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KONSEP DASAR

PENCEGAHAN
KECELAKAAN KERJA
Oleh :
Nasrul Sjarief, SE. ME.
nsjarief@yahoo.com
KECELAKAAN
(Industrial Accident)
• Tidak direncanakan (unplanned)
• Terjadinya tiba-tiba (suddenly)
• Menghentikan proses yg direncanakan
• Tidak diinginkan (undesired)
• Mengakibatkan :
– Meninggal
– Penyakit akibat kerja
– Cidera
– Kerusakan asset
– Kerusakan lingkungan
– Peningkatan liabilitas
Happen
CONSEQUENCES After ACCIDENT
the

I njury
D amage
CAUSES
L oss
E motion P lant, Processes, Premises
E quipment
All of which could not
E nvironment
happen without
P EOPLE
REMOVE THE CAUSES S ystems of work

PREVENT THE ACCIDENT


Tanda-TandaTempat Kerja
Yang Tidak Memenuhi Syarat2 K3

• High accident/injury rate.


• Unsafe system of work.
• The use of short cuts.
• Unguarded machines.
• Poor housekeeping.
• Limited knowledge of OSH.
• Lack of care and interest.
TEORI KECELAKAAN
• TEORI DOMINO
• SINGLE FACTOR THEORY
• MULTIPLE FACTOR THEORY
• TEORI 4MS`
• ENERGY THEORY
• TEORI De Reamer
• Reason’s “Swiss-cheese” Model of Human
Error
• The ILCI Loss Causation Model
• Dan lain-lain
I. Teori DOMINO
TEORI DOMINO
(William W. Heinrich 1930)

A B C D E

LINGKUNGAN SIFAT PERBUATAN/ KECELAKAAN


SOSIAL CIDERA/RUSAK
INDIVIDU KONDISI
BERBAHAYA

(Diluar perusahaan) (Dalam perusahaan)

PERSYARATAN PENGENDALIAN :
~ MENGENDALIKAN DAN MENIADAKAN
PERBUATAN/KONDISI BERBAHAYA
PERBUATAN BERBAHAYA
(UNSAFE ACTION)

• Menjalankan Mesin/ • Mengambil posisi pada


Peralatan tanpa tempat yang berbahaya
wewenang • Membetulkan mesin dalam
• Menjalankan Mesin/ keadaan jalan
Peralatan dgn • Lalai memberikan
kecepatan yg tidak peringatan atau lupa
semestinya mengamankan tempat
kerja
• Membuat Alat
Pengaman/K3 tidak • Bersenda gurau tidak pada
berfungsi tempatnya
• Lalai menggunakan • Memaksakan diri untuk
APD bekerja walaupun sakit
• Mengangkat barang • Merancang /memasang
peralatan tanpa pengaman
dengan cara yg salah
KENAPA PERBUATAN TIDAK
AMAN DILAKUKAN
• KURANG PENGETAHUAN
• KURANG TERAMPIL/ PENGALAMAN
• TIDAK ADA KEMAUAN
• FAKTOR KELELAHAN
• JENIS PEKERJAAN YG TIDAK SESUAI
• GANGGUAN MENTAL
• KESALAHAN DALAM SIFAT DAN
TINGKAH LAKU MANUSIA
KONDISI BERBAHAYA
(UNSAFE CONDITION)

• Pelindung atau • Kebersihan lingkungan


pengaman yang tidak kerja yang jelek
memadai • Polusi udara di ruangan
• Peralatan/ perkakas kerja (gas, uap, asap,
dan bahan yang rusak debu dsb.)
tetap digunakan
• Kebisingan yang
• Penempatan barang
yang salah berlebihan
• Sistem peringatan yang • Pemaparan Radiasi
tidak memadai • Ventilasi yang tidak
• Pengabaian terhadap memadai
perkiraan bahaya • Penerangan yang tidak
kebakaran/peledakan memadai
PENYEBAB TERJADINYA KONDISI
BERBAHAYA

ENERGY MATERIAL

KONDISI
BERBAHAYA

SITE &
STRUCTURE MACHINERY
DISEBABKAN OLEH :
-Environmental Stress
-Failures
-Design Characteristics
THE ACCIDENT TRIANGLE

