Jurnal Internasional Manajemen Sektor Publik Bagaimana sistem pengukuran kinerja memberdayakan

manajer? Sebuah studi eksplorasi di perusahaan milik negara Martyna Swiatczak Michèle Morner Nadine Finkbeiner
Informasi artikel: Untuk mengutip dokumen ini: Martyna Swiatczak Michèle Morner Nadine Finkbeiner, (2015), "Bagaimana

sistem pengukuran kinerja memberdayakan manajer? Sebuah studi eksplorasi di perusahaan milik negara ", Jurnal

Internasional Manajemen Sektor Publik, Vol. 28 Edisi 4/5 hal. - Tautan permanen ke dokumen ini:

http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-08-2015-0142

Diunduh pada: 08 Oktober 2015, Di: 10:42 (PT) Referensi: dokumen ini mengandung referensi ke 0 dokumen lainnya. Untuk
menyalin dokumen ini: permissions@emeraldinsight.com Teks lengkap dokumen ini telah diunduh 12 kali sejak 2015 *
Pengguna yang mengunduh artikel ini juga mengunduh: Sandra van Thiel, (2015), "Papan organisasi sektor
publik: tipologi dengan Belanda ilustrasi ", Jurnal Internasional Manajemen Sektor Publik, Vol. 28 Edisi 4/5 hal. - Giuseppe

Grossi, Ulf Papenfuss, Marie-Soleil Tremblay, (2015), "Tata kelola perusahaan dan akuntabilitasmilik perusahaannegara:

relevansi bagi ilmu pengetahuan dan masyarakat dan perspektif penelitian interdisipliner", Jurnal Internasional Sektor Publik

Manajemen, Vol. 28 Edisi 4/5 hal. - Susanna Alexius, Jenny Cisneros Örnberg, (2015), "Misi tidak mungkin? Mengkonfigurasi

nilai dalam tata kelola perusahaan milik negara", Jurnal Internasional Manajemen Sektor Publik, Vol. 28 Edisi 4/5 hlm. -

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Pendahuluan

Didefinisikan sebagai perusahaan yang secara langsung atau tidak langsung, sepenuhnya atau sebagian
besar dimiliki oleh negara,

kota, atau tingkat otoritas publik lainnya (Friedmann dan Garner, 1970; Grossi et al., 2015;

OECD, 2005), “state perusahaan yang dimiliki ”(BUMN) saat ini sebagian besar merupakan hibrida
daripublik dan swasta

kepemilikan(Bruton et al., 2015; Koppell, 2007; Thynne, 1994). Oleh karena itu, mereka menghadapi
potensi

konflik agensi karena model kepemilikan dan kontrol berlapis-lapis (Calabrò dan Torchia, 2011;

Kankaanpää et al., 2014). Lebih lanjut, BUMN secara bersamaan dihadapkan dengan sektor publik

tujuan, seperti penciptaan nilai publik, dan tujuan sektor swasta yang khas seperti profitabilitas

dan keunggulan kompetitif (Bruton et al., 2015; Grossi dan Reichard, 2008; Vagliasindi, 2008). Ini

menyiratkan pengaturan akuntabilitas berlapis-lapis terhadap anggota masyarakat, administrasi,

kelompok profesional, dan perwakilan politik (Bovens, 2007; Christensen dan Lægreid, 2015;

Verschuere et al., 2006), volume semata yang menantang tata kelola efektif BUMN. .

Akibatnya, dua gelombang reformasi telah mencoba untuk memberikan mekanisme tata kelola yang
memadai untuk

mengatasi kompleksitas ini (Christensen dan Lægreid, 2007; Christensen, 2012; De Vries dan Nemec,

2013). Pertama, "manajemen publik baru" (NPM) memperkenalkan mode tata kelola yang berfokus pada

pemberiankepada

otonomi tambahanBUMN sambil membuat pelaku publik secara langsung bertanggung jawab atas hasil
kinerja

(Christensen dan Lægreid, 2015; Hood, 1995; Palermo et al., 2010). Tata kelola berbasis hasil
menetapkan

tujuan, mengukur kinerja, dan menggunakan insentif untuk mengarahkan BUMN menuju
pemenuhanefisien

tugas publik yang(Bouckaert dan Halligan, 2008; Van Dooren, 2005; Frost dan Morner, 2011; Pollitt dan

Bouckaert, 2011). Dengan demikian, sebagian besar reformasi NPM bergantung pada pengukuran kinerja
(Van

Dooren, 2005; Pollitt dan Bouckaert, 2011). Sistem pengukuran kinerja (PMS) adalahformal

sistemyang menetapkan keluaran strategis tertentu dan memberikan informasi tentang tingkat kinerja
aktual

(Franco-Santos et al., 2007; Melnyk et al., 2014). Menggunakannya, otoritas publik bertujuan untuk
mengatur BUMN
dengan gaya sektor swasta. Penggunaan informasi kinerja konkret bermacam-macam dan

terjadi pada langkah berikutnya; Namun, makalah ini berfokus khususnya pada perspektif pengukuran.

