Mantiqi III with Kalimantan,
Sulawesi and Southern Philippines and
Mantiqi IV territories in Australia.
The development of radical Islam
in Indonesia was supported by the
domestic situation when transition of
power from semi-authoritarian to liberal
democracy as a result of the 1998
reform had opened a space for freedom
of speech and freedom of assembly.
The strengthening of liberal democracy
is in line with Fukuyama's opinion in
his book The End of History and The
Last Man which claims that the history
of the great ideological conflict has
mempengaruhi cara pengelolaan
negara dan segenap persoalan di
dalamnya.
Pemahaman tentang demokrasi
liberal yang tidak tepat berdampak
pula pada menguatnya primordialisme,
baik yang berbasis kedaerahan,
kesukuan, etnis maupun keagamaan.
Dari berbagai primordialisme yang
ada, primordialisme berbasis
agama dipandang paling berbahaya
karena sentimen agama sangat
mudah digunakan untuk membawa
masyarakat low class melakukan aksi
demonstrasi dan melakukan tindakan
anarkis. Itulah sebabnya di awal-awal
era reformasi sering terjadi konflik
horisontal, di antaranya adalah konflik
di Ambon (Maluku) dan Poso (Sulawesi
Tengah). Konflik di kedua wilayah
tersebut memicu sentimen agama
dan dihembuskan sebagai konflik
antar agama sehingga “mengundang”
kelompok Islam radikal untuk terjun
langsung dengan mengatas namakan
Jihad.
Kesadaran akan keberadaan
dan aktifitas JI mulai muncul setelah
terjadinya peristiwa bom Bali tahun
2002 yang diikuti dengan berbagai
aksi kekerasan lainnya39 sehingga
pemerintah membentuk Satuan Tugas
Anti Teror yang kemudian berkembang
39 Dari tahun 2000-2011 telah terjadi 65 peristiwa teror yang
mengakibatkan 300 orang meninggal dan 934 luka-luka.
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
ended and all civilizations of the world
will move towards liberal democratic
order38 giving space to radical Islamist
network to develop as well. The
typical values of liberal democracy
which prioritize the rule of law, civil
government, human rights protection,
and liberalism in various fields have
influenced the way to manage a state
and the problems within it.
Understanding of improper
liberal democracy also impacts the
strengthening of primordialism,
either based on regionalism, tribes,
ethnicity and religion. From the
existed primordialism, religious-based
primordialism is considered to be the
most dangerous because religious
sentiments are easily capitalized
in leading low-class society into
demonstrations and anarchist acts.
That is why in the early reform era
horizontal conflicts were often occured,
among them were conflict in Ambon
(Maluku) and Poso (Central Sulawesi).
Conflicts in both regions triggered
religious sentiments and were exposed
as inter-religious conflicts to "invite"
radical Islamic groups to directly come
in the name of Jihad.
38 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(London: Simon and Schuster, 2006), p. 42.
23
menjadi Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti
Teror. Dalam menghadapi aksi-aksi
teror, pemerintahan Presiden Megawati
(saat itu) lebih mengedepankan peran
Polri sebagai aparat penegak hukum.
Dengan dukungan intelijen yang kuat
serta kerjasama dengan negara-
negara lain, JI dapat dijinakkan.40
Gelombang Kedua terorisme
di Indonesia berlangsung sejak
munculnya Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) dengan Abubakar Al
Baghdadi sebagai pemimpinnya. ISIS
berkeinginan untuk menghidupkan
kembali Kekhalifahan Islam atau
Khilafah Islam yang menjadi penguasa
dunia. ISIS mempunyai agenda untuk
memperluas pengaruhnya ke seluruh
dunia, baik ke negara-negara Islam
maupun non Islam, bahkan sampai ke
Eropa dan Amerika. Dengan kekuatan
persenjataan yang dimiliki, penguasaan
sumber ekonomi dan militansi para
pejuangnya, ISIS menjadi organisasi
radikal Islam yang paling ditakuti di
dunia.41 Serangan yang dilakukan
juga tidak hanya di Suriah dan Irak
tetapi menyebar ke seluruh dunia.
Pusat Kajian Keamanan Nasional
40Selama periode tersebut, Polri berhasil menangkap lebih dari
500 orang terduga teroris. Meskipun masih terjadi aksi-aksi
teror dalam skala kecil, sejak tahun 2010 aksi terror menurun
drastis dengan ditangkapnya Abu Bakar Baasyir dan Aman
Abdurahman.
41 Michael Weiss and others, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror
(New York: Regan Arts, 2016), pp. xvii–xviii.
24 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
The awareness of JI existence
and activities began to emerge after the
2002 Bali Bombing followed by various
acts of violence39 until the government
established Anti Terror Task Force
which later developed into Special
Detachment 88 Anti Terror. In facing
the acts of terror, President Megawati’s
government (then) put forward the role
of the Police as the law enforcement
apparatus. With strong intelligence
support and cooperation with other
countries, JI could be tamed.40
The second wave of terrorism
in Indonesia took place since the
emergence of the Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) with Abubakar
Al Baghdadi as its leader. ISIS wishes
to revive the Islamic Caliphate, or the
Islamic Caliphate is the ruler of the
world. ISIS has an agenda to expand
its influence worldwide, both to Muslim
and non-muslim countries, even to
Europe and America. With its armament
possesion, economic resources and
militancy of its fighters, ISIS became the
39 From 2000-2011 there have been 65 terror events resulting in
300 deaths and 934 injuries.
40 During that period, Police managed to capture more than
500 people suspected terrorists. Although terror acts continue to
occur on a small scale, since 2010 the acts of terror have declined
drastically with the arrest of Abu Bakar Baasyir and Aman
Abdurahman.
(Puskamnas) mencatat bahwa dari
361 serangan terror selama tahun
2015 di seluruh dunia, serangan yang
dilakukan ISIS adalah yang terbanyak
yaitu 80 kali serangan diikuti oleh Boko
Haram sebanyak 66 kali serangan dan
Taliban dengan 22 kali serangan.42
Dalam menyebarkan ideologinya,
ISIS sangat aktif menggunakan
jaringan dunia maya atau internet
untuk merekrut anggota-anggota
baru. Internet menjadi komponen
yang penting dalam pengembangan
ISIS, termasuk mampu mengundang
simpatisannya untuk bergabung
langsung ke wilayah perjuangannya
di Irak dan Suriah sebagai Foreign
Terrorist Fighters (FTF). Banyak
warga muslim dari seluruh dunia,
bahkan wanita dan anak-anak dengan
sukarela bergabung dengan ISIS
dengan harapan mendapatkan Islam
yang sesungguhnya.
Jatuhnya Mosul dan Raqqa
sebagai basis terkuat ISIS ke tangan
tentara Irak pada bulan Juli 2017
membawa babak baru dalam aksi
terorisme dengan melakukan aksinya
di luar Irak dan Suriah. Para simpatisan
dan militas ISIS melakukan aksi-aksi
terror di manapun dan kapanpun
mereka berada tanpa harus menunggu
42 Ali Asghar, ‘Gerakan Terorisme Tahun 2015: Pola Serangan,
Jumlah Korban Dan Wajah Baru Global Jihad’, Jurnal Keamanan
Nasional, 2.1 (2016), 1–18 (p. 4).
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
most feared radical Islamic organization
in the world.41 The attacks were carried
out not only in Syria and Iraq but also
spread throughout the world. The
National Security Assessment Center
(Puskamnas) recorded that of from 361
terror attacks worldwide in 2015, ISIS
attacks were the highest of 80 attacks,
followed by Boko Haram 66 attacks,
and Taliban with 22 attacks.42
In spreading its ideology, ISIS
is very active in using cyber world or
internet to recruit new members. The
Internet has become an important
component in ISIS development,
including in inviting its sympathizers
to join directly into the territory of their
fighting in Iraq and Syria as Foreign
Terrorist Fighters (FTF). Many Muslims
from all over the world, even women and
children have joined ISIS voluntarily in
the hope of getting the real Islam.
The fall of Mosul and Raqqa as
ISIS's strongest base to the hands of the
Iraqi army in July 2017 brought a new
41 Michael Weiss and others, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New
York: Regan Arts, 2016), pp. xvii–xviii.
42 Ali Asghar, ‘Gerakan Terorisme Tahun 2015: Pola Serangan,
Jumlah Korban Dan Wajah Baru Global Jihad’ (translated; The
2015 Terrorism Movement: Attack Pattern, Number of Victims
and New Faces of Global Jihad) Jurnal Keamanan Nasional, 2
(2016), 1–18, (p.4).
25
komando sebagai pembalasan dan
mengalihkan perhatian serangan ke
ISIS di Suriah dan Irak. Kembalinya
para FTF ke Indonesia ini perlu
diwaspadai sehingga pengalaman
dengan para Mujahid yang bergabung
dengan Taliban di Afganistan tidak
terulang kembali. Namun demikian,
terkait dengan kembalinya para
FTF ke tanah air terkendala oleh
belum adanya undang-undang yang
mengkriminalisasi aksi mereka di
Suriah dan Irak. Data dari Densus 88
menyebutkan bahwa sebanyak 678
orang Indonesia bergabung dengan
ISIS di Suriah baik orang dewasa
maupun anak-anak dimana terdapat
97 orang diantaranya tewas di sana.
Sedangkan sebanyak 66 orang WNI
berhasil digagalkan keberangkatannya
sebelum meninggalkan Indonesia.
Dari keseluruhan WNI yang berhasil
masuk ke Suriah, sebanyak 84 orang
diantaranya sudah kembali ke tanah
air.
Secara ideologi ada perbedaan
antara JI dengan ISIS. JI menganut
ideologi Salafi Jihadi atau Ideologi
Qutubiyan karena diperkenalkan
kembali oleh seorang tokoh radikal
Mesir, Sayyid Qutb sedangkan
ISIS menganut ideologi Takfiri.
Dalam Ideologi Salafi Jihadi tidak
diperbolehkan membunuh sesama
muslim dan apabila ada muslim yang
26 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
chapter in acts of terrorism by carrying
out its actions outside of Iraq and Syria.
ISIS sympathizers and militants commit
acts of terror wherever and whenever
they are located without having to wait
for command as retaliation and divert
the attention the attacks on ISIS in
Syria and Iraq. The return of FTFs to
Indonesia needs to be watched so that
previous experience with Mujahids who
joined the Taliban in Afghanistan does
not happen again. However, the return
of FTFs to their homeland is constrained
by the absence of laws that authorize
law enforcement authorities to take
act against them. Data from Densus
88 mentioned that 678 Indonesians
have joined ISIS in Syria, both adults
and children, 97 of them were killed
in the country. While 66 Indonesians
departures were successfully foiled
before they leave Indonesia. From
the total number of Indonesian who
managed to get into Syria, 84 persons
have returned to the homeland.
Ideologically there is a difference
between JI and ISIS. JI embraces
Salafi Jihadi ideology or Qutubiyan
ideology which being reintroduced by
an Egyptian radical figure, Sayyid Qutb,
while ISIS embraces Takfiri ideology.
terbunuh dalam aksi yang mereka
lakukan maka diyakini bahwa korban
tersebut juga akan masuk surga
(collateral casualty). Sebaliknya
Ideologi Takfiri dengan konsep
utamanya Tauhid lebih berbahaya
karena ideologi ini berpandangan
bahwa segala sesuatu yang tidak
berasal dari Tuhan dan diperuntukkan
Tuhan dapat dihancurkan, mereka
yang berbeda aliran boleh dibunuh,
termasuk sesama muslim.
Kehadiran ISIS disambut baik
oleh beberapa kelompok radikal di
Indonesia. Bagi kelompok militan
Islam, ISIS dianggap bisa menjadi jalan
baru bagi perjuangan menegakkan