Serious or fatal injury

Minor injury

Damage only

RESULT No injury or damage

CAUSES Substandard Practices Unsafe Acts and


And Conditions Condition
HEINRICH`S ACCIDENT TRIANGLE

1 Serious or fatal injury (0,33%)

29 Minor injury (8,78%)

No injury accidents
RESULT 300 (90,90%)

CAUSES 3000 Unsafe Acts and


Condition
II. SINGLE FACTOR THEORIES
SINGLE FACTOR THEORIES

• PENDAPAT INDIVIDU YANG TIDAK


PERNAH MEMAHAMI DAN
MENGETAHUI :
– PENCEGAHAN KECELAKAAN (accident
prevention)
– PENYELIDIKAN KECELAKAAN (accident
investigation)
III. MULTIPLE FACTOR THEORIES
MULTIPLE FACTOR THEORIES

• V.L. GROSE (1972)


• 4 FAKTOR SISTEM K3 (4 M`s)
– MAN
– MACHINE
– MEDIA
– MANAGEMENT
KHARAKTERISTIK 4M`S

MAN

• USIA • PENDIDIKAN/
• JENIS KELAMIN LATIHAN
• FISIK • MOTIVASI
• SKILL • EMOSIONAL
• SIKAP/PERILAKU • DSB
KHARAKTERISTIK 4M`S

MACHINE

• UKURAN (size) • KONSTRUKSI


• BERAT • MATERIAL
• BENTUK • TYPE OF ACTION/
• SUMBER ENERJI MOTION
• DSB.
KHARAKTERISTIK 4M`S

MEDIA

• SUHU • KEBISINGAN
• LINGKUNGAN • DEBU
PADAT/KUMUH • EMISI GAS
• KELEMBABAN • DSB.
• SIRKULASI
UDARA
KHARAKTERISTIK 4M`S

MANAGEMENT

• MANAGEMENT • KEBIJAKAN DAN


STYLE PROSEDUR
• STRUKTUR • URAIAN TUGAS
ORGANISASI • DSB.
• ALIRAN
KOMUNIKASI
KHARAKTERISTIK 4M`S

CONTROL MEASURES

• STATISTICAL • CAUSES AND


TECHNIQUES EFFECT ANALYSIS
• FAULT TREE • FISH BONE
ANALYSIS (FTA) ANALYSIS
• EVENT TREE • DSB.
ANALYSIS (ETA)
IV. ENERGY THEORY
ENERGY THEORY

• WILLIAM HADDON (1970)


• PENYEBAB KECELAKAAN :
TRANSFER OF ENERGY
• TEORI INI DISEBUT JUGA : energy
release theory
• CONTROL STRATEGY : (10)
ENERGY THEORY

CONTROL STRATEGY
1. MENGHINDARKAN PENGGUNAAN ENERJI
BERPOTENSI BAHAYA TINGGI
2. MENEKAN JUMLAH ENERJI YANG
DIGUNAKAN
3. MENCEGAH TERLEPASNYA ENERJI
4. MERUBAH TINGKAT ENERJI YANG
TERLEPAS DARI SUMBERNYA
5. MEMISAHKAN ENERJI YANG DILEPASKAN
SESUAI DENGAN WAKTU/ TEMPAT
ENERGY THEORY

CONTROL STRATEGY

6. MEMISAHKAN ENERJI YANG AKAN


DILEPASKAN DENGAN BANGUNAN/ ORANG
7. MERUBAH PERMUKAAN BANGUNAN
8. MENGUATKAN KONDISI BANGUNAN /MANUSIA
9. DITEKSI DINI TERHADAP KERUSAKAN
10. MEMPERTAHANKAN KONDISI YANG STABIL
V. TEORI De Reamer (1980)
TEORI De Reamer (1980)
• PENYEBAB KEC. DIKELOMPOKKAN
DALAM 2 KELOMPOK

1. IMMEDIATE CAUSES

2. CONTRIBUTING CAUSES
IMMEDIATE CAUSE
TERMASUK DALAM KELOMPOK INI :

1. UNSAFE ACTS
(perbuatan berbahaya)
2. UNSAFE CONDITIONS
(kondisi berbahaya)
CONTRIBUTING CAUSES

• TERMASUK DALAM KELOMPOK INI :

1. KONDISI FISIK PEKERJA


(physical condition of worker)
2. KONDISI MENTAL PEKERJA
(mental condition of worker)
3. KEBIJAKAN MANAJEMEN
(management policies)
PENYEBAB KECELAKAAN
(De Reamer Theory)