PMSyang paling luas mungkin Kaplan dan Norton “balanced scorecard” (Kaplan dan Norton,

1992) dengan pembangunan strategis (Kaplan dan Norton, 1996, 2001), tetapiformal dan informal lainnya

modeljuga ada (misalnya Neely etal.,1995 ; Nudurupati et al., 2011; Watts dan McNair-Connolly,

2012). Namun, pengukuran kinerja manajerial di BUMN sangat sulit

(Aharoni, 1981; Bai dan Xu, 2005) karena merupakan pengaturan yang sangat kompleks, dan penelitian
internasional masih

menghadapi kesenjangan penelitian di bidang ini secara umum (Bruton et al., 2015) dan khususnya
berkaitan dengan

perspektif pengukuran (untuk pengecualian, lihat Ramamurti, 1987).

Kedua, reformasi “manajemen publik pasca-baru” (pasca-NPM) berupaya mengatasi

kekurangan reformasi NPM yang tidak berhasil meningkatkantata kelolasignifikan

efektivitassecara(Christensen dan Lægreid, 2007). Mereka meningkatkan daftar tata kelola dengan
berbagai

macam pendekatan baru yang lebih fokus pada pengalihan kekuasaan kembali kepolitik dan administrasi

badan-badandan, pada saat yang sama, memberikan kerangka tata kelola yang terakhir untuk membantu
mereka mengatur

tindakan antar-organisasi secara lebih efektif (Christensen , 2012). Inti dari pendekatan ini adalah

penekanan yang lebih besar pada nilai-nilai umum, peningkatan keterlibatan BUMN, dan
penyediaanumum

kerangka kerjauntuk pemerintahan sendiri dalam rangka meningkatkan kerja sama vis-à-vis tujuan publik
(Ling, 2002;

Nabatchi, 2010; Sørensen dan Triantafillou, 2009).

Pada pandangan pertama, pendekatan tata kelola pasca-NPM tampaknya bertentangan dengan tata
kelola berbasis-NPM, yang berpusat pada hasil

. Beberapa sarjana, bagaimanapun, menyerukan kedua pendekatan untuk diakui sebagai

suplemen daripada pengganti satu sama lain (Christensen dan Lægreid, 2007, 2011a;

Christensen, 2012; Egeberg dan Trondal, 2009). Menurut pandangan ini, NPM tidak perlu

diganti (Pollitt, 2003) tetapi perlahan-lahan diperkaya oleh reformasi pasca-NPM, menghasilkanberbeda
mekanisme tata kelola yangberdampingan satu sama lain (Askim et al., 2014). Kombinasi

mode tata kelola ini tampaknya menjadi solusi yang memuaskan untuk pengaturan tata kelola yang
kompleks seperti

BUMN, karena memungkinkan adaptasi yang fleksibel terhadap perubahan kebutuhan tata kelola (Bruton
et al., 2015;

Christensen dan Lægreid, 2010; Grandori, 1997, 2001a; Morner dan Misgeld, 2013). Namun,

menggabungkan mode tata kelola membutuhkan mekanisme tata kelola agar kompatibel (Lægreid et al.,

2008; Schillemans, 2008; Sørensen dan Torfing, 2011; Verschuere et al., 2006). PMS sebagaikhas

mekanisme berbasis hasil yangcenderung mempersempit pandangan manajer secara eksklusif untuk
pemenuhan-

tujuan masingmasing (Bhattacharyya, 2013; Jaworski dan Young, 1992; Merchant, 1990), dan

bahkan dilaporkan digunakan secara aneh oleh manajer publik untuk mendukung kepentingan pribadi
(Moynihan, 2008),

sedangkan pemerintahan sendiri mencoba untuk memperluas pandangan manajer publik terhadapinovatif
dan holistik

pemenuhan tugas-tugas publik yang(Sørensen dan Torfing, 2012; Sørensen dan Triantafillou, 2009).
Ketika

datang ke apakah PMS adalah mekanisme tata kelola yang efektif, penelitian menawarkancampuran

kesimpulan(Cavalluzzo dan Ittner, 2004; Greiling, 2006) - yang menyoroti relevansi

pertanyaan tentang bagaimana sistem ini harus dirancang untuk menghasilkan yang diinginkan.
hasil.