syariah Islam pasca pudarnya
eksistensi Al-Qaeda. Segera setelah
deklarasi Negara Islam oleh ISIS,
Aman Abdurahman dengan Jamaah
Ansarut Daulah dan Abu Bakar Baasyir
dengan Jamaah Ansarut Tauhid (JAT)
menyatakan loyalitas dan dukungannya
kepada ISIS. Mereka berbai’at kepada
Abubakar Al Baghdadi sebagai Amir
ISIS.
Di tubuh JI sendiri terjadi perbedaan
dimana sebagian mendukung ISIS,
namun sebagian masih loyal kepada
Al Qaeda. Terjadinya perpecahan
tersebut disebabkan oleh adanya 2
(dua) alasan yaitu alasan ideologi
antara Salafi Jihadi (AL Qaeda) dengan
Takfiri (ISIS) dan alasan politis yaitu
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
Salafi Jihadi Ideology does not allow
killing fellow Muslims and if there are
Muslims who are killed in the action it
is believed that they will go to heaven
(Collateral Casualty). On the contrary
Takfiri Ideology with it main concept
Tauhid is more dangerous because it
believes that everything that does not
come from God and destined by God
can be destroyed, those who have
different view are allowed to be killed,
including fellow Muslims.
The presence of ISIS was
welcomed by some radical groups in
Indonesia. For Islamic militant groups,
ISIS is considered as a new path for
the struggle to enforce Islamic sharia
after the fading of Al-Qaeda existence.
Immediately after the ISIS Islamic
State declaration, Aman Abdurahman
with Jamaah Ansarut Daulah and Abu
Bakar Baasyir with Jamaah Ansarut
Tauhid (JAT) expressed their loyalty
and support to ISIS. They pledged
allegiance to Abubakar Al Baghdadi as
ISIS Emir.
In JI's own structure there are
friction in which some are supporting
ISIS, while some others are still loyal
to Al Qaeda. The friction is based on
2 (two) reasons, i.e. the ideological
27
tentang siapa yang menjadi pemimpin.
Pemimpin ISIS, Abubakar Al Baghdadi
masih belum dianggap sebagai tokoh
senior dalam jaringan Islam Radikal
bahkan boleh dikatakan sebagai
pendatang baru sehingga sebagian
tidak mengakui kepemimpinannya.
Saat ini JAD merupakan ancaman
terbesar bagi Indonesia karena
mereka sudah mempunyai struktur
di 8 (delapan) provinsi dan beberapa
daerah lainnya. Kelompok ini juga
memiliki hubungan dengan berbagai
elemen di Suriah sebagai melting pot,
Filipina, Malaysia dan Singapura.
Selama periode tahun 2010
sampai dengan 2017 di Indonesia
telah terjadi 130 aksi teror di mana
Polri mampu menangkap 896 terduga
teroris dengan 126 orang di antaranya
meninggal, 674 diajukan ke sidang
pengadilan dan 96 diantaranya dilepas.
Selama periode ini pula aksi-aksi teror
telah mengakibatkan 34 anggota Polri
meninggal dan 78 lainnya luka-luka.
Sejak tahun 2014, ancaman
terorisme lainnya muncul di Indonesia
sebagai akibat dari perkembangan
teknologi informasi dan komunikasi
dengan munculnya “lone wolf” atau self
radicalism yang penyebarannya tidak
mempunyai batas (borderless) dan
berafiliasi ke ISIS. Lone wolf adalah
fenomena teroris yang beroperasi
sendirian, dapat terjadi di mana saja,
28 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
reason between Salafi Jihadi (AL
Qaeda) and Takfiri (ISIS) and the
political reason on who the leader is.
The ISIS leader, Abubakar Al Baghdadi
is still not considered as senior figure
in the Radical Islamist network, he is
even regarded as a newcomer, so that
some of them do not recognize his
leadership.
Currently JAD is the biggest threat
to Indonesia because they already
have structures in 8 (eight) provinces
and several other areas. The group
also has links with various elements in
Syria as a melting pot, the Philippines,
Malaysia and Singapore.
During the period of 2010 to 2017
in Indonesia there have been 130
terrorist acts in which INP managed to
capture 896 suspected terrorists and
126 among them were dead, 674 were
brought to the court and 96 of them
were released. This terror acts period
have resulted in the death of 34 police
members and wounded 78 others.
Since 2014, other terrorist threats
have emerged in Indonesia because
of the development of information
and communication technology with
the emergence of "lone wolf" or self
radicalism in which its spreading is
kapan saja dan dilakukan oleh siapa
saja dengan motif yang terkadang
tidak jelas. Dalam hal lone wolf terkait
Islam radikal, para pelaku mendapat
pengaruh ideologi Islam radikal melalui
internet maupun media sosial. Melalui
internet pula mereka mendapatkan
pelatihan serta mempelajari cara
membuat bom, bahkan bom dengan
bahan radioaktif. Aksi-aksi ini lebih
didorong oleh aspek ideologis yaitu
keinginan untuk melaksanakan jihad
yang mereka anggap fardu ain atau wajib
bagi setiap Muslim untuk menegakkan
syariah, serta dorongan politis untuk
mengambil alih kekuasaan.43 Harapan
mereka dengan ikut melaksanakan
aksi tersebut maka kewajiban jihad
mereka telah terlaksana, dan memberi
contoh bagi yang lain untuk melakukan
jihad yang sama. Bola salju dapat
bergulir sehingga aksi military-foco ini
dapat meluas dan ditiru oleh yang lain
menjadi gerakan besar aksi kekerasan
melawan pemerintah.44
STRATEGI PENANGANAN
TERORISME DI INDONESIA
Dalam menghadapi terorisme
yang berkembang di Indonesia, pada
awalnya pemerintah mengedepankan
opsi pendekatan kekerasan (hard
approach) yaitu dengan melakukan
43 Richardson, op. cit., p. 70.
44 Johnson, op. cit., p. 28.
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
borderless and affiliated with ISIS.
Lone wolf is a terrorist phenomenon
who operates alone, could happen
anywhere, anytime and committed by
anyone with uncertain motive. In terms
of lone wolf related to radical Islam, the
perpetrators get the influence of radical
Islamic ideology through internet and
social media. Through the internet they
also get training and learning how to
make bombs, even bombs made of
radioactive material. These actions are
driven more by the ideological aspect
that is a desire to carry out jihad which
they consider fardu ain or obligatory
for every Muslim to enforce shari'a,
rather than the political impulse to take
power.43 Their hope in participating in
the action is that obligation to perform
jihad has been carried out, and could
be set as an example to others to do
the same. The snow ball is rolling so
that this military-foco action can be
expanded and imitated by others and
become a large violent movement
against the government44.
43 Richardson, op. cit., p. 70.
44 Johnson, op. cit., p. 28.
29
pengejaran dan penangkapan
terhadap para pelaku. Bahkan, pada
masa Orde Lama pemerintah lebih
mengedepankan strategi penggunaan
kekuatan militer (military led strategy)
khususnya pada saat menumpas
pemberontakan DI/TII. Pada masa
Orde Baru di bawah presiden
Soeharto, strategi yang digunakan
adalah memperkuat intelijen (intelijen
led strategy), sedangkan sejak era
Reformasi pemerintah menggunakan
strategi penegakan hukum (law
enforcement led strategy) dengan Polri
sebagai ujung tombaknya.
Saat ini, strategi yang digunakan
untuk memberantas terorisme adalah
menggunakan gabungan antara
“hard approach” dan “soft approach”.
Penanganan dengan hard approach
dilakukan dengan strategi penegakan
hukum melalui “due process of
law” memang berhasil mengurangi
aksi-aksi kekerasan, namun tidak
mampu memberantas radikalisme
dan terorisme yang sudah menyebar.
Polri menjadi leading sector untuk
melakukan penegakan hukum
terhadap jaringan Islam radikal. Pada
tahun 2002 Polri membentuk Satuan
Tugas Bom dan tahun 2003 unit khusus
bernama Detasemen Khusus 88 Anti
Teror untuk merealisasi kebijakan ini.
Dari sudut pandang strategis,
penerapan strategi penegakan hukum
30 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
STRATEGY OF COUNTER
TERRORISM IN INDONESIA
In dealing with growing terrorism
in Indonesia, the government had
initially put forward a hard approach
by conducting pursuit and arrest of
the perpetrators. Even during the Old
Order regime, the government had
put forward the military led strategy,
particularly in cracking down the
Islamic State/Indonesia Islamic Military
(DI / TII) rebellion. The New Order
under President Soeharto was using
intelligence led strategy, whereas since
the Reform era, the government have
been applying the law enforcement led
strategy which the police act as the
spearhead.
Currently, the applied strategy to
combat terrorism is by combining the
"hard approach" and "soft approach".
Hard approach which is conducted
with law enforcement strategy through
"due process of law" has successfully
reducing violent actions, but not able to
eliminate the spreading of radicalism
and terrorism. The INP became the
leading sector in enforcing the law
against radical Islamic networks. In
2002 INP formed a Bomb Task Force
and in 2003 a special unit named
ini dirasakan cukup tepat karena
berpeluang besar untuk mendapatkan
dukungan publik nasional dan
internasional yang menjadi kunci
kemenangan penanganan terorisme.
Penggunaan kekuatan secara
minimum oleh penegak hukum, yang
mana setiap upaya paksa dilakukan
sesuai aturan hukum dan perlindungan
HAM para tersangka teror, telah
membuat publik menerima cara-cara
penanganan teroris yang dilakukan
pemerintah dan publik menganggap
pelaku teror tidak lain sebagai pelaku
pelanggar hukum dari pada pejuang
kebebasan atau pejuang agama.
Pada sisi lain, kelemahan
utama strategi ini adalah tindakan
yang terkadang lamban karena
untuk melakukan upaya paksa harus
diperoleh bukti-bukti hukum terlebih
dahulu, yang acapkali sulit diperoleh
karena pelaku teror juga memahami
taktik menghindari jeratan hukum.
Dengan menggunakan pendekatan
due process of law maka implementasi
sistem pembuktian yang ada justru
dapat mengakibatkan sukarnya aparat
penegak hukum membawa pelaku ke
pengadilan.
Di beberapa negara, taktik
terorisme dinetralisir dengan
penggunaan sistem hukum yang
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
Special Detachment 88 Anti Terror to
realize this policy.
From strategic point of view, the
application of the law enforcement
strategy is quite appropriate as it has
a great opportunity to gain national
and international public support, which
could be the key to victory in combating
terrorism. The minimum use of force
by law enforcement, whereas forcible
attempt is conducted in accordance
with the rule of law and human rights
protection of terror suspects, has made
public to accept the measures taken
by the government, and the public
has considered the terror perpetrators
as law breakers instead of freedom
fighters or religious fighter.
On the other side, the main
weakness of this strategy is that the
action seems to be a slowgoing, since
in performing forcible attempts must
be precedeed by legal evidence,
which often difficult to obtain since
the perpetrators are also understand
the tactics in avoiding legal process.
By using the due process of law then
the implementation of the existing
evidentiary system has brought
difficulties for law enforcement to bring
the perpetrators to the court.
31
bernuansa crime control model,45
sebagai konsekwensi dimasukkannya
terorisme sebagai kejahatan luar
biasa (extra ordinary crime), Memang
dengan digunakannya pendekatan
crime control akan menimbulkan
pro dan kontra karena pendekatan
ini berpotensi melanggar HAM dan
mengurangi civil liberty, namun dengan
besarnya resiko terhadap keamanan
nasional (national security) maka perlu