IMMEDIATE KASUS CONTRIBUTING


KECELAKAAN
CAUSES
CAUSES
1.Manajemen
1.PERBUATAN AKIBAT dan Supervisi
BERBAHAYA KECELAKAAN
(Unsafe Acts)
2.Kondisi Mental
2.KONDISI -Cidera Pekerja
-Kerusakan Asset
BERBAHAYA -Kerusakan Lingkungan
(Unsafe Conditions) -Berpengaruh thd : 3. Kondisi Fisik
-Produktivitas, Kualitas, Pekerja
Effisiensi Biaya, Loss
POO
POORR
BASIC
BASIC MA
CAUSES MANAG
NAGEM ENT
EME NT
CAUSES

INDIRECT
INDIRECT UNSAFE UNSAFE
CAUSES
CAUSES CONDITIONS ACTS

UNPLANNED
DIRECT
DIRECT RELEASE OF
CAUSES
CAUSES ENERGY

ACCIDENT
STRUCTURE OF ACCIDENT
INFLUENCES ON ACCIDENT CAUSATION
(Caruana,S.A.- 2004)

IMMEDIATE ORGANISATIONAL CORPORATE EXTERNAL


CAUSES CAUSES INFLUENCES INFLUENCES
-Equipment -Management/ -Organisational -Regulation
Design Supervision change -Political
-Working -Communication - Ownership and environment
environment -Recruitment/ Control -Customers
-Inspection & Selection -Safety -Public
maintenance -Training management perception
-Risk perception -Planning system -Economic
-Motivation -Procurement Factors
-Procedures
-Pressure -Incident
-Fatigue Management &
-Compliances Feedback
-Competence
VI. SWISS CHEESE
MODEL OF DEFENCE
REASON’S SWISS CHEESE
MODEL OF DEFENCE (1990)
Third Stage Control :
First Stage Control : Control of Outputs :
Control of Input : -Products and Services
- Physical Resources -By Products
- Human Resources -Information
- Information Organisation
Objective :
Objective: To minimise risks
To minimise People outside the organi-
hazards entering sation from work
the organisation activities, products
and services
Procedures

Premises Plant and


(workplaces) Substances

The Job
Second Stage Control :
Control of Work Activities : People, Procedures, Plant&Substances, Premises.
Objectives : To Eliminate and minimise risks inside the organisation.
To create a supportive organisational culture.
No Accident
Defences
Safe Acts
Preconditions
Line Management

Decision Makers

Safe Acts and


Latent Safe Conditions

Latent Safe Conditions


Defences Accident

Unsafe Acts
Preconditions
Line Management

Decision Makers
REASON’S Defences
MODEL
Unsafe Acts
Preconditions
Window
Line Management of Opportunity
Decision Makers

Unsafe Acts
and Latent
Unsafe Conditions

Latent Unsafe Conditions


REASON’S Defences
Accident
MODEL
Unsafe Acts
Preconditions
Window
Line Management of Opportunity
Decision Makers

Unsafe Acts
and Latent
Unsafe Conditions

Latent Unsafe Conditions


SWISS CHEESE MODEL OF DEFENCE
Reason’s “Swiss-cheese”
Model of Human Error (1990)
Latent Failures
Input Organizational
Factor
Latent Failures
Unsafe
Supervision

Precondition Latent Failures


For
Unsafe Acts

Active Failures

Unsafe
Acts
Failed or
Absent Defenses

Accident &
Injury
ACCIDENT MODEL
HUMAN
FAILURE Unsafe acts

INCIDENT

Latent Unsafe Plant/


Errors Condition

Fail to
recover situation

ORGANISATION

PERSON JOB
Failure of ACCIDENT
ACCIDENT
mitigation
HUMAN FAILURE TYPES
SLIP
OF ACTIONS
SKILL BASED
ERRORS
LAPSE OF
MEMORY
ERRORS
RULE BASED
MISTAKE MISTAKE
HUMAN
FAILURE KNOWLEDGE
BASED MISTAKE
ROUTINE

VIOLATIONS SITUATIONAL

EXCEPTIONAL
HUMAN FACTOR

OR
AL

GA
DU

NI
IVI

ZA
HUMAN
IND

TIO
FACTOR
(Health & Safety Executive -1999)