PMS tidak harus mempersempit pandangan manajer publik - mereka juga dapat dirancang untuk
memperluasmereka

pandangandan dengan demikian untuk menumbuhkan pemerintahan sendiri (lihat Walker et al., 2011). Ini
adalah kasus jika sistem

tidak menghalangi tetapi memberdayakan manajer untuk mengambil "peran kerja aktif", yang
memungkinkan mereka untuk memahami

kompleksitas pemenuhan tugas publik dan secara intrinsik memotivasi mereka (Deci et al., 1989; Gómez-

Miñambres, 2012; Spreitzer, 1995) untuk berkontribusi pada berbagai aspek nilai publik. Oleh karena itu,

untuk memperoleh parameter desain yang memadai untuk PMS, penelitian ini memperkenalkan konsep

"pemberdayaan psikologis" (Conger dan Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas dan Velthouse,

1990), yang menurutnya, individu dapat diberdayakan jika mereka menganggap (a) pekerjaan mereka

bermakna dan (b) diri mereka kompeten untuk memenuhinya. Selanjutnya, harus dimungkinkan (c) bagi
mereka

untuk membentuk pekerjaan mereka dengan cara yang ditentukan sendiri dan (d) untuk
mempengaruhinya. Pemberdayaan umumnya

terkait dengan peningkatan hasil organisasi dan kinerja di swasta (Arogundade dan

Arogundade, 2015; Drake et al., 2007; Haines dan St-Onge, 2012; Price et al., 2004) dan sektor publik

(Fernandez dan Moldogaziev, 2013), tetapi belum dikaitkan dengan pengukuran kinerja BUMN.

Sementara fokus yang kuat pada langkah-langkah kinerja yang telah ditetapkan di bawah tata kelola
berbasis hasil biasanya

mengurangi pemberdayaan manajer dengan mempersempit rasa akuntabilitas mereka, pemberdayaan di

tempat

kerja membangun kapasitas tata kelola sendiri (lihat Amundsen dan Martinsen, 2015). Dengan demikian,
merancang

PMS yang mampu memberdayakan manajer dan dengan demikian tata kelola sendiri adalah kunci
untukkinerja yang tepat

manajemenuntuk BUMN di lingkungan yang kompleks. Dengan demikian, dalam makalah ini, keadaan di

mana PMS dapat mendorong pemberdayaan psikologis manajer BUMN diselidiki.

Sisa dari makalah ini disusun sebagai berikut: di bagian berikutnya,psikologis

pemberdayaanmanajer sebagai pendorong efektivitas tata kelola dalam konteks spesifik BUMN

diidentifikasi, dan cara pemberdayaan yang dapat didukung oleh desain PMS tertentu adalah.

diuraikan. Kemudian, kasus dan metode penelitian diperkenalkan, dan materi empiris disajikan

sesuai dengan kerangka teori penelitian. Akhirnya, hasil penelitian dibahas, dan

implikasi teoretis dan praktisnya meningkat.

Perkembangan lebih lanjut dari PMS: Perspektif teoretis untuk tata kelola

perusahaan milik negara

Pandangan awal pada konteks tata kelola BUMN tertentu menunjukkan bagaimana, di bawahNPM dan
pasca-NPM

reformasi, berbagai mode tata kelola telah berupaya meningkatkan efektivitas tata kelola BUMN.

Bagian berikut ini menguraikan lebih lanjut tentang spesifik BUMN, dan menyimpulkan bahwagabungan

struktur tata kelolalebih efektif bagi BUMN karena mereka merespon dengan lebih baik terhadaptata
kelola yang berubah-ubah

kebutuhandan akuntabilitas yang berbeda. Untuk menggabungkan kedua mode tata kelola, penelitian ini
mengusulkan

menyelaraskan mekanisme yang mendasarinya. Kombinasi seperti itu membutuhkan PMS yang secara
bersamaan

memberdayakan manajer BUMN ke arah pemerintahan sendiri, dan makalah ini menguraikan bagaimana
ini dapat

dirancang.