dicari formula aturan hukum yang
tepat dan dapat menyeimbangkan
kepentingan perlindungan civil liberty
dan national security 46.
Selain itu, dengan digunakannya
pendekatan penegakan hukum akan
menyisakan permasalahan terkait
keberadaan undang-undang tindak
pidana terorisme yang sekarang
berlaku karena regulasi yang ada
belum mampu mencegah orang
untuk pergi ke luar negeri meskipun
untuk bergabung dengan ISIS, belum
mampu menyentuh simpatisan dan
loyalis ISIS dan juga belum mampu
menyentuh para WNI yang pernah
bergabung dengan ISIS dan kembali
ke tanah air. Persoalan belum
lengkapnya aturan dalam UU nomor
15 tahun 2003 tentang Pemberantasan
45 Model ini memiliki fokus lebih pada keamanan nasional.
Akibatnya kebebasan sipil perlu untuk lebih diperhatikan,
misalnya terkait dengan pelanggaran HAM.
46 Joycelyn M. Pollock, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in
Criminal Justice (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016), p. 116.
32 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
In some countries, terrorism
tactics are neutralized by using a crime
control model,45 as a consequence
of the inclusion of terrorism as an
extraordinary crime. Indeed, the
use of a crime control approach will
lead to pros and cons because this
approach potentially violates human
rights and reduces civil liberty, but with
the magnitude of the risk to national
security it is necessary to find the
right formula which can balance the
interests of protecting civil liberty and
national security46.
In addition, the use of law
enforcement approach will leave
problems related to the existing
Terrorism Act, which has not been able
to prevent people from going overseas
eventhough they travel to join ISIS,
and has not been able to touch ISIS
sympathizers and loyalists, as well has
not been able to touch the Indonesian
citizen who had joined ISIS and
returned to the homeland. The problem
of incomplete rules in Law number
15 of 2003 on Combating Terrorism
45 This model has more focus on national security. As a result
civil liberties need to be more concerned, for example related to
human rights violations.
46 Joycelyn M. Pollock, Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in
Criminal Justice (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016), p. 116.
Tindak Pidana Terorisme membuat
sulit bagi Polri untuk menanganinya
secara dini. Penegakan hukum hanya
dapat dilakukan ketika ada perbuatan
nyata apakah itu pemboman maupun
penyerangan lainnya, sementara
terhadap perbuatan awal belum dapat
dikriminalisasikan. Polri tidak dapat
melakukan tindakan terhadap berbagai
aktifitas pelatihan yang dilakukan
(kecuali bila menggunakan senjata
api dan bahan peledak dapat dijerat
dengan UU no 12 Drt 1951). Terhadap
orang yang sudah nyata-nyata masuk
dalam organisasi teroris namun tidak
melakukan aksi teroris, Polri juga
tidak dapat melakukan penangkapan.
Selain itu, dalam undang-undang
pemberantasan terorisme yang ada,
belum memuat pengaturan yang
sistematis dan komprehensif dalam
pencegahan dan rehabilitasi terhadap
mereka yang sudah terkena paham
radikal. Dengan berbagai kendala
ini, aparat Polri sering dianggap tidak
efektif ketika terjadi sebuah aksi teror.
Strategi hard approach juga
dipandang tidak mampu menyentuh akar
permasalahan terkait dengan mindset
dan ideologi yang menjadi main driver
bagi para pelaku untuk melakukan aksi
kekerasan. Sebagaimana diketahui,
Ideologi Islamis radikal baik ideologi
Salafi Jihadi maupun Takfiri muncul di
Timur Tengah yang menyebar melalui
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
made it difficult for the INP to handle
it in early stage. Law enforcement can
only be conducted when there is real
action whether it is bombing or other
attacks, while the initial action can not
be criminalized. The INP can not take
action on various conducted training
activities (except the use of firearms
and explosives can be charged under
Emergency law No. 12 Year 1951).
Against those who have been clearly
involved in terrorist organizations, INP
can not make arrests either. Moreover,
in the existing anti-terrorism laws,
there has not been a systematic and
comprehensive arrangement in the
prevention and rehabilitation for those
who have already exposed to radical
ideology. With these various obstacles,
INP officers are often considered as
ineffective when the act of terror occurs.
Hard approach strategy is also
considered not able to touch the root
of the problem such as mindset and
ideology which become the main
drivers for perpetrators in committing
violence acts. As it is known, the radical
Islamist ideologies both Salafi Jihadi
and Takfiri ideologies which emerged in
the Middle East are spread out through
the internet and direct interaction. The
33
internet maupun hubungan langsung
dengan ideologi radikal. Ideologi
tersebut akhirnya dibawa masuk dan
disebarluaskan di Indonesia.
Untuk melengkapi strategi
hard approach, pemerintah juga
menggunakan strategi soft approach
yaitu melalui upaya pencegahan dan
penangkalan berkembangnya ideologi
Islamis radikal. Strategi pendekatan
lunak dalam menangani terorisme
dilakukan melalui 5 (lima) kegiatan
yaitu:
1. Kontra Radikalisasi (counter
radicalization) yang ditujukan
kepada pihak-pihak yang rentan
terhadap penyebaran paham
radikal seperti kalangan pemuda,
pelajar dan mahasiswa. Para
remaja yang sedang mencari
jati dirinya merupakan salah
satu target penyebaran paham
radikal. Oleh karena itu, melalui
kontra radikalisasi diharapkan
dapat meningkatkan daya tahan
mereka terhadap paham radikal.
2. Deradikalisasi (deradicalization)
yang ditujukan kepada mereka
yang sudah terkena dan
mempunyai paham radikal dalam
segala tingkatan. Program ini
dilakukan dengan melakukan
pendataan terhadap mereka
yang sudah terekrut, dilakukan
34 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
ideology was eventually brought in and
disseminated in Indonesia.
To complement the hard approach
strategy, the government also uses
soft approach strategy that is through
prevention and deterrence efforts on
the growing of radical Islamist ideology.
The soft approach strategy in handling
terrorism is conducted through 5 (five)
activities, those are:
1. Counter Radicalization (counter
radicalization) which aimed at
people who are vulnerable to the
spread of radical ideology, such
as youth, pupils and students.
Teenager who is still searching
for their own identity is one of the
targets of radical dissemination.
Therefore, counter radicalization
is expected to be able to increase
their resistance against radical
understanding.
2. Deradicalization is aimed at
those who have been exposed
to and have radical ideology at
all levels. This program is carried
out by collecting data on those
who have been recruited, they
are approached and analyzed
in order to obtain information on
their motivation in joining radical
 pendekatan dan dianalisa apa
yang menjadi motivasi mereka
untuk bergabung dengan
kelompok radikal. Program
deradikalisasi juga dilakukan
terhadap para pelaku yang
sedang ditahan di berbagai
lembaga pemasyarakatan,
namun pola ini kurang tertangani
dengan baik karena belum
adanya program yang jelas dalam
rangka deradikalisasi.
3. Kontra Ideologi (counter
ideology) yaitu dengan
menyebarkan ideologi yang
moderat melalui peran para
sarjana dan ulama, melibatkan
orang dalam (insider) yang sudah
meninggalkan paham radikal,
maupun dengan mengintensifkan
ideologi penantang (challenging
ideology). Ideologi penantang
yang diharapkan dapat
digunakan antara lain Islam
moderat ala Nahdatul Ulama
dan Muhammadiyah, ideologi
Pancasila dan Ideologi Demokrasi.
Upaya untuk menginternalisasi
kembali Pancasila dilakukan
pemerintah dengan membentuk
Unit Kerja Presiden Pembinaan
Ideologi Pancasila berdasarkan
Peraturan Presiden Nomor 54
Tahun 2017 Tentang Unit Kerja
Presiden Pembinaan Ideologi
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
group. A deradicalisation program
is also applied to prisoners in
correctional institution, but this
pattern is poorly handled due to
lack of precise deradicalisation
program.
3. Counter ideology by spreading
moderate ideology through the
role of scholars and ulema,
involving insiders who have left
radicalism, or by intensifying
the challenging ideology. The
challenger ideologies that can be
used, among others are moderate
Islam such as Nahdatul Ulama
and Muhammadiyah, Pancasila
and Democratic Ideology. The
effort to re-internalize the Five
Principles/Pancasila is carried
out by the government by setting
up the Presidential Working
Unit on Coaching of Pancasila
Ideology based on Presidential
Regulation No. 54 of 2017 on
the Presidential Working Unit on
Coaching Pancasila Ideology.47
47 Consideration of the issuance of Presidential Regulation no.
54 Year 2017 is: In the framework of actualization of Pancasila
values in the life of nation and state, and should be done coaching
ideology Pancasila to all state organizers, planned, systematic,
and integrated.
35
 Pancasila.47 4. Neutralize channel or media,
4. Menetralisir channel atau media, especially electronic media
khususnya media elektronik (online) which is utilized to spread
(online) yang digunakan untuk radical understanding through
penyebaran paham radikal
Taklim or by closely monitoring
melalui Taklim maupun dengan
mengawasi secara ketat terhadap the contents which are indicated
konten-konten yang terindikasi as radical ideology.
ideologi radikal. 5. Maintaining situation to prevent
5. Menjaga kondusifitas situasi the spread of radical Islam
untuk mencegah penyebaran because radicalism and terrorism
paham Islam radikal mengingat could arise and triggered
radikalisme dan terorisme
by, among others, poverty,
dapat muncul antara lain dipicu
economic disparity, revenge and
oleh kemiskinan, kesenjangan
ekonomi, balas dendam maupun marginalization, as mentioned
karena merasa termarjinalkan. by Marc Sageman that there are
Sebagaimana disebutkan oleh three main motives of terrorists to
Marc Sageman bahwa ada do their action: ideology, emotion
tiga motif utama pelaku teror and material48.
melakukan aksinya: ideologi, In the framework of countering
emosi dan materi48.
terrorism by using hard approach and
Dalam rangka penanganan
soft approach simultaneously, in 2010,
terorisme dengan menggunakan
strategi hard approach maupun President established National Agency
soft approach secara simultan, for Countering Terrorism (BNPT)
pada 2010 Presiden membentuk with the main task to coordinate law
Badan Nasional Penanggulangan enforcement and intelligence efforts,
Terorisme (BNPT) dengan tugas as well as for being executor on
prevention and rehabilitation activities,
47 Pertimbangan dikeluarkannya Perpres No. 54 Tahun 2017
adalah: Dalam rangka aktualisasi nilai-nilai Pancasila dalam which previously less touched by
kehidupan berbangsa dan bernegara, serta perlu dilakukan
pembinaan ideologi Pancasila terhadap seluruh penyelenggara
negara, yang terencana, sistematis, dan terpadu.
48 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 1st Edition 48 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 1st Edition
edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), edition (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004),
p. 131. p. 131.

