Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia

Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 333 - 337

RETHINKING OF MY EXPERIENCE AS A MINISTRY OF

FINANCE: STABILIZATION IN A PERIOD OF TRANSITION;
INDONESIA 2001 –2004
Boediono
Universitas Gadjah Mada

ABSTRAK
Artikel ini menggambarkan bagaimana proses kebijakan ekonomi dilakukan dalam
praktek berdasarkan pengalaman di Indonesia sewaktu masa pemerintahan Megawati
2001-2004. Pada tahun 2001 ekonomi Indonesia mengalami ketidakstabilan makro yang
bersumber dari hilangnya kepercayaan para pelaku ekonomi terhadap kebijakan
pemerintah. Di sini ditunjukkan langkah-langkah apa yang diambil untuk mengembalikan
kepercayaan tersebut, hambatan-hambatan apa yang dihadapi dalam praktek terutama
karena Indonesia juga sedang mengalami masa transisi politk yang mendasar. Prinsip
ekonomi yang melandasi kebijakan pemerintah cukup sederhana, namun yang rumit adalah
penerapannya dalam praktek. Hambatan politik-ekonomi itu satu per satu diselesaikan dan
hasilnya adalah ekonomi Indonesia yang stabil dalam tahun 2004. Satu hal yang belum
dapat dicapai pada waktu itu adalah bagaimana meningkatkan investasi dan pertumbuhan
ekonomi yang cukup tinggi untuk mengurangi pengangguran dan kemiskinan. Ini
memerlukan pembenahan struktural untuk memperbaiki iklim usaha dan iklim investasi
yang sifatnya berjangka menegah dan panjang. Inilah tantangan yang harus ditanggulangi
oleh pemerintahan sekarang tanpa mengorbankan stabilitas ekonomi yang sudah dicapai.
Keywords: Government policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy.

This paper is about government policies to THE POLICY

stabilize an economy suffering from prolonged
consequences of a financial crisis while the
country is undergoing a profound political
change. That problem setting is a rough
depiction of what Indonesia has been facing in
the past seven years or so. My story relates to
the last three years of that period, drawing on
my own experience as a member of the
economic team in the Megawati government.
My account of the events will inevitably be
personal and therefore subjective. I do not
know whether lessons can be learnt for other
countries, but I do think that Indonesia should
learn from the experience. I will proceed by
describing first the basic thoughts behind the
policy, then the environment in which the
policy had to be implemented and finally the
results of the policy.
Let me start with the background that
influenced the policy.
Indonesia has passed the worst of the crisis,
thanks to the early efforts at stabilization.
However, when the Megawati government
took office in August 2001, that is full four
years after the crisis began, the economic
situation of the country was still far from
normal. Growth was feeble at the annual level
of 3 per cent, the Rupiah was excessively
depreciated and very volatile, inflation and the
basic interest rate were at the high teens, our
public debt was as big as our GDP, and
although the worst had past capital was still
flowing out of the country on a significant
scale. Our relation with the IMF with whom
we still had an ongoing program, and by
334 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
extension our relation with the international
community at large, was at a low point, which
of course did not help.
Since most of us in the economic team
were close observers of the country’s
development before we joined the cabinet, we
were able to quickly come to a diagnosis of the
problem. We agreed that the cause of all the
troubles was in fact a general lack of
confidence among economic actors in the
prospects of the economy. It was the case of
runaway expectations that needed to be
anchored. More specifically, we saw that the
root of the problem was the widespread
perception that there was no credible economic
program with credible implementation.
As the first step in our bid to restore
credibility and regain market confidence we
immediately reopened our negotiation with the
IMF. After a marathon discussion for two
weeks, we were able to come to an agreed
program. We were also aware that the negative
perception was partly caused by the fact that in
the past numerous policy actions were
promised but undelivered. So we took extra
care in negotiating the details of the program.
We wanted to minimize the risk of broken
promises. We in the economic team agreed to
deliberately tone down our rhetoric, especially
when we talked to the market.
Without going into the details, the core of
the program focused on two themes: fiscal
consolidation and financial sector (especially
banking sector) restructuring. These were the
two areas where, in our view, the market most
wanted assurance from the government. On
these two policy themes we were in substantial
agreement with the Fund. The main objective
was to trigger a kind of “virtuous cycle” where
improved confidence would lead to more
stable and stronger Rupiah, lower inflation,
lower interest rate and higher growth. We were
hoping that the improved confidence would
eventuate as the market began to believe that
we meant what we said.
Oktober
Given the prevailing situation at that time,
we frankly did not see any alternative
“models” that could give us better light or
more helpful guide for actions than the one
implied in the program. Our study indicated
that similar mechanism had worked in other
crisis hit countries, and I learnt it also had in
the United States during the first Clinton
period. So we launched the program with a bit
of confidence of our own.
The swiftly agreed program with the Fund
immediately soothed the market. But it
presented the government with some problems
in the domestic politics. Our relations with the
IMF had been a contentious issue all along. In
the ambience of prevailing politics, even an
agreement resulting from earnest discussions
and a long process of negotiation, as it was,
could easily be depicted as a proof that the
government succumbed to the Fund’s wishes.
Without appropriate management of the
situation, that could spell problems for the
implementation of the program. I will come
back to this later.
THE ENVIRONMENT
The policy had to be put to work in the real
world setting. The environment in which the
policy was to be implemented clearly had an
important influence on the outcome. Here I can
only give you a partial sense of it by describing
the implications of three issues: first, the
extended process of political transition;
second, the controversies surrounding our
relations with the IMF and third, the problem
of coordination between the government and
the central bank.
There is little doubt that the lingering
uncertainties associated with the extended
process of political transition have been a
central factor in Indonesia’s slow economic
recovery. Complications arise when we
implement economic policy in a fluid
environment, where the basic rules of the game
are not well established. Although some
progress has been made, such setting has
2005 Boediono
generally been the policy environment in
Indonesia in the past seven years and likely for
some years to come.
During the Habibie period the political
situation was very unsettled. I cannot
remember a single day passed by without a
demonstration in front of my office in
Bappenas.1 When Abdurrahman Wahid took
the presidency over noisy public oppositions
began to subside but then the relation between
the government and the all powerful par-
liament grew increasingly strained, culmi-
nating in a change of government. During the
subsequent Megawati administration public
protests were still occurring, though more
occasionally, but the relation with the
parliament began to improve. However, one
problem has persisted, namely the rules of the
game governing institutions continue to be
fuzzy. That has often created problems when a
policy is being implemented on the ground.
Let me elaborate it a little.
The cabinet was not immune to the “fuzzy
rules” problem. As a result, the fate of your
proposed policy depended, more crucially than
in the more established system, on your
personal approach and rapport with key cabinet
members and of course with the president.
The “fuzzy rules” problem presented itself
most notably in the decision making process
that involved the parliament. Although as I
said earlier the relation between the govern-
ment and the parliament during the Megawati
period had begun to improve, to secure the
necessary approvals from the parliament for a
policy continued to be an uncertain and, often,
long and winding exercise.
In the environment of change where the
balance of power between the executive branch
and the legislative branch had been radically
redefined, many grey areas emerged when you
1
For an account of policy making process during the
Habibie government, see Boediono, “The IMF Support
Program in Indonesia: Comparing Its Implementation
Under Three Presidents”, in Bulletin of Indonesian
Economic Studies, Vol. 3, December 2002.
335
put the system into practice on the floor of the
parliament. So, when a policy proposal was
tabled, a considerable amount of time often
had to be expended on agreeing on procedures
as much as on the substance. I do not know
whether that is also the case in other countries.
But being no politician myself, at times I found
it to be rather confusing, and a bit exhausting.
In spite of those hurdles we were able to
get most of the major policies approved and
the necessary legislations passed.
Let me now turn to our relations with the
IMF. As I mentioned earlier this was a
contentious issue all along. The group
expressing disapproval of the IMF, and our
involvement with it, was in fact an amorphous
one. It included those who were ideologically
against international capitalism and
globalization, those who had joined in the
recent waves of criticisms of the Bretton
Woods institutions, those who squarely blamed
the IMF for getting us into the terrible crisis,
those who did not like to see us being “ordered
around” by the IMF, and those who had a
general dislike of any Western creation.
Be that as it may, the government was
placed in a dilemmatic position. On the one
hand, we in the government saw the imperative
of getting the support of the IMF in order to
implement the necessary policies to win back
market confidence. On the other hand, we
knew that it was unpopular. But we opted to
implement the policies and tried to manage the
situation as best as we could.
In the cabinet there was none like a
consensus view. Fortunately, there were two
things that saved the situation. First, the three
ministers most directly concerned with the
program with the IMF (that is, the coordinating
minister, the minister of finance and the
minister for state enterprises) and the central
bank governor shared a more or less common
view. Second, the presidential cabinet system,
even though it was formed through some kind
of coalition building processes, meant that the
bottom line for a policy was the consent of the
336 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
president. Most of our proposals eventually got
approval or support from the president, though
often only an implicit one.
In the parliament the broad questions
relating to our continued engagement with the
Fund had of course surfaced from time to time.
But it turned out that intensive debates
generally occurred on specific policies, such as
the fiscal policy stance, subsidies, privatization
plan, bank restructuring policy and the many
draft laws that the government proposed. I
must say that it was a relief to learn that the
more political issues on the IMF had not
distracted the focus on specific policies. I
guess if you are an optimist you may take it as
a testimony that however imperfect it might
still be, democracy in Indonesia could lead to
results. My experience also indicated that even
in the rough and tumble of politics the usual
human dynamic was at work and personal
approach made a difference. As by necessity
we interacted with each other more intensively,
better rapport developed and smoother
discussions followed.
In contrast to what happened in the cabinet
and in the parliament, in public forums our
program with the Fund continued to be a
favorite sport for commentators. Here, I think
part of the problem lay with the government
who had not done well in explaining its
policies to the public. The present government
seems to realize this and is making some effort
to remedy it. But I suspect the question of our
relations with the Fund and indeed with the
international community at large will continue
to be an issue that has to be managed with
caution for some years to come.
A good coordination between fiscal policy
and monetary policy, and more to the point
between the government and the central bank,
is obviously key to any successful stabilization
program. Yet it was precisely this one thing
that was missing during much of the
Abdurrahman Wahid period, with the
inevitable consequence of continually eluding
stability. The relation between the two vitally
important institutions for macroeconomic
stability was then under such strain that
Oktober
substantive communications between them
practically ceased.
Looking back, the reason for it appears to
be as much about substance (that is central
bank’s independence versus its accountability)
as about “practical politics” that had broken
loose and clashes of personality. The situation
was clearly untenable that its resolution must
be at the top of the list for the new
government. But to do that some sticking
points needed to be ironed out.
The most sensitive matter related to some
articles in the revision of the central bank law
earlier proposed by the government, which
central bank officials regarded as a thinly
veiled plot to remove the incumbent governor
and some members of the board. The new
government agreed to drop the controversial
articles thus relieving immediately an
important source of tension. However, other
items that contained proposed improvements in
the accountability of the central bank had
remained on the agenda. Although the debates
on the law dragged on until mid 2003 when the
law was finally passed, the relations between
the central bank and the government, thanks to
efforts by officials on both sides, had progres-
sively improved since that initial gesture.
The second sticking point was the question
of how to share the burden of the liquidity
support that Bank Indonesia provided, and
much of it was lost, to avert the collapse of the
banking sector during the crisis. Since the
Abdurrahman Wahid period the issue had
become so politicized that it was impossible to
come to a rational solution. It was only well
into the Megawati era that, after many
meetings, the central bank and the government
agreed to move forward by seeking the view of
an independent party (which happened to be
Paul Volcker and associates). It was also
agreed, wisely I think, to involve the
parliament early to smoothen the approval
process. In 2003 the issue was at last resolved.
Again the experience in resolving the coor-
dination problem between the government and
the central bank demonstrates that personal
2005 Boediono
gestures and approaches do matter, sometimes
a lot.
THE RESULTS
We now come to the results of the policy.
Did it work? I think the answer is yes, but
with one qualification. Over the three years,
from the third quarter 2001 to the third quarter
2004, the Rupiah had strengthened apprecia-
bly, the exchange rates had become steadier,
inflation and basic interest rate had dropped
from high teens to respectively around 6 per
cent and slightly below 7.5 per cent, public
debt to GDP ratio had declined from close to
100 per cent to around 60 per cent and was
projected to continue declining, budget deficit
had been contained below 2 per cent of GDP
even during the elections year of 2004, over-
seas funds were returning and one indicator of
market confidence – the Jakarta stock price
index – had almost doubled from around 370
to over 800 (it has now passed 1000).
Over those three years economic growth
had edged up steadily from an annual growth
of around 3 per cent to around 5 per cent. But
many think, and I agree with them, that this is
a rather unremarkable performance considering
other economies equally hard hit by the crisis,
such as Korea and Thailand, had rebounded
very strongly once they passed the worst phase
of the crisis. Certainly, that level of growth had
hardly made a dent on the biggest social
problem confronting us post-crisis – namely,
unemployment – which has persisted at around
10 per cent with signs of worsening recently.
One estimate suggests that the country has to
grow in the range of 6 – 7 per cent for at least
3 – 4 years before one sees a firm turnaround
in the unemployment rate.
Why didn’t growth pick up more quickly?
If we look at the numbers we see that for the
most part of the past three years the main
driving force of growth was consumption
spending while investment and exports were
weak. Seven years after the crisis the
investment ratio was still closer to the crisis
337
level of around 20 per cent of GDP than to the
typical 30 per cent level before the crisis. And
despite the substantial depreciation of the
Rupiah, non-oil exports continued to be
sluggish.
It is clear that the last link in the “virtuous
cycle” that we projected, lower interest rates
that would lead to higher growth, was still
missing. It seems to me that there existed some
“supply side” hurdles and institutional
constraints that had stood between the return of
stability and lower interest rates on the one
hand and the revival in investment and growth
on the other.
One important hurdle – political uncer-
tainties surrounding the elections and change
of government - is now gone. However, other
constraints have remained because many of
them by their nature can only be overcome in
the medium or long term. This is a vitally
important policy theme that should be the
focus of the new government. Concrete
problems in such areas as legal processes,
taxation and customs, labor laws and regional
regulations have been a constant complaint by
investors. They have to be dealt with. Some
steps have been initiated, but much remains to
be done. What we need now, I think, is a fully
worked out medium term action plan focusing
on the improvement in business and
investment climate.
REFERENCE
Boediono, 2002, “The IMF Support Program
in Indonesia: Comparing Its Implementa-
tion Under Three Presidents”, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 3.
Rubin, Robert E. and Jacob Weisberg, 2003, In
An Uncertain World, Random House, New
York
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 338 - 350

IMPLEMENTATION OF TECHNOLOGY
AND MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES TO ELIMINATE COMPETITIVE
PRIORITIES TRADE-OFFS
Anjar Priono & Fahmi Radhi
Universitas Gadjah Mada

ABSTRAKSI

Penelitian ini mengidentifikasi apakah implementasi teknologi dan praktek manajemen

berperan dalam meminimalkan trade-off diantara competitive priorities. Pengujian
dilakukan dengan menggunakan paradigma matrik produk-proses (Hayes dan Wheelwright
1979) yang mensyaratkan adanya kesesuaian antara struktur produk dan struktur proses
produksi. Variabel yang digunakan untuk meminimalkan trade-off adalah teknologi
pemrosesan, teknologi pendesainan produk, program kualitas dan JIT. Competitive
priorities dibentuk dengan analisis faktor (factor analysis) sedangkan untuk menyusun
kategori process choice diterapkan non-hierarchical clustering.
Hasil analisa menunjukkan process choice berkaitan erat dengan competitive priorities
yang diterapkan dalam persaingan, kecuali untuk competitive priorities pengiriman. Hal
ini mengindikasikan bahwa perusahaan manufaktur belum mempertimbangkan pengiriman
sebagai variabel yang penting untuk memberikan keunggulan kompetitif. Sebagian besar
plant yang dijadikan sampel juga masih mengikuti paradigma matrik produk-proses
dengan memposisikan dirinya berada pada diagonal matrik. Namun demikian, terdapat
beberapa plant yang memposisikan diri berada di luar diagonal matrik untuk memperjelas
posisinya dengan pesaing. Plant pada kelompok ini berhasil menghilangkan beberapa
trade-off dengan menerapkan teknologi dan praktek manajemen meskipun masih terdapat
dua trade-off yang belum berhasil untuk dihilangkan, yaitu biaya-kustomisasi dan biaya-
kualitas.
Keywords: competitive priorities, process choice, processing and designing technology,
JIT, quality program.

INTRODUCTION lead trade-offs with competing on cost since

Competitive priorities have shown to be a the utilization of both competing priorities
major determinant of manufacturing leads to higher cost and higher price (Wood
performance as well as to the overall business 1991). In this context, the prerequisite for the
performance (Vickery et al. 1993). In order to manufacturing is that how to minimize that
create competitive advantages, the trade-offs.
manufacturers should utilize some competitive Trade-off concept is based on focused
priorities, such as competing based on cost, factory proposed by Skinner (1974) explained
quality, time and customization simultaneously that the manufacturers are unable to perform
(Noble 1995). Previous studies of well in all competitive priorities equally at the
manufacturing companies indicated that same time. He further explains that one area
competing on flexibility and on quality may creates a competitive advantage, but at the
2005 Priono & Radhi
same time it raises expenses of others.
According to Hayes and Schmenner (1978), it
is potentially dangerous for a company to
compete by offering superior performance
along with several competitive priorities. The
company must select definitely one of
competitive priorities to avoid the trade-offs
among them. Through product-process matrix
concept, Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a)
suggest that a process selection should be
compatible well with one of the competitive
priorities. By utilizing two competitive
priorities in a process selection, it will lead
trade-off each other. For example, the selection
of the job shop process will utilize quality and
customization as competitive priorities, but it
will be sacrifice delivery and cost.
In contrast, the sandcone model of Ferdows
and De Meyer (1990) argues that
manufacturing should follow a certain pattern
in applying several competitive priorities
simultaneously. These include several
competitive priorities, such as: competing on
quality, dependability, flexibility (speed), and
cost efficiency. According to Noble (1995),
one or more competitive priorities can be
applied in the same time if another has
previously achieved a minimum level of
manufacturing capability that will be able to
eliminate the nature of manufacturing trade-
offs. In his study at tool industry in USA,
McDermott et al. (1997) found that
competitive priorities trade-off decreased
gradually along with implementing process
technology, such as: cellular manufacturing
technology, just-in-time (JIT), continuous
improvement, and manufacturing information
systems like flexible manufacturing system
(FMS) and computer integrated manufacturing
(CIM). By implementing new manufacturing
technologies and methods, manufacturers are
able to reduce the gap of ability between rigid
flexibility and mass customization as well as
eliminate the trade-offs. Through employing
cluster analysis, Ahmad and Schroeder (2002)
examined several variables implemented to
minimize the trade-offs. The variables consist
339
of process design, product design technology,
Just-In-Time (JIT) and quality programs. Some
of these variables are apparently useful to
minimize contradiction between cycle time and
inventory turnover.
Previous researches regarding the effort of
minimizing competitive priorities trade-off
have been undertaken mostly in the USA and
other West Countries, which their
manufacturing industries are in an advance
phase (Safizadeh et al. 2000; Silveira and
Slack 2001; Boyer and Lewis 2002; Flynn and
Flynn 2000). Researchers have paid little
attention to conduct the same research topic in
developing countries, which most their
manufacturing industry are still in the growth
phase, like in Indonesia. Therefore, a similar
study on this topic in Indonesia will make a
significant contribution of theoretical and
practical interest.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study investigates the relationship of
process choice with the implementation of
manufacturing technologies and management
initiatives to overcome the trade-off of
competitive priorities in the Indonesian
manufacturing industry. The propositions
related the trade-off focus on three research
questions as the following:
1. Is there compatibility between the process
choice and selected competitive priorities?
2. Are the trade-offs resulted from
competitive priorities requiring similar
facilities easier to be eliminated?
3. Is the implementation of technology and
management initiatives able to eliminate
the trade-off of the selected competitive
priorities?
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK
The result of previous research of
Safizadeh al et. (1996) which then be renewed
by Safizadeh al et. (2001) found that process
choice determines type of trade-off among
340 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
competitive priorities. Plants have to consider
process choice to be applied because there
should be compatibility between choice
process with competitive priorities. Process-
oriented plants are more appropiate to
implement quality and customization, while
product-oriented one should provide more
emphasis on cost and delivery. Incompatibility
between product structure and process
structure will have negative impact to plant
performance. The idea of Safizadeh al et.
(2001) can be depicted graphically as Figure 1
below.
Figure 1. Framework of Previous Research
Competitive
Process Priorities Plant
Choice Performance
Trade-off
Source: Developed from Safizadeh et al. (1996) and
Safizadeh et al. (2001).
Safizadeh al et. (1996) found evidence that
the selection of product structure which do not
appropriate with process structure can be
overcome with certain technology such as
modular design. Unfortunately, Safizadeh al et.
(1996) did not formulate these variables into
their research hypothesis. The next research
conducted by Ahmad and Schroeder (2002)
identified some variables can be used to
overcome incompatibility between product
structure and structure process and at the same
time these technologies also facilitate plants to
minimize trade-off. If plants were successful to
minimize trade-off, plants can apply several
competitive priorities simultaneously and lead
to better performance. Conversely, the failure
to minimize trade-offs deteriorates
performance. The study of Noble (1995) found
that plant will reach optimum performance
using 4 competitive priorities simultaneously.
Technology and management initiatives
influence do not effect process choice but they
influece competitive priorities trade-offs
resulted from process choice. By implementing
Oktober
them, a process choice has more similiraties
than the difference. For example, product
oriented process choice would be capable of
producing a large number product with lower
cost. Conversely, a process oriented one
increase the degree of customization without
sacrificing its low cost. The model of this
research is described graphically as Figure 2
below.
Figure 2. Research Framework
Competitive
Process Plant
Priorities
Choice Trade-off Performance
Technology and
Management
Initiatives
LITERATURE REVIEW
A product-focused plant deploys automated
and special-purpose equipment produced in
very large volume. This kind of plants tends to
be capital intensive with specialized labor skill.
This production system bears high fixed cost
but low variable cost. Production capacity in
large volume enables plants to achieve
economies of scale result in low product price.
Heavy equipment, automated production
system, and standardized product enable
product-oriented plant to produce product in
low cost and fast (Hayes and Wheelwright
!978a).
In contrast, a process-focused plant is
characterized with job shops producing low
volume and customized product. Process-
oriented plants employ multipurpose
equipment, multi skilled labors, and jumbled-
flow of production systems are able to produce
various product characteristics come from
different customers. Order variability inhibit
process-oriented plant to produce as fast as
process oriented plant since each order require
different raw material, flow of production, type
of and labor skill. But the positive side of this
system is its ability to produce customized
2005 Priono & Radhi
products that meet customers’ order high
degree of design quality. Based on explanation
above, the following hypothesis are offered:
H1a: The higher plants emphasize on process,
the higher the plants emphasize on
quality.
H1b: The higher plants emphasize on process,
the higher the plants emphasize on
customization
H1c: The higher plants emphasize on product,
the higher the plants emphasize on
delivery.
H1d: The higher plants emphasize on product,
the higher the plants emphasize on cost.
Trade-offs among competitive priorities
requiring similar production facilities are
easier to be minimized. For example, trade-off
between quality and customization is much
easier to be minimized than that between
quality and cost. Both quality and
customization are appropriate to be developed
in proces-product oriented plant using multi-
skill labor and multi-purpose equipment thus
the plants suffer high unit product cost. This
system has low utilization of facilities and
extremely high variable cost (Heizer and
Render 2001).
Oppositely, cost is appropriate to be
developed in process oriented plant using
automated production system operated by
labors with a specific skill. An automated
production system operates efficiently with
high utililizatoin of facilities result in low
product price and fast product delivery. A
similar case occurs in product-focused plant
where cost and delivery contradiction will be
easier to be improved since both of them
requiring process-oriented plant. The research
expect trade-off requiring similar production
facilities will no longer exist because of
improvement efforts.
However, it is not impossible to eliminate
trade-off requiring different production system.
Safizadeh et al. (2000) found cost and quality
trade-off is minimized despite they require
341
different process choice to implement. This
trade-off disappears because of improvement
effort through quality program (Noble 1995).
From the argument above, we propose
hypothesis as follow:
H2a: There is a trade-off between cost and
quality
H2b: There is a trade-off between cost and
customization
H2c: There is a trade-off between cost and
delivery
H2d: There is not a trade-off between quality
and customization
H2e: There is not a trade-off between quality
and delivery
H2f: There is not a trade-off between delivery
and customization
Position outside diagonal reflects
incompatibility between product structure and
process structure. According to product-
process matrix framework, product oriented
production system, such as job shop and
disconnected line flow, should produce in low
volume with low standardization. By using
multi purpose equipment and multi-skilled
labor, this system capable of producing high
quality and customized product. Conversely,
continous flow is a very efficient process
choice which can produce high volume product
but it ignores customization. Incompatibility
between product and process structure result in
poor performance since they do not have
competitive advantage (Hayes and
Wheelwright 1979a). Recent research suggests
that to be competitive plants do not have to be
positioned inside or near the diagonal.
Manufacturers’ decision to be outside diagonal
is a strategic choice to differentiate them from
the other players in the industry (De Meyer and
Vereecke 1996). This position can be
successful, but success requires technology and
management initiatives to overcome the
incompatibility between product structure and
process structure and minimize trade-offs.
342 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Quality programs eliminate trade-off
between quality and cost through reducing
rework, scrap and process variance. Quality
from the source principle of this program
ensures to minimize process variance and
product failure (Heizer and Render 2001). JIT
principles such as waste elimination through
the simplification of manufacturing process are
able to minimize trade-off between delivery
and cost (Flynn et al., 1995). CAD enables
manufacturers to share database for all related
function results in dramatic cost reduction.
Computerize design allows designer to analyze
various product without producing the
prototype. This technology facilitates
manufacturers to reduce trade-off between cost
and customization (Heizer and Render 2001).
We expect plants positioned off-diagonal
product-process matrix implement these
practice more intensively than those positioned
on diagonal. Hence, we propose hypothesis as
follow:
H3a: Plants positioned on upper product-
process matrix diagonal implement technology
and management initiatives more intensively
than those positioned inside the diagonal.
H3b: Plants positioned on lower product-
process matrix diagonal implement technology
and management initiatives more intensively
than those positioned inside the diagonal.
RESEARCH METHOD
Sample
Samples consist of plants from medium and
large sized companies listed on Standard Trade
& Industry Directory of Indonesia 2003 that
were selected randomly as samples. These
plants are categorized medium and big sized
company with respect to asset capitalization.
These companies have more financial resource
to implement technology and management
initiatives than those of the smaller one. The
most dominant plant has greatest probability to
contribute to overall business performance. In
Oktober
spite of strategic business unit, we select plant
level as our unit of analysis.
A total of 217 questionnaires were sent to
plant manager through mail survey followed
by telephone interview. Of the total
questionnaires, the response rate is 40.01
percent from 21 various industries at two-digit
standard industry. Only two industry
categories are not represented from a total of
25 industry categories. Statistical comparison
using t-test to check non-response bias did not
show any differences with respect to plant
performance.
Variables
Corbett and Van Wassenhove (1993)
argued that the use of several kinds
management and technological initiatives
could eliminate or at least minimize trade-off
among competitive priorities. Ahmad and
Schroeder (2002) classified these management
and technological initiatives into four
categories: processing technology, product
design, management initiatives included JIT
and quality program, and process choices. The
definition of the variables is shown in Table 1
above.
To classify process choice from product
oriented to process oriented, we employed
non-hierarchical cluster analysis using two
variables including orientation toward process
(PROCESS) and orientation toward product
(PRODUCT). PROCESS is measured with
fixed sum scale with a total value of 100
classified into the following categories (in
percentages with a total value of 100): highly
customized, somewhat customized, standard
with custom options, somewhat standardized
and highly standardized. Similarly,
respondents were asked to classify their
PRODUCT into these categories (in
percentages): one of a kind, small batch, large
batch, repetitive/line flow, and continuous
flow.
2005 Priono & Radhi 343

Table 1. Technology and Managerial Initiatives Operationanalization

Processing Technology
VENDOR We have a strong influence over the design of our process equipment
IN_HOUSE Percentage of equipment purchased from vendor which was then modified for
our use is ………%.
Product Design
CUST_INV Our customers are actively involved in the product design process.
CON_ENG The tooling of new products is not started until the final design is completed.
CAD Years of use computer aided design (CAD) technology…..years.
COM_PART Percentage of common parts among all products……...%
Managerial Practice
CONT_IMP Continuous improvement of quality is stressed in all work processes
throughout our plant.
QUAL_SUP Quality is the number one criterion in selecting supplier.
QUAL_CUS Quality is the number one criterion used by our customer in selecting us as
T supplier.
JIT We use JIT for daily control of operations.
JIT_SUPP Our suppliers deliver to us on a just-in-time basis.
CUST_JIT Our customers receive just-in-time deliveries from us.
Note: Respondents were asked to respond the question using 5 points Likert Scale. Strongly Agree: 5,
Agree: 4, Neutral: 3, Disagree: 2, and Strongly Disagree: 1.