Kekhususan perusahaan milik negara dan implikasinya bagi PMS

Konteks tata kelola BUMN sangat kompleks. Tidak hanya jumlah mereka yang terus

meningkat di negara-negara berkembang serta negara-negara maju setelahde-privatisasi saat

trenini (Bruton et al., 2015; Christiansen, 2011; Ekonom, 2012; Ernst & Young, 2010; Florio, 2014;

Kankaanpää et al., 2014; Thynne, 2011), BUMN juga beroperasi di berbagai sektor, sepertipublik

utilitas, perawatan sosial, atau budaya (Grossi dan Reichard, 2008; OECD, 2005), dan mengejar beberapa

tujuan (Aharoni , 1981; Bruton et al., 2015; Vagliasindi, 2008). Mereka selanjutnya menghadapi masalah

pemilik dan pelaku yang beragam dan tidak langsung, Aharoni, 1981; Estrin dan Pérotin, 1991;

Kankaanpää et al., 2014). Oleh karena itu, BUMN harus bersaing dengan banyak akuntabilitas (Bovens,

2007; Christensen dan Lægreid, 2015; Verschuere et al., 2006), yang berarti berbagai kewajiban untuk

membenarkan tindakan mereka (Pollitt, 2003; Schlenker et

al., 1994).

Pertama, BUMN bertanggung jawab kepada badan administratif negara bagian atau kota yang
memberlakukanfinansial atau

pengawasanbentuk lainnya. Meningkatnya jumlah solusi kepemilikan campuran dan

berbagai tingkat kontrol publik - dari ketat hingga longgar (Bruton et al., 2015; Flinders dan Tonkiss,

2015) - menjadikan dimensi akuntabilitas ini (“akuntabilitas administratif”) semakin

kompleks. Selain itu, BUMN bertanggung jawab kepada partai-partai politik yang berkuasa - banyak

perwakilan di antaranya adalah anggota dewan pengawas masing-masing - dan mereka saat ini memegang

ide-ide dan pemilih politik (Estrin dan Pérotin, 1991). Dalam hal ini, BUMN menjadi bagian daripolitik

konflikdan perebutan kekuasaan ("akuntabilitas politik"). Selain itu, BUMN beroperasi di berbagai
sektor dan masing-masing perusahaan mengkhususkan diri dalam bidang profesional tertentu yang
berisitertentu

standar profesionalyang secara eksplisit atau implisit mengikat untuk semua anggota ("profesional

akuntabilitas"). Masyarakat juga terlibat dalam penilaian pencapaian tujuan, dan karenanya

berfungsi sebagai mekanisme akuntabilitas, meskipun tidak dapat secara langsung menjatuhkan sanksi
(Estrin dan

Pérotin, 1991); akuntabilitas di sini bukannya didasarkan pada harapan implisit masyarakat dan

hubungannya dengan negara (“akuntabilitas sosial”). Akhirnya, BUMN bertanggung jawab untuk
memenuhihukum tertentu

standar("akuntabilitas hukum"). Pendekatan holistik untuk tata kelola BUMN mencakup semuaini

dimensi akuntabilitas- dan, untuk mengatasi kompleksitas yang dihasilkan, otoritas publik memerlukan

mekanisme tata kelola yang memadai. Menghubungkan ke literatur dalam teori organisasi, kami
mendefinisikan

tata kelola BUMN sebagai "proses pengambilan keputusan yang mengkoordinasikan saling
ketergantungan" (Frost dan

Morner, 2011, hlm. 22) antara semua pemangku kepentingan yang terlibat untuk
memenuhi tugas publik.

Mode tata kelola berbasis hasil mengandalkan mekanisme tata kelola sektor swasta (Bovens, 2007;

Christensen dan Lægreid, 2001; Van Dooren et al., 2010), dan karena itu pada awalnya tidak menangkap

dimensi akuntabilitas yang beragam dan tidak langsung. Dengan demikian, dapat diasumsikan bahwa,
dalam konteks spesifik

BUMN, mekanisme sektor swasta, terutama yang diperkenalkan melalui reformasi NPM, pasti akan
gagal.

Namun beberapa penelitian mengungkapkan hubungan positif antara tata kelola melalui penetapan tujuan
dan

akuntabilitas secara umum (Berman dan Wang, 2000; Ho, 2006), dan mengonfirmasi bahwakinerja

pengukuranjuga dapat memajukan komunikasi, pembelajaran organisasi, dan diskusi (Mahama,

2006; Melkers dan Willoughby, 2001). Namun, keterkaitan di balik temuan ini belum

cukup diselidiki, dan efek negatif yang luas dari mengatur BUMN berdasarkan tujuan dan

output juga telah dilaporkan (misalnya Bhattacharyya, 2013). Oleh karena itu, orientasi yang kuat
terhadap

serangkaian tujuan organisasi yang telah ditentukan sebelumnya berisiko membuat BUMN tidak
menyadari peran mereka dalampublik
pemenuhan tugas(Brunsson, 1989). Alih-alih menghasut manajer untuk mencari solusi baru