36 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

utama mengkoordinasikan upaya
penegakan hukum dan intelijen, serta
menjadi eksekutor untuk kegiatan
pencegahan dan rehabilitasi, yang
sebelumnya kurang banyak disentuh
oleh Detasemen Khusus 88 Polri.
Secara umum, meskipun
radikalisme dan terorisme di Indonesia
saat ini sudah berkembang, namun
keberadaannya masih dapat dideteksi
dan dikendalikan. Namun demikian,
ada beberapa hal yang perlu menjadi
perhatian semua pihak terkait hal
tersebut yang mana hal ini dapat
dilihat dari sudut pandang kurang
menguntungkan atau “bad news”
dan kondisi yang menguntungkan
atau “good news”. Kondisi yang
kurang menguntungkan antara lain:
musuh (pelaku teror) semakin pintar
untuk menghindari deteksi Polri
dengan mengggunakan aplikasi yang
terenkripsi; menjadikan polisi dan
kepentingan Barat sebagai sasaran;
kemungkinan telah terbentuk jaringan
teroris regional dan internasional;
metode serangan semakin bervariasi
menggunakan senjata tajam, panci
bertekanan tinggi, bahkan unsur kimia
untuk “dirty bombs”.
Menghadapi situasi yang tidak
menguntungkan tersebut, tentunya
kita tidak boleh pesimis karena masih
ada kondisi yang menguntungkan
yaitu: negara masih lebih kuat dari
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
Special Detachment 88 of INP.
In general, despite radicalism and
terrorism development in Indonesia,
its existence can still be detected and
controlled. However, there are things
that needs to be the attention of all
parties related to this issue which
can be seen from the point of view
of less profitable or "bad news" and
favorable conditions or "good news".
Unfavorable conditions include: enemy
(terrorist) become cleverer to avoid
police detection by using encrypted
applications; targeting police and
Western interests; possibility of
establishing regional and international
terrorist networks; attacking methods
which are increasingly varied by using
sharp weapons, high pressure pans,
even chemical elements for "dirty
bombs".
Facing such an unfortunate
situation, we should not be pessimistic
because there are still favorable
conditions, such as the state is stronger
than radical and terrorist groups; their
structure can be identified; the quality
of attack is weaker than the JI; the split
between JI and JAD; and majority of
Indonesian people reject violence and
radical ideology.
37
kelompok radikal dan teroris; struktur
mereka mampu diidentifikasi; kualitas
serangan masih lebih lemah dibanding
dengan JI; terjadi perpecahan antara
JI dan JAD; serta mayoritas rakyat
Indonesia menolak kekerasan dan
ideologi radikal.
PERAN POLRI DALAM
KERANGKA STRATEGI
PENANGANAN TERORISME
DI INDONESIA
Dalam kerangka strategi
penanganan terorisme sebagaimana
telah di jelaskan di atas, Polri
memegang peranan sentral khususnya
dalam proses penegakan hukum.
Peran Polri juga penting dalam
upaya pencegahan penyebaran
radikalisme. Penegakan hukum yang
efektif akan dapat memberikan efek
deteren, menekan terorisme dan
sekaligus memperoleh legitimasi dan
dukungan publik terhadap negara.
Untuk memenuhi peran ini maka Polri
harus memiliki kemampuan deteksi
yang baik, penyidikan secara ilmiah
(scientific crimel investigation), serta
striking force yang kapabel untuk
beroperasi di berbagai medan.
Dengan adanya Densus 88 Anti
Teror, penanganan aksi-aksi teror
di Indonesia relatif dapat tertangani
dengan baik mengingat Densus
38 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
INP’S ROLE IN COUNTERING
TERRORISM STRATEGY IN
INDONESIA
Within the framework of counter
terrorism strategy as described
above, Indonesian National Police
plays a central role especially in law
enforcement process. The role of
INP is also crucial in preventing the
spread of radicalism. An effective law
enforcement will provide deterrent
effects in supressing terrorism and
simultaneously gaining legitimacy and
public support towards the state. To
fulfill this role, INP must have good
detection capability, scientific crime
investigation, and capable striking
force to operate in various fields.
With the existence of Densus
88 Anti Terror, the handling of terror
acts in Indonesia is relatively well
handled, since Densus 88 has
special units filled by well trained
personnels, such as detection units
with analytical capabilities using
cutting-edge technology, technical
intelligence teams, many surveillance
teams and informant handling.
Scientific investigative capability is
also sufficient because of the existing
interrogator team understands the
culture of terrorism networks, well
88 memiliki unit-unit khusus yang
didalamnya ditempati personil yang
terlatih, seperti unit deteksi dengan
kemampuan analisis menggunakan
teknologi mutakhir, tim intelijen teknik,
sejumlah tim surveillance dan informant
handling. Kemampuan penyidikan
secara ilmiah juga cukup memadai
karena adanya tim interogator yang
memahami budaya jaringan terorisme,
tim penyidik yang kaya pengalaman,
tentunya tanpa mengabaikan
adanya dukungan teknis dari Pusat
Laboratorium Forensik Polri, tim DVI
(Disaster Victim Identification) Pusat
Kedokteran Kesehatan Polri, dan tim
Inafis Polri yang memiliki kemampuan
identifikasi. Dukungan operasi juga
diberikan oleh Brimob dan Satuan
Tugas (Satgas) Bom Polri yang telah
dibentuk pasca Bom Bali 2002. Satgas
ini bergerak amat fleksibel, karena
tidak masuk dalam struktur permanen
organisasi Polri. Anggotanya dapat
direkrut dan dilepas dari berbagai
satuan kerja tingkat Mabes dan
kewilayahan tanpa melalui proses
birokrasi berbelit-belit.
Khusus untuk kemampuan taktis
striking force, Densus 88 mendapat
dukungan penuh dari Korbrimob Polri.
Personel satuan taktis ini mendapat
latihan dengan persenjataan modern
sehingga mampu menjalankan operasi
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
experienced investigators, as well
as technical support of the Police
Forensic Laboratory Center, the DVI
(Disaster Victim Identification) team of
the Police Health Medical Center and
the team from Indonesia Automatic
Fingerprint Identification System
(INAFIS) with identification capability.
Operational support is also provided
by Mobile Brigade and INP Bomb
Task Force which was established
after the 2002 Bali Bombing. The task
force work with high flexibility, since
it is not under permanent structure of
INP organization. Members can be
recruited and released from various
working units at headquarters level and
territorial level without going through
complicated bureaucratic process.
Spesifically for tactical striking
force ability, Densus 88 has full support
from Mobile Brigade of INP. Personnels
of this tactical unit were trained with
modern weaponry so they could run
operations in urban territories. Besides
uniformed units (high profile), there
are also teams in charge of performing
closed operations without wearing
police uniform (low profile).
Prof. Rohan Gunaratna, in a
focus group discussion at STIK-PTIK
39
pada medan perkotaan. Selain satuan
terbuka berseragam (high profile),
terdapat juga tim yang bertugas
melakukan penindakan tertutup
berpakaian preman (low profile).
Prof. Rohan Gunaratna dalam
focus group discussion di STIK-PTIK
beberapa waktu lalu menyatakan bahwa
Indonesia cukup sukses menanganai
terorisme, namun Indonesia belum
mampu menangani Radikalisme
dengan baik . Terlepas dari cerita
49
sukses ini, ancaman terorisme tidak
sepenuhnya dapat dinetralisir dan
jaringannya diprediksi akan terus
berkembang terbukti dengan masih
terjadinya aksi-aksi terorisme hingga
kini, baik yang dilakukan perorangan
maupun kelompok. Dari hasil analisis
terhadap penanganan aksi terorisme
selama ini, permasalahan tersebut
muncul karena adanya beberapa
kelemahan yang utamanya bersumber
dari belum maksimalnya upaya
pencegahan dan rehabilitasi mengingat
sistemnya belum terintegrasi dengan
baik di antara stake holders, serta
kemampuan penegakan hukum yang
belum efektif karena masih ditemukan
banyak kelemahan dari regulasi yang
ada. Penangaan terorisme dengan
49 FGD dilaksanakan dalam rangka Transformasi STIK-PTIK
menjadi Universitas pada tanggal 30 Agustus 2017 di Lounge
Adhi Pradana STIK-PTIK Jakarta.
40 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
some time ago, stated that Indonesia is
quite successful in handling terrorism,
but Indonesia has not been able
to handle radicalism well49. Apart
from this success story, the threat of
terrorism has not been completely
neutralized and its network is predicted
will continue to grow, evidenced by
the ongoing acts of terrorism up to
now, either committed by individuals
or groups. From the analysis of
countering terrorism through out the
time, the problem arises because of
some weaknesses mainly because the
prevention and rehabilitation efforts
have not been maximized, considering
the system among stake holders is not
well integrated, as well as ineffective
ability of law enforcement since there
are still some weaknesses on the
existing regulations. The handling
of terrorism with law enforcement
alone, will certainly not touch the root
of the problems which has caused or
stimulated the occurrence of terrorism.
Regarding prevention and
rehabilitation efforts that have not
been integrated, the facts on the
ground show that prevention has not
49 FGD was held in the framework of STIK-PTIK Transformation
to University on August 30, 2017 at Adhi Pradana Lounge STIK-
PTIK Jakarta.
penegakan hukum semata, tentunya
tidak akan menyentuh akar masalah
yang menjadi penyebab maupun
stimulus terjadinya terorisme.
Terkait upaya pencegahan dan
rehabilitasi yang belum terintegrasi,
fakta di lapangan menunjukkan bahwa
pencegahan tidak banyak disentuh
oleh Densus 88, Satgas Bom Polri dan
elemen Polri lainnya. Memang Densus
88 melakukan kegiatan pencegahan
dan deradikalisasi namun masih
amat terbatas. Upaya pencegahan
dan rehabilitasi lebih bertumpu pada
BNPT. Sudah banyak upaya yang
diselenggarakan BNPT termasuk
pendekatan kepada kelompok moderat
dan radikal serta kampanye kepada
masyarakat umum. Namun upaya
ini tampaknya belum menyentuh
jaringan terorisme sehingga hasilnya
belum optimal. BNPT perlu memiliki
grand strategy pencegahan dan
rehabilitasi atau deradikalisasi dengan
landasan akademis yang kuat guna
mengkoordinasikan semua sumber
daya negara termasuk Polri untuk
melaksanakan pendekatan lunak.
Mengingat begitu sentralnya
peran Densus 88 anti teror dalam
pemberantasan terorisme di Indonesia,
maka Polri dengan dukungan
pemerintah melakukan penguatan
terhadap Densus 88. Penguatan
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
been touched completely by Densus
88, INP Bomb Task Force and other
elements of INP. It is true that Densus
88 is carrying out preventive and de-
radicalization activities but still is very
limited. Prevention and rehabilitation
efforts are more focused at BNPT.
Many efforts have been carried out
by BNPT including by conducting
approaches towards moderate and
radical groups and public campaign.
But this effort seems to have not
touched terrorism network, so that the
result is not yet optimal. BNPT needs
to have grand strategy on prevention
and rehabilitation or deradicalization
with strong academic foundation to
coordinate all state resources including
INP to implement the soft approach.
Given the central role of Densus
88 anti-terror in combating terrorism
in Indonesia, then the INP with the
support of the government have taken a
strengthening effort on Densus 88. The
strengthening efforts are by increasing
the capacity of Densus 88, increasing
echelon and rank of the Densus 88
commander, increasing the number of
Regional Task Force and expanding
its activities by including prevention
measure. The reinforcement is also
conducted towards equipment, capacity
41
dilakukan dengan memperbesar jumlah
kekuatan Densus 88, meningkatkan
eselon dan kepangkatan Kadensus
88, menambah jumlah Satuan Tugas
Wilayah dan memperluas kegiatan
dengan memasukkan aksi pencegahan.
Penguatan ini juga dilakukan terhadap
berbagai peralatan yang digunakan,
peningkatan kapasitas (capacity
building) dan anggaran operasional.
Begitu pula faktor regulasi
(perundangan-undangan), dalam hal
ini Undang-undang No. 15 tahun 2003
tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana
Terorisme50 yang menjadi dasar pijakan
yuridis dalam melakukan penegakan
hukum, masih menyisakan beragam
kelemahan. Pokok-pokok pikiran yang
diatur dalam Undang-undang No. 15
tahun 2003 tentang Pemberantasan
Tindak Pidana Terorisme adalah
untuk mengatur bentuk tindak pidana
terorisme, memberikan hukuman
yang berat, menambah sejumlah
kewenangan bagi penegak hukum
agar efektif mengungkap Bom Bali,
dan mempermudah hukum acara
bagi proses kasus terorisme Bom
Bali. Mengingat lahirnya Undang No.
15 tahun 2003 adalah respons atas
terjadinya peristiwa pemboman di Bali
tentunya jika dikaitkan dengan kondisi
50 Merupakan hasil penetapan dari Perppu No. 1 tahun 2002
yang dibuat dalam keadaan darurat merespon kasus Bom Bali 1
42 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
building and operational budget.
Similarly, on the regulation factor
(legislation), in this case the Law No.
15 of 2003 on Combating Terrorism
50
which became the basis of juridical
foundation in enforcing the law, still
have various weaknesses. The main
points set forth in Law no. 15 of 2003
on Combating Terrorism is to regulate
the form of terrorism, give severe
punishment, increase the number of
authority for law enforcers to effectively
reveal the Bali Bombing case, and
facilitate the procedural law for Bali
Bombing case. Since the birth of Law
no. 15 of 2003 was a response to the
Bali Bombing event, then of course if
it is associated with present condition,
many of provisions in the Law need to
be revised.
From the prosecution aspect
there are still weaknesses particularly
related with tactical unit capability in
the field besides urban. Inadequate
capabilities for operations in forest and
mountain areas has made some tactical
operations not yet optimal, such as
operation on military training of radical
group in Aceh in 2010 and operations
against Santoso group in Poso since
50 It is the result of the implementation of Perppu no.1 of 2002
made in an emergency response to the 1st Bali Bombing
kekinian, banyak aturan dalam undang-
undang tersebut sudah waktunya
dilakukan perubahan.
Dari aspek penindakan masih
ditemukan adanya kelemahan
khususnya terkait kemampuan satuan
taktis untuk medan selain perkotaan
(urban). Kurang maksimalnya
pembangunan kemampuan untuk
operasi di wilayah hutan dan gunung
membuat beberapa operasi taktis
belum berjalan optimal, seperti operasi
penindakan pelatihan militer kelompok
radikal di Aceh tahun 2010 dan operasi
terhadap kelompok Santoso di Poso
sejak 2012. Kelemahan ini akibat mulai
ditinggalkannya kemampuan Gerilya
Anti Gerilya (counter insurgency
operation) Brimob sejak 1998 sebagai
respons tuntutan perubahan Polri
menuju polisi sipil.
Kelemahan lain yang terdeteksi
dalam kerangka penindakan terorisme,
dari sisi anggaran belum tersedia
anggaran khusus untuk operasi Satgas
karena selama ini hanya mengandalkan
anggaran rutin. Absennya laboratorium
forensik di beberapa wilayah juga
menjadi kendala penting dalam rangka
melaksanakan penyidikan secara
ilmiah karena laboratorium forensik
hanya ada di beberapa wilayah saja,
seperti Jakarta, Makasar, Surabaya
dan Medan. Akibatnya, proses
The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia
2012. The shortcoming is due to the
abandonment of Mobile Brigade’s skill
for anti-Guerrilla (counter insurgency
operation) since 1998 as a response of
the INP reform towards civilian police.
Another weakness which is
detected in the framework of terrorism
prosecution is in terms of budgeting
in which a spesific budget is not
available for Task Force operations
as it is only rely on annual budget.
The absence of forensic laboratories
in some areas is also a constraint in
conducting scientific investigations
because forensic laboratories only
exist in certain areas, such as Jakarta,
Makassar, Surabaya and Medan. As a
result, the examination process could
take a relatively long time.
For tactical operations, the
obstacles encountered are occured
during operations in forests and high
mountains with thin oxygen. This
condition is often beneficial for the
terrorists who were born and raised in
the mountains so that their activities
are difficult to be dealt with. Similarly,
the vast geographical conditions,
difficult terrain of forests and islands
which are not supported by adequate
means of transportation often resulted
in the inffectivenes of back-up layer
43
pemeriksaan sampai menerima
hasilnya memerlukan waktu relatif
lama.
Untuk operasi taktis, kendala
yang dihadapi terjadi saat operasi
dilakukan di hutan dan gunung yang
tinggi dengan oksigen tipis. Kondisi
ini seringkali menjadi keuntungan bagi
pelaku teror yang lahir dan besar di
gunung sehingga kegiatan mereka
sulit untuk ditindak. Begitu pula, kondisi
geografis yang luas, medan gunung,
hutan dan pulau yang sulit namun
tidak didukung dengan ketersediaan
sarana transportasi yang memadai
sering mengakibatkan sistem back-up
lapis kemampuan dalam manajemen
operasional Polri kurang berjalan
sesuai harapan. Back-up dari satuan
atas cenderung terlambat untuk
mendukung satuan bawah dalam hal
terjadi serangan di medan sulit dan
terpencil seperti pegunungan Poso.
Negara harus melakukan
“tekanan” yang kuat kepada para
pelaku teror agar aksi-aksi terorisme
dapat diakhiri. Penguatan tekanan
negara bisa dilakukan dalam berbagai
perwujudan baik melalui penguatan
kapasitas sumber daya manusia,
peningkatan anggaran, modernisasi
sarana prasarana dan regulasi
yang mampu mengatasi persoalan
terorisme. Hal ini relevan dengan
44 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
system in operational management.
Backups by the upper units tend to
be late in supporting lower units in
difficult and remote terrain such as in
Poso mountains.
Goverment must conduct a strong
"pressure" toward the perpetrators
of terror so that acts of terrorism
can be immediately terminated. The
affirmation of government pressure
can be implemented in various
manifestations either through the
enhancement of human resources
capacity, increased budget,
modernization of infrastructure
facilities and regulations which are
capable in resolving terrorism. This is
relevant to Cronin's analysis, which is
the result of his research on several
terrorist and insurgent groups in
the world, stating that terrorism and
insurgency can come to an end, one
of which if there is a strong pressure
by the state.51
CONCLUSION
From the above explanation
can be drawn some conclusions as
follows:
51 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding
the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 117.
argumen Cronin, yang merupakan hasil 1. The shift in the paradigm of the
dari penelitiannya terhadap sejumlah world order system which leads
kelompok teroris dan insurgen di dunia, to Liberalism and Constructivism
saat menyatakan bahwa terorisme has caused potential conflict
dan insurgensi dapat berakhir salah which involve non-state actors
satunya adalah jika adanya tekanan to become even greater. One of
negara yang sangat kuat51. them is insurgency movement,
including terrorism by non-state
KESIMPULAN
actors against the state.
Dari penjelasan di atas dapat
2. Government implements soft
ditarik beberapa kesimpulan sebagai
approach and hard approach
berikut:
1. Perubahan paradigma strategy simultaneously.
sistem ketertiban dunia yang For the case of terrorism
mengarah pada Liberalisme by radical Islamist network,
dan Konstruktivisme telah government emphasizes counter-
menyebabkan potensi konflik radicalisation, deradicalisation,
yang melibatkan aktor non neutralize cyber and counter
negara menjadi semakin besar. ideology, and law enforcement
Salah satunya adalah gerakan option as a form of hard approach.
insurgensi, termasuk terorisme 3. INP has done good enough in
oleh aktor non negara terhadap implementing law enforcement
negara. on radical Islamist insurgency
2. Pemerintah menerapkan strategi by utilizing Densus 88 Anti
pendekatan lunak dan keras
Terror as its spearhead, even
secara simultan. Untuk kasus
though in some aspect many
terorisme jaringan Islamis
obstacles are still found which
radikal pemerintah menekankan
impacting the obtained results
pendekatan lunak kontra
radikalisasi, deradikalisasi, that is not maximized. While the
menetralisir Siber dan kontra soft approach is conducted by
promoting BNPT in the front line,
51 Audrey Kurth Cronin, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding in which INP’s contribution on this
the Decline and Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 2009), p. 117. field has not run optimally.