ANALYSIS large suggesting that the four formed clusters

Table 2. Factor Analysis
Factor Cronbach α
Biaya 0.7358
Kualitas 0.8570
Pengiriman 0.7526
Kustomisasi 0.8660
As shown at Table 2 above, Confirmatory
factor analysis with a Varimax rotation
identified four competitive priorities with
Cronbach α above the acceptance level of 0.70
(Cooper dan Schindler 2001). These four
factors explain 76.675 percent of the overall
variance while theother 23.235 percent are
explained by unidentified factors.
We employed several criteria as suggested
by Miller and Roth (1994) to analyze the
feasibility of cluster analysis. The t-value of
0.000 suggests that both clustering variables
contribute significantly to clustering process.
The overall R2 of 0.729 (above 0.50) is quite
are heterogeneous. Relative value of standard
deviation within cluster to total standard
deviation (15.677/110.410) is 0.142. The
ralative value of standard deviation indicates
the degree of homogenity of the member
within the clusters. The lower the value, the
higher the homogenity and the relative value of
0.142 suggesting that the member of the
clusters are highly homogenous. Both of the
clustering variables have R2 value of 0.763
and 0.789 for PRODUCT and PROCESS
respectively indicate that the clusters are well
separated with respect to these variables.
Table 3. Cluster Analysis
Statistics Value
t-value 0.000
Overall R2 0.279
R2 PRODUCT 0.763
R2 PROCESS 0.789
344 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Process Choice and Competitive Priorities
This study employed Spearman Corre-
lation. Classification of process choice through
cluster analysis results in four clusters varied
from product oriented to process oriented. We
label the most process oriented cluster as
customized and the most product oriented one
as standardized. To test hypothesis 1c and 1d,
we assign score for each of process choice
according to their sequence from process-
oriented up to product-oriented one, e.g.
standardized=1 and customized=4. We reserve
the values of these scores as we test hypothesis
1c and 1d., e.g. standardized=4 and custom-
mized=1. The correlation of the four factors
and process choice are shown it Table 4.
Examining the correlation between quality
and process choice (H1a), we found significant
correlation as our expectation. This finding is
similar to previous study of Miller and Roth
(1994) which found that quality is the second
highest rank competitive priorities after
flexibility for job shop. Moreover, they also
found that quality is the top competitive
priorities for all other priorities. Unfortunately,
this study does not examine the importance of
quality across four process choices therefore
we can not compare our result with theirs.
Consistent with the observation of Miller
and Roth (1994) and Safizadeh et al. (2000),
customization in our samples achieved through
employing process-oriented plant.
Customization loses its importance as process
choice moves away from process-oriented
toward product-oriented. This finding also
confirms previous study of Safizadeh et al.
(1996) who proved that product flexibility is
the most important for job shops. Ward et al.
Table 4. Correlation between Process Choice and Competitive Priorities
Cost
Process Corr. Coeff. 0.289
Choice Sig. (2-tailed) 0.010*
* Significant at 5% (2-tailed).
** Significant at 1% (2-tailed).
Oktober
(1998) also found that the importance of
flexibility as competitive weapon increase
when the process moves from continous flow
to job shop. Even though customization and
flexibility are two different constructs but they
have strong relationship. A production system
must be flexible enough to produce customized
product (Corbett and Van Wassenhove 1993).
The ability to deliver product in timely
manner is not considered important regardless
of process choice (H1c). Theoretically, we
expect delivery is important for product-
oriented plants, which can produce a large
number of products very quickly through
heavy equipment and automation. One
explanation of this phenomenon is fast
delivery ignored because it is not considered as
a good competitive weapon in product-oriented
manufacturers. Delivery will be more
important in process focused where
customized products are produced based on
order from customers so that on-time delivery
is critical factor in this situation. In spite of the
fact that the relationship is not significant, the
direction of the correlation behaves as our
expectation.
Highest correlation between cost and
process choice indicates that minimizing
product cost is the first criterion for
manufacturers during process selection and
product planning. This finding consistent with
prior study (Ward et al. 1998; Safizadeh et al.
1996; Safizadeh et al. 2000) which found line
flow is strongly linked to cost efficiency.
Compared with sandcone model which
suggests quality should has strongest
correlation with process choice because it
played as foundation for improving other
capabilities, this finding seems contradictory.
Customization Delivery Quality
0.258 0.007 0.226
0.023* 0.950 0.047*
2005 Priono & Radhi
The direction and significance of the
correlation between process choice and
competitive priorities meet product-process
matrix prescription. It also confirms previous
study shows that plants need to develop very
different infrastructures in order to excel on
different dimensions of competitive
performance (Flynn and Flynn 2000). Delivery
is the only priority that does not has significant
correlation with process choice (H1c) therefore
Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a, 1979b) idea
that process choice selection and product
planning are linked together still has great
relevance although it is not fully supported.
Competitive Priorities Trade-offs
To test hypothesis 2a until 2e, we
employed Spearman Correlation then
examined the correlation coefficients among
capabilities to see whether they are traded-off
or jointly emphasized. A positive correlation
means parallel development of two capabilities
while a negative correlation implies trading-off
one capability for another. Table 5 below
presents the correlation between capabilities.
As already noted at Table 4 above, among
all competitive priorities cost has the highest
correlation with process choice therefore it is
not surprising to find cost contradict with both
quality (H2a) and customization (H2b). This
finding agrees with previous empirical study
which found cost contradicts to others (Boyer
and Lewis 2002). Flynn and Flynn (2000) also
Table 5. Correlation among Competitive Priorities
Corr.
Delivery
Sig.
Corr.
Quality
Sig.
Corr.
Customization
Sig.
* Significant at 5% (2-tailed).
** Significant at 1% (2-tailed).
345
found cost still correlate negatively with
quality and customization (flexibility) among
World Class Manufacturing samples
eventhough they applied quality program
already. Quality construct we embrace in this
study is only design quality, hence customer is
paying higher prices for higher design quality.
This trade-off is inherent when manufacturers
decide to select product focused or process
focused plant as their process choice
(Safizadeh et al. 2000).
This positive correlation between quality
and customization suggests that improving
quality is accompanied with improving
customization capability. This evidence agrees
with previous study of Ferdows and De Meyer
(1990) who found that quality which provides
the foundation for other competitive priorities
correlate positively with customization.
There is interesting evidence when
examining delivery with other three
capabilities. Why do the trade-offs of cost-
delivery (H2c), quality-delivery (H2e), and
customization-delivery (H2f) are not proved?
From empirical evidence above, we found that
delivery is ignored when choosing process
choice. As a result, delivery does not have
impact over other competitive priorities
embedded in process choice. For instance,
when selecting competitive priorities cost,
quality, or customization, manufacturers do not
evaluate whether their decision will have
negative effect on delivery.
Cost Delivery Quality
-0.030
0.793
-0.318 0.115
0.004** 0.316
-0.298 -0.131 0.269
0.008** 0.252 0.017*
346 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

This evidence does not in line with previous
research of Boyer and Lewis (2002) which
shows that plants emphasize on delivery place
a much lower emphasize on quality and
customization. The similar case also occurs to
delivery and flexibility.
The Implementation of Technology and
Management Initiatives to Eliminate Trade-
offs
The purpose of these hypothesis testing is
to identify which of the technology and
management initiatives may allow manu-
facturers to minimize trade-offs. We expect
off-diagonal plants implement these variable
higher than plants near or inside the diagonal
matrix.
This research identify 32 plants select
position near the diagonal, 24 plants far above
the diagonal and 22 plants far below the
diagonal. A plant is categorized as outside the
diagonal if its distance is more than 50.1 We
compare the entire characteristics of the three
groups plant to examine their effort to
minimize trade-offs. The separation of plants
positioned far above and far below diagonal
brings us to special consequences. Plants
below the diagonal tend to compete relatively
more on consistent quality, leads time and
responsiveness, and slightly more on price and
technical performance. Conversely, plants
above the diagonal focus more on market
related advantages, such as product image,
service, and also apparently innovativeness
(De Meyer and Vereecke 1996). From these
characteristics we find that plants above the
diagonal are very similar with process-oriented
plant while those below the diagonal are very
close to product-oriented plant.

Table 6. Implementation of Technology and Management Initiatives Based on Position

Near Diagonal far below Near Diagonal far above
Variables Diagonal Diagonal
T Sig.(2-tailed) T Sig.(2-tailed)
VENDOR -2.206 0.033* -2.839 0.007**
IN_HOUSE -1.372 0.177 -2.279 0.027*
CUST_INV 0.140 0.890 -2.321 0.024*
CON_ENG -4.917 0.000** -4.528 0.000**
CAD -0.971 0.337 -1.447 0.154
COM_PART -0.716 0.478 -1.635 0.108
CONT_IMP -1.932 0.060 -1.423 0.161
SUPP_INV -2.607 0.012* -1.476 0.146
QUAL_SUP -2.355 0.023* -2.079 0.015*
JIT -2.293 0.027* -2.277 0.027*
JIT_SUPP -4.093 0.000** -2.417 0.019*
CUST_JIT -1.537 0.131 -2.422 0.019*
PERFORMANCE -1.779 0.082 -1.672 0.100
* Significant at 5% (2-tailed)
** Significant at 5% (2-tailed)
2

2
This cut-off value for the bandwidth outside the diagonal was set based on the minimum value of variable PRODUCT
and PROCESS. Both PRODUCT and PROCESS has minimum value of 100. Because the distance above and below the
diagonal are equally important, the value of 50 represents the distance of a plant located on either side from the diagonal.
2005 Priono & Radhi
The vendors design processing equipment
tend to be general and frequently do not fully
meet the specific requirement of the
manufacturers. To address this problem, off-
diagonal plants customize the process through
close relationship with vendor (VENDOR) or
modify the equipment by them alone
(IN_HOUSE). During modification, manufac-
turers can integrate two dissimilar functions,
add new function, attach or eliminate unused
part. In some cases, specialized equipment is a
source of order winning criteria (Heizer and
Render 2002; p. 251). Plants below the
diagonal can not do this modification
IN_HOUSE. It is not surprising since their
equipment tend to be specific and vendors feel
hesitate to share their knowledge. Quite often
the vendors require manufacturers to sign a
contract for continuity of equipment services
so that manufacturers depend on the vendor for
a long period of time.
This study includes customer involvement
to ensure that product design process does not
sacrifice customer specification (CUST_INV).
The earlier customer involvement during
product design, the higher the level of product
customization (McCutcheon et al. 1994). We
do not find CUST_INV in product design
process for plants below diagonal because they
rely on VENDOR only. Customer
specification can be accommodated if
VENDOR is combined with IN_HOUSE
modification so that the equipment becomes
more flexible. Another technique to
accommodate customer specification is the use
of modular design (MODULAR). MODULAR
allows part of product to be made in high
volume to reduce fixed cost by achieving
economies of scale. MODULAR allows
customizaton in lower cost by means of
modifying the modules or adding features in
the final stage of production (Duray 2002).
Unfortunately, plants below diagonal do not
implement this method either.
High significance values of simultaneous
development process (CON_ENG) shows that
347
the variable is important for all plants deviate
from the diagonal to overcome misalignment
between product design and process design
function. This technique assists to reduce
trade-offs related to delivery because it allows
plants to produce in shorter time, reduce lead-
time and response to customer faster by
conducting several activities simultaneously
(Herrmann and Chincholkar 2001/2002).
Moreover, the advantages of this technique are
higher for plants above the diagonal since their
core competencies are responsiveness and
lead-time (De Meyer and Vereecke 1996).
Theother method to cope with trade-off
between cost and customization is the use of
CAD which enables designer to investigates
more potential problems, shortens product
design phase, reduces cost, and allows a more
rapid response to market. Centralized database
allows related departments using the same
information results in dramatic cost reductions
(Heizer and Render 2002; p. 284).
Unfortunately, this technology is not applied
by all plant categories deviate from the
diagonal.
Involvement of other parties such as
supplier (JIT_SUPP, SUPP_INV) and
customer (CUST_JIT, JIT_SUPP) is required
to ensure that both quality program and JIT
methods are applied holistically to gain
optimal result (Vuppalapati et al. 1995;
Sripavastu and Gupta 1997). Implementation
of QUAL_SUP, JIT and JIT_SUP for all plants
far from the diagonal indicates that these
variables are appropriate under all plant
categories. Implementing quality management
practices through QUAL_SUP increase the
predictability of process, while employing JIT
internally and JIT_SUPP can streamline a
production process under pull system (Flynn et
al. 1995). All of these practices either applied
individually or simultaneously assist the
manufacturers to reduce cost, response
customer more quickly and increase product
quality. In short, these practices minimize
trade-offs among cost, quality and delivery.
348 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
To accommodate the uncertainty in
customers’ order and fluctuation of production
schedule, plants above the diagonal involve
customer in JIT practice (CUST_JIT).
Inventory can be reduced significantly through
the use of linked data that enable production
system connected to customer purchasing
department (Chase et al. 2001; p. 407-408).
Plants below the diagonal do not involve their
customer in JIT practice because they are
facing problem from various customer taste in
low volume.
Plants below the diagonal involve supplier
in production activity (SUPP_INV) to ensure
the continuity of their production. A little
suspension in these system causes
manufacturers suffered huge loss because of
high fixed cost of the system. The
manufacturers need to guarantee that the
materials are supplied as expected to ensure
production activity run normally. Conversely,
plants above the diagonal do not cooperate
with supplier because of production schedule
fluctuation. High degree of product variation
and quick new product introduction foster this
plant category to look for new alternative of
raw materials. This group of plants assumes
applying this variable is extravagance because
of their difficulties to forecast their
requirement accurately.
CONT_IMP and JIT result in synergies if
applied together and therefore, applying both
these two management initiatives minimize
trade-off more effectively instead of
implementing either one (Vuppalapati et al.
1995; Sripavastu and Gupta 1997). Despite our
samples still implement them partially, they
are able to minimize trade-off included quality-
customization and quality-delivery, but trade-
off between quality and cost remain exist.
From this statistical result we can not refute
the hypothesis that quality program facilitates
the manufacturers to cope with trade-off
between quality and cost. Most probably,
manufacturers are still focusing on building
capabilities other than cost, because cost
Oktober
should be built after all other capabilities attain
a certain acceptable level (Ferdows and De
Meyer 1990).
In general, our finding consistent with
proposed hypothesis hence accept both H3a
and H3b. Plants occupying off-diagonal
positions implement technology and
managerial initiatives higher than those on-
diagonal to overcome trade-offs. These two
groups apply slightly different approach to
overcome trade-offs because the two groups
emphasize different competitive priorities.
Emphasizing different competitive priorities
result in different types of trade-off they are
facing.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION
The findings of this study provide
interesting answers to research questions
mentioned in the beginning of this article.
Manufacturers do not necessarily align their
process choice with competitive priorities as
suggested by Hayes and Whelwright (1979a).
Recent emerging managerial practices and
technology are useful to solve the problem
concerning competitive priorities contradiction
facing by the manufacturers. Technology
indeed improves the performance of
competitive priorities, but the manufacturers
still have to make choice which one is the most
important. However, Indonesian manufacturers
are still implement these technologies partially
so that they do not produce optimum result.
Perhaps, most Indonesian manufacturers think
the techologies are still too expensive to adopt.
Trade-offs resulted from competitive
priorities requiring similar facilities easier to
be eliminated. However, two type of trade-offs
are remain exist involving cost-customization
and cost-quality. These two types of trade-offs
involves cost since cost is least important
competitive priorities among manufacturers.
This does not mean that technology and
management initiatives are not succesful in
improving cost performance. Trade-offs
related to cost becauses manufacturers do not
2005 Priono & Radhi
consider cost reduction is as important as other
competitive priorities improvement. Perhaps
this is one reason why Indonesian
manufacturers’ product found difficulities
when compete with foreign product in
international market.
The main limitation of this research is that
we use cross sectional data. Cross sectional
data only give us portrait at a particular point
of time. We can not examine the dynamic
nature of trade-off which is changing over time
(Silveira and Slack 2001). Next research
should be conducted longitudinally to observe
the progress of improvement efforts. There is a
probability that plants lack of strategic
consensus between policy maker (manager)
and the operator. To address this problem, next
research should not rely on a single respondent
only.
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Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 351 - 367

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A CASE STUDY

OF INDONESIAN MANUFACTURE
Tri Widodo
Universitas Gadjah Mada

ABSTRAK

Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) merupakan isu sentral dalam Industrial-

Organization (IO). Analisis SCP biasanya menggunakan pendekatan parsial dan linier
sederhana, Structure mempengaruhi Conduct dan Performance. Dalam dunia nyata,
Structure, Conduct dan Performance memiliki hubungan yang terkait satu dengan yang
lain (interaktif). Paper ini menggunakan pendekatan analisis model SCP interaktif untuk
menganalis SCP industri manufaktur Indonesia dan mengaplikasikan model ekonometrik
persamaan simultan. Paper ini berkesimpulan bahwa konsentrasi tidak dapat dijadikan
variabel eksogen untuk perilaku perusahaan-perusahaan (conduct) dan kinerja pasar
(performance) seperti dalam paradigma SCP.
Keywords: Structure-Conduct-Performance; Industrial Organization; Interactive Model.

INTRODUCTION (in 1980s) have applied some export

In the last two decades, manufacture
sectors have taken important role in East Asia,
Japan, Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs
i.e. Hongkong, South Korea, Taiwan) and
ASEAN countries. The share of manufacture
sectors in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has
increased tremendously in those countries. In
East Asia, manufacture sectors have driven
strongly by their manufacture export
(Mohamed and Hall Hill,1988).
In the historical perspective, Indonesia has
applied some industrialization policies/strate-
gies such as Import Substitution Industria-
lization (ISI) and then Export Promotion (EP).
The ISI policies created a fast growth in
industrial sectors but it was unsustainable
(Hadjam et al 1989). Manufacture outputs
grew in small and restricted domestic market;
therefore they were not competitive in the
world international market.
To promote the sustainability of manu-
facture growth, the governments of Malaysia,
Philippine, Thailand (in 1970s) and Indonesia
promotion policies and continued to apply ISI
focusing on more capital intensive and skilled-
labor intensive. As a result, the domestic
market is integrated with the world
international market. The world economic
development might be a new threat and
problem for national international trade
development (Karseno 1995). World Trade
Organization ratification, establishing regional
economy (such as APEC and AFTA) and
arriving some new comers (Cina and Vietnam)
might also be new threats for Indonesia.
Globalization becomes a new phenomenon
that is not avoidable by all countries in the
world. The level of production penetration into
markets becomes higher and higher. In
contrast, space and time dimension -which
were main restriction in international trade-
can be solved easily as a result of the science
and technology developments.
Almost of manufacture outputs are trada-
ble goods. International trade plays important
role in the success of industrialization process
352 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
(Poot, 1992). Export performance of a country
depends on some factors effecting supply and
demand conditions. In short, competitive and
comparative advantages will determine the
competitiveness of exported products. They are
summarized in the industrial organization.
Therefore, a study of industrial organization is
important in analyzing the interrelationship
between factors impacting on performance of a
manufacture output in a market. This research
is addressed to answer some questions: What
factors determine the structure, conduct and
performance (SCP)? How do the structure,
conduct and performance interrelate?
LITERATURE REVIEW
The most essential contribution of
contestability theory, particularly for public
policy, is its insinuation that industry structure
is determined endogenously and simulta-
neously with the pricing, output, advertising
expenditure and other decisions of the firm
comprising industry. The claim contrast with
older theories of industrial organization such as
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP)
paradigm which presented an analytical and
empirical framework that dominated industrial
economics for many years (Moschandreas
2000). According to this paradigm, industry
structure determines the conduct of firms and
the performance of the industry. That implies
that the fewer firms in an industry the more
likely it is that they will have a propensity to
collude. Prices will consequently tend to be
above the competitive level and entry pre-
vention and other anti-competitive strategies
will be more prevalent the higher the degree of
Figure 1. Linear Structure-Conduct-Performance framework
Structure:
Number and Size Distribution of sellers
Number and size distribution of buyers
Product differentiation
Entry conditions
Source: Martin (1988)
Oktober
industrial concentration. Furthermore, lack of
competitive pressures may contribute to
managerial slack and inefficiency in
production.
The causes and consequences of the
structure of industry are two of the concerns of
the industrial organization field. A basic
framework of this field is the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) framework of
industrial analysis (Martin 1988:3). In this
basic view, the market structure (its
organizational characteristics: particularly
degree of concentration and conditions of
entry) determines the behaviors (conducts) of
the firms in the market regarding prices, sales,
employment, advertising, research and
development and so on. The conducts of the
firms determines performance, particularly
profits and efficiency. There is a sense in
which the study of industrial economics
amounts to fleshing out the relationship outline
in Figure 1.
Many researches have concentrated on the
effect of the concentration ratio, the percentage
of output represented by leading four (or three
or eight) firms in industry, a measure of
structure of an industry, on conduct, such as
advertising, and on performance, such as profit
(Weis 1971, Comanor and Wilson 1979; Hay
and Morris 1979; Scherer 1980; Waterson
1984). The concentration-profit relationship is
one of the most thoroughly tested of all
hypotheses in economics (Weis, 1974). A
voluminous empirical work has attempted to
the test the prediction that structure determines
performance.
Conducts:
Performances:
Collusion
Profitability
Strategic behavior
Efficiency
Advertising/research and
Progressiveness
development (R&D)
2005 Widodo 353

But since it not possible to construct an index
which encompasses all, or even the main,
structural features of an industry many empi-
rical researches attempt to infer the relation-
ship between structure and performance by
examining one feature, usually market concen-
tration, on some measures of performance,
usually profitability. Moschandreas (2000)
notes that research carried over three decates
or more by Bain (1956), Stigler (1968), Weiss
(1974) and others has consistently indicated a
positive although occasionally weak relation-
ship between market concentration and profits.
In contrast, there are dissenting voices. Several
studies report an insignificant negative
(Holtermann 1973; Clarke 1984) or positive
(Khalizadeh 1974) relationship between con-
centration and profits while other (Geroski
1984) have found that the relationship is non-
linear.
Various other aspects of industrial conduct
and performance have also been related to
concentration and other variables. Variables
such as prices, wages, advertising, research
and development expenditures, and
productivity have all been related to
concentration and other variables. Each of
these studies can be considered a single
equation from a larger and simultaneous-
equation model of industrial organization
relationships, which build on the SCP
hypothesis, and can be tested the role played
by concentration.
The linear SCP model depicted in Figure 1
presumes very simple causal relationships. In
facts, the structure-conduct-performance model
that industrial relationships are not so simple
but complex and interactive (Phillips 1974).
More recently, the group of economists
associated with what is known as the ‘new
industrial organization’ theory treats conduct
as an equilibrium concept exogenously deter-
mined. The no-cooperative Nash Equilibrium
is commonly adopted. In their models conduct
and the initial demand and supply conditions
determine the performance of the market and
the number of firms that will exist in the long
run (Moschandreas 2000). The transaction cost
approach to business organization has also
shed doubts on the simple one-way causation
implied by the simple SCP paradigm.The
linear structure-conduct-performance has been
augmented to reflect the interactions among
structure conduct and performance that occur
in real world market. The structure-conduct-
performance interaction suggested by Martin
(1988) is presented in Figure 2. This research
will analyze the interactive structure-
performance-conduct framework in Indonesian
manufacture.