JOB N

• The JOB – what people are ask to do


(task/workload/procedures/environment/equipment)
• The INDIVUAL – who is doing it
(competence/attitude/capability/risk perception)
• ORGANIZATION – how is the work organized
(leadership/resources/culture/communication)
HUMAN FACTOR
ORGANISATION AND INDIVIDUAL
JOB FACTOR MANAGEMENT FACTOR FACTOR

LATENT FAILURE

LATENT CONDITION

ACTIVE FAILURE
JOB FACTORS
• Illegal design of equipment and
instruments;
• Constant disturbances and interruptions;
• Missing or unclear instructions;
• Poorly maintained equipment;
• High workload;
• Noisy and unpleasant working conditions.
ORGANIZATION and
MANAGEMENT FACTORS
• Poor work planning, leading to high work
pressure;
• Lack of safety systems and barriers;
• Inadequate responses to previous incidents;
• Management based on one-way
communications;
• Deficient co-ordination and responsibilities;
• Poor management of safety and health;
• Poor safety and health culture.
INDIVIDUAL FACTORS

• Low skill and competence level;


• Tired staff;
• Individual medical problems;
• Bored or disheartened staff.
Latent Failures
(Human error & Violations)
1. Poor design of plant and equipment;
2. Ineffective training;
3. Inadequate supervision;
4. Ineffective communications;
5. Inadequate resources;
6. Uncertainties in roles and responsibilities.
Latent failure are usually hidden within an
organization : SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
Latent Condition
• The managerial influences;
• Social pressures;
• Influences the design of equipment;
• Influences system;
• Define supervision inadequacies.
INFLUENCING DOMAINS
VII. The ILCI Loss Caution Model
The ILCI
Loss Causation Model
Lack of Basic Immediate
INCIDENT LOSS
Control Causes Causes

People, Property,Process
Inadequate
Personal
Contact
Factors Substandard
with
Program Acts
Energy
and/or
or
Job Conditions
Substance
Factors
Standards

Compliance
VIII. KONSEP LAIN DALAM MEMILIH
TINDAKAN PENCEGAHAN
KECELAKAAN KERJA
KONSEP LAIN DALAM MEMILIH
TINDAKAN
PENCEGAHAN KECELAKAAN
• MELALUI 4E`S :
– ENGINEERING
– EDUCATION
– ENFORCEMENT
– ENTHUSIASM
MELALUI 4E`S

ENGINEERING
• SUBSITUSI
• MODIFIKASI PROSES
• MENEKAN/MENGURANGI JUMLAH
INVENTORI
• DISAIN
• ALAT PENGAMAN/PELINDUNG
• WARNING SYSTEM
• DLL
MELALUI 4E`S

EDUCATION
• LATIHAN K3 UNTUK MANAJER, SUPERVISOR,
OPERATOR, PEKERJA BARU
• PENGGUNAAN PROSEDUR KERJA AMAN/SOP
• MENGOPERASIKAN MESIN DENGAN BENAR
DAN AMAN
• PENGGUNAAN ALAT PELINDUNG DIRI
• PROSEDUR KEADAAN DARURAT
• REGU PENANGGULANGAN KEBAKARAN
• PENILAIAN RISIKO
• DLL
MELALUI 4E`S

ENFORCEMENT

• MEMATUHI PERATURAN/ KETENTUAN/


SYARAT-SYARAT/STANDARD K3
MELALUI 4E`S

ENTHUSIASM

• MELIBATKAN DAN MEMOTIVASI TENAGA


KERJA
IX. STRATEGI PENCEGAHAN
KECELAKAAN KERJA
STRATEGI PENCEGAHAN
KECELAKAAN KERJA

• DIDASARKAN KEPADA :

– FREQUENCY (KEKERAPAN)
– SEVERITY (KEPARAHAN)
– COST (BIAYA)
– KOMBINASI
PENDEKATAN DALAM
PENCEGAHAN KECELAKAAN

1. PENDEKATAN REAKTIF

INVESTIGA PREVENTIVE
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
TION ACTION
PENDEKATAN DALAM
PENCEGAHAN KECELAKAAN

2. PENDEKATAN PROAKTIF

ANALYSIS OF
PREVENTIVE
POTENTIAL ACCIDENT
PROGRAM
ACCIDENTS
SEKIAN

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