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 45

 ideologi, serta opsi penegakan
hukum sebagai bentuk
pendekatan keras.
3. Polri sudah cukup baik dalam
melaksanakan penegakan hukum
insurgensi jaringan Islamis radikal
dengan ujung tombak Densus
88 Anti Teror sekalipun dalam
beberapa aspek masih ditemukan
kendala yang berdampak
pada belum maksimalnya hasil
yang diperoleh. Sedangkan
pendekatan lunak dilakukan
dengan mengedepankan BNPT,
dimana kontribusi Polri di bidang
ini belum optimal.
REKOMENDASI
1. Pemahaman tentang insurgensi
dan kontra insurgensi perlu
diserap oleh semua perwira Polri,
karena sebagai penanggung
jawab keamanan dan ketertiban
masyarakat di dalam negeri sesuai
dengan Undang-undang No. 2
tahun 2002 tentang Kepolisian
Negara Republik Indonesia, Polri
berposisi sebagai garda terdepan
dalam penanganan insurgensi
dan terorisme di Indonesia.
2. Polri perlu mengintensifkan
pelibatan fungsi intelijen dan
Bimmas di semua tingkatan untuk
melaksanakan pendekatan,
46 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Understanding insurgency and
counter insurgency needs to
be absorbed by all INP officers,
because as a person in charge
of security and public order in the
country, pursuant to the Law No.
2 of 2002 on the National Police
of the Republic of Indonesia,
INP stands as the front guard
in countering insurgency in
Indonesia.
2. INP needs to intensify the inclusion
of intelligence and Community
Counselling (Bimmas) functions
at all levels to implement
approaches, pre-conditioning and
detection as tools of prevention
and rehabilitation of radical
Islamist insurgency. Therefore, it
is necessary to set up a specific
budget system within the INP to
support this effort. Involvement
of territorial units is very crucial
considering the vastness of
terrorist networks in many
provinces.
3. INP should encourage relevant
and competent agencies to revise
the law on combating terrorism to
be stronger in protecting national
security, without ignoring the law
 penggalangan dan deteksi dalam supremacy and protection of
rangka tindakan pencegahan dan human rights (equilibrium of crime
rehabilitasi insurgensi Islamis control model and due process of
radikal. Untuk itu perlu diatur law).
sistem anggaran khusus dalam 4. INP needs to improve INP’s
sistem anggaran Polri guna Mobile Brigade tactical ability
mendukung upaya ini. Pelibatan to be effective in conducting
satuan kewilayahan sangat
enforcement operations in forest
penting mengingat luasnya
and mountain areas, while
jaringan teroris di banyak provinsi.
maintaining law enforcement
3. Polri perlu mendorong
operations framework. This
instansi terkait dan kompeten
untuk merevisi aturan capability should also be
perundang-undangan tentang developed to support the
pemberantasan tindak pidana effectiveness of INP’s operations
terorisme agar lebih kuat dalam in some areas which are prone to
melindungi keamanan nasional, armed groups.
namun tanpa mengabaikan 5. Intelligence, Community
ditegakkannya supremasi Counselling and Public Relations
hukum dan perlindungan HAM of provincial Police at territories
(equilibrium of crime control which are prone to terrorism need
model and due process of law). to be strengthened with adequate
4. Polri perlu mengembangkan personnel, budget and equipment
kemampuan taktis Brimob Polri to maximize the soft approach.
agar efektif dalam melaksanakan
Backups from INP’s Headquarters
operasi penindakan di wilayah
are also required, especially
hutan dan gunung, dengan tetap
for intelligence and Community
berpijak pada kerangka operasi
Counselling activities.
penegakan hukum. Kemampuan
ini perlu juga dikembangkan untuk
mendukung efektifitas operasi 6. INP needs to have Center for
penindakan Polri di beberapa Assessment of Radicalism and
wilayah rawan kelompok Terrorism which can be utilized as
bersenjata. one of studies in Police Science