Figure 2. The Interactive Structure-Conduct-Performance framework

Progressiveness

Technology Profitability
Structure

Performance
Strategy

Demand
Conduct

Sales efforts
Source: Martin 1988
354 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

METHODOLOGY (K/L), and advertising, measured by

Data and Estimation
Data used in this paper is obtained for 30
three-digit (ISIC, International Standard
Industrial Classification) manufacturing Indus-
tries for the 1994-1995 period. A linear version
of the model is then estimated using both
ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stages
least square (2SLS) techniques.
Model
In analyzing the structure-performance-
conduct of Indonesian manufacture, this paper
will apply simultaneous equation suggested by
Intriligator et al (1975) with some extension.
Table 1 shows the six endogenous variables of
the model. Market structure is indicated by two
variables: concentration, measured by the four-
firm concentration ratio based on the value of
shipments (CR), and entry, measured by the
relative change in the number of firms (ΔN,
defined as Nt/Nt-1).
Conduct, involving the decision of the
firm, is represented by two variables: capital
intensity, measured by the capital/labor ratio
advertising-sales ratio (A/S). Performance,
involving the social performance of the
industry, is represented by two variables: price
change, measured by relative change in price
(Δp, defined as pt/pt-1) and profit, measured by
net profit on the net worth (Π).
The exogenous variables fall into two
categories. First, those are factors that may be
treated as 'underlying considerations',
especially, price and income elasticity of
demand (εp and εI) and the minimum efficient
size (MES). Second, those are factors that are
endogenous to the overall economy but treated
as exogenous for any particular industry,
namely the real wage (w), the growth in the
value of shipments (g) and the relative change
in direct cost (Δc). The real wage is assumed to
be set by aggregate labor markets, which cut
across all industries. As the growth in
shipment and the change in direct costs, they
reflect considerations that are, from an input-
output stand point, respectively, 'downstream'
and 'upstream' from any particular industry. An
expanded model would treat some of the
exogenous variables as endogenous.

Table 1. Variables of the Simultaneous-Equations Model of Industrial Organization

No. Variables
1. Endogenous Variables
Structure Module
1) CR = concentration ratio (CR4)
2) ΔN = relative change in number of firms
Conduct Module
1) K/L = capital-labor ratio
2) A/S = advertising-sales ratio
Performance Module
1) Δp = relative change in price
2) Π = profit rate on net worth
2. Exogenous Variables
Underlying-considerations module
1) εp = price elasticity of demand (negative)
2) εI = income elasticity of demand
3) MES = minimum efficient size (weighted average of the total asset size class)
Factor external to a particular industry
1) w = real wage
2) g = growth in the value of shipment
3) Δc = relative change in direct cost
2005 Widodo 355

Tabel 2. Simultaneous-Equation Model of Industrial Organization

Structure Conduct
1) CR = f1(K/L , A/S , Π , εp , g) 3) K/L=f3(CR , w)
+ + + - - + +
2) ΔN = f2(CR , A/S, Π , MES) 4) A/S=f4(CR , Π , εp)
- - + - + + -
Performance
5) Δp=f5(CR , K/L , Δc)
+ - +
6) Π=f6(CR,A/S, MES , g , εI)
+ + + + +

The econometric simultaneous model is The six equations of the model and the
presented as follows: expected sign of coefficients of all variables of
the model are specified in Table 2. It is by no
⎛K⎞ ⎛ A⎞
CR = α 0 + α 1 ⎜ ⎟ + α 2 ⎜ ⎟ + α 3 Π + means claimed that the model is either
⎝L⎠ ⎝S⎠ (1) definitive or exhaustive. Rather it is an attempt
α 4ε p + α 5 g + ui to represent the SCP paradigm. The variables
incorporated and relationships indicated were
⎛ A⎞ chosen on the basis of three considerations-
ΔN = β 0 + β 1 CR + β 2 ⎜ ⎟ + β 3 Π +
⎝S⎠ (2) their roles in the SCP paradigm, their use in
β 4 MES + u previous studies, and that availability of the
i
pertinent and utilizable data.
⎛K⎞
⎜ ⎟ = φ 0 + φ 1 CR + φ 2 w + ui (3) RESULT
⎝L⎠
The result of both estimation techniques
⎛ A⎞ i.e. ordinary least square (OLS) and two-stage
⎜ ⎟ = γ 0 + γ 1 CR + γ 2 Π + γ 3 ε p + ui (4)
⎝S⎠ least square (2SLS) is presented in Table 3.
Several finding appear from estimation of this
⎛K⎞ model, particularly the 2SLS coefficient and
Δp = ϕ 0 + ϕ1 CR + ϕ 2 ⎜ ⎟ + ϕ 3 Δc + ui (5)
⎝L⎠ (asymptotic) standard errors. One set of
findings concerns the several two-way
⎛ A⎞ relationships of the model, in which one
Π = ξ 0 + ξ 1 CR + ξ 2 ⎜ ⎟ + ξ 3 MES +
⎝S⎠ (6) variable both influences and is influenced by
ξ 4 g + ξ 5 ε p + ui another.
Table 3. Industrial Organization Simultaneous Model, Estimated for 30 Three-Digit Manufacturing Industries 356
Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Oktober
2005 Widodo
The first is that between advertising-sales
ratio and the concentration ratio: A/S exerts a
statistically insignificant positive influence on
CR, and CR exerts a statistically insignificant
positive effect on A/S. The relationship
between CR and the profit rate Π has been a
major implication of the SCP paradigm. The
estimated model, however, indicates that Π
exerts a statistically significant negative
influence on CR, and CR exerts a statistically
insignificant negative effect on Π. It indicates
that higher profitability lower CR, vice versa.
The third and the last of two-way relationship
is that between A/S and Π. According to the
estimate in Table 3, A/S exerts statistically
significant positive influence on Π, while Π
exerts a insignificant positive influence on
A/S. The second set of findings concerns the
one-way relationship of the estimated model,
specifically the lack of statistically significant
influence of CR on ΔN.
The third set of findings relates to the role
of concentration. This construct has played a
central role in the SCP literature, but the result
suggest that while concentration does have
some place in industrial-organization relation-
ship, it perhaps does not occupy the central
place it has assumed as a result of an
inadequately tested acceptance of the SCP
paradigm. While concentration does have a
statistically significant effect on capital
intensity, it has no significant influence on
entry. Nor does it have a significant influence
on the two conduct of decision of the firm with
regard to capital intensity and advertising or on
the two performance variables of the change in
price and the profit rate. Even the central
doctrine of the SCP paradigm that
concentration leads to higher productivity is
not supported by the evidence. Furthermore,
concentration can not itself be explained on the
basis of consideration such as advertising.
These finding concerning the influence and
role of the concentration ratio in the system
pose serious questions about its central role in
the literature on industrial organization.
The fourth set of findings relates to the
role of advertising. The evidence points to
answer the question of whether advertising is a
357
barrier to entry or not are presented.
Advertising does appear to reduce entry, but at
the same time, it appears to have no
statistically significant effect on concentration.
Thus advertising may create a barrier to the
entry of new firm with out changing the degree
of concentration in the industry.
The fifth set of finding relates to the two
techniques of estimation, OLS and 2SLS.
Comparing the estimates obtained using OLS
with those obtained using 2SLS indicates the
effect of the estimation technique. Seven
important shifts take place in moving from
OLS to 2SLS estimates:
• The influence of Π negative and
insignificant on ΔN using OLS but positive
and significant using 2SLS
• The influence of MES positive and
insignificant on ΔN using OLS but
negative and insignificant using 2SLS
• The influence of Π negative and
insignificant on A/S using OLS but positive
and significant using 2SLS
• The influence of εp positive and
insignificant on A/S using OLS but
negative and insignificant using 2SLS
• The influence of A/S negative and
insignificant on Π using OLS but positive
and insignificant using 2SLS
• The influence of εp positive and
insignificant on Π using OLS but negative
and significant using 2SLS
CONCLUSION
Several conclusions come forward from
this study. First, the SCP paradigm may be
improperly giving to much weight to
concentration as an explanatory variable for
industry conduct and performance. In the case
of Indonesian manufacture, the estimated
model indicates that profit exerts a statistically
significant negative influence on concentra-
tion, and concentration exerts a statistically
insignificant negative effect on profit. Varia-
ble advertising-sale ration exerts statistically
significant positive influence on profit, while
358 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
profit exerts a insignificant positive influence
on the advertising-sale ratio. In the case of
Indonesian manufacture, concentration does
not occupy the central place of the SCP
paradigm. Concentration does have a
statistically significant effect on capital
intensity; it has no significant influence on
entry. Concentration can not itself be explained
on the basis of consideration such as
advertising. The influence and role of the
concentration ratio in the system pose serious
questions about its central role in the literature
on industrial organization. Advertising does
appear to reduce entry, but at the same time, it
appears to have no statistically significant
effect on concentration. Second, it is possible
to specify and estimate a simultaneous-
equation model of industrial organization.
Third, the OLS and 2SLS techniques provide
different estimates, casting some doubt upon
previous single-equation studies.
REFERENCES
Adnan Hadjam at al, 1986. Pengaruh
Pembatasan Ekspor Terhadap Kinerja
Industri di Indonesia. Unpublished . PAU-
UGM. Yogyakarta.
Bain, J.S. 1956. Barrier to New Competition.
Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press.
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS). Industrial Statistic.
Indonesia
Clarke, R. ‘Profit margins and market concen-
tration in UK manufacturing Industry: 1970-
1976’. Applied Economics, 16: 57-71.
Geroski, 1981. ‘Price leadership and welfare
losses in US manufacturing’. American
Economic Review, 76:756-67.
Holterman, S.E. 1973.’Market structure and
Economics Performance in UK
Manufacturing Industry’. Journal of
Industrial Economics, 27: 359-68.
Intriligator, M.D., J.F. Weston and H. De
Angelo, 1975. An econometric test of the
structure-conduct-performance paradigm
in industrial organization. Paper presented
Oktober
at the Econometric Society 3rd World
Congress, Toronto.
Karseno, A. R, 1995. Efisiensi Manufaktur dan
Peran Teknologi di Indonesia. Paper
presented in Seminar Internasional Lustrum
ke-8 Fakultas Ekonomi UGM. Yogyakarta.
Karseno, A. R, and Tri Widodo, 1996. Efisiensi
(teknik, skala, alokatif) unggulan produk
manufaktur Indonesia. Research funded by
MM-UGM. Unpublsihed.
Khalilzabeth, S.J. 1974. ‘Market structure and
price-cost margins in UK manufacturing
industries. Review of Economics and
Statistics, 54:64-76.
Mohamed, A. dan Hall Hill, 1988.
Industrialisasi di ASEAN. LP3ES. Jakarta.
Martin, S. 1988. Industrial Economics: Eco-
nomic Analysis and Public Policy. Mac-
millan Publishing Company. New York.
Moschandreas, M. 2000. Business Economics.
Business Press. London.
Poot, H. 1991. “Interindustry linkage in
Indonesian manufacturing”, Bulletin of
Indonesian Economic Studies, Vol. 27, No.
2, Agustus.
Poot, H., Arie, K., dan Jaap, C.J., 1992.
Industrialisation and Trade in Indonesia,
Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta.
Porter, E. M. 1990. Competitive Advantage of
The Nations. The Free Press. New York.
Stigler, G.J. The Organization of Industry.
Homewood, IL: Irwin.
Weiss, L. W., 1971. Quantitative Studies of
Industrial Organization. In M.D.
Intriligator, Ed. Frontier of Quantitative
Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Company.
Weiss, L.W., 1974. The Concentration-profit
relationship and antitrust. In H.J
Goldschmid, H.M. Mann, and J.F. Westen,
Eds., Industrial Concentration: The New
Learning. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company.
2005 Widodo 359

Appendix

A. 1. Estimation of Equation 1 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: CR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 07:22
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 136.6732 60.92362 2.243353 0.0344
RKL -0.024385 5.282122 -0.004617 0.9964
RAS 22.55822 24.269 0.929508 0.3619
PHI -410.6111 213.149 -1.926404 0.066
PE 0.270246 0.285018 0.948169 0.3525
G -82.44661 54.47823 -1.513386 0.1432
R-squared 0.265007 Mean dependent var 40.504
Adjusted R-squared 0.111884 S.D. dependent var 21.80224
S.E. of regression 20.54641 Akaike info criterion 9.060106
Sum squared resid 10131.72 Schwarz criterion 9.340345
Log likelihood -129.9016 F-statistic 1.730678
Durbin-Watson stat 1.702376 Prob(F-statistic) 0.16592

A.2. Estimation of Equation 2 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: DN
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 07:18
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.02901 0.065273 15.76474 0
CR 0.001554 0.00126 1.233928 0.2287
RAS 0.384021 0.145799 2.633901 0.0143
PHI -0.461869 1.199721 -0.384981 0.7035
MES 0.046518 0.042684 1.089821 0.2862
R-squared 0.372919 Mean dependent var 1.134463
Adjusted R-squared 0.272586 S.D. dependent var 0.142594
S.E. of regression 0.121616 Akaike info criterion -1.22488
Sum squared resid 0.369763 Schwarz criterion -0.99135
Log likelihood 23.3732 F-statistic 3.71681
Durbin-Watson stat 2.388939 Prob(F-statistic) 0.016576
360 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

A.3. Estimation of Equation 3 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: RKL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 07:25
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.379586 0.366916 3.759951 0.0008
CR 0.000242 0.008 0.030237 0.9761
W 0.00669 0.025587 0.261444 0.7957
R-squared 0.002554 Mean dependent var 1.392647
Adjusted R-squared -0.071331 S.D. dependent var 0.907418
S.E. of regression 0.939224 Akaike info criterion 2.807114
Sum squared resid 23.81782 Schwarz criterion 2.947233
Log likelihood -39.1067 F-statistic 0.034566
Durbin-Watson stat 0.998187 Prob(F-statistic) 0.966067

A.4. Estimation of Equation 4 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: RAS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 07:26
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.045942 0.090881 0.505524 0.6174
CR 0.001041 0.001575 0.661103 0.5144
PHI -1.022915 1.796953 -0.56925 0.5741
PE 0.001351 0.002118 0.637806 0.5292
R-squared 0.057641 Mean dependent var 0.075325
Adjusted R-squared -0.051093 S.D. dependent var 0.163674
S.E. of regression 0.167803 Akaike info criterion -0.60849
Sum squared resid 0.732104 Schwarz criterion -0.42166
Log likelihood 13.12729 F-statistic 0.530109
Durbin-Watson stat 2.174144 Prob(F-statistic) 0.665606
2005 Widodo 361

A.5. Estimation of Equation 5 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: DP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 07:34
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.135778 0.024399 46.55022 0
CR -0.000275 0.000428 -0.643259 0.5257
RKL -0.021797 0.010176 -2.142052 0.0417
DC 0.00081 0.004131 0.196033 0.8461
R-squared 0.162429 Mean dependent var 1.09561
Adjusted R-squared 0.065786 S.D. dependent var 0.051439
S.E. of regression 0.049718 Akaike info criterion -3.04133
Sum squared resid 0.064269 Schwarz criterion -2.85451
Log likelihood 49.61999 F-statistic 1.680711
Durbin-Watson stat 2.389503 Prob(F-statistic) 0.195592

A.6. Estimation of Equation 6 (OLS)

Dependent Variable: PHI
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 08:11
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.

C 0.050212 0.063763 0.787487 0.4387

CR -0.000338 0.000217 -1.557242 0.1325
RAS -0.006512 0.025682 -0.253544 0.802
MES 0.000921 0.007322 0.125792 0.9009
G -0.011414 0.055858 -0.204343 0.8398
IE 7.39E-05 0.000569 0.129851 0.8978
R-squared 0.128867 Mean dependent var 0.024057
Adjusted R-squared -0.052619 S.D. dependent var 0.020145
S.E. of regression 0.020668 Akaike info criterion -4.74358
Sum squared resid 0.010252 Schwarz criterion -4.46334
Log likelihood 77.15362 F-statistic 0.710067
Durbin-Watson stat 1.594369 Prob(F-statistic) 0.621741
362 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

B. 1. Estimation of Reduced Equation 1 to Get CRhat

Dependent Variable: CR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 09:54
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 110.8249 56.7793 1.951853 0.0627
PE 0.099255 0.236686 0.419353 0.6787
IE 0.486854 0.546956 0.890116 0.3822
MES 15.81716 6.466392 2.446057 0.0222
W 0.297558 0.577089 0.515619 0.6108
G -73.133 51.28393 -1.426041 0.1667
R-squared 0.283668 Mean dependent var 40.504
Adjusted R-squared 0.134432 S.D. dependent var 21.80224
S.E. of regression 20.28392 Akaike info criterion 9.03439
Sum squared resid 9874.494 Schwarz criterion 9.314629
Log likelihood -129.5158 F-statistic 1.900799
Durbin-Watson stat 2.019069 Prob(F-statistic) 0.131609

B. 2. Estimation of Reduced Equation 2 to Get DNhat

Dependent Variable: DN
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:04
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.530017 0.301092 5.081568 0
PE 0.004796 0.001245 3.852901 0.0007
IE 0.007396 0.002894 2.555594 0.0171
MES 0.053685 0.033163 1.61882 0.118
G -0.430829 0.271917 -1.584415 0.1257
R-squared 0.509475 Mean dependent var 1.134463
Adjusted R-squared 0.430991 S.D. dependent var 0.142594
S.E. of regression 0.107562 Akaike info criterion -1.47048
Sum squared resid 0.289242 Schwarz criterion -1.23695
Log likelihood 27.0572 F-statistic 6.491457
Durbin-Watson stat 2.482036 Prob(F-statistic) 0.001001
2005 Widodo 363

B. 3. Estimation of Reduced Equation 3 to Get RKLhat

Dependent Variable: RKL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:06
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 4.012131 2.214856 1.811464 0.0816
PE 0.028105 0.009292 3.024626 0.0055
W 0.000595 0.021941 0.027103 0.9786
G -2.615941 2.013019 -1.299511 0.2052
R-squared 0.303178 Mean dependent var 1.392647
Adjusted R-squared 0.222775 S.D. dependent var 0.907418
S.E. of regression 0.799983 Akaike info criterion 2.515113
Sum squared resid 16.63928 Schwarz criterion 2.701939
Log likelihood -33.72669 F-statistic 3.770747
Durbin-Watson stat 1.274951 Prob(F-statistic) 0.022658

B. 4. Estimation of Reduced Equation 4 to Get RAShat

Dependent Variable: RAS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:08
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -0.260474 0.471541 -0.55239 0.5856
PE 0.001298 0.00195 0.665608 0.5118
IE 0.004302 0.004533 0.949086 0.3517
MES -0.032265 0.051936 -0.621235 0.5401
G 0.308614 0.42585 0.724701 0.4754
R-squared 0.086841 Mean dependent var 0.075325
Adjusted R-squared -0.059264 S.D. dependent var 0.163674
S.E. of regression 0.168454 Akaike info criterion -0.5733
Sum squared resid 0.709419 Schwarz criterion -0.33976
Log likelihood 13.59944 F-statistic 0.594373
Durbin-Watson stat 2.139176 Prob(F-statistic) 0.66995
364 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

B. 5. Estimation of Reduced Equation 5 to Get DPhat

Dependent Variable: DP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:10
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.706423 0.11378 6.208664 0
PE -0.001345 0.000471 -2.855084 0.0085
W 0.000773 0.001563 0.494638 0.6252
G 0.361797 0.10248 3.530413 0.0016
DC 0.002556 0.004716 0.542106 0.5925
R-squared 0.463742 Mean dependent var 1.09561
Adjusted R-squared 0.37794 S.D. dependent var 0.051439
S.E. of regression 0.04057 Akaike info criterion -3.42056
Sum squared resid 0.041148 Schwarz criterion -3.18702
Log likelihood 56.30835 F-statistic 5.404831
Durbin-Watson stat 2.144092 Prob(F-statistic) 0.002815

B. 6. Estimation of Reduced Equation 6 to Get Phihat

Dependent Variable: PHI
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:13
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.00659 0.057734 0.114146 0.9101
PE 0.000428 0.000241 1.779986 0.0877
IE -5.52E-05 0.000556 -0.099172 0.9218
MES -0.004662 0.006575 -0.709016 0.4851
W -0.000101 0.000587 -0.172718 0.8643
G 0.014864 0.052146 0.28505 0.7781
R-squared 0.132515 Mean dependent var 0.024057
Adjusted R-squared -0.048211 S.D. dependent var 0.020145
S.E. of regression 0.020625 Akaike info criterion -4.74777
Sum squared resid 0.010209 Schwarz criterion -4.46753
Log likelihood 77.21656 F-statistic 0.733236
Durbin-Watson stat 1.943644 Prob(F-statistic) 0.605674
2005 Widodo 365

C. 1. Estimation of Equation 1 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: CR
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:17
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 768.0672 3857.233 0.199124 0.8438
RKLHAT -153.3588 959.7001 -0.159799 0.8744
RASHAT 63.99336 117.1505 0.546249 0.5899
PHIHAT -3835.781 1540.705 -2.489627 0.0201
PE 5.969512 27.0382 0.220781 0.8271
G -437.0436 2515.75 -0.173723 0.8635
R-squared 0.283668 Mean dependent var 40.504
Adjusted R-squared 0.134432 S.D. dependent var 21.80224
S.E. of regression 20.28392 Akaike info criterion 9.03439
Sum squared resid 9874.494 Schwarz criterion 9.314629
Log likelihood -129.5158 F-statistic 1.900799
Durbin-Watson stat 2.019069 Prob(F-statistic) 0.131609

C. 2. Estimation of Equation 2 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: DN
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:19
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.549304 0.119127 4.611087 0.0001
CRHAT 0.009831 0.002935 3.349616 0.0026
RASHAT 0.635769 0.530038 1.199479 0.2416
PHIHAT 6.740051 3.256738 2.069571 0.049
MES -0.043451 0.059757 -0.72713 0.4739
R-squared 0.515134 Mean dependent var 1.134463
Adjusted R-squared 0.437556 S.D. dependent var 0.142594
S.E. of regression 0.10694 Akaike info criterion -1.48208
Sum squared resid 0.285905 Schwarz criterion -1.24855
Log likelihood 27.23125 F-statistic 6.640161
Durbin-Watson stat 2.412498 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000875
366 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

C.3. Estimation of Equation 3 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: RKL
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:21
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.459381 0.604521 0.759909 0.4539
CRHAT 0.022953 0.014358 1.598619 0.1215
W 0.007335 0.024459 0.299909 0.7665
R-squared 0.088769 Mean dependent var 1.392647
Adjusted R-squared 0.021271 S.D. dependent var 0.907418
S.E. of regression 0.897715 Akaike info criterion 2.716712
Sum squared resid 21.7591 Schwarz criterion 2.856831
Log likelihood -37.75068 F-statistic 1.315128
Durbin-Watson stat 1.204763 Prob(F-statistic) 0.285091

C.4. Estimation of Equation 4 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: RAS
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:24
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1.14897 1.460185 -0.786866 0.4385
CRHAT 0.008823 0.012631 0.698527 0.491
PHIHAT 42.51085 47.55374 0.893954 0.3795
PE -0.017794 0.021535 -0.826291 0.4162
R-squared 0.063387 Mean dependent var 0.075325
Adjusted R-squared -0.044683 S.D. dependent var 0.163674
S.E. of regression 0.167291 Akaike info criterion -0.6146
Sum squared resid 0.72764 Schwarz criterion -0.42778
Log likelihood 13.21904 F-statistic 0.586536
Durbin-Watson stat 2.187876 Prob(F-statistic) 0.629253
2005 Widodo 367

C.5. Estimation of Equation 5 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: DP
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:25
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 1.189834 0.031784 37.43558 0
CRHAT -0.000297 0.000767 -0.387311 0.7017
RKLHAT -0.059469 0.017473 -3.403546 0.0022
DC 0.000374 0.003649 0.102603 0.9191
R-squared 0.36797 Mean dependent var 1.09561
Adjusted R-squared 0.295044 S.D. dependent var 0.051439
S.E. of regression 0.043189 Akaike info criterion -3.3229
Sum squared resid 0.048497 Schwarz criterion -3.13608
Log likelihood 53.84354 F-statistic 5.04577
Durbin-Watson stat 1.832699 Prob(F-statistic) 0.006898

C.6. Estimation of Equation 6 (TSLS)

Dependent Variable: PHI
Method: Least Squares
Date: 11/24/02 Time: 10:28
Sample: 1 30
Included observations: 30
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.137108 0.273726 0.500896 0.621
CRHAT -0.000341 0.001972 -0.172718 0.8643
RASHAT 0.356161 0.253508 1.404931 0.1729
MES 0.012217 0.036172 0.337748 0.7385
G -0.119961 0.211279 -0.567786 0.5755
IE -0.001421 0.000971 -1.463424 0.1563
R-squared 0.132515 Mean dependent var 0.024057
Adjusted R-squared -0.048211 S.D. dependent var 0.020145
S.E. of regression 0.020625 Akaike info criterion -4.74777
Sum squared resid 0.010209 Schwarz criterion -4.46753
Log likelihood 77.21656 F-statistic 0.733236
Durbin-Watson stat 1.943644 Prob(F-statistic) 0.605674
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 368 - 382

PROBLEMS OF THE INDONESIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY:

AN INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
Ahmad Erani Yustika
Universitas Brawijaya
Malang

ABSTRACT

Diantara sekian banyak komoditas pertanian yang memainkan peran strategis di

Indonesia, gula merupakan salah satu produk yang mendapatkan perhatian sangat besar
dari pemerintah. Masalahnya, sejak beberapa dekade terakhir, industri gula di Indonesia
mengalami kemerosotan yang luar biasa, baik karena faktor internal maupun eksternal.
Akibat persoalan ini, Indonesia yang semula menjadi eksportir gula terbesar kedua di
dunia, saat ini justru menjadi salah satu negara importer gula terbesar di dunia. Secara
umum, bila dipetakan, masalah pada industri gula di Indonesia berakar dari empat faktor
beikut: (i) inefisiensi pada level petani; (ii) inefisiensi pada tingkat pabrik gula (iii)
kebijakan pemerintah yang tidak efektif; dan (iv) perdagangan produk gula sangat distortif
dalam pasar internasional. Tulisan ini, dengan cara yang berbeda, berargumentasi bahwa
sebagian dari penyebab kemunduran industri gula nasional disebabkan oleh inefisiensi
kelembagaan (institutional inefficiency), baik pada level kebijakan kelembagaan
(institutional environment) maupun kesepakatan kelembagaan (institutional arrangement).
Keywords: sugar industry, institutional environment, institutional arrangement,
transaction costs.

INTRODUCTION inflation, sugar is an important commodity in

Among various plantation products that the Indonesian economy (Susila and Susmiadi,
have strategic roles in Indonesia, sugar is one 2001:1). Its role as a job provider also
commodity that continually gets attention from strengthens the important role of the sugar
industry in Indonesia. This strategic role
the government.1 Concern has increased
causes the government to make frequent
recently, caused by many factors. As one of the
interventions in the sugar industry through
primary needs and as a determinant of
many production and trading policies.
Unfortunately, in the last two decade, the sugar
1 industry in Indonesia began to face many
The sugar industry in Indonesia reached its glory days
in 1930, when Indonesia was still colonized by the awkward problems. One of these has been the
Dutch. At that time Indonesia became the second trend for import volume to continuously
biggest exporter in the world. This gave rise to the increase, while at the same time sugar
saying “the sugar industry is the corky wood place
where the Netherlands floats.” The success of the sugar production in the country tends to decrease
industry can be attributed to two things: the (Susila, 2002:A4-1).
management system in planting and the cheap land and
low labor wages involved in the sugar industry. See
Mubyarto, et al, Tanah dan Tenaga Kerja Perkebunan:
Kajian Sosial Ekonomi, Aditya Media, Yogyakarta,
1992, p. 113
2005 Yustika 369

Table 1: Performance of the Indonesian Sugar Industry in the Past, 1910-1970

No Description 1910 1920 1930 1940 1952 1960 1965 1970
1 Number of factories 182 183 179 118 50 55 55 55
2 Production (ton mil.) 1.3 1.5 2.9 1.6 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.7
3 Export (ton mil.) 1.3 1.5 2.8 0.9 - - 0.1 -
4 Import (ton mil.) - - - - - - 0.1 0.1
5 Area (ha thousand) 126 157 92 92 48 73 87 82
6 Production (ha/ton) 10.2 10.6 17.2 17.2 9.1 8.9 8.8 8.7
Source: Indikator Ekonomi; Furnivall, 1944:338; Mubyarto, 1969:41; Mubyarto, 1977:31. As quoted by
Ibrahim, 2003:6
Because of heavy damage to factories import bill and eventually achieving self-
during the Revolution, post-independence sufficiency (Brown, 1982:39; Mardjana,
exports never exceeded the 1954 figure of just 1995:96; Bachriadi, 1995:35).34
212,000 tons for the whole of Java, and they The experience of the TRI program shows
then rapidly fell away, ceasing altogether after that the individual smallholders frequently
1966. The sugar industry survived but have not received the full benefits of the
henceforth produced only for the domestic program to which they are entitled (Brown,
market and exported only the by-product 1982:59; Mardjana, 1995:96-97). First, farm
molasses (Dick, 1995:45). Table 1 shows that size: the efficient cultivation of cane generally
the number of sugar mills decreased requires blocks of land at least ten hectares in
drastically, from 182 units in 1910 to only 55 area. With average farm sizes in Java of less
factories in 1970.23 In order to cope with this than 0.5 ha, smallholders have had to find
problem, in April 1975 the Government issued ways to amalgamate their land, or at least to
Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 9/1975, setting farm cooperatively, if they are to have any
up the Intensified Smallholder Cane (Tebu chance of cultivating cane profitably. Second,
Rakyat Intensifikasi, hereafter TRI) program under the program, the landholder became the
(Mubyarto, 1977:29; Brown, 1982:39; Isma’il, cultivator and the mill, in a sense, became a
2001:4). Briefly put, the program had two contractor to the farmer. It is in connection
objectives: changing the basic structure of the with the provision of these services that most
industry from one in which the mills grew cane of the new conflicts between landholders and
on land rented from smallholders to one in mills have arisen. Third, there have been
which the smallholders themselves took on the problems related to the institutional setting
entrepreneurial role producing cane on their (management) of mills (sugar factories) that
own land and raising the nation’s total
production of refined sugar, reducing the
3
This program is modeled on the Bimas (Bimbingan
Massal/Mass Guidance) system, which aimed to
2
Nowadays in Indonesia there are 63 sugar mills (PG), modernize the farming enterprise through intensification,
which are 54 PG owned by the government which are using modern production methods such as fertilizer,
managed by nine state-owned entreprises pesticides and high-yielding varieties. It was supported
(BUMN/PTPN) with a capacities of 72% and nine sugar by government credit at low interest rates, and many
mills that are managed by privately-owned entreprises government institutions such as the BRI (Indonesian
(BUMS) with capacities of 28%. From a location aspect, People’s Bank), KUD (Village Unit Cooperative), Bulog
50 sugar mills are in Java with people smallholder (The National Food Agency) and regional governments
pattern and 13 sugar mills are outside of Java with HGU were involved (Basri and Flaming, 1991). For more
(right to engage an enterprise) of dry land. See M. Yamin details, see I Ketut Mardjana, Ownership or Management
Rahman, Keragaan Pasar Gula Domestik Pasca Problems? A Case Study of Three Indonesia State
Demonopoli Bulog, Proceeding of P3GI Technical Enterprises, Bulletin of Indonesian Economics Studies,
Meeting, P3GI, Pasuruan, 2002, p. A1-2 – A1-3 Vol. 31, No. 1, April 1995, p. 96
370 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
usually places farmers in the marginal position,
for example, in the calculation of sugar content
(rendemen). As seen in Table 2, since
implementing TRI policy all productivity
indicators worsened compared to the previous
era. With this background, this paper focused
on efforts to describe the institutional problems
of Indonesian sugar industry.
From the explanation, it can be concluded
that part of problem in the Indonesian sugar
industry is caused by inefficiency of
institutions, both “institutional environment”
(government policies) and “institutional
arrangement” (agreement among economic
units). With this background, this paper
focused on efforts to describe the institutional
problems of Indonesian sugar industry. The
approach of analysis uses the institutional
economics perspective, especially transaction
cost economics. Transaction cost economics is
used to analyze the relation between economic
actors in the sugar industry (external
transaction costs) and the magnitude of
transaction costs at incurred sugar mills and by
sugarcane farmers themselves (internal
transaction costs).
THE ROLE OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY
IN INDONESIA
Table 3 shows that the plantation area
planted with sugarcane is wide enough
compared with other plantation plants in
Indonesia. From this size aspect, sugarcane
occupied the third largest area after palm oil
and rubber commodities. In 2001, for example,
the area planted by sugarcane was 406.5
thousand ha, less than the areas of palm oil
(2,704.5 thousand ha) and rubber (539
thousand ha). The sugarcane area is remaining
stable from year to year (even increasing
slightly), whereas land area of other
commodities tends to decrease every year. This
indicates that the sugarcane commodity is one
of the most important products in the
plantation sector in Indonesia. If we compare
based on region, plantation area in Java is
Oktober
61.3% and out of Java is 38.7%. Plantation
areas in Java are mostly owned by farmers
(86%), while outside of Java only 7% are
owned by farmers and 93% are owned by
BUMN (state-owned enterprise) and private
plantations. At the national level, farmers’
sugarcane plantation area is 56% and the
remaining 44% are owned by sugar mills
(Rahman, 2002:A1-2).
From the aspect of production, for the last
five years sugar production tended to decrease
from 2.187 million tons in 1997, to 1.928
million tons in 1998, then 1.801 million tons in
1999, but then increased to 1.896 million tons
in 2000, and increased again to 2.025 million
tons in 2001 (Table 4). From another aspect,
sugar consumption rates tended to increase
with the growth of the population and
food/drink industries. To cover the deficit, it
was necessary to import sugar in a great
volume. Even in 1999, the total import was
bigger than the sugar production in the
country.45 This condition is aggravated by the
tendency to reduce the price of import sugar
from year to year (Rahman, 2002:A1-1). In
detail, the development of sugar imports from
1997 to 1999 showed continual increase. In
1997 sugar import was 1.36 million tons, then
in 1998 and 1999 it was 1.7 and 2.19 million
tons, respectively, or an average increase of
37% every year. But in 2000 sugar import
decreased to 1.55 million tons and decreased
again to 1.28 million tons in 2001 (Rahman,
2002:A1-3).
4
Indonesia has been a sugar-importing country since
1967. This happened due to increasing demand for sugar
domestically, while the rate of national sugar
productivity was low. See Dianto Bachriadi,
Ketergantungan Petani dan Penetrasi Kapital: Lima
Kasus Intensifikasi Pertanian dengan Pola Contract
Farming, Akatiga, Bandung, 1995, p. 34
2005 Yustika 371

Table 2: Indonesian Sugar Productivity, 1965 – 1998

Sugarcane/ha Sugar content Sugar/ha
No Sugarcane farming enterprise system
(ton) (%) (ton)
1 Before TRI era (1965-1975) 89.3 10.09 9.01
2 Transition era (1976 – 1982) 78.5 9.46 7.42
3 TRI era (1983 – 1998) 70.7 7.58 5.40
Source: Data P3GI. In: Sumardiko, 2000 (Appendix 3)
Table 3: Planted Areas of Indonesian Large Estates at the Beginning of the Year by Type of
Crops 1997-2001 (thousand ha)

Type of Crops 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Perennial crops
Rubber 557.9 549.0 545.0 541.0 539.0
Coconut 120.2 126.1 93.6 94.5 94.6
Palm oil 1,739.1 1,878.1 2,397.8 2,548.9 2,704.5
Coffee 61.8 62.5 63.2 63.2 62.9
Cocoa 146.3 151.3 154.6 159.2 162.5
Tea 89.3 91.2 91.6 91.7 91.7
Kapok 5.1 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.9
Cinchona 2.3 0.6 1.3 1.3 1.3
Annual crops
Sugarcane 378.1 405.4 391.1 405.2 406.5
Tobacco 4.5 5.7 5.2 5.2 5.1
Rosella 2.5 0.6 1.6 1.6 1.3
Note: 1) Harvested Area 2) Directorate General of Estates
Source: BPS, 2001
Table 4: Production of Indonesian Large Estates by Type of Crops 1997-2001 (thousand tons)
Type of Crops 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Perennial crops
Rubber 330.5 332.6 293.7 336.2 328.3
Coconut 2)3) 72.7 87.9 90.9 91.7 92.7
Palm oil 4,081.1 4,013.1 4,454.5 4,531.1 4,595.9
Palm kernel 927.5 912.1 1,012.4 1,034.2 1,047.9
Coffee 30.6 28.5 27.5 27.7 28.7
Cocoa 65.9 60.9 58.9 60.6 65.3
Tea 121.0 132.7 126.4 127.9 129.3
Kapok 3) 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 1.1
Cinchona 0.5 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.9
Annual crops
Sugarcane1) 2,187.2 1,928.7 1,801.4 1,896.4 2,025.1
Tobacco 1) 7.8 7.7 5.8 6.3 5.1
Rosella 1) 9.6 3.7 2.3 2.7 2.2
Note: 1) Including production with raw material from smallholders’ estates
2) Copra equivalent
3) Directorate General of Estates
Source: BPS, 2001
372 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
The average performance of the sugar
industry in Indonesia can be seen in Table 5.
The data apparently shows that almost all
aspects of the sugar industry in Indonesia
experience a reduction of performance
prominently, except land size, which relatively
increases. In the period of 1930-1940, for
example, land size of only about 95 thousand
ha produced almost 1.5 million tons of sugar.
This occurred because most of the area used
was wetland that can produce higher yields
(137 tons/ha) and a seed system without ratoon
(seed applied for one planting season) so that
its sugar content (sucrose) is very high
(11.7%).56 With this performance, it is not
surprising that production in which period was
16-tons sugar/ha. Yet, this achievement
continuously worsened until the period of
1995-2000 when production of sugar was 1.8
million tons yearly (increasing about 20%
compared with the period of 1930-1940),
whereas the land size planted increased about
400% compared with the period of 1930-1940.
This occurred because most of the sugar land
in the period of 1995-2000 was dry land so that
sugar productivity was very low (70 tons/ha)
and the ratoon system was used (many times
planting season, even up to 15 times) so that
sugar content (sucrose) rates were very low
(6.89%). So it can be predicted that in the
recent period production would only be 4.82
tons of sugar/ha.
Concerning the sugar industry performance
that has continually worsened, in 2002 the
government set out the “Acceleration Program
of National Sugar Productivity Development,”
with the hope that it can improve sugar quality
and productivity in Indonesia.67 These
5
This is known as the Reynoso system, which is replacing
sugar area from dry land with wetland. This replacing
aims to develop plants’ productivity by giving them
growth land that has good drainage. See Dianto
Bachriadi, ibid, p. 31
6
It is hoped that by the “Acceleration Program of
National Sugar Productivity Development,” performance
of the sugar industry in Indonesia will increase so that
the objectives of the national sugar reliance will be
achieved in 2007. The government has set up specific
Oktober
activities are predicted to cost about Rp 350
billion for four years. These activities are
conducted at two levels of organization
(Departemen Pertanian, 2002:3). First, at the
national level the “Operational Unit of
National Sugar Industrial Revitalization” was
established with the function to guide, monitor,
and evaluate the implementation in the field.
Members of this unit include the Department
of Finance, Department of Agriculture,
Department of Industry and Commerce,
Ministry of BUMN, P3GI (Indonesian Sugar
Research Institute) and APTR (Smallholder
Sugarcane Farmers Association). Second, in
the field the “sugar seed industry company,
ratoon removing service, and irrigation” will
be established. Sugar Seed Industry Company
is established in every PTPN/PT of Sugar in
Java. Its members include of PTPN/PT sugar,
regional APTR of PTPN/PT sugar, local
government, and interested investors.
targets to increase sugar productivity by developing land
size, crystal (sugar), and sugarcane productivity. It is
expected, for example, in 2007 that sugarcane land size
will reach about 385 thousand ha, crystal (sugar)
production will reach 3 million tons, sugarcane
productivity 88.11 tons/ha, and crystal (sugar)
productivity 7.74 tons/ha (see Appendix 1). If the targets
can be achieved, then in 2007 the government will not
need to import sugar to fulfill domestic sugar needs. Of
course, this will not be easy because there are many
problems that must be solved by the national sugar
industry, from farmers, to sugar mills, to government
policies themselves.
2005 Yustika 373

Table 5: Average Performance of Indonesian Sugarcane and Sugar for the Period 1930-2000
Land Sugarcane Sucrose White sugar Total white
Period
(ha) (tons/ha) content (%) (tons/ha) sugar (tons)
1930 – 1940 95.099 137.3 11.70 16.06 1,485,099
1983 – 1987 287.676 76.3 7.97 6.08 1,748,363
1998 – 1994 379.669 76.3 7.45 5.77 2,190,084
1995 – 2000 378.703 70.0 6.89 4.82 1,829,094
Year of highest production reached in every period
1930 196.592 129.4 11.55 14.95 2,938,205
1986 303.740 79.2 8.05 6.38 1,936,525
1992 402.486 79.1 7.17 6.30 2,534,197
1997 386.884 72.3 7.83 5.66 2,190,185
Source: Soepardi, 2002:A9-3

INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE more intensively done by sugarcane farmers.78

INDONESIAN SUGAR INDUSTRY
Problems that have been encountered by
the sugar industry in Indonesia recently are
very complex, and are both internal and
external. Generally, if we categorize, the sugar
industry has four basic problems, i.e. (Susila,
2002:A4-8): (i) inefficiency at the farmers’
level; (ii) inefficiency at the sugar mill level;
(iii) government policy has not effectively
stimulated the development of the national
sugar industry; and (iv) the sugar industry and
trading are very distorted in the international
market. First, identified inefficiency at the
farmers’ level comes from the ratoon planting
pattern system that makes sugar productivity
decrease. In this ratoon system, planted seed
can be used many times each planting season
(even up to 15 times) so it can produce bad
sugarcane quality. Ideally, seed can only be
used twice for each planting season. Sugarcane
farmers use the ratoon system because they
cannot afford to buy expensive seed every
planting season. According Soekarso
(1999:19), after 1988 ratoon plants dominated
sugarcane plants in Indonesia (for wetland and
dry land), so the total reached 80%; plants that
have been ratoon for three times are 20.45%. It
seems that this condition continuously
occurred, with the ratoon system usage being
In other words, decreasing productivity is
caused by behavior changes in sugarcane
plantations from high-input to low-input as
rational reactions to changes in the ratio of
input-output price (Sukarso, 1999:14). Beyond
this, decreasing productivity is also triggered
by the changing of sugarcane land type, from
using wetland to dry land. As seen in Table
1.6, up until 1998 wetland percentage was only
29.4% of total land planted by sugar; the
remaining 70.6% was dry land. The changing
of this land type has very big influences
because of the different fertility rates. In 1999,
average sugarcane productivity in wetland was
64.2 tons/ha, while sugarcane productivity in
dry land was 57.3 tons/ha (Kuntohartono,
2000:16).89
7
Widening ratoon sugarcane plants occurred intensively
after the rent sugarcane system was forbidden and after
sugarcane was developed in dry land. Besides,
motivation to manage ratoon sugarcane comes from the
assumption that production costs can be reduced without
disturbing the crops, the scarcity of labor, and the
increased limiting of land that can be cultivated with
sugarcane. See Kuntohartono and Hendroko,
Peningkatan Produktivitas Keprasan, Paper presented at
P3GI Technical Meeting, P3GI, Pasuruan, 1995, p. Pleno
7-2
8
Decreasing productivity is also caused by the cut-load-
carry system that seems inefficient because there is no
adequate coordination between sugarcane farmers and
the sugar mill. In this condition, there often exist cases in
which sugarcane that has been cut down cannot be
374 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Table 1.6: Development of Indonesian Sugar-
cane Area Based on Land Types (in
hectare)
Year Wetland Dry land Total
1994 146.028 276.662 424.690
1995 135.737 285.169 420.906
1996 135.847 265.452 401.299
1997 118.286 268.592 386.878
1998 108.864 261.401 370.265
Source: P3GI. In: Soekarso, 1999:17
Second, inefficiency at the sugar mill level
is caused by the sugar mills being too old and
by management of the sugar mills that is still
traditional. This reality means that sugarcane
cannot be well-processed (milled) so the result
is not maximal. If we describe based on
ownership, privately-owned sugar mills are
generally more efficient than are state-owned
sugar mills (Prabowo, 1998:12). This is
because most of the privately-owned sugar
mills are more newly established so that their
technology is better and they are managed with
a more professional management system
compared with state-owned sugar mills. Third,
government policies are not effective because
of lack of implementation of the policies, for
example credits coming to farmers were very
late. One of sugarcane farmers’ credit sources
originating from a sugar mill/cooperative,
where the money comes from the government
program distributed through assigned banks.
Banks predetermine then coordinate with sugar
mills and cooperatives to distribute their
credits. Sugar mills usually select those
directly milled by the sugar mill, or sugarcane that
actually should be cut down is not cut because the sugar
mill cannot receive it. Certainly this condition causes the
quality of the sugarcane to worsen. Other writers see that
decreasing productivity occurred as a result of the
sugarcane payment system and the system of benefit and
risk division, which are not in accordance with farmer
enterprise. The farmers are always encouraged to send
fresh-clean-sweet sugarcane to the sugar mill, but they
do not respond to the suggestion because the production
organizational system and the payment system do not
give appropriate incentives. See Gunawan Soekarso,
Gula Nasional: Kondisi Sekarang dan Masa Datang,
Gula Indonesia, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, April – June 1999, p.
14
Oktober
farmers who are entitled to receive credit and
simultaneously collect their guarantees, while
the cooperative has the duty to distribute their
credit. In the implementation, usually farmers
received credit from cooperatives is often late
(about two months delay).910 Finally, sugar
import by producer countries make national
sugar industries collapse. The import sugar that
is sold at a lower price is not a result of higher
efficiency compared with Indonesian sugar,
but is caused by government intervention in
sugar-producing countries, such as input and
export subsidies.1011 In the United States, for
example, the government since 1981 has
consistently used domestic policies to support
the agricultural sector, such as with input
subsidies (credits). The policy is presently
formulated as the “Farm Security and Rural
Investment Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act),” by
which farmers get price guarantees in the form
of loans equal to about US$18/lb for sugarcane
and US$22.9/lb for sugar-beet. Under this
policy, about 67% of the income of American
sugar producers derives from price
supports/subsidy policy (Davados and Kropf,
1999; as quoted by Susila, 2002:A4-2).
In short, the Indonesian sugar industry
presently faces the same situation as does
9
Sugarcane farmers stated that their production is not
optimal because their credit is not received on time. For
example, sometimes farmers cannot fertilize the plants
in the pre-planting period because credit has not already
been given. As a consequence of the late fertilizing,
sugarcane quality is not optimal, which decreases the
farmers’ revenue.
10
So far, both developed and developing countries (sugar
exporter and importer countries), have not seemed to
decrease the tariff because of each country’s own
interest. Even countries such as the Philippines, India,
and Pakistan are giving strong protection to their own
sugar industries by increasing the import duty tariff of
import sugar. The same policy is also conducted in
many developed countries, where they still impose a
high import tariff on sugar, such as Japan (955.04%),
European Union (491.19%), and USA (357.40%). See
Sigit Subiantoro, Upaya Peyelematan Pergulaan
Nasional dari Kebangkrutan, Proceeding of P3GI
Technical Meeting, Pasuruan, 2002, p. D1 – 8. In
comparison, the Indonesian Government imposes low
import duty. See Gunawan Sukarso, ibid, p. 15.
2005 Yustika
Fiji’s, with what its government calls “core
inefficiencies.” The series of core inefficiencies
are: (i) low sugarcane quality; (ii) cane
burning; (iii) mill inefficiencies; (iv) transport
inefficiencies; and (v) payment systems to
farmers (Snell and Prasad, 2001:261-262).
According to some research, the inefficiency
of the sugar industry is caused by a lack of raw
materials and decreases in productivity and
sugar content (Isma’il, 2001:6-9), milling
process inefficiency (Martoyo, 2000:10), and
sugar loss during cut-load-carry/TMA
(Darmawan, et al, 2000:6). However, this
research did not study sugar industry
inefficiency from an institutional perspective
(Arum, 2000:39), in which the institutional
factor is very likely to be the source of sugar
industry inefficiency. These have been very
specifically pointed towards institutional
reforms aimed at reducing “political
interference” in the industry, improving
farming practices, and related measures. In the
view of the World Bank, the Indonesian sugar
industry had moved from being a low-cost
sugar producer to a high-cost producer. Yield-
share payment systems to sugarcane farmers,
failure to invest in new equipment and the
expansion of production onto marginal lands
were seen as the likely causes for declines in
productivity.
If they are simplified in an issue’s schema
for the national sugar industry, the problems of
Indonesia’s sugar industry can be found in
Appendix 2. First, the cropping system is not
optimal. As described above, a cropping
system which is not optimal is caused by many
factors, for example: (i) cut-back system
(ratoon) used by sugarcane farmers; (ii) yield-
share system that does not give sugarcane
farmers incentive to produce better crops; (iii)
planting and cut systems that are not well-
coordinated; and (iv) spread-out land
dominated by dry land. All these processes
ultimately cause a decrease in sugar
productivity, bad sugar quality, and low sugar
content (sucrose) rate. Therefore, sugar
development issues should be mainly
375
concerned with whether sugar productivity
targets will be improved. What must not be
forgotten is that the issues of development are
not only concerned with systems of planting,
finding new seed varieties, and land type
change; but also with the structuring of
efficient economic institutions so that yield-
share and cut and planting schedules are
beneficial for both parts, especially for sugar
farmers. Without improvement of the
institutional aspects, it will be difficult to
improve the performance of the sugar industry
as a whole.
Second, management and technology cause
a decrease in sugar mill performance. Some
assumptions state that in general sugar
industries in Indonesia are still efficient,
although there are about 27 sugar mills that
have problems and are inefficient. According
to International LMC (1997), in the case of
efficiency, Indonesian sugar industries occupy
21–30 ranks from 62 sugar producers in the
world, with production costs of US$288 – 310
per ton. As a comparison, average production
costs of the 15 countries most efficient are
US$301.5 per ton (Husodo, 1999:14). Yet
given the fact that the total number of sugar
mills in Indonesia nowadays remains at 64
units (compared with the total number of sugar
mills in 1930 which reached 182 units), the
assumption that sugar mills in Indonesia are
not efficient is reasonable. One of the reasons a
sugar mill is closed is because of the
inadequacy of raw material (sugarcane) from
sugarcane farmers. However, what we should
not ignore is management performance of the
sugar industry that is bad (especially state-
owned sugar mills) as a result of high spend-
control. For example, in the process of buying
equipment (machines), sugar mill management
must propose to PTPN and its decision usually
takes a long time to be realized, which disturbs
the process of production. Indeed, this problem
includes an institutional aspect, something that
cannot be understood by most people.
376 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Third, government policy and international
market distortion do not support the interests
of the domestic sugar industry. So far, the
government holds control of national sugar
industry policy through a series of policies
established, input policy, marketing, price
determination, and international trading.
Unfortunately not all the policies benefit the
domestic sugar industry, and even less so the
sugarcane farmers. Presidential Instruction No.
9/1975 about TRI (Intensified Smallholder
Cane) that began to run between 1985-1988 is
regarded as the most oppressive policy for
sugarcane farmers in the history of the
Indonesian sugar industry. Then, producer
countries that give high subsidies to domestic
sugar so that it can be sold at a cheap price to
the Indonesian market cause international
market distortion. Additionally, producer
countries protect their domestic market by
imposing a very high import duty so that sugar
from abroad cannot enter.1112 By comparison,
the Indonesian government reduces subsidies
continuously to the sugar industry and imposes
a very low import duty,1213 which makes the
11
There are few countries in the world that do not
intervene in their domestic sugar markets. Perhaps this
is because both temperate and tropical countries can
grow sugar. Regardless of the motives for intervention,
the result is that about three-quarters of the sugar grown
in the world is consumed in the country of production.
See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of
Controls: American Sugar. In: Lee J. Alston, Thrainn
Eggertsson, and Douglass C. North, (eds.), Empirical
Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 176
12
Based on the Ministry of Industry and Trade Decree
(SK Memperindag) No. 230/MPP/Kep/6/1999, the
government imposes import duty of 20% for raw sugar
and 25% for white sugar. See Wayan R. Susila and Ali
Susmiadi, Dampak Tarif Impor Gula Terhadap Industri
Gula Indonesia, Bulletin P3GI, March, 2001, p. 2. Then
in 2002, the government set out new import duty
policies for sugar products Rp 700/kg through Ministry
of Finance Decree (SK Menteri Keuangan) No.
324.KM.01/2002. This tariff, indeed, is still low
compared with other countries’ import duty, such as
Columbia (130%), South Africa (124%), Thailand
(104%), Brazil (55%), Bangladesh (200%), the
Philippines (133%), and Sri Lanka (66%). See Slamet
Darsosoeprapto, Penyehatan Industri Gula Nasional
Demi Ketahanan Nasional dan Penyelamatan Puluhan
Oktober
price of domestic sugar products unable to
compete with world sugar prices. Of course,
this also involves an institutional
(environment) problem, i.e. government failure
to create regulations that allow the sugar
industry to get insurance from policies that
support operational activities efficiently.
Therefore, the decreasing performance of
the Indonesia sugar industry is actually caused
by inefficiency of institutions1314, especially in
managing the relationships among economic
actors in the sugar industry (institutional
arrangement). The institutional inefficiency
can be detected in the high transaction costs in
the sugar industry, both as farmers’ and as
sugar mills’ burdens. From the perspective of
the sugarcane farmers, the institution that
manages farmers’ relationships with
cooperatives and sugar mills are not based on
the same level agreement and are not done
transparently so that farmers often lose the
opportunity to make an economic profit
(opportunity cost). For example, sugarcane
farmers, theoretically, may easily and freely
get letter of delivery order (SPTA) from the
sugar mill, but, in fact, it is not so. Sugarcane
farmers must pay for getting SPTA or do not
get it at all so that they must join with other
farmers (or through brokers). This means
farmers have an additional expense. Sugarcane
farmers must even pay special costs that are
not related to their activities, for example, for
security and as donations to the village. The
result can be predicted that this pattern
ultimately will increase the transaction costs of
sugarcane farmers.
Juta Orang Penganggur, Paper presented at National
Seminar of Indonesian Sugar, held with cooperation of
LPM-UGM and PTPN (Persero), Yogyakarta, 2000, p.
18
13
An institution is defined as a regularity of behavior or a
rule that is generally accepted by members of a social
group, which specifies behavior in specific situations,
and which is either self-policed or policed by an
external authority. See Malcolm Rutherford,
Institutions in Economics: The Old and the New
Institutionalism, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1994, p.182
2005 Yustika
Based on my research at the sugarcane
farmers’ level can be drawn that the proportion
of transaction costs is very high for sugarcane
farmers, even reaching almost 50% of total
costs spent by sugarcane farmers. These
transaction costs have excluded other difficult
(implicit) variables, so transaction costs data in
this research is actually lower than in reality.
Finally, from all explanations, there are some
important conclusions that can be drawn about
the transaction costs of sugarcane farmers.
First, in general, the transaction costs
percentage reaches almost 43% of total costs
spent by sugarcane farmers; the remaining
57% is production costs. If costs of land rent
are excluded from production costs, then the
composition of production and transaction
costs is approximately in balance (50% : 50%)
[Yustika, 2005:181-182].
At the sugar mill level itself there is much
evidence that management is not efficient,
which raises many costs. For example, sugar
mills must ask for approval from the director
(PTPN) for buying equipment/machines, but
the process takes a very long time because it is
the PTPN itself that will buy the tools. This is
disruptive to the production process. Sugar
mills also deliberately determine sugar content
(sucrose) values and yield-share systems,
which hurts the farmers. It is impossible for
farmers themselves to control their sugar
content value because the process is very
complex. Government policies also burden
sugar mills with things, i.e. multiple taxation,
for water needs.1415 Last but not least, there is
much taxation conducted by government
officials (from central to local) for various
interests, which also raise transaction costs in
the sugar mills. Accumulation from all of the
institutional issues results in inefficiency of the
sugar industry in Indonesia. From this
14
Interview conducted by the researcher with
accountancy unit of Ngadiredjo Sugar Mill who
maintain that since economic decentralization was
applied in 2001, the sugar mill must pay the same tax
object (water) to two entities simultaneously
(Dispenda/Board of District Revenue and Jasa Tirta).
377
perspective, inefficiency in the sugar industry
can be seen not only in terms of production
costs but also of transaction costs generated.
Besides, sugar mills’ management is also
not efficient. In the context of institutional
economics analysis, sugar mill managerial
transaction costs can be divided into two
groups. Internal managerial transaction costs
are defined as transaction costs generated from
the corporate internal management model, for
example policies of wage rate, facilities, and
maintenance. At this level, the amount of
transaction costs depends on how efficient the
management institution is in supporting the
production process. External managerial
transaction costs are transaction costs related to
the authority of the management in decision-
making. In the case of the sugar mill, in
general the sugar mill management (Chief
Executive Officer, hereafter CEO) does not
have absolute authority to make decisions
because all proposals must get approval from
the Board of Directors (hereafter BoD) [PTPN
for state-owned sugar mill].1516 The problem is
that the BoD often does not know exactly the
real needs of the sugar mill (kinds of needs and
time frames) so that the BoD disturbs the
production process. In this case, centralized
decision-making management generates high
transaction costs for the sugar mill, which
indicates institutional inefficiency in the
corporation’s management.
Based on my research about transaction
and production costs in the sugar mills some
conclusions can be drawn (Yustika, 2005:154).
First, transaction costs make a high
contribution to the total costs of the sugar mill
(about 50%). This fact illustrates that sugar
15
For example, in Kebon Agung Sugar Mill - Malang,
according to Wiwied WILUYO (Chief of Factory Unit),
the management of the sugar mill is only given a
limited authority to manage daily operational activity,
and the other activities are determined by the BoD (PT.
RNI) located in Surabaya. The BoD has full authority to
buy raw material (as in chemistry materials and
machine tools), make investment substitutes (like office
inventories and tools), acquire new equipment,
purchase transportation tools, and plan investment.
378 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
mill institutions have not been efficient, so
they generate high transaction costs. Second,
from the composition of transaction costs,
managerial transaction costs are the highest
contributors to total transaction costs (above
70%). These results give more detailed
information that the management of sugar
mills is less efficient, which contributes to high
transaction costs. Internally, sugar mill
management has not applied a good planning
and supervising system so every performed
activity always raises high transaction costs,
for example, the mark-up practice. Externally,
management of the sugar mill does not have
authority to make strategic decisions, for
example, investment decisions, spare parts
purchasing, and goods acquisition. All
activities are under the authority of the BoD,
which causes the production process to be
disturbed. In other words, the centralization of
decision-making causes high transaction costs
for the sugar mills.
CONCLUSION
From the last explanation, it can be
concluded that part of the inefficiency in the
Indonesian sugar industry is caused by
inefficiency of institutions, both “institutional
environment” (government policies) and
“institutional arrangement” (agreement among
economic units). The implication is that
inefficient institutions generate high
transaction costs in sugar industry activities.
The high transaction costs involve sugar mills
and sugarcane farmers, and relate to other
organizations or regulations, such as
cooperatives and government policies. This
paper suggests some important policy
implications to improve the institutional design
of the sugar industry in Indonesia. First is
improvement of contractual arrangements of
sugarcane farmers. This paper argues that
cooperatives and APTR (Smallholder
Sugarcane Farmers’ Association) should be
improved so that the organizations will stand
for farmers’ interests. It is also important to
Oktober
establish an intermediary institution that is able
to control the milling process in sugar mills.
Second is corporate governance reform of
sugar mills. This study argues that there are at
least two institutional problems causing
management inefficiency in sugar mills: (i) a
share ownership structure that is concentrated
with a few capital owners (both state and
privately-owned sugar mills); and (ii) a very
centralized model of corporate governance,
where the Board of Directors (BoD) holds the
corporation fully. Third is the institutional
change process in the sugar industry. The
process of institutional change in sugar mills
can be done on two levels simultaneously:
demand of constituents and supply of
institutions. On the demand of constituent’s
side, the demand of sugarcane farmers that
sugar mills should implement a transparency
principle and accountability in milling
management may join with sugar mill
management’s demand to the BoD to get wider
authority in running the corporation.
Furthermore, on the supply of institutions side,
institutional change of sugar mills can take
place because of external factor pressures, such
as government policies and the higher
competition in the era of liberalization
(globalization). The globalization era forces
every corporation to improve efficiency and
innovation in all fields, including sugar
production.
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2005 Yustika 381