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 47

5. Intelijen, Bimmas dan Humas College (STIK PTIK). INP has
Polda yang di wilayahnya already own a field laboratory
terdapat daerah rawan terorisme related to radicalism and terrorism
perlu diperkuat dengan in Densus 88 so that it will be more
dukungan personel, anggaran comprehensive if complemented
dan peralatan yang memadai with academic studies at higher
untuk memaksimalkan upaya educational level.
pendekatan lunak. Back-up dari
Finally, I would like to quote
Mabes Polri juga diperlukan,
Joseph Stycos's statement in Louis
khususnya untuk kegiatan
Richardson's book "What Terrorists
intelijen dan Bimmas.
Want": If theory without policy is for
6. Polri perlu mempunyai Pusat
Pengkajian Radikalisme dan academics, then policy without theory
Terorisme yang dapat dijadikan is for gamblers". If the theory without
salah satu kajian di STIK PTIK. being formulated into policy is for
Polri telah memiliki Laboratorium academics, then policy without theory
lapangan terkait radikalisme dan is chancy. So, be practitioners who are
terorisme di Densus 88 sehingga also academics to make policy based
akan lebih komprehensif apabila on strong academic analysis, not
ditambah dengan kajian akademis chancy.
di tingkat pendidikan tinggi.
Akhirnya saya ingin mengutip
kata-kata Joseph Stycos dalam buku
Louis Richardson “What Terrorists
Want”: If theory without policy is for
academics, then policy without theory
is for gamblers”. Jika teori tanpa
dirumuskan menjadi kebijakan adalah
untuk para akademisi, maka kebijakan
tanpa teori adalah untung-untungan.
Maka jadilah praktisi yang juga
akademisi agar membuat kebijakan
yang dilandasi analisis akademik yang
kuat, bukan untung-untungan.

48 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

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The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 51

52 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
 Daftar Riwayat Hidup

1. Data Pribadi
Nama : Prof. H. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, M.A.,Ph.D.
Tempat & Tanggal Lahir : Palembang,26 Oktober 1964
Pangkat/ Nrp : Jenderal Polisi / 64100600
Jabatan : Kapolri
Kesatuan : Mabes Polri
Agama : Islam
Nama Orang Tua : Alm H Achmad Saleh Dan Ibu Kordiah
Nama Istri : Ir. Tri Suswati, M.Si.
Nama Anak Kandung : 1) Muhammad Garda Ramadhito
2) Lavia Agusta
3) Muhammad Oktovan Tito
Alamat Rumah : Jl. Patimura No. 37 Kebayoran Baru Jaksel
Kantor : Jl. Trunojoyo No. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jaksel

2. Pendidikan
A. Pendidikan Umum
1) SD Xaverius 4 Palembang (1976);
2) SMP Xaverius 2 Palembang (1980);
3) SMA Negeri 2 Palembang (1983);

B. Pendidikan Kepolisian
1) Akademi Kepolisian (Akpol) sebagai Lulusan Terbaik Peraih Bintang
Adhi Makayasa (1987);
2) Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian (PTIK) (1996) sebagai Lulusan
Terbaik Peraih Bintang Wiyata Cendekia;
3) Sespim Polri, Lembang (2000); - penyamaan dari Sesko di New
Zealand;
4) Lemhannas RI PPSA XVII Peserta Terbaik Peraih Bintang Seroja
(2011);

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 53

 C. Pendidikan Luar Negeri
1) Master of Arts (M.A.) In Police Studies, University of Exeter, United
Kingdom (1993);
2) Royal New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff College,
Auckland, New Zealand (1998)
3) Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) In Strategic Studies, Massey University, New
Zealand (1998)
4) Ph. D in Strategic Studies with Interest in Terrorism and Islamist
Radicalization at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Dengan Predikat
Magna Cum Laude (2013);

3. Jabatan
A. Pamapta Polres Metro Jakarta Pusat Polda Metro Jaya (1987)
B. Kanit Jatanras Reserse Polres Metro Jakarta Pusat Polda Metro Jaya
(1989)
C. Wakapolsek Metro Sawah Besar Polres Metro Jakarta Pusat Polda Metro
Jaya (1992)
D. Kapolsek Metro Cempaka Putih Polres Metro Jakarta Pusat Polda Metro
Jaya (1996)
E. Sespri Kapolda Metro Jaya (1996)
F. Sespri Kapolri (1997)
G. Kasat Serse Ekonomi Direktorat Reserse Polda Metro Jaya (1999)
H. Kasat Serse Umum Direktorat Reserse Polda Metro Jaya (2000)
I. Kabag Serse Tipiter Direktorat Reserse Polda Sulsel (2002)
J. Kasat I/ Keamanan Negara Dit Reskrimum Polda Metro Jaya (2003)
K. Kaden 88 Anti Teror Polda Metro Jaya (2004)
L. Kapolres Serang Polda Banten (2005)
M. Kasubden Intelijen Densus 88/AT Bareskrim Polri (2006)
N. Kadensus 88/AT Bareskrim Polri (2009)
O. Deputi Penindakan dan Pembinaan Kemampuan Badan Nasional
Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) (2010)

54 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

 P. Kapolda Papua (2012)
Q. Asrena Polri (2014)
R. Kapolda Metro Jaya (2015)
S. Kepala Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) (2016)
T. Kapolri (2016 - Sekarang)

4. Kepangkatan
A. Inspektur Polisi Dua (1987)
B. Inspektur Polisi Satu (1990)
C. Ajun Komisaris Polisi (1993)
D. Komisaris Polisi (1997)
E. Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi (2001)
F. Komisaris Besar Polisi (2005)
G. Brigadir Jenderal Polisi (2010)
H. Inspektur Jenderal Polisi (2012)
I. Komisaris Jenderal Polisi (2016)
J. Jenderal Polisi /. (2016)

5. Tanda Kehormatan Dan Penghargaan:

A. Bintang Bhayangkara Utama dari Presiden RI
B. Bintang Bhayangkara Nararya dari Presiden RI
C. Bintang Bhayangkara Pratama dari Kapolri
D. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 8 Tahun
E. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 16 Tahun
F. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 24 Tahun
G. Satyalencana Dwija Sistha
H. Satyalencana Bhakti Buana
I. Satyalencana Bhakti Nusa
J. Satyalencana Darma Nusa
K. Satyalencana Jana Utama
L. Satyalencana Karya Bakti
M. Satyalencana Ksatria Bhayangkara
N. Satyalencana Operasi Kepolisian

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 55

 O. 3 (Tiga) Kenaikan Pangkat Luar Biasa (KPLB), Yaitu:
• Komisaris Polisi Menjadi Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi (2001)
• Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi Menjadi Komisaris Besar Polisi (2005)
• Komisaris Besar Polisi Menjadi Brigadir Jenderal Polisi (2010)

6. Kasus Menonjol yang Ditangani:

A. Korupsi Bulog (1999)
B. Bom Kedubes Filipina, Jakarta (2000)
C. Bom Bursa Efek Jakarta, Jakarta (2001)
D. Bom Malam Natal Jakarta (2001)
E. Bom Plaza Atrium, Senen Jakarta Pusat (2001)
F. Pembunuhan Hakim Agung Safiudin Kartasasmita, Jakarta (2001)
G. Bom Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan (2002)
H. Bom di Gedung MPR/DPR, Jakarta (2003)
I. Bom Bandara Internasional Sukarno Hatta Jakarta (2003)
J. Bom J.W. Mariott, Jakarta (2003)
K. Pembunuhan Direktur PT. Asaba (2004)
L. Bom Cimanggis Depok (2004)
M. Bom Kedubes Australia Jakarta (2004)
N. Bom Bali II (2005)
O. Mutilasi 3 Siswi Di Poso, Sulawesi Tengah (2006)
P. Bom Pasar Tentena, Poso, Sulawesi Tengah (2005)
Q. Mutilasi Kepala Desa Pinedapa, Poso, Sulawesi Tengah (2006)
R. Bom Hotel Ritz Carlton dan J.W. Marriott, Jakarta (2009)
S. Operasi Pengungkapan Latihan Paramiliter Teroris di Aceh (2010)
T. Operasi Pengungkapan Perampokan Bersenjata CIMB Bank Medan
(2010)
U. Operasi Pengungkapan Bom Bunuh Diri di Polres Cirebon Kota (2011)
V. Operasi Pengungkapan Bom Buku dan Parsel di Jakarta (2011)
W. Operasi Pengungkapan Terorisme Penembakan dan Bom di Aceh (2012)
X. Bom Bunuh Diri di Jalan Thamrin, Jakarta Pusat (2016)
Y. Operasi Tinombala dalam rangka Pemberantasan Jaringan Teroris
Santoso, Poso, Sulteng (2016)

56 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

7. Buku-Buku dan Jurnal Internasional
1. Indonesian Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso, PT. Gramedia Pustaka
Utama, Jakarta, 2008.
2. Bhayangkara di Bumi Cenderawasih, ISPI Strategic Series, Jakarta,
2014.
3. Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah
and the Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007, Imperial College
Press, London, 2015.
4. Regional Fraternity: Collaboration Between Violent Islamist Groups In
Indonesia and The Philippines, Bab dalam Buku “Terrorism In South And
Southeast Asia In The Coming Decade”, diedit oleh Daljit Singh, ISEAS
and MacMillan, Singapura, 2009.
5. Intercourse with Tragedy, Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2016.
6. Polri dalam Arsitektur Negara, Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2016.
7. Democratic Policing, Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2017.
8. The Role of the National Police in Countering Insurgencies in Indonesia
dalam A Journal of The International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (CTR), Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, RSIS,
NTU, Volume 9, issue 09, September 2017.