Appendix 1: Objectives of Indonesian Sugar Productivity 2002-2007

Description 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

I. Java
1. Land (ha) 215.664 218.115 220.198 222.084 222.505 223.928
2. Crystal (tons) 1,053.801 1,186.913 1,358.437 1,531.907 1,643.200 1,759.861
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 75.87 79.02 83.26 87.25 89.11 90.79
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 4.89 5.44 6.17 6.90 7.39 7.86
5. Rendement (%) 6.43 6.92 7.63 8.00 8.42 8.75
II. Outside of Java
1. Land (ha) 131.558 142.165 145.462 151.732 155.425 161.845
2. Crystal (tons) 837.240 885.662 979.470 1,065.206 1,119.918 1,227.873
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 75.76 74.87 79.44 81.49 82.54 84.41
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 6.36 6.23 6.73 7.02 7.21 7.59
5. Rendement (%) 8.40 8.35 8.52 8.66 8.77 9.02
III. Indonesia
1. Land (ha) 347.222 360.280 365.660 373.816 377.930 385.773
2. Crystal (tons) 1,891.041 2,072.575 2,337.907 2,597.113 2,763.118 2,987.734
3. Sugarcane (tons/ha) 75.83 77.38 81.74 84.91 86.41 88.11
4. Crystal (tons/ha) 5.45 5.75 6.39 6.95 7.31 7.74
5. Rendement (%) 7.19 7.48 7.99 8.26 8.56 8.86
Note: * Quoted from Department of Agriculture, 2002:4
Source: Program of National Sugar Productivity Development Acceleration, Book 1
Department of Agriculture, in Sugar Observer, No.19/2003:5
382 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Appendix 2: Problems of the Indonesian Sugar Industry and Government Policy

International
market distortion Yield-share
system

Ratoon
seed

Low price/ Plant and cut

fluctuation schedule

Sub-optimal
cropping Dry land

Cutting
Cane
system
quality
Government
policy

Too old of
Decreasing of Decreasing of
Sugar mill
sugar content productivity

Sugar mill
Decreasing Lack of
of cane land capacity consolidation

Investment in Decreasing of Increasing of

out of Java production consumption

Impacts:
- Increasing of import
- Existency of sugar industry
- Socio-economic stability

Source: Modified from SUSILA, 2002: A4 – 9

Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 383 - 397

PENYARINGAN SP (SPECIAL PRODUCT) PERTANIAN DI WTO:

SEBUAH MODALITAS DARI INDONESIA
M. Husein Sawit, Adi Setiyanto,
Helena J. Purba, Supriyati
Pusat Analisis Sosial Ekonomi dan Kebijakan Pertanian, Bogor

ABSTRAK

Negara berkembang telah mengajukan sejumlah proposal penyempurnaan Perjanjian

Pertanian WTO, agar lebih berimbang dan adil. SP adalah salah satu perlakuan khusus
dalam Akses Pasar yang diminta oleh negara berkembang kelompok G-33. Dengan
fleksibelitas yang diberikan untuk sektor pangan di negara berkembang, diharapkan
dengan reformasi perdagangan mampu memperkuat produksi pangan domestik dan
ketahanan pangan, mempercepat pembangunan perdesaan dan pengentasan kemiskinan.
Dalam makalah ini dibahas cara pemilihan SP, kombinasi antara metoda kuantitatif
dengan metoda sederhana dan diharapkan dapat mencapai tujuannya. Hasilnya terpilih
delapan komoditas/produk yang pantas diajukan sebagai SP untuk Indonesia yaitu
padi/beras, sayur-sayuran, buah-buahan, jagung/pakan ternak, ternak besar dan hasil-
hasilnya, unggas dan hasil-hasilnya, kedelai/olahannya, dan tebu/gula. Kombinasi metoda
kuantitif dan sederhana ini diharapkan dapat juga dipakai oleh negara kelompok G-33,
sebagai kontribusi dari Indonesia.
Keywords: developing countries, agreement on agriculture, modality, flexiblelity, special
product,

PENDAHULUAN lingkungan hidup, arus urbanisasi yang sulit

Hampir semua negara anggota WTO telah
menilai dampak dari reformasi perdagangan di
sektor pertanian. Negara berkembang menge-
tengahkan bahwa reformasi tersebut ternyata
telah memperburuk laju pembangunan
ekonomi perdesaan dan pertanian negara
berkembang. Impor pangan meningkat lebih
pesat dibandingkan sebelumnya, ekspor
produk pertanian tidaklah berkembang seperti
yang diharapkan. Yang lebih parah lagi adalah
kemiskinan dan kelaparan, khsususnya
penduduk perdesaan tidaklah berkurang, malah
dibeberapa tempat semakin parah, demikian
juga ketahanan pangan tidaklah semakin
menguat, tetapi sebaliknya semakin melemah.
Merosotnya pembangunan perdesaan dan
pertanian yang dihuni tidak kurang dari 60%
penduduk, telah menyebabkan kerusakan
dibendung. Hal yang terakhir ini telah
menimbulkan berbagai dampak buruk di
wilayah perkotaan seperti penyediaan peru-
mahan, air bersih, sarana transportasi, penang-
gulangan sampah, meningkatnya kriminalitas
serta keresahan sosial lainnya.
Sejak akhir tahun 2000, dimulai lagi
perundingan pertanian di markas besar WTO
Jenewa, baik itu dalam bentuk pertemuan
formal maupun tidak formal. Dalam berbagai
pertemuan itu, sejumlah negara berkembang
mengajukan berbagai usul dan proposal untuk
penyempurnaan Perjanjian Pertanian WTO di
masa mendatang. Setidak-tidaknya ada dua hal
yang diusung oleh negara berkembang yaitu:
Pertama, Reballancing (menyeimbangkan
kembali). Selama ini tidak ada keseimbangan
384 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
antara 3 pilar yaitu MA (market access), DS
(domestic support) dan ES (export subsidy),
sehingga secara keseluruhan telah membuah-
kan perdagangan yang tidak adil (unfair trade).
Selama ini, reformasi perdagangan terlalu
terfokus pada pilar MA, mengabaikan pilar
lainnya seperti DS dan ES. Padahal melalui
dua pilar terakhir inilah, negara maju
melakukan berbagai macam subsidi terhadap
petani mereka yang kaya, dan itu mendapat
legalitas di Perjanjian Pertanian WTO,
sehingga telah membuahkan unfair trade.
Kedua, Special and Differential Treatment
(S&D) yang ada, ternyata belum mampu
membuahkan hasil seperti yang dikehendaki
negara berkembang. Dengan S&D itu, ternyata
belum mampu merealisir suatu pola perda-
gangan yang berimbang dalam tatanan level of
playing field yang semakin berimbang pula.
Selama ini, S&D hanya efektif dimana negara
berkembang mendapat waktu yang lebih lama
dalam reformasi perdagangan dan lebih rendah
tingkat penurunan tarifnya. Sedangkan
komponen S&D lainnya amat lemah, karena
memang tidak ada kewajiban yang mengikat
negara maju untuk merealisasikannya,
terutama yang menyangkut:
• provision aimed at increasing
opportunities;
• provisions that require WTO members to
safeguard the interests of developing
countries; dan
• provisions relating technical assistance.
Dalam kaitan dengan itulah, maka muncul
berbagai proposal dari negara berkembang,
baik yang berbentuk box (kotak)117maupun
yang bukan. Yang masuk dalam usulan box
yang paling menonjol adalah:
Pertama, Development Box (DB). Inti
kotak ini adalah perjanjian pertanian WTO
mendatang tidak boleh mengabaikan food
security, rural development, the poor, dan
right to food. Gagasan dan pengembangan
1
Lihat lebih detail Diaz-Bonilla dkk (2002).
Oktober
kotak ini dimotori oleh Pakistan. Melalui kotak
inilah semua aspek yang terabaikan selama ini
diharapkan dapat dilaksanakan dengan lebih
baik dan lebih fleksibel (Murphy and Suppan,
2003).
Kedua, Food Security Box (FSB)
dimandori oleh India. Inti dari kotak ini adalah
reformasi perdagangan harus mampu
memperkuat food security dan kesejahteraan
serta kehidupan petani sempit dan miskin di
negara berkembang. Melalui FSB inilah,
diharapkan negara berkembang dapat dengan
lebih mudah memperjuangkan kepentingan
yang terkait dengan food security dan
penanggulangan kemiskinan di perdesaan
(Murphy and Suppan, 2003).
Kedua kotak tersebut ternyata belum
berhasil diperjuangkan dalam KTM IV di
Doha tahun 2001. Namun sepirit dari kotak itu,
sebagian diantaranya terakomodasi dalam
deklarasi Doha terutama Paragraf 13 dan
Paragraf 14.
SP (special/strategic product) adalah
bentuk lain dari S&D yang diperjuangkan oleh
NB. Tujuan SP adalah untuk memperkuat food
security dan mendorong percepatan rural
development, serta mempercepat pengentasan
trade kemiskinan dan kelaparan. Itu disampaikan
oleh banyak negara berkembang di sidang
formal dan informal dalam Komisi Pertanian
(CoA) sejak 2000 (WTO 2004).
PTRI Jenewa, kemudian mengambil
inisiatif mengembangkan konsep SP itu. Para
policy markers di Jakarta pun mendukung
penuh tentang SP, dan merekomendasikan 4
komoditas yaitu beras, jagung, kedelai dan
gula. Sayang, analisa akademis yang terkait
dengan usulan itu belum didiskusikan secara
terbuka, sehingga belum mendapat dukungan
publik secara luas. Publik beranggapan bahwa
pemilihan 4 komoditas itu lebih menonjolkan
aspek politik daripada rasional ekonomi. Hal
itu tidaklah berarti kepentingan politik tidak
penting untuk diketengahkan, namun itu harus
dikuatkan pula oleh pertimbangan ekonomi
yang rasional.
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati
Pada awal 2003, PTRI Jenewa bersama
dengan tim pertanian WTO di Jakarta berhasil
membuat konsep (first draft) tentang SP (PTRI
Jenewa 2003a). Konsep itu dibahas di dalam
kelompok negara berkembang yang sekarang
sebagian besar bergabung dalam G-33. Konsep
itulah kemudian menjadi proposal SP yang
diajukan oleh 12 negara negara berkembang ke
WTO (PTRI Jenewa 2003b). Dalam proposal
itu, negara berkembang menginginkan kriteria
SP haruslah sederhana, mudah dilaksanakan
serta mempertimbangkan ketersediaan data.
Oleh karena itu, mereka mengusulkan agar
menggunakan kriteria kombinasi antara
number-base approach dan self-selection.
Kepada NB diberikan sejumlah x% pos tarif
untuk SP, dan kemudian mereka dibebaskan
untuk memilih komoditas sesuai dengan
pertimbangan masing-masing.
Konsep SP kemudian masuk dalam draft
modalitas Harbinson (Juni 2003). Dalam draf
pertama Harbinson (Maret 2003), SP
disebutkan sebagai Strategic Product. Akan
tetapi pada revisi draf modalitas bulan Juni
2003, SP dirubah menjadi Special Product,
tanpa jelas alasannya.
Namun modalitas Harbinson itu tidak
diterima oleh sebagian besar negara
berkembang, dan sebagian negara maju.
Sehingga dalam KTM V di Cancun bulan
September 2003, yang dibahas adalah
framework baru terutama gagasan Blended
Formula, dan tidak banyak kaitannya dengan
modalitas yang dikembangkan oleh Harbinson.
Namun, SP tetap diakomodasi di dalam
framework Cancun, walau tidak seperti yang
diharapkan oleh NB. KTM V Cancun ternyata
gagal.
Baru pada akhir Juli 2004, diterima
framework baru atau disebut juga sebagai
Paket Juli (WT/CGS/W/535). Dalam paragrap
41, Annex A dari Framework baru itu,
disebutkan tentang SP adalah sbb:
“Developing country Members will have the
flexibility to designate an appropriate number
of products as Special Product, based on
385
criteria of food security, livelihood security
and rural development needs. These products
will be eligible for more flexibility treatment.
The criteria and treatment of these products
will be further specified during the negotiation
phase and will recognize the fundamental
importance of SP to developing countries”.
Kriteria pemilihan SP masih belum
ditentukan, dan ini akan dirundingkan dalam
waktu dekat, sebelum diputuskan dalam KTM
VI di Hongkong akhir tahun 2005. Oleh karena
itu, khususnya negara berkembang harus
menyiapkan sejumlah pilihan tentang
komoditas apa yang pantas masuk sebagai SP.
Berbagai kriteria telah disarankan seperti
yang dibuat oleh PTRI Jenewa (2003a, dan
2003b), Ruffer (2003), dan Simatupang (2004)
akan tetapi masih belum jelas kaitannya secara
kuantitatif terhadap pembangunan perdesaan
dan penyerapan tenaga kerja perdesaan sebagai
unsur penting dalam pengurangan orang
miskin dan kelaparan serta penguatan food
security. Makalah-makalah yang tersedia itu,
hanya menyaring SP dengan menggunakan
indikator tidak langsung. Indikator ini menjadi
amat subjektif, dan belum tentu mampu
mencapai tujuan SP. Adapun tujuan SP itu
adalah untuk (i) melindungi dan memperkuat
produksi pangan negara berkembang, terutama
pangan pokok (key staple foods), (ii)
mempertahankan dan penyerapan tenaga kerja,
memperkuat ketahanan pangan serta kehidupan
masyarakat desa.
Oleh karena itu, perlu dicari cara lain
untuk menyaring SP dengan metodologi yang
lebih layak. Metoda Input/Output (I/O) sebagai
salah satu cara untuk menyaring SP buat
Indonesia. Tujuan makalah ini adalah untuk
menyaring SP dengan metoda I/O dan
indikator lain yang relevan. Dengan saringan
ini, diharapkan Pemerintah dapat memutuskan
pemilihan SP yang terbaik buat percepatan
pembangunan perdesaan, pengentasan
kemiskinan, serta penguatan produksi pangan
domestik dan ketahanan pangan.
386 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
REVIEW KRITERIA SP
Penyaringan komoditas SP menjadi
penting, karena itu harus dikaitkan dengan
tujuan mengapa SP itu perlu diberikan buat
negara berkembang. Kalau salah dalam
memilihnya, maka akan keliru pula dalam
usaha untuk mencapai tujuannya. Perlu diingat
bahwa, fleksibelitas yang diberikan terhadap
SP, bukan berarti dengan sendirinya tujuan itu
akan lebih mudah tercapai. Itu harus ada
kemauan politik Pemerintah untuk merealisir
pembangunan yang pro-poor dan pro-rural
development. Dengan adanya fleksibelitas SP
itu, maka akan membantu untuk mencapai
tujuan tersebut.
Konsep SP yang diajukan NB atau dibahas
secara panjang lebar oleh peneliti, lembaga
penelitian atau diplomat WTO di Jenewa.
PTRI Jenewa (2003a) mengajukan pemilihan
SP menurut 5 kriteria yaitu: (a) self
declaration, (b) number based approach, (c)
criteria based approach, (d) multilaterally
negotiated, dan (e) kombinasi diantaranya.
Pada umumnya, negara berkembang
memilih kombinasi kriteria a) dan b) (PTRI
Jenewa 2003b). Alasannya adalah itu akan
lebih mudah dilaksanakan dan datanya
tersedia. Misalnya, kepada negara berkembang
diberikan x% jumlah pos tarif sebagai SP,
kemudian mereka bebas menentukan mana
yang dianggap tepat dipilih sebagai SP.
Simatupang (2004) melangkah lebih dalam
lagi dengan mengembangkan criteria based
approach yang lebih rinci. Ia memakai 6
indikator sebagai penciri SP yaitu: (a)
Persentase pangsa suatu produk dalam nilai
total produksi pertanian domestik, (b)
Persentase pangsa suatu produk dalam
penyediaan zat gizi (kalori dan protein), (c)
Persentase pangsa suatu produk dalam total
serapan tenaga kerja sektor pertanian, (d)
Oktober
Ketergantungan suatu produk terhadap impor,
(e) Insiden banjir impor suatu produk, dan (f)
Trend pertumbuhan suatu produk.
Tiga indikator pertama (a s/d c) dikelom-
pokkan sebagai kinerja pembangunan
perdesaan dan ketahanan pangan, sedangkan
tiga indikator terakhir terkait dengan
kerawanan/kerapuhan produksi pangan DN.
Komoditas yang dimasukkan sebagai SP,
tentu tidak hanya makanan pokok seperti
beras, tetapi juga makanan lainnya seperti
kedelai dan gula. Untuk indikator itu, dibuat
skor, setelah itu baru ditentukan total skor.
Besaran skor ditetapkan >10 untuk masing-
masing (a) s/d (c). Sedangkan untuk kreteria
(e), skornya >25, dan untuk kriteria (f) dengan
pertumbuhan negatif. Lebih rinci dari dapat
dilihat dalam Tabel 1 berikut.
Berdasarkan skor itu, kemudian ia
aplikasikan pada 4 komoditas yaitu beras,
jagung, kedelai, dan gula pasir. Ia
menyimpulkan, bahwa ke 4 komoditas tersebut
layak dijadikan sebagai SP. Sayang,
Simatupang (2004) belum menghitung
komoditas di luar 4 komoditas stragis yang
dipandang penting oleh Pemerintah. Akan
tetapi dengan metodologi yang sama,
seseorang dapat menerapkannya untuk
menyaring komoditas lainnya.
Timbul pertanyaan, mengapa sejumlah
indikator ditetapkan > 10 sebagai batasannya,
sedangkan frekwensi banjir impor ditetapkan >
25. Mengapa pula skor tersebut dijumlahkan
tanpa diberi bobot untuk masing-masing
indikator? Persolan lainnya adalah kerentanan
produksi pangan dalam negeri banyak
ditentukan oleh praktek dumping yang
dilakukan oleh negara maju, dan ini dengan
sendirinya belum menggambarkan kaitannya
dengan pembangunan perdesaan secara
langsung, tetapi itu hanya terkait dengan unfair
trade.
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati
Tabel 1. Indikator dan kriteria SP
Indikator
A. Kinerja Pembangunan
a) Pangsa dalam nilai produksi
b) Pangsa dalam nilai gizi:
o kalori
o protein
c) Pangsa dalam penyerapan tenaga kerja
pertanian
Jumlah pangsa (1+2+3)
B. Indikator Kerawanan/Kerapuhan Produksi DN
d) Ketergantungan thdp impor
e) Frekwensi banjir impor
f) Trend pertumbuhan produksi
Sumber: Simatupang (2004)
Lembaga lain tingkat internasional juga
melakukan hal yang sama untuk SP yaitu
Oxford Policy Management (Ruffer 2003).
Ruffer (2003) menentukan terlebih dahulu
negara yang berhak mendapatkan SP sebelum
memilih SP itu sendiri. Negera berkembang
yang berhak mendapatkan SP adalah negara
yang rawan pangan (food insecurity countries)
sesuai dengan kriteria. Kriteria penentuan food
insecurity countries adalah: (a) Pendapatan per
kapita kurang dari US $ 2500; (b) Kontribusi
sektor pertanian terhadap GDP, tidak kurang
dari 30%; (c) Tingkat konsumsi yang dilihat
dengan kalori dan protein per kapita, paling
tinggi 2.380 kalori, dan 62 gram protein per
hari; (d) Klasifikasi FAO tentang Low Income
Food Deficit Countries, dan (e) status LDC
(less developing countries).
Setelah ditentukan negara yang berhak
mendapat SP, maka baru dipilih SP dengan
kriteria. Kriteria yang diusulkan itu harus
dikaitkan dengan justifikasinya serta hu-
bungannya dengan tujuan SP (Tabel 2).
Ruffers (2003) mengatakan bahwa meng-
hubungkan impor melebihi tingkat tertentu,
misalnya A% dari konsumsi, tidak jelas
hubungan antara impor pangan dengan food
security. Demikian juga, untuk kriteria tertentu
misalnya konsumsi produk Z lebih besar dari
387
Kisaran Skor Kriteria SP
0-100 >10
0-100 >10
0-100 >10
0-300 >10
0-100 >10
0-100 >25
negatif
produksinya, itu tidak jelas kaitannya dengan
tujuan SP.
Pada umumnya, kelompok G-33 kurang
tertarik dengan metoda pemilihan SP tersebut.
Bukan saja karena alasan praktis, tetapi juga
ada unsur politis di dalamnya. Penelitian
tersebut dibiayai oleh sejumlah negara maju,
yang menentang konsep SP. Karena itulah,
pandangan Ruffers (2003) dianggap bias
terhadap kepentingan negara maju.
KAITAN METODA I-O DENGAN
TUJUAN SP
Ketergantungan antar sektor dalam
pembangunan ekonomi, tidak kecuali ekonomi
perdesaan dapat dianalisa dengan metoda I/O.
Masing-masing sektor menggunakan output
yang dihasilkan oleh sektor lain yang
kemudian dijadikan input dalam proses
produksi. Output yang diproduksikannya itu,
tidak saja digunakan sebagai permintaan antara
(intermediate demand) oleh sektor lain, tetapi
juga dipakai sebagi input untuk keperluan
sendiri, serta dikonsumsi oleh sektor lain
sebagai pemakai akhir (final demand).
Permintaan akhir ini tidak terbatas untuk
keperluan konsumsi rumah tangga, tetapi juga
konsumsi Pemerintah, ekspor, pembentukan
kapital dan perubahan stok.
388 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Tabel 2. Sejumlah Kriteria Terpilih untuk Menyaring SP

Kriteria Justifikasi Kaitannya dgn tujuan SP

1. Suatu negara bukan net
exporter ut produk Z
2. Impor lebih dari A% dari
total konsumsi
3. Konsumsi produk Z lebih
besar dari produksinya
4. Konsumsi produk Z lebih
besar A% total konsumsi
5. Produksi mencapai lebih
dari A% GDP pertanian
6. Total jumlah SP kurang
dari A% total impor produk rendah unt sejumlah impor,
pertanian
7. Biji-bijian (grains),
termasuk beras
Sumber: Ruffer (2003)
Barang Z tdk kompetitif di
psr dunia, ini perlu proteksi
khusus
Bila panetrasi impor besar,
itu artinya perlu proteksi
Ini sebagai net importir,
ternyata tidak kompetitif
untuk ekspor
Bergantung pada gizi
setempat, ini perlu proteksi.
Penting produk itu tehadap
ekonomi
Dibatasi pada tarif yg lebih
sehingga distorsi berkurang
Banyak staple crops adalah
biji-bijian (grains)
Tidak jelas.
Hub antara impor pangan dgn
food security tidak jelas.
Walaupun itu erat kaitannya dgn
produksi pangan itu sendiri
Tidak jelas.
Produksi DN, hambatan untuk
impor, manakala ketergantungan
impor tinggi. Ini dapat
menguranginya, tapi bukan
memperkuat food security.
Bila dibuka, maka ini akan serius
efek terhadap sektor pertanian
Tidak jelas. Tetapi berguna untuk
membatasi perdagangan secara
keseluruhan.
Ini terkait dgn tujuan untk
melindungi key staple yang
dihasilkan dari DN

Keterkaaitan antar sektor, hubungan bolak jumlah penyerapan tenaga kerja218untuk

balik, baik itu langsung maupun tidak
langsung, dapat dipelajari dari Tabel Input
Output (I/O) yang diterbitkan BPS setiap 5
tahunan. Tabel I/O yang paling akhir adalah
tahun 2000. Data itulah yang dipakai untuk
analisa kuat tidaknya keterkaitan antar sektor
atas komoditas/produk pertanian (rincian
metodologinya dibahas dalam Lampiran 1).
Pemilihan itu, tidak saja melihat kaitan suatu
komoditas calon SP dengan indek DP (daya
penyebaran) dan indek DK (derajat kepekaan)
terhadap output, tetapi juga dikaitkan dengan
masing-masing produk/sektor.
Suatu sektor dapat dikatakan sebagai
sektor kunci, manakala indeks DP atau indek
DK lebih besar dari satu. Apabila DP sektor j
berada di atas rata-rata daya penyebaran
seluruh sektor ekonomi, atau sektor ini mem-
punyai daya dorong yang kuat dibandingkan
dengan sektor ekonomi lain. Apabila DK
sektor i lebih tinggi di atas rata-rata DK
seluruh sektor ekonomi (indek lebih dari satu).
2
Dicoba juga menggunakan angka multiplier nilai tambah
dan muliplier upah/gaji, tetapi hasilnya lebih komplek,
sehingga dipilih penyerapan tenaga kerja.
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati 389

Atau sektor ini mempunyai derajat kepekaan/
ketergantungan (daya hela) tinggi disbanding-
kan dengan sektor lain.
Sektor yang dipilih itu, harus juga
dikaitkan dengan jumlah tenaga kerja yang
terlibat. Jumlah tetaga kerja yang terlibat,
sebagai indikasi tentang pentingnya
kesempatan kerja yang diciptakan oleh sektor
tersebut. Sektor itu dianggap penting manakala
mampu menyerap tenaga kerja lebih dari satu
juta orang atau lebih 2% dari total pengerjaan
di sektor pertanian. Pemakaian angka 1 juta
orang sebagai tolok ukur sederhana (arbitrary),
tidak ada dasar teorinya. Penyerapan ini, juga
harus dijumlahkan antara produk pertanian
primer dan produk agro industri. Kesemuanya
itu kemudian dikaitkan dengan tujuan SP
seperti yang disarikan dalam Tabel 3 berikut.
Pada dasarnya, tahapan penyaringan itu
dibuat sebagai berikut. Pertama menggunakan
penyaringan dengan Indek DP dan Indek DK.
Dipilih produk hanya yang indeknya bernilai
satu atau lebih. Kedua, ditetapkan mana yang
dianggap sebagai pangan (food) dan net
importir. Ketiga, tahap selanjutnya megunakan
kriteria penyerapan tenaga kerja.
PENYARINGAN SP
Indek DP dan indek DK dipakai untuk
menyaring sektor kunci pembangunan
ekonomi, khususnya ekonomi perdesaan dari
sejumlah 55 produk pertanian (lihat bahasan
detail tentang produk tersebut dalam
metodologi di Lampiran 1).

Tabel 3. Kriteria Sektor/Produk Kunci dan Penyaringan SP dengan Metoda I/O

Kriteria Justifikasi Tujuan SP

Indek DP (Daya (nilai αj > 1); Daya penyebaran sektor j • Key sector for rural
Penyebaran)/Backward berada di atas rata2 daya penyebaran development
Linkages Effect Ratio seluruh sektor ekonomi; atau sektor ini • (Food availability, Poverty
(αj) mempunyai daya dorong yang kuat reduction; dan Food
dibandingkan dengan sektor ekonomi accessibility)1)
lain.
Indek DK (Daya (nilai βi > 1); Daya kepekaan/ • Key sector for rural
Kepekaan/Ketergantung ketergantungan sektor i lebih tinggi di development
an)/Forward Linkages atas rata2 derajat kepekaan seluruh • (Food availability;
Effect Ratio (βi) sektor ekonomi; atau sektor ini Poverty reduction; dan
mempunyai derajat Food accessibility) 1)
kepekaan/ketergantungan (daya hela)
tinggi dibandingkan dengan sektor lain
Penyerapan Tenaga • Makin besar penyerapan tenaga kerja • Poverty reduction
Kerja (Employment) untuk suatu sektor, semakin penting • Reduce urbanization
dalam kaitannya dengan pengentasan • Rural livelihood
pengangguran. • Food accessibility
• Dipakai angka penyerapan tenaga
kerja sejumlah 1 juta atau lebih; atau
lebih dari 2% total tenaga kerja yang
terlibat di pertanian.
1) Pengaruh tidak langsung dalam kurung
390 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Hanya 27 sektor/produk menjadi sektor komoditas kedelai perlu dimasukkan dalam

kunci pembangunan dalam kaitannya untuk
mendorong pembangunan ekonomi, dan 10
sektor kunci yang menghela industri/sektor
ekonomi, karena nilai indek lebih besar dari 1.
Diantara 27 produk sebagai sektor kunci
pembangunan ekonomi, selanjutnya dipilih
hanya yang terkait dengan pangan (food) dan
net importir. Dari sana terpilihlah 16
sektor/produk yang dapat dipertimbangkan
sebagai SP, seperti yang disarikan dalam
Tabel 4 berikut.
Ke 16 sektor ini perlu pula ditambah
dengan 3 sektor/produk lain karena adanya
keterkaitannya. Misalnya, pengolahan kedelai
yang termuat dalam Tabel 4 tersebut, itu terkait
erat dengan komoditas kedelai yang menurut
kriteria indek tidak terpilih. Sehingga
perhitungan lebih lanjut. Sektor sayur dan
buah-buahan awetan yang terpilih dalam Tabel
4, itu terkait dengan produk primernya yaitu
sektor sayur-sayuran dan sektor buah-buahan.
Demikian juga produk jagung yang terpilih
dari indeks DK dalam Tabel 4, itu harus
dikaitkan dengan agro industri pakan ternak.
Lebih dari separoh jagung digunakan untuk
pakan ternak.
Secara lengkap produk SP menjadi 19
jenis produk (produk pertanian primer dan
produk agro-industri). Semua produk tersebut
di ranking menurut besaran penggunaan tenaga
kerja, ranking multiplier upah/gaji dan
multiplier nilai tambah. Besaran angka
multiplier upah/gaji dan multiplier nilai
tambah serta ranking untuk 55 jenis produk.

Tabel 4. Sektor/Produk Kunci Sebagai SP

HS
Sektor Indeks
No Nama Sektor F dan NI dua/empat/6
Asli DP/DK
digit
A. Sektor Kunci Pendorong Pembangunan
1 50 Daging olahan dan awetan 1.45961 F dan NI 01 atau 02
2 51 Makanan dan minuman terbuat dari susu 1.33981 F dan NI 0402
3 68 Makanan lainnya 1.32986 F dan NI ?
4 57 B e r a s 1.32792 F dan NI 1006
5 62 G u l a 1.28448 F dan NI 1701
6 49 Daging, jeroan dan sejenisnya 1.24609 F dan NI 02
7 27 Unggas dan hasil-hasilnya 1.21732 F dan NI 1602.39
8 59 Tepung lainnya 1.16931 F dan NI ?
9 52 Buah-buahan dan sayur-sayuran olahan dan awetan 1.11091 F dan NI 07 atau 08
10 67 Hasil pengolahan kedele 1.08014 F dan NI 1201
11 26 Susu segar 1.05838 F dan NI 0402
B. Sektor Kunci Penghela Industri/Sektor
12 1 Padi 1.47744 F 1006
13 13 T e b u 1.28386 F 1701
14 2 Jagung 1.13572 F dan NI 1108
15 25 Ternak dan hasil-hasilnya kecuali susu segar 1.04825 F dan NI 01 atau 02
16 27 Unggas dan hasil-hasilnya 1.03158 F dan NI 1602.39
Keterangan: a) F=food dan NI=net importer
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati
Hampir tidak mungkin memilih suatu
produk yang mendapat ranking tertinggi untuk
semua kriteria, yang ada adalah campuran.
Padi misalnya, mampu menyerapan tenaga
kerja tertinggi, akan tetapi rendah rankingnya
untuk multiplier upah/gaji atau nilai tambah,
masing-masing hanya pada urutan ke 36 dan
40. Namun padi terkait dengan industri beras
yang angka multiplier upah/gaji dan nilai
tambah beras adalah tertinggi (ranking ke-1),
dalam penyerapan tenaga kerja hanya berada
pada ranking ke-10.
Berikutnya adalah tebu sebagai produk
primer dalam penyerapan tenaga kerja
mendapat ranking ke-8, namun rendah untuk
multiplier upah/gaji dan nilai tambah, masing-
masing hanya ranking ke 42 dan ke-36. Namun
gula mendapat ranking tinggi ke-2 untuk
upah/gaji dan ke-4 untuk nilai tambah. Tebu
tentunya tidak dapat dipisahkan dengan
industri gula, karena hampir seluruh tebu
digunakan untuk industri gula, sehingga
keduanya harus dilihat secara bersamaan.
Selanjutnya adalah sektor unggas dan
hasil-hasilnya mencapai ranking-ke 5 dalam
penyerapan tenaga kerja, tetapi agak moderat
dalam ranking multiplier baik untuk upah/gaji
maupun untuk nilai tambah. Interpretasi yang
sama dapat juga dilakukan untuk produk
lainnya baik itu produk primer maupun produk
agro industri.
Untuk menyederhanakannya, maka
dipakai penyerapan tenaga kerja sebagai tolok
ukur utama dan kemudian dipilah-pilah
menurut produk primer maupun produk agro
industri, seperti yang diperlihatkan dalam
Tabel 5 berikut.
Apabila penggunaan tenaga kerja di sektor
produk primer dan produk industri
dijumlahkan, maka diperoleh penggunaan total
tenaga kerja. Kalau 11 produk tersebut masuk
391
sebagai SP, maka SP tersebut menampung 31
juta orang atau 70% dari total 44 juta orang
yang terlibat di sektor pertanian primer dan
agro industri. Sebagian besar mereka bekerja
di wilayah perdesaan. Itu merupakan angka
yang cukup berarti untuk pengentasan
pengangguran dan kemiskinan, peredam arus
urbanisasi serta terkait erat degan rural
livelihood.
Seandainya jumlah SP dibatasi sehingga
tidak mampu menampung keseluruhan yang
diusulkan, maka untuk itu perlu diberikan
prioritas pada 8 jenis produk saja, karena
masing-masing produk tersebut menyerap
tenaga kerja lebih dari 1 juta orang atau 2%
lebih dari total pengerjaan di sektor pertanian
(agriculture employment). Atau dengan kata
lain, kedelapan produk inilah harus diberikan
prioritas tinggi buat dipilih sebagai SP. Produk
gula/tebu menyerap tenaga kerja sedikit di
bawah 1 juta orang tetapi mengambil peran
2,35% terhadap total agriculture employment.
Ke-delapan jenis produk SP prioritas adalah
beras/padi; sayur-sayuran/sayur-sayuran dan
buahan awetan; buah-buahan; jagung/pakan
ternak; ternak dan hasil-hasilnya/daging,
jeroan, daging olahan; kedelai/olahan kedelai;
dan tebu/gula (Tabel 5).
Sejumlah produk SP amat agregatif seperti
buah-buahan, sayur-sayuran, ternak, unggas,
sehingga tidak diperoleh jenis produk yang
jelas. Misalnya, untuk buah-buahan, tidak jelas
jelas jenis buahnya. Data untuk itu memang
tidak tersedia dalam Tabel IO. Namun, produk
tersebut masih bisa dipakai kalau kita
mengaitkannya dengan HS dua digit. Memang
ada produk seperti makanan lain, tidak dapat
digolongkan ke HS, karena terlalu banyak
produk pangan yang dimasukan di dalamnya
(sesuai dengan keperluan IO) seperti es,
makanan dari kedelai/kecap, kerupuk, kue2
basah, bumbu masak dan penyedap makanan.
392 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Tabel 5. Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja dan SP (Produk Primer dan Agro Industri)
Total % thdp Total
Produk Jumlah Tenaga Produk Agro Jumlah Tenaga
Tenaga Kerja Tenaga kerja
Primer Kerja (Orang) Industri Kerja (Orang)
(Org) Sektor Pertanian

Padi 11,320,533 Beras 734,443 12,054,976 28.79

Sayur-sayuran 5,829,887 Sayuran/buahan 59,155 5,889,042 13.92
awetan
Buah-buahan 5,130,436 5,130,436 12.25

Jagung 2,318,914 Pakan ternak 157,938 2,476,852 5.92

Ternak dan hasil- 805,260 Daging/jeroan+daging 865,651 1,670,911 3.99
hasilnya kecuali susu olahan/awetan
segar
Unggas dan hasil- 1,537,561 1,537,561 3.67
hasilnya
Kedele 881,730 Olahan kedelai 161,449 1,043,179 2.49
Tebu 822,882 Gula 160,132 983,014 2.35
Susu segar 76,312 Makanan/minuman 112,732 189,044 0.45
terbuat dari susu
Makanan lainnya 139,806 139,806 0.34

Tepung lainnya 23,654 23,654 0.06

Total 28,723,515 2,414,961 31,138,476

KESIMPULAN DAN REKOMENDASI • Beras/padi (HS 1006)

Ada 3 tahap dilakukan untuk menyaring
SP, pertama dengan indeks DK dan indek DP
yang nilainya 1 atau lebih. Kedua disaring dan
dikeluarkan produk yang non-food dan net
exporter. Kemudian tahap akhir, dinilai dan
diranking besaran penyerapan tenaga kerja
lebih dari 2% total tenaga kerja pertanian atau
mecapai 1 juta orang atau lebih.
SP yang terpilih adalah pangan (food) dan
net importir, dan menyerap tenaga kerja
terbanyak, sehingga dengan penyaringan itu
SP akan erat kaitannya dengan percepatan
pembangunan khususnya pembangunan di
wilayah perdesaan, menyerap tenaga kerja
sehingga terkait dengan pengurangan
pengangguran serta kemiskinan, dan rural
livelihood.
Penyaringan pertama dan kedua terpilih 11
produk SP. Rincian produk tersebut dengan HS
(2 digit, 4 atau 6 digit) seperti berikut:
• Sayur-sayuran/sayuran dan buah awetan
(HS 07)
• Buah-buahan (HS 08)
• Jagung/pakan ternak (HS 1108)
• Ternak dan hasil-hasilnya/daging, jeroan,
daging olahan dan awetan (HS 02 dan HS
01)
• Unggas dan hasil-hasilnya (HS 1602.39)
• Kedelai/olahan kedelai (HS 1201)
• Gula/tebu (HS 1701)
• Susu segar/Makanan dan minuman dari
susu (HS 0402)
• Makanan lainnya319(HS ?)
• Tepung lainnya (HS 1106?).
Produk tersebut dapat disaring lagi dengan
memakai kriteria jumlah penggunaan tenaga
3
Dikelompokan dalam IO untuk industri es, makanan dari
kedelai/kecap, kerupuk, kue2 basah, industri bumbu
masak dan penyedap masakah.
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati
kerja 1 juta orang atau lebih (minimal 2% dari
total agriculture employment). Sehingga 3
produk seperti susu, makanan lain, dan tepung
lainnya harus dikeluarkan dalam penentuan
prioritas utama SP. Akhirnya terpilih 8 produk
yang harus mendapatkan prioritas utama untuk
SP. Produk itu adalah mulai dari urutan
pertama (beras/padi) sampai dengan urutan ke
delapan (gula/tebu) seperti yang telah dibahas
di atas.
Sebagian besar aktivitas produk pertanian
primer dan agro industri untuk pangan berada
di perdesaan, sehingga pemilihan SP tersebut
akan berpengaruh penting dalam mendorong
pembangunan pertanian dan perdesaan, serta
menyerap tenaga kerja serta mengurangan
jumlah orang miskin yang dominan di
perdesaan.
Disarankan agar semua SP harus
mendapatkan perlakuan SSM (special
safeguard mechanism). Karena SSM adalah
perlindungan sementara dari serbuan impor. Itu
tidak saja diperlukan buat komoditas SP, tetapi
juga komoditas penting lain di luar SP.
Diharapkan hasil yang diperoleh ini dapat
digunakan sebagai bahan perunding dari
Indonesia untuk menyusun modalitas dari
framework yang telah disetujui akhir Juli 2003.
Atau juga sebagai kontribusi Indonesia selaku
negara yang memimpin kelompok G-33.
DAFTAR BACAAN
Diaz-Bonilla, E, M. Thomas, S.Robinson
(2002), ”On Boxes, Contents, and Users:
Food Security and the WTO
393
Negotiations”, IFPRI, TMD Discussion
Paper no.82 (revised July 2002).
BPS (1999), Kerangka Teori dan Analisis
Tabel Input-Output, BPS: Jakarta
Mangari, K (2000), Perencanaan Terpadu
Pembangunan Ekonomi Daerah Otonom:
Pendekatan Model IO, BPS dan CSS:
Jakarta
Murphy, S and S. Suppan (2003), Introduction
to the Development Box: Finding Space
for Development Concerns in the WTO’s
Agriculture Negotiations, International
Institute for Sustainable Development,
Manitoba, Canada
PTRI Jenewa (2003a), Specific Modalities
Inputs on Strategic Products, Non-Paper
(First Draft), March
PTRI Jenewa (2003b), Strategic Products,
submission by Cuba, Dominican Rep.,
Honduras, India, Indonesia, Rep Korea,
Nigeria, Turkey, Peru, Philippines, Sri
Lanka, and Venezuela, disampaikan pada
sidang Special Session CoA-WTO (20
March)
Ruffer, T (2003), Special Products: Thinking
Through the Details, Oxford Policy
Management, London
Simatupang, P (2004), Justifikasi dan Metode
Penetapan Komoditas Strategis, dalam
R.Wibowo dkk (Eds.), Rekontruksi dan
Restrukturisasi Ekonomi Pertanian,
PERHEPI
WTO (2004), WTO Agriculture Negotiations:
the issues and where we are now, updated
1 March 2004 (tersedia di website).
394 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

LAMPIRAN 1

Metodologi Tabel I/O dan Rincian Sektor

Data yang pakai adalah Tabel Input-Output (I-O)420175 sektor yang bersumber dari Badan
Pusat Statistik (BPS), tahun 2000. Rincian 175 sektor sesungguhnya belum cukup untuk
menggambarkan semua komoditas pertanian secara detail, akan tetapi sejumlah komoditas penting
memang lebih terinci seperti tebu, gula, kedelai, jagung, ubikayu, ubi rambat, teh, kopi, dan
sebagainya. Tetapi ada sebagian digambungkan seperti buah-buahan atau sayur-sayuran, sehingga
kita tidak dapat memahami secara detil jenis buah-buahan yang dimaksud, apakah jeruk atau
langsat atau lainnya, sehingga komoditas itu tidak terungkap.
Dalam Tabel I-O, hubungan antara output dan permintaan akhir dijabarkan sebagai berikut :
X = (I-Ad)-1Fd
Dimana :
X = matriks output sektor
Ad = matriks koefisien input domestik
Fd = matriks permintaan akhir
Jika diuraikan dalam bentuk matriks, maka hubungan di atas dapat ditulis dalam bentuk sebagai
berikut:

⎛ X 1 ⎞ ⎛ b11 L bij L b1n ⎞ ⎛ d⎞

⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ F1 ⎟
⎜ M ⎟ ⎜ M M M ⎟ ⎜ M ⎟
⎜ X ⎟ = ⎜ bi1 L bij L bin ⎟ ⎜ d⎟
⎜ i⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ Fi ⎟
⎜ M ⎟ ⎜ M M M ⎟ ⎜ M ⎟
⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ d⎟
⎝ X n ⎠ ⎝ bn1 L bnj L bnn ⎠ ⎜ ⎟
⎝ Fn ⎠
dimana
bij = sel matriks kebalikan (I-Ad)-1 pada baris ke-i dan kolom ke-j
Xij = output sektor ke-i
Fid = permintaan akhir domestik sektor i
i,j = 1,2, …, n

1. Dampak atau Sektor Kunci

Untuk menentukan kehandalan suatu sektor dalam perekonomian dapat menggunakan
pemetaan secara serempak dalam satu salib sumbu dari indeks daya penyebaran dan derajat
kepekaan (backward-forward linkage effect). DP (daya/drajat penyebaran) disebut tingkat
keterkaitan ke belakang (backward linkage) dan DK (daya/drajat kepekaan) dapat disebut
besarnya tingkat keterkaitan ke depan (forward linkage). Dari daya penyebaran dan derajat
kepekaan dapat diturunkan angka indeks DP dan indeks DK.

4
Lihat lebih terinci konsep IO dalam berbagai penerbitan, terutama BPS (1999) dan Mangari (2000).
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati 395

Indeks DP memberikan indikasi bahwa sektor-sektor yang mempunyai indeks DP lebih besar
dari satu, menunjukkan daya penyebarannya di atas rata-rata daya penyebaran keseluruhan sektor
ekonomi. Pengertian yang sama juga berlaku untuk indeks DK. Sektor yang mempunyai indeks
DK lebih dari satu, berarti derajat kepekaan sektor tersebut berada di atas derajat kepekaan rata-
rata secara keseluruhan.
Sektor yang mempunyai DK tinggi memberikan indikasi bahwa sektor tersebut mempunyai
keterkaitan ke depan atau daya dorong yang cukup kuat terhadap sektor sendiri dan sektor lainnya
dibandingkan dengan sektor lainnya. Sedangkan sektor yang mempunyai DP tinggi berarti sektor
tersebut mempunyai ketergantungan yang tinggi terhadap dirinya sendiri maupun sektor-sektor
lain. Semua hal itu, dapat dianalisis dengan memakai metoda Tabel I-O
Kalau mengacu pada persamaan seperti yang telah disebutkan di atas maka secara umum
jumlah dampak akibat perubahan permintaan akhir suatu sektor terhadap output seluruh ekonomi
adalah :
rj = b1j + b2j + … + bnj = Σibij
dimana
rj = jumlah dampak akibat perubahan permintaan akhir sektor ke-j terhadap output seluruh
sektor ekonomi
bij = dampak yang terjadi terhadap output sektor i akibat perubahan permintaan akhir sektor j
Jumlah dampak seperti di atas disebut juga sebagai jumlah DP, Selanjutnya untuk keperluan
perbandingan antar sektor, maka persamaan di atas harus dinormalkan (normalized), yaitu dengan
cara membagi rata-rata dampak suatu sektor dengan rata-rata dampak seluruh sektor. Ukuran yang
dihasilkan dari proses ini disebut sebagai indeks daya penyebaran (DP) atau disebut juga backward
linkages effect ratio yang rumusnya sebagai berikut :
⎛1⎞
⎜ ⎟Σ i bij
Σ i bij
αj = ⎝ ⎠
n
=
⎛ 1 ⎞ ⎛1⎞
⎜ 2 ⎟Σ i Σ j bij ⎜ ⎟Σ i Σ j bij
⎝n ⎠ ⎝n⎠
dimana αj adalah indeks DP sektor j dan lebih dikenal sebagai daya penyebaran sektor j. Bila αj =
1 berarti daya penyebaran sektor j sama dengan rata-rata daya penyebaran seluruh sektor ekonomi.
Nilai αj > 1 menunjukkan daya penyebaran sektor j berada di atas rata-rata daya penyebaran
seluruh sektor ekonomi dan sebaliknya αj < 1 berarti daya penyebaran sektor j lebih rendah dari
rata-rata keseluruhan sektor ekonomi.
Berdasarkan matriks di atas dapat juga dilihat bahwa jumlah dampak terhadap output suatu
sektor i sebagai akibat perubahan permintaan akhir berbagai (seluruh) sektor dapat dirumuskan
dalam persamaan umum
Si = Σj bij
dimana
si =jumlah dampak terhadap sektor i sebagai akibat perubahan seluruh sektor.
Nilai si disebut juga sebagai jumlah DK, yaitu besaran yang menjelaskan dampak yang terjadi
terhadap output suatu sektor sebagai akibat dari perubahan permintaan akhir pada masing-masing
sektor perekonomian. Oleh karena besaran ini menjelaskan pembentukan output disuatu sektor
396 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

yang dipengaruhi oleh permintaan akhir masing-masing sektor perekonomian, maka ukuran ini
dapat dimanfaatkan untuk melihat keterkatan ke depan.
Untuk membandingkan antar sektor, maka persamaan di atas perlu dinormalkan, sehingga
menjadi indek derajat kepekaan (indek DK):
Σ i bij
βi =
⎛1⎞
⎜ ⎟Σ i Σ j bij
⎝n⎠
dimana
βi = indeks derajat kepekaan sektor i atau lebih sering disebut sebagai derajat kepekaan (DK)
saja.
Nilai βi >1 menunjukkan bahwa derajat kepekaan sektor i lebih tinggi dari rata-rata derajat
kepekaan seluruh sektor, sedangkan βi <1 menunjukkan derajat kepekaan sektor i lebih rendah dari
rata-rata. Indeks derajat kepekaan disebut juga sebagai tingkat dampak keterkaitan ke depan
(forward linkages effect ratio).