8. Kegiatan Kuliah Umum:

A. 26 Oktober 2016, Press Briefing 2 tahun kerja Jokowi – JK dengan tema:
Reformasi Hukum, Gedung Bina Graha Jakpus.
B. 24 November 2016, Rapat Koordinasi dan Dialog Terbuka Gubernur Se
Indonesia dengan tema: “Koordinasi Kamtib dalam Menghadapi Dinamika
Politik dalam Negeri”, Gedung Sasana Bhakti Praja Kemendagri
C. 30 November 2016, Keynote Speech dengan tema: Peta Jalan Menuju
Aturan Hukum yang Berkelanjutan, Gedung Rektorat Lt. B Universitas
Jayabaya
D. 19 Desember 2016, Keynote Speech dalam Acara Forum Diskusi bagi
Generasi Muda dengan tema: Merangkai Indonesia dalam Kebhinnekaan,
Universitas Negeri Jakarta

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 57

 E. 21 Desember 2016, Narasumber dengan tema: Peranan Polisi dan
Perguruan Tinggi dalam Pencegahan Gerakan Radikalisme dan
Terorisme, Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa
F. 26 Desember 2016, Kuliah Umum di Universitas Trunojoyo dengan tema:
Pergulatan Politik Internasional dan Dampaknya bagi NKRI yang Ber-
Bhinneka, Gedung Pertemuan Kampus Universitas Trunojoyo Madura
G. 17 Januari 2017, Keynote Speech FGD Terkait Fatwa MUI dengan tema:
Fatwa MUI dan Hukum Positif, Lounge Adhi Pradana STIK PTIK
H. 18 Januari 2017, Narasumber dalam Pembekalan kepada Praja IPDN
di Kampus IPDN Jatinangor dengan tema : Kebijakan Penyelenggaraan
Pemerintahan Bidang Ketentraman, Ketertiban dan Perlindungan
Masyarakat RI, Balairung Rudini Kampus IPDN Jatinangor Sumedang
I. 27 Januari 2017, Pembicara dalam Kuliah Umum dengan tema:
Penegakkan Hukum di Indonesia, Gedung Yustinus Kampus Unika
Atmajaya Jakarta
J. 10 Februari 2017, Ceramah dan Kuliah Umum di Universitas Ibnu
Chaldun, dengan tema: Peran Polri dan Perguruan Tinggi dalam
Mendorong Terciptanya Pembangunan Hukum yang Berkeadilan, Aula
Prof. Bahder Dhohan Universitas Ibnu Chaldun
K. 17 Februari 2017, Kuliah Umum di Universitas Syahkuala, dengan
tema: Memantapkan Demokrasi dan Memperkuat NKRI dari Aceh untuk
Indonesia, Universitas Syahkuala
L. 3 Maret 2017, Keynote Speech dan Membuka Acara Silaturahmi BEM
Nusantara dengan tema: Membangun Kedaulatan dan Memperkukuh
Kebangsaan, Universitas Islam Riau
M. 8 Maret 2017, Narasumber dalam Kuliah Umum di Institut Teknologi
Bandung dengan tema: Perkembangan Demokratisasi dan Globalisasi
serta Dampaknya bagi Kebhinnekaan di Indonesia, Aula Barat ITB
N. 11 April 2017, Ceramah Kepada Peserta Didik Sespimti Polri Dikreg Ke 26
dan Sespimen Polri Dikreg Ke 57, dengan tema: Ancaman Radikalisme
dan Terorisme di Indonesia, Gedung Utaryo Suryawinata Sespim Polri
O. 12 April 2017, Kuliah Umum pada Acara GPII dengan tema: Merawat
Indonesia yang Damai dan Aman, Gedung Juang 45

58 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

P. 25 April 2017, Narasumber Kuliah Umum dengan tema: “Nasionalisme,
Keragaman, serta Tantangan Transnational Crime dalam Pembangunan
Generasi Milenial” Balairung Kampus UI Depok
Q. 26 April 2017, Dosen Tamu dalam Acara Kuliah Umum dengan tema:
Pentingnya Peneguhan Nilai-Nilai Pancasila dan Ke-UGM-an demi
Kedaulatan NKRI dan Mendorong Indonesia Memimpin Dunia, Graha
Sabha UGM
R. 26 April 2017, Dosen Tamu dalam Acara Kuliah Umum dan Sarasehan
Bersama para Guru Besar UGM, Graha Sabha UGM
S. 25 Agustus 2017, Keynote Speech di The Pyramid dengan tema:
Perkembangan Indonesia Khususnya Pemberantasan Terorisme dan
Radikalisme Agama di Indonesia, 2 Goodwood Hill Singapura
T. 7 September 2017, Keynote Speech dengan tema: Speech on Terrorism,
Cyber Crime and National Security, Universitas Airlangga
U. 23 September 2017, Orasi Ilmiah pada Wisuda Magister, Sarjana dan
Ahli Madya Ke 59 Periode 2017 dengan tema: Mewujudkan Indonesia
sebagai Negara Dominan, Auditorium Ukhuwah Islamiyah – Universitas
Muhammadiyah Purwokerto
V. 25 September 2017, Pemateri Seminar Kebangsaan Pertemuan
Perguruan Tinggi se Indonesia, dengan tema: Peran Lembaga
Pendidikan Tinggi sebagai Benteng Perlawanan terhadap Radikalisme
serta Ancaman bagi Pancasila dan NKRI, BNDCC - Bali
W. 3 Oktober 2017, Keynote Speech dalam Seminar Sekolah Sespimen
Dikreg Ke-57 T.A. 2017, dengan tema: Penguatan Implementasi Nilai
Kebhinekaan terhadap Ancaman Disintegrasi Bangsa, Auditorium STIK -
PTIK
X. 11 Oktober 2017, Keynote Speech dalam Kongres Ke IV BEM / Dema
PTAI Se – Indonesia dengan tema: Peran Pemuda dalam Mewujudkan
Indonesia sebagai Negara Dominan, Gedung Akademik Center UIN
Raden Fatah Palembang

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 59

60 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Reading Sources:
Abas, Nasir, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah: pengakuan mantan anggota
JI (translated; Uncover Jamaah Islamiyah: confession of ex JI member) (Jakarta:
Grafindo Khazanah Ilmu, 2005)
Ba’asyir, Abu Bakar, Catatan dari penjara: mengamalkan dan menegakkan
Dinul Islam (translated; Note from prison: practise and establish Dinul) (Depok:
Komunitas Bambu, 2006)
Baylis, John, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the Contemporary
World (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2013)
Benbow, Tim, and Rod Thornton, Dimensions of Counter-Insurgency: Applying
Experience to Practice (New York: Routledge, 2013)
Chaliand, Gérard, The History of Terrorism: From Antiquity to ISIS (Oakland:
Univ of California Press, 2016)
Cronin, Audrey Kurth, How Terrorism Ends: Understanding the Decline and
Demise of Terrorist Campaigns (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009)
Dengel, Holk H., Darul Islam dan Kartosuwirjo: langkah perwujudan angan-
angan yang gagal (translated; Darul Islam and Kartosuwiryo: the steps of illusory
manifestations that fail) (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995)
Dreyfuss, Robert, Devil’s Game: How the United States Helped Unleash
Fundamentalist Islam (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2006)
Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Simon and
Schuster, 2006)
Gunaratna, Rohan, and Aviv Oreg, The Global Jihad Movement (Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2015)
Howard, Russell, ‘Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism’,
in Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment,
Readings and Interpretations, by Bruce Hoffman and Russell Howard, 4 edition
(New York (N.Y.): McGraw-Hill Education, 2011)
Johnson, Joshua, ‘From Cuba to Bolivia: Guevara’s Foco Theory in Practice’,
Retrieved October, 24 (2006), 2008

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 61

 Jones, Seth G., Waging Insurgent Warfare: Lessons from the Vietcong to the
Islamic State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)
Karnavian, Muhammad Tito, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of
Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah and the Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007
(London: ICP, 2014)
Karnavian, Muhammad Tito, ‘The Regional Fraternity: Collaboration Between
Violent Islamic Groups in Indonesia and the Philippines’, in Terrorism in South and
Southeast Asia in the Coming Decade, ed. by Daljit Singh (Singapore : New Delhi:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009)
Kongres Mujahidin dan Penegakan Syariah Islam, ed., Risalah Kongres
Mujahidin I dan Penegakan Syariah Islam. (translated; The Congress of Mujahidin I
and the Enforcement of Islamic Sharia) (Yogyakarta: Wihdah Press, 2001)
Lawrence, Christopher A., America’s Modern Wars (Philadelphia: Casemate,
2015)
Phares, Walid, Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies against America (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 2014)
Pollock, Joycelyn M., Ethical Dilemmas and Decisions in Criminal Justice
(Boston: Cengage Learning, 2016)
Ramakrishna, Kumar, Islamist Terrorism and Militancy in Indonesia: The Power
of the Manichean Mindset (Singapore: Springer, 2014)
Richardson, Louise, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy,
Containing the Threat (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2006)
Roy, Olivier, The Failure of Political Islam (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994)
Sageman, Marc, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011)
Sageman, Marc, Understanding Terror Networks, 1st Edition edition
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004)
Tan, Andrew T. H., A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009)
Weinberg, Leonard, The End of Terrorism? (Milton Park: Routledge, 2013)

62 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

 Wilkinson, Paul, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response
(Milton Park: Taylor & Francis, 2011)
Zada, Khamami, Islam Radikal: Pergualtan Ormas-Ormas Islam Garis Keras Di
Indonesia (translated; Radical Islam: The Struggle of Islamic Hardline In Indonesia)
(Jakarta: Teraju, 2002)

Journal Sources:
Asghar, Ali, ‘Gerakan Terorisme Tahun 2015: Pola Serangan, Jumlah Korban
Dan Wajah Baru Global Jihad’ (translated; The 2015 Terrorism Movement: Attack
Pattern, Number of Victims and New Faces of Global Jihad) Jurnal Keamanan
Nasional, 2 (2016), 1–18
Hoffman, Bruce ‘The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism: Why Osama bin Laden
Still Matters’, Foreign Affairs, 87 (2008), 133–8
Wendt, Alexander, ‘Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
of Power Politics’, International Organization, 46 (1992), 391–425

Legislations
Undang-Undang Darurat Republik Indonesia Nomor 12 Tahun 1951 (translated;
Emergency Law of Republic of Indonesia No. 12 Year 1951)
Undang-Undang No. 15 tahun 2003 tentang Pemberantasan Tindak Pidana
Terorisme (translated; Law No. 15 Year 2003 on Counter Terrorism)
Peraturan Presiden Nomor 54 Tahun 2017 Tentang Unit Kerja Presiden
Pembinaan Ideologi Pancasila (translated; Presidential Decree No. 54 Year 2017
on Presidential Working Unit for Coaching the Pancasila Ideology)

Other Sources
International Crisis Group, Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh (Jakarta/Brussels:
International Crisis Group, 20 April 2010) <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-
east-asia/indonesia/indonesia-jihadi-surprise-aceh> [accessed 13 September 2017]
Tomotaka, SHOJI, ‘ASEAN Security Community: An Initiative for Peace and
Stability’, NIDS Security Reports, 3 (2008), 17–34

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 63

64 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia
 Curriculum Vitae

1. Personal Data
Name : Prof. H. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, M.A., Ph.D.
Place, Date of Birth : Palembang, 26 October 1964
Rank/ Reg. No : Police General / 64100600
Position : Chief of Indonesian National Police (INP)
Unit : INP’s Headquarters
Religion : Islam
Parents’ name : Alm H Achmad Saleh and Ibu.Kordiah
Wife’s name : Ir. Tri Suswati, M.Si.
Children’s name : 1) Muhammad Garda Ramadhito
2) Lavia Agusta
3) Muhammad Oktovan Tito
Home address : Jl. Patimura No. 37 Kebayoran Baru Jaksel
Office address : Jl. Trunojoyo No. 3 Kebayoran Baru Jaksel

2. Education
A. General Education
1) Elementary School SD Xaverius 4 Palembang (1976);
2) Junior High School SMP Xaverius 2 Palembang (1980);
3) Senior High School SMAN 2 Palembang (1983);
B. Police Education
1) Police Academy (Akpol) as the Best Graduate awarded Bintang
Adhi Makayasa (1987);
2) Police Science College (PTIK) (1996) as the Best Graduate awarded
Bintang Wiyata Cendekia;
3) Police Command and Staff College, Lembang (2000) - Equation
Program from Police Command and Staff College of New Zealand;
4) National Resilience Institute - Lemhannas RI PPSA XVII as the Best
Participant awarded Bintang Seroja (2011);