2. Mulitplier Nilai Tambah dan Upah/gaji serta Penyerapan Tenaga Kerja.

Konsep multiplier NT atau Upah/gaji untuk suatu sektor juga penting untuk melihat dampak
dari perubahan keseluruhan nilai tambah atau upah/gaji akibat dari perubahan satu unit Rp (juta
Rp) final demand untuk sektor tersebut. Makin besar angka multiplier tersebut, semakin tinggi
dampaknya akibat dari perubahan final demand. Upah dan gaji, tentu terkait erat dengan
kemiskinan serta livelihood, demikian juga nilai tambah terkait erat dengan kemiskinan.
Suatu sektor, juga menyerap tenaga kerja. Makin besar penyerapan tenaga kerja suatu sektor,
semakin penting sektor itu dalam kaitannya dengan pengangguran, serta berpengaruh positif
terhadap pengurangan kemiskinan serta livelihood.
Ketiga hal tersebut diranking, dan diprioritaskan pada jumlah penyerapan tenaga kerja, serta
angka multiplir yang tinggi baik untuk Nilai Tambah, maupun untuk Upah/gaji.

3. Cakupan Produk Pertanian

Data IO tahun 2000, produk primer pertanian dipilah-pilah ke dalam 6 kelompok, di dalam
nya dirinci lagi dalam beberapa sektor yang jumlahnya berbeda antara satu kelompok dengan
kelompok lain seperti yang di bahas oleh Mangiri (2000). Masing sektor ada yang cukup detail,
ada pula yang tidak terinci. Buah-buahan atau sayur-sayuran misalnya, tidak dirinci lebih lanjut
dalam Tabel I/O, sehingga kita tidak dapat melihatnya secara lebih rinci, jenis buah atau sayur
yang dimaksud. Sedangkan bahan makanan seperti padi, jagung, kedalai, ubi jalar, kacang tanah
telah terpisah secara rinci.
Demikian juga IO 2000, produk agro industri dipisahkan dengan sektor primer. Beras, gula,
daging dan sejenisnya dimasukan dalam kelompok agro industri, karena telah meningkat nilai
tambah akibat dari kegiatan prosesing sederhana maupun lebih komplek.
Adapun rincian untuk bidang produk primer pertanian adalah sebagai berikut:
1. Tanaman Bahan Makanan yang terdiri dari 11 sektor yaitu padi, jagung, ketela pohon, ubi
jalar, umbi-umbian lainnya, kacang tanah, kedelai, kacang-kacangan lainnya, sayur-sayuran,
buah-buahan, dan padi2an dan bahan makanan lainnya.
2005 Sawit, Setiyanto, Purba & Supriyati 397

2. Perkebunan terdiri dari 13 sektor yaitu karet, tebu, kelapa, kelapa sawit, hasil tanaman serat,
tembakau, kopi, teh, cengkeh, kakao, jambu mete, hasil perkebunan lainnya, dan hasil pertanian
lainnya5.21
3. Peternakan terdiri atas 4 sektor yaitu ternak dan hasil-hasilnya kecuali susu segar, susu segar,
unggas dan hasil-hasilnya, dan hasil pemeliharaan hewan lainnya.
4. Kehutanan terdiri atas 2 sektor yaitu kayu, dan hasil hutan lainnya,
5. Perikanan terdiri atas 3 sektor yaitu ikan laut dan hasil laut lainnya, ikan darat dan hasil
perairan darat, dan udang.
6. Jasa pertanian dikelompokan hanya satu sektor sesuai namannya6.22
Bidang agro industri dapat juga dikelompokan dalam 7 bidang yang terkait dengan produk
primer seperti yang telah disebutkan di atas. Rincian pengelompokan itu adalah sebagai berikut:
1) Agro Industri Makanan terdiri atas buah-buahan dan sayuran olahan dan awetan; beras;
tepung terigu; tepung lainnya; roti, biskuit dan sejenisnya; mie, makaroni dan sejenisnya; hasil
olahan kedelai; dan makanan lainnya; minuman beralkohol; minuman tak beralkohol;
2) Agro Industri Perkebunan terdiri atas sektor kopra, gula; biji-bijian kupasan; coklat dan
kembang gula; kopi giling dan kupasan; teh olahan; tembakau olahan; rokok; kapuk bersih;
benang; industri tekstil serta pakaian dll7;23
3) Agro Industri Peternakan terdiri atas sektor daging, jeroan dan sejenisnya; daging olahan dan
awetan; dan makanan dan minuman terbuat dari susu; pakan ternak; industri kulit dll8;24
4) Agro Industri Kehutanan yaitu kayu gergajian dan awetan; kayu lapis dan sejenisnya; bahan
bangunan dari kayu, parabot rumah tangga; dan sebagainya.
5) Agro Industri Perikanan terdiri atas 2 sektor yaitu ikan kering dan ikan asin; dan ikan olahan
dan awetan;
6) Industri Pupuk925dan
7) Industri Pestisida1026
Khusus untuk kelompok perikanan dan jasa pertanian tidak dimasukan dalam perhitungan
untuk SP, hal yang sama untuk produk agro industri kehutanan dan perikanan, karena produk
tersebut tidak ada dalam AoA WTO. Sehingga keseluruhan sebanyak 55 sektor dipakai dan
disaring untuk produk SP.

6
Ini terdiri dari perkebunan lain yg tidak diklasifikasi di tempat lain, hortikultura, tanaman hias, dan kombinasi pertanian
atau perkebunan dengan peternakan (mixed farming)
7
Banyak aktivitas jasa yang dimasukan disini yaitu antara lain jasa pengolahan lahan, pemupukan, pasca panen,
pelayanan kesehatan ternak, perlindungan hutan dll.
7
Pegabungan kode sektor 75-80.
8
Penggabungan kode sektor 81-83.
9
Teridiri dari industri pupuk alam, pupuk buatan, pupuk hara mikro atau makro dll.
10
Teridir dari industri pemberantasan hama, dan zat pengatur tumbuh
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia
Vol. 20, No. 4, 2005, 398 - 411

INTENSIFIKASI PEMUNGUTAN PAJAK

MELALUI PERBAIKAN PELAYANAN
(Kasus PBB dan BPHTB di Kantor Pelayanan Malang)
Munawar Ismail
Universitas Brawijaya Malang

ABSTRACT

Tax collection intensification through service quality improvement is an efficient way to

increase the role of tax as a main source of government revenue. The objective of this study
is to evaluate the service quality of Malang Property-Tax Office delivered to taxpayers in
the view of their own perception. The study found that the taxpayers expectation of the
service dimensions that consists of tangibles, assurance and accessibility had been met so it
has to be continued. Yet, while the taxpayers expectation of the service dimensions that
contains reliability and responsiveness was not fullfiled. Therefore, in the future, Malang
Property-Tax Office should make more attention on it. Other finding is that there was no
dimension of the services that the taxpayers consider it worse.
Keywords: property tax, intensification, service quality

Pajak, yang diartikan sebagai iuran kepada
negara yang dapat dipaksakan melalui undang-
undang, memiliki dua fungsi, yaitu fungsi
budgetair dan fungsi reguler (Waluyo dan
Ilyas, 1999). Sebagai fungsi budgetair, pajak
berperan sebagai sumber penerimaan negara,
yang selanjutnya dapat digunakan untuk
membiayai kegiatan negara. Oleh karena itu,
besar kecilnya pajak yang bisa dikumpulkan,
memiliki implikasi yang sangat penting
terhadap jumlah dan kualitas kegiatan yang
bisa diselenggarakan oleh negara. Sedangkan
sebagai fungsi reguler, pajak diperankan
sebagai instrumen untuk mengatur kehidupan
negara sesuai dengan kehendak negara, seperti
menciptakan stabilitas ekonomi dan
mengurangi ketimpangan pendapatan.
Pajak sebagai sumber penerimaan negara,
memiliki peranan yang semakin penting dari
waktu ke waktu. Seperti tercantum pada Tabel
1, sumbangan pajak terhadap penerimaan
dalam negeri mengalami kenaikan yang luar
biasa, yaitu dari hanya 56,5% pada tahun 2000
menjadi 75,6% pada tahun 2003. Fenomena
seperti ini memiliki implikasi lanjutan, yaitu
terus merosotnya sumbangan penerimaan
bukan pajak terhadap penerimaan dalam
negeri, yaitu dari 43,5% pada tahun 2000
menjadi hanya 24,4% pada tahun 2003.
Sementara itu, pada periode yang sama, hampir
90% seluruh belanja negara dibiayai oleh
penerimaan dalam negeri, dan penerimaan
dalam negeri itu sendiri didominasi oleh
penerimaan pajak. Dengan demikian peranan
pajak sebagai sumber pembiayaan negara
menjadi semakin dominan.
2005 Ismail 399

Tabel 1: Struktur Penerimaan Pajak dalam APBN di Indonesia, 2000-2003 (dalam %)

Sumbangan dari 2000 2001 2002* 2003**

PBB & BPHTB terhadap total pajak 3,8 3,6 3,7 4,1
PPH terhadap total pajak 49,2 50,9 48,1 47,6
PPN terhadap total pajak 30,3 38,5 40,6 41,7
Cukai terhadap total pajak 9,7 9,4 10,4 10,9
Pajak perdagangan internas. thdp total pajak 6,0 5,1 5,6 4,8
Total pajak thdp penerimaan dalam negeri 56,4 61,7 70,4 75,6
Penerimaan dalam negeri thdp belanja negara 92,7 88,0 88,2 90,7
Belanja negara (miliar Rp) 221.466,7 341.562,7 345.604,9 370.591,8
* Perkiraan realisasi APBN
** APBN
Sumber : Diolah dari BAPPENAS

Meskipun penerimaan pajak di Indonesia yang ada, persoalan perpajakan di Indonesia

mengalami kenaikan yang luar biasa, tetapi
jika dibandingkan dengan beberapa negara di
ASEAN, prestasi tersebut tidak sepenuhnya
menggembirakan. Hal ini dibuktikan oleh
masih rendahnya rasio pajak terhadap GDP,
dimana pada tahun 1999 angkanya mencapai
10,3%. Sedangkan pada tahun yang sama
angka-angka di Malaysia mencapai 15,1%,
Singapura 15,2%, Thailand 15,5%, Philippina
14,5% dan Vietnam 15,3% (Asian
Developement Bank, 2004). Prestasi Indonesia
tersebut hanya lebih tinggi dari Kamboja
(7,7%) dan Laos (7,3%) (Asian Developement
Bank, 2004). Fakta seperti ini mengharuskan
Indonesia untuk berupaya lebih keras lagi
dalam meningkatkan peranan pajak sebagai
sumber pembiayaan negara.
Sehubungan dengan hal tersebut, ada dua
cara yang bisa dilakukan, yaitu ekstensifikasi
dan intensifikasi. Melalui ekstensifikasi,
peningkatan penerimaan pajak dapat dilakukan
dengan menggali atau memperluas objek-objek
pajak baru melalui perubahan perundang-
undangan. Sedangkan usaha intensifikasi dapat
ditempuh melalui perbaikan kualitas pengum-
pulan di lapangan tanpa harus merubah
undang-undang yang berlaku. Dari sudut
pandang seperti ini, usaha melalui intensifikasi
tampaknya lebih murah dan efisien daripada
usaha ekstensifikasi. Disamping itu, dari fakta
sebenarnya bukan terletak pada peraturan yang
ada, tetapi lebih didominasi oleh berbagai
persoalan teknis pada tingkat pengumpulannya
di lapangan. Oleh karena itu, usaha
intensifikasi menjadi solusi yang tepat untuk
memperbaiki peranan pajak sebagai sumber
penerimaan negara.
Pertanyaan yang bisa diajukan adalah:
mulai dari mana intensifikasi itu dilaksanakan
?. Mengingat setiap transaksi pajak melibatkan
dua pihak, yaitu pihak otoritas pajak dan wajib
pajak, maka perbaikan itu seharusnya
berangkat dari kepentingan kedua belah pihak.
Meskipun begitu, kepentingan wajib pajak,
terutama kepentingan memperoleh pelayanan
yang baik, perlu mendapat perhatian lebih
besar. Ini sangat penting karena wajib pajak
sudah bersedia membayar pajak kepada
negara, meskipun yang bersangkutan tidak
mendapatkan balas jasa langsung dari negara.
Sebagai gantinya, otoritas pajak perlu
memberikan pelayanan yang baik bagi wajib
pajak yang telah rela berkorban. Tanpa
pelayanan yang prima, kemauan wajib pajak
untuk memenuhi kewajibannya akan sulit
direalisasikan, sehingga mendorong muncul-
nya kasus-kasus penggelapan dan penghin-
daran pajak yang semakin luas lagi.
Berangkat dari alasan seperti di atas,
artikel ini dibuat untuk mengungkap persepsi
400 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

wajib pajak terhadap pelayanan yang diberikan PELAYANAN DAN UNSUR-UNSURNYA

oleh Kantor Pelayanan Pajak Bumi dan Sebelum mebahas lebih lanjut mengenai
Bangunan Malang sebagai representasi dari hasil analisis, terlebih dahulu akan dibahas
Otoritas Perpajakan. Dari hasil pembahasan secara ringkas persoalan pelayanan beserta
mengenai persepsi tersebut, selanjutnya dapat dimensi-dimensi yang membentuk pelayanan
direkomendasikan hal-hal yang perlu itu sendiri, yang selanjutnya akan dijadikan
dipertahankan, maupun hal-hal yang harus sebagai landasan berpikir dari tulisan ini.
diperbaiki guna meningkatkan jasa pelayanan
di kemudian hari. Perbaikan kualitas pelayanan, secara
sederhana, berpusat pada pemenuhan atas
Artikel ini lebih menekankan pada Pajak
keinginan klien serta ketepatan penyampaian
Bumi dan Bangunan (PBB) dan Bea Perolehan
untuk memenuhi harapan klien. Kunci kualitas
Hak atas Tanah dan Bangunan (BPHTB). Hal
pelayanan adalah menyesuaikan, atau bahkan
ini didasarkan pada dua pertimbangan.
melebihi, kualitas yang diberikan oleh institusi
Pertama, seperti yang tercantum pada Tabel 1,
atas pelayanan yang diharapan oleh para klien.
sumbangan PBB dan BPHTB terhadap total
Harapan bisa dipandang sebagai sesuatu yang
penerimaan pajak masih sangat kecil, atau
bersifat normatif (Parasuraman, Zeithaml, dan
bahkan terkecil, jika dibandingkan dengan
Berry, 1994) dan, bila dipandang dari
pajak-pajak yang lain. Kedua, objek pajak dari
kepentingan klien, dapat dibedakan dalam tiga
PBB dan BPHTB sangat luas karena wajib
tipe (Tjiptono, Chandra dan Diana, 2004).
pajaknya meliputi seluruh pemilik
Pertama, harapan diartikan sebagai tingkat
tanah/bangunan yang ada di wilayah nusantara.
kinerja yang diperkirakan klien akan
Jumlah wajib pajak dari PBB jelas jauh lebih
diterimanya berdasarkan semua informasi yang
banyak dari pada Pajak Penghasilan (PPH)
dimilikinya (will expectation), dan ini
atau Pajak Pertambahan Nilai (PPN), tetapi
merupakan konsep harapan yang banyak
sayang sumbangannya masih kecil. Dua alasan
dipakai. Kedua, harapan merupakan tingkat
tersebut tampaknya saling bertentangan,
kinerja yang sudah sepantasnya diterima oleh
sehingga perlu dilakukan studi tersendiri untuk
klien (should expectation). Ketiga, harapan
meningkatkan peranan PBB dan BPHTB baik
merupakan tingkat kinerja terbaik yang
sebagai sumber penerimaan pemerintah pusat
diharapkan dapat diterima oleh konsumen
maupun pemerintah daerah1.27
(ideal expectation). Kesenjangan antara kenya-
taan dan harapan, selanjutnya akan menen-
tukan tingkat kepuasan klien terhadap institusi
1
Disamping dua alasan yang telah disebutkan, sebenarnya yang memberikan pelayanan itu sendiri.
masih ada alasan yang tidak kalah pentingnya. PBB
adalah pajak pusat yang pemungutanya diserahkan Menurut Model Kesenjangan Pelayanan
kepada pemerintah daerah, dan dari sini pemerintah (Parasuraman, Berry, dan Zeithaml, 1991),
daerah mendapat bagian langsung. Bagian PBB yang kesenjangan antara harapan dan kenyataan
diterima daerah merupakan salah satu sumber
penerimaan yang penting bagi daerah dalam era otonomi muncul karena lima hal, yaitu : (1) manajemen
seperti sekarang ini. Karena daerah memiliki institusi salah mengerti terhadap harapan klien,
kewenangan untuk memungutnya, maka daerah memiliki (2) manajemen memahami harapan klien tetapi
peluang yang cukup besar untuk bisa mengintensifkan
pelaksanaan PBB di wilayahnya melalui perbaikan salah dalam merumuskan harapan klien ke
kualitas pelayanan. Dari sudut pandang seperti ini, dalam bentuk tolak ukur kualitas pelayanan,
artikel ini diharapkan mampu memberikan kontribusi (3) manajemen tidak mampu untuk memenuhi
mengenai konsep pelayanan yang baik bagi pemerintah
daerah. Lebih dari itu, PBB merupakan pajak lama yang
standar kualitas pelayanan, (4) manajemen
sudah ada sejak jaman penjajahan sehingga keberada-
anya sudah dikenal luas oleh masyarakat (Permana, 2005
dan Suharno, 2003). Oleh karena itu, keberhasilan PBB yang sangat positif bagi masyarakat terhadap pajak
secara umum.
dalam memberikan pelayanan akan memberikan kesan
2005
tidak mampu memenuhi janji-janji yang
dikomunikasikan ke pihak eksternal, dan (5)
kesenjangan yang timbul akibat dari tidak
terpenuhinya harapan klien.
Kalau diamati, sebab-sebab munculnya
kesenjangan tersebut tersusun secara hirarkis.
Maksudnya, bila manajemen salah mengerti
terhadap harapan klien (sebab 1), maka sebab-
sebab yang berikutnya akan muncul secara
otomatis. Untuk itu, pemahaman manajemen
terhadap harapan klien menjadi sangat penting
karena hal ini merupakan titik awal dari puas
tidaknya klien terhadap institusi.
Selanjutnya, untuk bisa menentukan
apakah klien itu puas atau tidak, maka
kepuasan itu harus bisa diukur. Oleh karena
itu, mengetahui dimensi pelayanan menjadi
sangat penting. Menurut pakar di bidang
pelayanan, dimensi atau unsur-unsur pelayanan
sangat beragam sesuai dengan jenis industrinya
(Carauna, Ewing dan Ramashesan, 2000 ; Lee,
Lee dan Yoo, 2000). Maksudnya, setiap jenis
industri memiliki dimensi pelayanan yang khas
sehingga tidak bisa disamaratakan untuk
semua industri. Meskipun begitu, menurut
Parasuraman, Zeithaml dan Barry (1988), ada
lima dimensi pokok yang harus diperhatikan
oleh institusi bisnis dalam bidang jasa dan ritel
yaitu :
1. Bukti langsung (tangibles); meliputi
fasilitas fisik, perlengkapan, pegawai, dan
sarana komunikasi
2. Keandalan (reliability); yakni kemampuan
memberikan pelayanan yang dijanjikan
dengan akurat, dan memuaskan
3. Kepekaan (responsiveness); yaitu keingin-
an para staf untuk membantu para klien dan
memberikan pelayanan secara cepat sesuai
yang dikehendaki klien
4. Jaminan (assurance); mencakup penge-
tahuan, kemampuan, kesopanan, dan sifat
dapat dipercaya yang dimiliki para staf,
bebas dari bahaya, risiko, atau keragu-
raguan
Ismail 401
5. Empati (empathy); meliputi kemudahan
dalam melakukan hubungan, komunikasi
yang baik, perhatian pribadi, dan
memahami kebutuhan para klien
Disamping dimensi seperti tersebut di atas,
masih ada dimensi lain yang perlu diper-
hatikan, yaitu corporate quality (reputation)
(Athanassopoulos, 2000) dan accessibility (Sit
dan Ho, 2002). Sebenarnya Sit dan Ho (2002)
merumuskan delapan dimensi yang harus
diperhatikan untuk pelayanan di pusat
pembelanjaan (shopping-centre), dimana
dimensi tersebut sangat berbeda dengan
dimensi yang dirumuskan Parasuraman,
Zeithaml dan Barry (1988). Namun dalam
tulisan ini hanya diambil accessibility
mengingat dimensi ini sebenarnya sudah
dirumuskan oleh Parasuraman, Zeithaml dan
Barry (1988) tetapi akhirnya dieliminasi
karena dianggap tidak signifikan untuk
menjadi dimensi tersendiri.
Dimasukannya dimensi reputation dan
accessibility dalam tulisan ini, disamping lima
dimensi yang sudah disebut sebelumnya,
karena keduanya sangat relevan dengan
persoalan pelayanan di bidang perpajakan,
dimana institusi pajak sering dipersepsikan
negatif oleh wajib pajak (reputasi kurang
bagus), dan jangkauan pelayanannya kepada
wajib pajak masih lemah (aksesibilitasnya
masih rendah). Yang terakhir ini bisa
dibuktikan dengan masih banyaknya keluhan-
keluhan yang dirasakan oleh wajib pajak.
Semua dimensi tersebut di atas akan dijadikan
landasan utama dalam tulisan ini.
DATA DAN ANALISISNYA
Data
Artikel ini didahului oleh penelitian yang
dimaksudkan untuk memperoleh data primer
dari wajib pajak. Populasi penelitiannya adalah
wajib pajak yang telah mendapatkan pelayanan
dari Kantor Pelayanan (KP) PBB Malang
selama tahun 2001-2003 yang tercatat dalam
buku pengaduan di KP PBB Malang.
402 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Sedangkan teknik pengambilan contohnya langsung, keandalan, kepekaan, jaminan,

adalah purposive yang didasarkan pada
pertimbangan-pertimbangan tertentu di
lapangan. Perlu diketahui bahwa menemui
wajib pajak sangat tidak mudah mengingat
pajak merupakan persoalan yang sensitif.
Besarnya contoh yang terambil adalah 108
wajib pajak yang tersebar Malang Raya (Kota
Batu, Kota Malang dan Kabupaten Malang).
Sedangkan teknik pengumpulan data yang
dipakai adalah wawancara dengan berpedoman
pada daftar pertanyaan.
Variabel dan Pengukurannya
Variabel yang diamati didasarkan pada
tujuh dimensi pelayanan yang sudah
dibicarakan pada bagian terdahulu, yaitu bukti
empati, reputasi dan kemudahan/akses. Setiap
dimensi diperlakukan sebagai variabel yang
mempengaruhi kepuasan, dan pengukuran dari
setiap variabelnya mengacu pada indikator-
indikator yang relevan untuk setiap variabel
yang dimaksud. Selanjutnya, ketujuh variabel
tersebut dijadikan sebagai landasan untuk
menentukan tingkat kepuasan pelayanan yang
dirasakan oleh wajib pajak. Mengikuti Bebko
(2000), kepuasan terhadap kualitas pelayanan
diukur berdasarkan selisih antara pelayanan
yang dirasakan dan pelayanan yang diharapkan
oleh wajib pajak. Variabel yang dipertim-
bangkan dalam tulisan ini dan indikator-
indikatornya dapat dilihat pada Tabel 2.

Tabel 2: Variabel dan Indikator Penelitian

VARIABEL INDIKATOR
• Bukti langsung Fasilitas fisik
Prosedur administratif
Perlengkapan
Kecukupan jumlah pegawai
Sarana sosialisasi/komunikasi
• Keandalan Kemampuan memberikan pelayanan yang dijanjikan dengan segera,
akurat, dan memuaskan
• Kepekaan Keinginan para staf untuk membantu /memberikan pelayanan dengan
tanggap
• Jaminan Pengetahuan staf
Kemampuan staf
Kesopanan staf
Sifat yang dapat dipercaya yang dimiliki para staf
• Empati Kemudahan dalam melakukan hubungan/ komunikasi yang baik
Memahami kebutuhan para klien
• Reputasi Citra institusi pajak (KP PBB dn BPHTB)
Citra pegawai/staff pajak
• Kemudahan Lokasi Kantor Pelayanan Pajak yang strategis dan mudah dijangkau
Sarana angkutan umum menuju kantor pelayanan
• Tingkat kepuasan Tingkat kepuasan atas pelayanan yang telah diberikan
2005 Ismail 403

Pengukuran variabel didasarkan pada tegak (Y) menunjukan skor tingkat harapan.
persepsi wajib pajak terhadap semua indikator Untuk setiap variabel yang mempengaruhi
dengan menggunakan skala Likert dengan lima kepuasan klien, dihitung dengan formula
kategori jawaban. Jawaban berkisar mulai dari berikut:
sangat setuju sampai sangat tidak setuju, atau ΣX i
sebaliknya dari sangat tidak setuju sampai X = (1)
n
sangat setuju. Untuk pernyataan positif 228skor
jawabannya adalah: 5 (sangat setuju), 4 ΣYi
dan Y= (2)
(setuju), 3 (ragu-ragu), 2 (tidak setuju), dan 1 n
(sangat tidak setuju). Sedangkan untuk
pernyataan negatif skor jawabannya adalah: 5 Dimana :
(sangat tidak setuju), 4 (tidak setuju), 3 (ragu- X = Skor rata-rata tingkat kualitas
ragu), 2 (setuju), dan 1 (sangat setuju). pelayanan yang dirasakan wajib
pajak
Model Analisis Y = Skor rata-rata tingkat harapan wajib
Model analisis yang digunakan adalah pajak
Importance Performance Analysis yang n = Jumlah responden
dikembangkan oleh Martilla dan James (1977). Untuk bisa memetakan posisi setiap
Model ini dinilai tepat karena mengasumsikan variabel ke dalam diagram kartesius, pada
bahwa kepuasan konsumen tergantung dari dua daerah yang dibatasi oleh sumbu X positif dan
hal, yaitu harapan dan penilaian konsumen sumbu Y positif, selanjutnya dibuat dua buah
terhadap atribut-atribut yang dipertimbangkan garis yang saling berpotongan tegak lurus pada
dalam penelitian. Asumsi ini sangat berse-
suaian dengan permasalahan yang diajukan titik ( X , Y ), dimana X merupakan rata-rata
dalam penelitian ini. dari rata-rata skor seluruh indikator tingkat

Importance Performance Analysis memu- kualitas pelayanan dan Y adalah rata-rata dari
lainya dengan dua variabel X dan Y yang rata-rata skor tingkat harapan seluruh indikator
digambarkan dalam sebuah diagram kartesius yang mempengaruhi kepuasan klien. Rumus
yang menunjukkan posisi kesesuaian antara yang dipakai untuk menghitung kedudukan
tingkat harapan dari klien dan kenyataan yang dari garis yang saling berpotongan tersebut
N
mereka terima. Diagaram kartesius merupakan
diagram dua dimensi yang menggabungkan ∑ Xi
i =1
sumbu datar dan sumbu tegak dalam satu adalah : X = (3)
k
diagram. Sumbu datar (X) dalam diagram
N
merepresentasikan skor tingkat kualitas
pelayanan yang dirasakan, sedangkan sumbu ∑ Yi
i −1
dan Y= (4)
k
2
Pernyataan positif adalah suatu pernyataan yang kalau
dilaksanakan akan memberikan dampak bagus bagi Dimana k menunjukan banyaknya indikator
kepentingan institusi/manajemen. Sedangkan pernyataan yang dapat mempengaruhi kepuasan klien.
negatif adalah pernyataan yang memiliki dampak jelek Dengan cara seperti ini, akhirnya daerah yang
bagi kepentingan institusi/manajemen. Contoh pernya-
taan positif adalah Petugas pajak selalu memberikan
dibatasi oleh sumbu X positif dan sumbu Y
pelayanan secara akurat, dan contoh pernyataan negatif positif dalam diagram kartesius, sudah terbagi
adalah Surat Penagihan Pajak Terhutang (SPPT) selalu dalam empat kuadran.
datang terlambat. Untuk pernyataan positif, skor
jawaban tertinggi (= 5) adalah sangat setuju dan skor Selanjutnya, hasil perhitungan skor dari
terendah (= 1) adalah jawaban sangat tidak setuju. Hal kinerja dan harapan dari setiap dimensi
sebaliknya berlaku untuk pernyataan negatif.
404 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

pelayanan, dipetakan ke dalam diagram menunjukkan variabel yang kurang penting

kartesius yang sudah terbagi dalam empat
kuadran seperti yang ada pada Gambar 1.
Masing-masing kuadran memiliki arti
tersendiri. Kuadaran A menunjukkan variabel
yang mempengaruhi kepuasan wajib pajak,
termasuk variabel-variabel yang dianggap
sangat penting, namun Kantor Pelayanan Pajak
belum melaksanakannya sesuai keinginan
wajib pajak, sehingga dinilai mengecewakan.
Kuadran B menunjukkan variabel pelayanan
yang telah berhasil dilaksanakan Kantor
Pelayanan Pajak, untuk itu wajib dipertahan-
kan di kemudian hari. Dari kacamata wajib
pajak, variabel tersebut dianggap sangat
penting dan sudah sangat memuaskan.
Kuadaran C menunjukkan variabel yang
kurang penting pengaruhnya bagi wajib pajak,
dan pelaksanaanya oleh Kantor Pelayanan
Pajak biasa-biasa saja. Bagi wajib pajak,
unsur-unsur tersebut dianggap kurang penting
dan kurang memuaskan. Kuadran D
dalam mempengaruhi kepuasan wajib pajak,
akan tetapi pelaksanaannya berlebihan, atau
dianggap kurang penting bagi wajib pajak
tetapi kualitas pelayanannya sangat bagus.
PEMBAHASAN HASIL
Perlu ditegaskan bahwa sebelum data
diolah dengan alat analisis yang sudah
disebutkan, terlebih dahulu dilakukan uji
validitas dan reliabilitas atas data-data yang
dimaksud. Dari beberapa tahapan pengujian
yang dilakukan, diperoleh hasil bahwa
variabel-variabel yang masuk dalam item
kinerja (pelayanan yang dirasakan oleh wajib
pajak) maupun variabel-variabel yang masuk
dalam item harapan (pelayanan yang
diharapkan oleh wajib pajak), semuanya valid
dan reliable. Dengan demikian, hasil
pengolahan terhadap data-data yang digunakan
dalam tulisan ini dapat dipertanggung
jawabkan.

Y (Harapan)

Prioritas Pertahankan
Utama Prestasi
A B

C D
Prioritas Berlebihan
Rendah

X (Realitas Pelayanan)

Gambar 1 : Diagram Kartesius

2005 Ismail 405

Harapan dan persepsi wajib pajak terhadap
pelayanan yang diberikan oleh KP PBB dan
BPHTB Malang dapat dilihat pada Gambar 2.
Pada diagram tersebut, ditunjukkan variabel
pelayanan mana yang harus menjadi prioritas
untuk diperbaiki, karena responden meng-
anggap tingkat kepentingannya tinggi
sedangkan kinerjanya masih rendah; dan
variabel pelayanan mana yang harus diperta-
hankan, karena responden menilai kinerjanya
sudah baik dan mendekati tingkat kepentingan
yang diharapkan oleh wajib pajak.
Perlu ditegaskan bahwa, dari hasil
perhitungan yang dilakukan, tidak ada variabel
pelayanan yang dianggap berlebihan oleh
wajib pajak (tidak ada variabel pelayanan yang
muncul pada kuadaran D). Ini bermakna
bahwa, di Kantor Pelayanan PBB & BPHTB
Malang, tidak ditemukan variabel pelayanan
yang, di satu sisi, dianggap kurang penting
oleh wajib pajak dan, di sisi lain, disediakan
dengan cara yang sangat bagus oleh otoritas
pajak. Kantor Pelayanan PBB di Malang tidak
memberikan perhatian yang terlalu besar
terhadap dimensi pelayanan yang memang
tidak dipandang penting oleh wajib pajak.
Dengan kata lain, penyediaan pelayanan secara
mubazir tidak dijumpai di daerah penelitian.
Variabel Pelayanan yang Perlu
Dipertahankan
Kuadran A pada Gambar 2, menunjukan
variabel pelayanan yang perlu dipertahankan.
Yang termasuk dalam kelompok ini adalah
bukti langsung (tangibles, X1), jaminan
(assurance, X4) dan kemudahan memperoleh
pelayanan (accesibility, X7). Jadi menurut
wajib pajak, bukti langsung, jaminan dan
jangkauan pelayanan, merupakan variabel-
variabel pelayanan yang dinilai sudah sesuai
dengan harapan wajib pajak. Oleh karena itu,
ketiga variabel pelayanan tersebut perlu
dipertahankan di masa depan oleh KP PBB dan
BPHTB Malang.

4.1
x3 Pertahankan Prestasi x1 Bukti langsung
4.05
H Prioritas Utama x4 x7 x2 Keandalan
a 4 x1 x3 Kepekaan
r 3.95 x2
x4 Jaminan
a
x5 Empati
p 3.9 x6
a 3.85 Prioritas rendah Berlebihan x6 Reputasi
n x7 Kemudahan
3.8 x5

3.75
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7
Kinerja

Gambar 2 : Kinerja dan Harapan Pelayanan Menurut Wajib Pajak

406 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Meskipun ketiga variabel pelayanan
tersebut sudah dianggap sesuai dengan harapan
wajib pajak, tetapi demi kesempurnaan
pelayanan di masa depan, pihak otoritas pajak
perlu meneliti kembali indikator-indikator
yang ada pada setiap variabel pelayanan
tersebut. Hal ini demikian karena kriteria yang
muncul dari setiap variabel pelayanan tersebut,
merupakan gabungan dari beberapa indikator
yang belum tentu semua indikator memiliki
nilai yang sama. Bila ada salah satu indikator
yang memiliki tingkat kesesuaian rendah 329
(antara pelayanan yang diterima dan pelayanan
yang diharapkan), maka otoritas pajak perlu
memperbaiki indikator tersebut. Tingkat
kesesuaian antara harapan dan kenyataan dari
semua indikator untuk ketiga variabel
pelayanan tersebut disajikan dalam Tabel 3.
Terlihat bahwa indikator yang masuk ke
dalam variabel kemudahan memiliki tingkat
kesesuaian yang sangan tinggi (91%). Ini
bermakna bahwa lokasi untuk memperoleh
pelayanan dan sarana angkutan untuk menuju
lokasi pelayanan, sudah dinilai sangat bagus
oleh wajib pajak. Hasil seperti ini tidak
mengherankan mengingat pelayanan pajak,
terutama untuk membayar pajak, tidak hanya
dipusatkan di KP PBB dan BPHTB saja,
melainkan juga diselenggarakan sampai di
Kantor Desa, Kecamatan dan counter-counter
bank secara meluas, sehingga wajib pajak tidak
kesulitan untuk melaksanakan kewajibannya.
Meskipun tidak sebaik indikator yang
termasuk dalam variabel jangkaun pelayanan,
indikator yang diperhitungkan dalam variabel
jaminan menunjukkan tingkat kesesuaian di
atas 80%. Secara umum, harapan wajib pajak
terhadap jaminan pelayanan yang diberikan
sudah terpenuhi 85%. Namun bila variabel
jaminan ini akan ditingkatkan mutunya di
kemudian hari, maka indikator kemampuan
dan pengetahuan petugas dalam memberikan
pelayanan kepada wajib pajak perlu diperbaiki.
Terutama sekali kemampuan dan pengetahuan
petugas terhadap persoalan PBB dan BPHTB.
3
Tingkat kesesuaian dihitung berdasarkan rasio antara
skor kinerja (menurut persepsi konsumen) dan skor
harapan.
Oktober
Dengan kemampuan dan pengetahuan yang
sangat bagus, petugas pajak bisa memberikan
penjelasan yang baik dan benar kepada wajib
pajak.
Begitu juga dengan variabel bukti
langsung. Secara umum tingkat pelayanan
yang diberikan sudah mencapai 85% dari yang
diharapkan oleh wajib pajak. Capaian untuk
variabel ini hampir sama dengan variabel
jaminan. Meskipun begitu, ada indikator yang
tingkat kesesuaianya sangat rendah, yaitu
indikator sarana sosialisasi dan komunikasi
(74%). Dari data di lapangan diperoleh
informasi bahwa pemahaman wajib pajak
terhadap persoalan pajak masih sangat rendah,
baik yang menyangkut prosedur adminis-
trasinya, prosedur pembayarannya, besaran
tarifnya, maupun prosedur pengaduan bila ada
keberatan. Oleh karena itu masih diperlukan
sosialisasi dan komunikasi yang lebih baik lagi
dari aparat pajak kepada wajib pajak.
Persoalan sosialisasi yang kurang optimal
ini, disamping karena sarananya yang terbatas,
juga terkait dengan rendahnya kualitas maupun
kuantitas sumber daya manusia petugas pajak.
Kualitas sumber daya manusia yang rendah
berhubungan dengan rendahnya pendidikan
dan keahlian sosial (keahlian berkomunikasi
dan problem solving) yang dimiliki oleh
petugas pajak. Padahal, persoalan pajak
merupakan persoalan yang kompleks. Kualitas
sumber daya manusia yang rendah memiliki
dampak terhadap tingginya kesalahan manusia
(human error) yang pada akhirnya akan
menghambat proses pelayanan dan mening-
katnya jumlah pengaduan dari masyarakat.
Persoalan ini diperparah oleh staf yang ada di
KP PBB sangat terbatas jumlahnya, sehingga
mereka lebih terserap untuk menyelesaikan
persoalan internal kantor dan hampir tidak ada
waktu untuk berhubungan dengan masyarakat.
Oleh karena itu, hendaknya sosialisasi ini
dilakukan secara bersama-sama baik oleh KP
PBB maupun oleh Pemerintah Daerah sebagai
lembaga kolektornya.
2005 Ismail 407

Tabel 3: Tingkat Kesesuaian Indikator dari Variabel Bukti Langsung, Jaminan dan Kemudahan

No. Variabel/Dimensi Indikator Tingkat Kesesuaian (%)

Fasilitas fisisk 91,0
Prosedur administratif 86,0
1. Bukti langsung (X1) Perlenmgkapan administratif 89,0
Jumlah pegawai 88,0
Sarana sosialisasi 74,0
Pengetahuan petugas 84,9
Kemampuan petugas 82,5
2. Jaminan (X4)
Kesopanan petugas 89,0
Sifat yang dapat dipercaya 85,0
Lokasi kantor pelayanan 91,0
3. Kemudahan (X7)
Sarana umum menuju kantor 91,0

Variabel Pelayanan Yang Perlu Diperbaiki Terhutang), lamanya penyelesaian keluhan

Kuadaran B pada Gambar 2 menunjukkan
variabel pelayanan yang perlu mendapat
perhatian utama, karena wajib pajak menilai
ada kesenjangan yang cukup serius antara
harapan dan kenyataan pelayanan yang
diberikan. Variabel yang dimaksud adalah
keandalan pelayanan (reliability) dan kepekaan
para petugas pajak terhadap kebutuhan wajib
pajak (responsiveness).
Kepekaan yang menggambarkan sensiti-
vitas para petugas pajak untuk memberikan
pelayan yang baik kepada wajib pajak,
merupakan hal yang harus menjadi perhatian
khusus dari pihak KP PBB Malang untuk
ditingkatkan kinerjanya. Persoalan yang sering
muncul sehubungan dengan hal ini adalah
keluhan mengenai lambatnya pengurusan
mutasi SPPT (Surat Penagihan Pajak
yang diajukan dan adanya beberapa petugas
yang minta tambahan fee atas layanan yang
diberikan. Keluhan-keluhan tersebut dijumpai
secara merata di seluruh daerah penelitian.
Dari 77 responden yang menyatakan bahwa
kepekaan petugas itu penting dan sangat
penting, hanya 25 responden (32%) yang
merasa bahwa kepekaan petugas masuk
kategori baik dan sangat baik. Ini
menggambarkan kepekaan petugas pajak yang
masih lemah.
Hal yang sama berlaku untuk variabel
keandalan. Masalah keandalan mutu pelayanan
ini masih perlu menjadi perhatian yang serius
bagi KP PBB. Dari 108 responden yang
diambil dalam penelitian ini, ada 74 responden
(atau 69%) yang menyatakan unsur keandalan
ini penting dan sangat penting.

Tabel 4: Tingkat Kesesuaian Indikator dari Variabel Keandalan dan Kepekaan

Tingkat Kesesuaian
No. Variabel/Dimensi Indikator
(%)
1. Keandalan (X2) Kemampuan memberikan pelayanan 81,6
secara tepat, akurat dan memuaskan
2. Kepekaan (X3) Kepekaan staf untuk memberikan/ 83,0
membantu pelayanan kepada klien
408 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Oktober

Tetapi dari 74 responden tersebut, yang
menyatakan bahwa pelayanan yang diberikan
sudah baik dan sangat baik, hanya mencapai
27 responden (atau 36%). Jelas ini menun-
jukkan fenomena yang kurang menggem-
birakan. Keluhan wajib pajak yang sering
muncul adalah ketidak tepatan dalam
pengukuran objek pajak, kesalahan dalam
menetapkan nilai jual objek pajak (NJOP), dan
kelambatan dalam menerima SPPT. Keluhan-
keluhan tersebut, bila ingin diperbaiki, perlu
dijawab dengan perbaikan yang serius dari
otoritas perpajakan.
Variabel Pelayanan Yang Kurang
Diprioritaskan
Kuadran C menunjukan variabel yang
mempengaruhi kepuasan tetapi masih dianggap
kurang penting bagi wajib pajak dan memang
kualitas pelaksanaannya termasuk kategori
biasa atau cukup saja. Karena pelaksanaan
variabel pelayanan ini di KP PBB Malang
sekedar cukup dan klien menganggap variabel
tersebut sebagai sesuatu yang tidak penting,
maka keberadaannya tidak perlu diprioritas-
kan. Meskipun begitu, bukan berarti unsur-
unsur pelayanan tersebut diabaikan sama sekali
atau ditiadakan. Variabel yang dimaksud tetap
perlu diperbaiki meskipun dalam skala
prioritas rendah.
Variabel yang tidak dianggap begitu
penting oleh wajib pajak adalah empati dan
citra institusi pajak itu sendiri. Tidak seperti
yang diduga sebelumnya, ternyata wajib pajak
tidak begitu mempertimbangkan hal-hal yang
berhubungan dengan sifat petugas (komunikasi
yang baik dan memahami kebutuhan klien) dan
citra institusi maupun pegawai dalam menilai
pelayanan yang diberikan oleh Kantor
Pelayanan PBB dan BPHTB Malang.
Barangkali, penjelasan dari temuan ini bisa
dikaitkan dengan kedudukan pajak sendiri
sebagai sesuatu yang harus ditunaikan oleh
wajib pajak. Oleh karena itu, wajib pajak tetap
harus membayar pajak tanpa memandang baik
buruknya citra institusi maupun empati
tidaknya petugas pajak. Dalam membayar
pajak, wajib pajak tidak memperhatikan empati
tidaknya aparat pajak, tetapi lebih
mementingkan kepekaan dan kemampuan
aparat pajak seperti telah disebutkan di bagian
terdahulu. Meskipun begitu, citra petugas
pajak tetap perlu diperbaiki mengingat ada
beberapa oknum yang memberikan kesan
negatif pada petugas pajak secara umum.
Persepsi Wajib Pajak dan Implikasinya
Bagi Otoritas Pajak
Sebelum mengakhiri tulisan ini, penulis
ingin menyajikan karakter responden di daerah
penelitian untuk memberikan gambaran yang
sesungguhnya mengenai bagaimana pandangan
wajib pajak terhadap pajak sebagai kewajiban
yang dibebankan oleh negara. Selama ini,
diyakini secara umum bahwa masyarakat,
terutama wajib pajak, adalah pihak yang hanya
memandang pajak sebagai sesuatu yang negatif
karena hanya memberikan beban kepada
masyarakat. Keyakinan semacam ini kemudian
menimbulkan asumsi yang luas di masyarakat,
dimana wajib pajak dianggap sebagai pihak
yang selalu berusaha untuk mengindari pajak.

Tabel 5: Tingkat Kesesuaian Indikator dari Variabel Empati dan Reputasi

No. Variabel/Dimensi Indikator Tingkat Kesesuaian (%)

Kemudahan dalam menjalin 88,7
1. Empati (X5) komunikasi yang baik
Memahami kebutuhan klien 87,7
Citra institusi pajak 88,0
2. Reputasi (X6)
Citra staf pajak 85,9
2005
Dengan kata lain, wajib pajak yang meng-
hindari atau enggan membayar pajak, dianggap
sebagai sesuatu yang wajar. Paradigma inilah
yang tampaknya dijadikan landasan bagi
perumusan kebijakan bidang perpajakan di
Indonesia.
Namun, sesuai dengan Tabel 6, anggapan
semacam ini tidak selamanya benar. Memang
ada sebagian wajib pajak yang cenderung
berperilaku seperti itu. Misalnya, enggan
membayar pajak, berusaha menghindari pajak
dan, kalaupun membayar, sebisa mungkin
membayar di bawah tarif resmi. Tetapi wajib
pajak yang memiliki perilaku semacam ini,
jumlahnya sangat kecil. Sebagian besar wajib
pajak, pada dasarnya, adalah orang-orang yang
taat pada peraturan. Mereka merasa bangga
kalau bisa membayar pajak, karena merasa
bisa melaksanakan kewajiban yang dibebankan
oleh negara. Sebagian besar dari mereka tidak
berkehendak untuk menghindari pajak, dan
beranggapan bahwa membayar pajak tepat
waktu adalah perbuatan yang mulia. Perlu
digaris bawahi bahwa, meskipun perbedaan
antara proporsi responden yang ingin
membayar sesuai dengan tarif resmi dan di
bawah tarif resmi sangat kecil, tetapi secara
statistik perbedaan itu tidak signifikan,
sehingga hal ini bisa diabaikan. Dengan
demikian dapat disimpulkan bahwa wajib
pajak adalah pihak-pihak yang sebenarnya
Tabel 6: Persepsi Responden Terhadap PBB dan BPHTB
Pernyataan yang diajukan kepada responden
Saya menyukai membayar pajak
Jika mungkin, saya akan menghindar untuk
membayar pajak
Membayar pajak tepat waktu adalah
perbuatan yang baik
Jika mungkin, saya akan membayar pajak
dibawah yang seharusnya
*) Jumlah responden 108
**) Untuk α = 5%
Ismail 409
memiliki itikad baik, dan bukan sebaliknya
seperti yang diyakini selama ini.
Bila wajib pajak adalah pihak-pihak yang
cenderung beritikad baik, maka munculnya
kelambanan dalam pengumpulkan pajak di
Indonesia, merupakan indikasi dari kelemahan
aparat pajak dalam melaksanakan tanggung
jawabnya. Jelasnya, bukan wajib pajak yang
salah, tetapi justru aparat dan otoritas pajak itu
sendiri yang salah, sehingga aparatlah yang
harus terlebih dahulu membenahi diri, dan
bukan sebaliknya, yaitu bukan wajib pajak
yang diminta untuk taat terlebih dahulu kepada
otoritas pajak.
Fakta semacam ini semakin memperkuat
pernyataan terdahulu, dimana dikatakan bahwa
persoalan pajak bukan terletak pada persoalan
perundang-undanganya, tetapi lebih terpusat
pada persoalan teknis pengumpulanya di
lapangan. Oleh karena itu, orientasi kebijakan
yang diarahkan untuk memperbaiki kualitas
internal, mendesak untuk dilakukan. Sebelum
melangkah pada kebijakan yang lebih
mendasar, misalnya pada perubahan
perundang-undangan, perbaikan secara internal
terutama yang menyangkut itikad dan cara
kerja dari aparat pajak, mutlak diperlukan.
Tanpa perubahan ini, perubahan mendasar
dalam perundang-undangan, tidak akan ada
gunanya.
Proporsi responden yang *) Hasil uji beda dua
Setuju Tidak setuju proporsi **)
93 7 Signifikan
17 83 Signifikan
96 4 Signifikan
58 42 Tidak signifikan
410 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia
Perubahan itu harus dimulai dengan
perubahan persepsi aparat pajak terhadap wajib
pajak. Aparat pajak harus menempatkan wajib
pajak sebagai raja, atau setidak-tidaknya,
sebagai pihak yang harus dihormati karena
kelangsungan aparat pajak sangat tergantung
dari kesediaan wajib pajak untuk membayar
pajak, dan justru bukan diasumsikan sebagai
pihak yang tidak memiliki itikad baik sehingga
harus dikejar-kejar dan diperlakukan sebagai
sebagai orang yang tidak baik.
Itu semua berimplikasi bahwa, membe-
rikan mutu pelayanan yang prima kepada wajib
pajak menjadi sangat relevan untuk
meningkatkan peranan pajak sebagai sumber
utama penerimaan negara. Pelayanan yang
baik pada dasarnya merupakan hak dari wajib
pajak yang harus dipenuhi karena mereka telah
menunaikan kewajibanya dalam membayar
pajak. Oleh karena itu, otoritas pajak harus
merubah mind set yang selama ini dianutnya,
yaitu bukan wajib pajak yang membutuhkan
petugas pajak tetapi petugas pajak yang
membutuhkan wajib pajak. Paradigma ini
sesuai dengan prinsip bisnis dimana, bukan
konsumen yang membutuhkan produsen, tetapi
justru produsen yang membutuhkan konsumen.
KESIMPULAN
Dari fakta-fakta yang dikumpulkan di
daerah penelitian, ditemukan bahwa para wajib
pajak umumnya adalah orang-orang yang
cenderung taat pada peraturan. Mereka sadar
bahwa pajak adalah kewajiban yang harus
dipenuhi, membayar kewajiban tepat pada
waktunya merupakan hal yang baik, dan
mereka umumnya tidak berkehendak untuk
mengindari atau mengurangi kewajiban yang
dibebankan pada dirinya. Untuk mengimbangi
perilaku seperti ini, aparat dan otoritas pajak
perlu memberikan pelayan yang baik sebagai
cerminan rasa terima kasih kepada wajib pajak
yang telah rela berkorban.
Dalam memberikan pelayanan yang lebih
baik kepada wajib pajak, ada hal-hal yang
perlu dipertahankan dan ada hal-hal yang perlu
Oktober
diprioritaskan untuk diperbaiki oleh KP PBB
dan BPHTB di Malang Raya. Yang tetap
dipertahankan adalah dimensi pelayanan yang
terdiri dari bukti fisik secara langsung, jaminan
dan jangkauan. Sebaliknya, unsur-unsur
pelayanan yang mendesak untuk diperbaiki
adalah keandalan dan kepekaan. Untuk
meningkatkan keandalan pelayanan, aparat
pajak harus memberikan pelayanan yang tepat
dan akurat sehingga mengurangi komplain dari
wajib pajak. Memperbaiki pelayanan melalui
unsur kepekaan berarti aparat pajak harus lebih
tanggap terhadap keluhan-keluhan yang
diajukan oleh wajib pajak. Untuk mengurangi
keluhan-keluhan semacam ini, usaha
sosialisasi kepada masyarakat luas perlu
dilakukan secara intensif dengan melibatkan
pihak yang terkait. Yang perlu digaris bawahi
pula adalah otoritas PBB dan BPHTB di
Malang dalam memberikan pelayan tidak
melakukan hal-hal yang dianggap berlebihan
oleh wajib pajak.
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