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 65

 C. Overseas Education
1) Master of Arts (M.A.) In Police Studies, University of Exeter, United
Kingdom (1993);
2) Royal New Zealand Air Force Command and Staff College,
Auckland, New Zealand (1998)
3) Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) In Strategic Studies, Massey University, New
Zealand (1998)
4) Ph. D. in Strategic Studies with Interest in Terrorism and Islamist
Radicalization at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore with predicate of
Magna Cum Laude (2013);

3. Career History
A. First Line Supervisor at Polres Metro Central Jakarta Polda Metro Jaya
(1987)
B. Head of Unit for Violent Crime Polres Metro Central Jakarta Polda Metro
Jaya (1989)
C. Deputy Chief of Sector Police Sawah Besar Polres Metro Central Jakarta
(1992)
D. Chief of Sector Police Cempaka Putih Polres Metro Central Jakarta Polda
Metro Jaya (1996)
E. Personal Secretary of Jakarta Police Chief (1996)
F. Personal Secretary of the Chief of Indonesian National Police (1997)
G. Head of CID Unit at Economic Crime Directorate Reserse Polda Metro
Jaya (1999)
H. Head of CID Unit at CID Directorate Polda Metro Jaya (2000)
I. Head of Specific Crime Division CID Polda South Sulawesi(2002)
J. Head of Unit I/ State Security General Crime Directorate Polda Metro
Jaya (2003)
K. Chief of Detachment 88 Anti Teror Polda Metro Jaya (2004)

66 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

 L. Chief of Regency Police Serang Polda Banten (2005)
M. Head of Intelligence Detachment 88/AT CID (2006)
N. Chief of Detachment 88/AT (2009)
O. Deputy of Enforcement dan Capacity Building of National Agency of
Counter Terrorism (BNPT) (2010)
P. Chief of Papua Province Police (2012)
Q. Assistant to the Chief of INP for for Planning and Budgeting (2014)
R. Chief of Jakarta Province Police (2015)
S. Head of National Agency of Counter Terrorism (BNPT) (2016)
T. Chief of Indonesian National Police (2016 - now)

4. Rank HIstory
A. Second Inspector (1987)
B. First Inspector (1990)
C. Senior Inspector (1993)
D. Assistant Superintendent (1997)
E. Superintendent (2001)
F. Senior Superintendent (2005)
G. Brigadier General (2010)
H. Inspector General (2012)
I. Commsissioner General (2016)
J. Police General (2016)

5. Awards and Decorations:

A. Bintang Bhayangkara Utama dari Presiden RI
B. Bintang Bhayangkara Nararya dari Presiden RI
C. Bintang Bhayangkara Pratama dari Kapolri
D. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 8 Tahun
E. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 16 Tahun
F. Satyalencana Kesetiaan 24 Tahun
G. Satyalencana Dwija Sistha

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 67

 H. Satyalencana Bhakti Buana
I. Satyalencana Bhakti Nusa
J. Satyalencana Darma Nusa
K. Satyalencana Jana Utama
L. Satyalencana Karya Bakti
M. Satyalencana Ksatria Bhayangkara
N. Satyalencana Operasi Kepolisian
O. 3 (three) times Extraordinary Promotion (KPLB):
• Assistant Superintendent to Superintendent (2001)
• Superintendent to Senior Superintendent (2005)
• Senior Superintendent to Brigadier General (2010)

6. High Profile Cases that have been handled:

A. Corruption on Indonesian Bureau of Logistics (1999)
B. Bombing at Philippines Embassy, Jakarta (2000)
C. Bombing at Jakarta Stock Exchange, Jakarta (2001)
D. Bombing at Christmas Eve Jakarta (2001)
E. Bombing at Plaza Atrium, Senen Jakarta Pusat (2001)
F. Murder of Supreme Court Judge Safiudin Kartasasmita, Jakarta (2001)
G. Bombing in Makassar, Sulawesi Selatan (2002)
H. Bombing at House of Representatives, Jakarta (2003)
I. Bombing International Airport Soekarno Hatta Jakarta (2003)
J. Bombing at J.W. Mariott, Jakarta (2003)
K. Murder of Director Asaba Company (2004)
L. Bombing at Cimanggis Depok (2004)
M. Bombing at Australian Embassy Jakarta (2004)
N. Bombing in Bali II (2005)
O. Mutilation of 3 Elementary Shool students in Poso, Central Sulawesi
(2006)
P. Bombing at Tentena market, Poso, Central Sulawesi (2005)

68 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

 Q. Mutilation of Head of Pinedapa Village, Poso, Central Sulawesi (2006)
R. Bombing at Ritz Carlton and J.W. Marriott, Jakarta (2009)
S. Operation on Terrorist Paramilitary Training in Aceh (2010)
T. Operation on Armed Roberry CIMB Bank Medan (2010)
U. Operation on Suicide Bombing at Polres Cirebon Kota (2011)
V. Operation on Book and Parcel Bomb in Jakarta (2011)
W. Operasi Pengungkapan Terorisme Penembakan dan Bom di Aceh (2012)
X. Suicide Bombing at Thamrin, Jakarta Pusat (2016)
Y. Operation Tinombala Santoso Terrorist Network, Poso, Central Sulawesi
(2016)

7. Books and International Journal

1) Indonesian Top Secret: Membongkar Konflik Poso (translated; Uncovering
Poso Conflict), PT. Gramedia Pustaka Utama, Jakarta, 2008.
2) Regional Fraternity: Collaboration Between Violent Islamist Groups In
Indonesia and The Philippines, Bab dalam Buku “Terrorism In South And
Southeast Asia In The Coming Decade”, diedit oleh Daljit Singh, ISEAS
and MacMillan, Singapura, 2009.
3) Bhayangkara di Bumi Cenderawasih (translated; Guardian in the Land of
Cendrawasih), ISPI Strategic Series, Jakarta, 2014.
4) Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah
and the Radicalisation of the Poso Conflict, 2000-2007, Imperial College
Press, London, 2015.
5) Intercourse with Tragedy, Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2016.
6) Polri dalam Arsitektur Negara (Translates; Indonesian National Police in
State’s Architecture), Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2016.
7) Democratic Policing, Pensil-324, Jakarta, 2017.
8) The Role of the National Police in Countering Insurgencies in Indonesia
dalam A Journal of The International Centre for Political Violence and
Terrorism Research (CTR), Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, RSIS,
NTU, Volume 9, issue 09, September 2017.

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 69

8. Public Lectures:
A. 26 October 2016, Press Briefing 2 Years of Work Jokowi – JK themed:
Law Reform, Gedung Bina Graha Jakpus.
B. 24 November 2016, Coordination Meeting and Open Dialogue with
Governors in Indonesia themed: “Coordination on Security and Order
in Facing Domestic Political Dynamics”, Gedung Sasana Bhakti Praja
Kemendagri
C. 30 November 2016, Keynote Speaker themed: Path towards Sustainable
Rule of Law, Gedung Rektorat Lt B Universitas Jayabaya
D. 19 December 2016, Keynote Speaker at Discussion Forum of Young
Generation themed: Constructing Indonesia in Diversity, Universitas
Negeri Jakarta
E. 21 December 2016, Speaker with Theme: The Role of Police and
Universities in Preventing the Movement of Radicalism and Terrorism,
Universitas Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa
F. 26 December 2016, Public Lecture at Trunojoyo University with Theme:
The International Political Struggle and Its Impact on Unity-Unified NKRI,
Gedung Pertemuan Kampus Universitas Trunojoyo Madura
G. 17 January 2017, Keynote Speaker FGD Related Fatwa MUI with Theme:
MUI Fatwa and Positive Law, Lounge Adhi Pradana STIK
H. 18 January 2017, Speaker at Debriefing to Praja IPDN at Jatinangor
IPDN Campus with Theme: Government Administration Policy in Peace,
Order and Protection of Indonesian People, Balariung Rudini Kampus
IPDN Jatinangor Sumedang
I. 27 January 2017, Speaker in Public Lecture with Theme: Law Enforcement
in Indonesia, Gedung Yustinus Kampus Unika Atmajaya Jakarta
J. 10 February 2017, Lecture and Public Lecture at Ibnu Chaldun University,
with Theme: The Role of Police and Universities in Promoting the Creation
of Justice Law Development, Aula Prof. Bahder Dhohan Universitas Ibnu
Chaldun

70 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia

K. 17 February 2017, Public Lecture at Syahkuala University, with Theme:
Strengthening Democracy and Strengthening NKRI from Aceh to
Indonesia, Universitas Syahkuala
L. 3 March 2017, Keynote Speaker and Opening the BEM Nusantara
Hospitality Event with Theme: Building Sovereignty and Strengthening
Nationality, Univeristas Islam Riau
M. 8 March 2017, Speaker at Public Lecture at Bandung Institute of
Technology with Theme: The Development of Democratization and
Globalization and Its Impact for Diversity in Indonesia, Aula Barat ITB
N. 11 April 2017, Lecture at Sespimti Polri Dikreg Ke-26 and Sespimen Polri
Dikreg Ke-5, Gedung Utaryo Suryawinata Sespim Polri
O. 12 April 2017, Public Lecture at GPII Event with Theme: Caring for
Peaceful and Safe Indonesia, Gedung Juang 45
P. 25 April 2017, General Lecture Speaker with Theme: “Nationalism,
Diversity, and Transnational Crime Challenges in Millennial Generation
Development” Balairung Kampus UI Depok
Q. 26 April 2017, Guest Lecture at Public Lecture with Theme: The Importance
of Affirming the Values of Pancasila and the Gadjah Mada University for
the sake of the sovereignty of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and
Encouraging Indonesia to Lead the World, Graha Sabha UGM
R. 26 April 2017, Guest Lecturer in Public Lecture and Workshop with UGM
Professors, Graha Sabha UGM
S. 25 August 2017, Keynote Speaker at The Pyramid Club with Theme: The
Development of Indonesia Especially Combating Terrorism and Religious
Radicalism in Indonesia, 2 Goodwood Hill Singapura
T. 7 September 2017, Keynote Speech with theme: Speech on Terrorism,
Cyber Crime and National Security, Universitas Airlangga
U. 23 September 2017, Scientific Oration at Graduation Ceremony, Bachelor
Degree and Expert to 59th Period 2017 with Theme: Realizing Indonesia
as the Dominant Country, Auditorium Ukhuwah Islamiyah – Universitas
Muhammadiyah Purwokerto

The Role Of Indonesian National Police In Countering Terrorism In Indonesia 71

 V. 25 September 2017, Speaker of National Seminar of Higher Education
Meeting in Indonesia, with Theme: The Role of Higher Education Institution
as Fortress of Resistance to Radicalism and Threat to Pancasila and
NKRI, BNDCC - Bali
W. 3 October 2017, Keynote Speech Seminar of Police Command and
Staff College Dikreg Ke-57 T.A. 2017, with Theme: Strengthening the
Implementation of the Value of Diversity Against the Threat of Nation
Disinegrity, Auditorium STIK - PTIK
X. 11 October 2017, Keynote Speech in the Fourth Congress of BEM /
Dema PTAI Se - Indonesia with Theme: The Role of Youth in Realizing
Indonesia as the Dominant Country, Gedung Akademik Center UIN
Raden Fatah Palembang

72 Peran Polri Dalam Penangann Terorisme Di Indonesia