(Boyne dan O'Toole, 2006), tata kelola berbasis hasil dapat mempersempit fokus mereka menjadi tolok
ukur sebelumnya

dan hasil tertentu (Sørensen, 2012). Alih-alih memperluas pandangan mereka tentang beragam
sumberpublik

penciptaan nilai, ia cenderung mempersempit fokus mereka ke tujuan yang telah ditentukan (Jaworski dan
Young, 1992;

Merchant, 1990) dan dapat menyebabkan mereka berakhir sebagai "organisasi tujuan tunggal"
(Christensen dan

Lægreid, 2007, hlm. 1060). Dalam konteks BUMN, kekurangan yang paling melumpuhkan adalah bahwa
PMStelah

terutamamembahas akuntabilitas manajerial terhadap administrasi, mengabaikanmereka

struktur akuntabilitas multidimensi, dan dengan demikian merampas akuntabilitas politik mereka

melalui devolusi struktural (Christensen dan Lægreid, 2001; James dan Van Thiel, 2011). Palermo

et al. (2010) juga melaporkan erosi nilai-nilai inti organisasi dan tujuan melalui

fokus sempit pada ukuran kinerja yang telah

ditentukan.

Berusaha untuk mengatasi juga, kelemahan dari tata kelola berbasis hasil yang sempit, era
pasca-NPM

memperkenalkan berbagai pendekatan tata kelola, seperti "Neo-Weberianisme" (Pollitt dan

Bouckaert, 2011), "pemerintah gabungan" , dan “seluruh pemerintahan” (Christensen dan Lægreid,

2007, 2011b; Stoker, 2006). Pasca-NPM adalah tentang integrasi, koordinasi, dan kerja sama, dan dengan
demikian

mekanisme tata kelola berupaya untuk menciptakan rasa nilai dan tujuan yang kuat dan terpadu dan untuk

meningkatkan keinginan semua pihak yang terlibat untuk berkontribusi secara aktif dalam pemenuhan
tugas publik berdasarkan

tata kelola mandiri mode (Frost dan Morner, 2011; Sørensen dan Triantafillou, 2009). Sementara
mengalihkan

kekuasaan kembali ke otoritas publik dan politik, pendekatan pasca-NPM menciptakan kerangka kerja
tata kelola

yang menumbuhkan pengawasan dan pengawasan timbal balik yang terdesentralisasi dan memungkinkan
para manajer BUMN untuk menumbuhkan
kapasitas pemecahan masalah dan kemampuan mereka sendiri (Sørensen dan Triantafillou, 2009;

Morner, 2013).

Pada pandangan pertama, mungkin tampak bahwa tata kelola berbasis hasil bertentangan dengan
mekanisme tata kelola di

bawah pasca-NPM. Atau, beberapa sarjana menganggap kombinasi mode tata kelola yang beragam
sebagai

peluang daripada penyakit (Christensen dan Lægreid, 2011a; Christensen, 2012). Salah satu

argumen untuk perspektif ini adalah bahwa mode tata kelola terintegrasi merespon lebih fleksibel
terhadapdinamis

pengaturan tata kelola yangdan kompleks (Bruton et al., 2015; Christensen dan Lægreid, 2007; Egeberg
dan

Trondal, 2009; Grandori, 1997, 2001a). Namun, banyak mode tata kelola didirikan padasebagian

mekanisme dan prinsip yang tidak konsisten(Christensen dan Lægreid,

2011a).

Singkatnya, PMS berbasis NPM membentuk persepsi manajer BUMN tentang atribut organisasi
dengan

cara yang menghambat orientasi kerja aktif mereka, karena mereka dipersempit dalam serangkaian
targettelah ditentukan

yangyang hanya sebagian memungkinkan mereka untuk membentuk peran dan konteks pekerjaan
mereka. Dengan demikian, sistem tersebut mengurangi

pemberdayaan manajer (Conger dan Kanungo, 1988; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas dan Velthouse,

1990). Sebaliknya, mekanisme tata kelola pasca-NPM memperluas pandangan manajer BUMN untuk

mencakup pemenuhan tugas-tugas publik yang inovatif dan holistik (Sørensen dan Torfing, 2012;

Sørensen dan Triantafillou, 2009) dan memberdayakan manajer untuk mencapai tujuan
yang ditetapkan sendiri.

Karenanya makalah ini mengusulkan pemberdayaan manajer BUMN sebagai solusi untuk integrasi

mode tata kelola yang diperkenalkan; bagian berikut ini memperkenalkan konseppsikologis

pemberdayaandan menjelaskan bagaimana PMS dapat dirancang untuk mendorong, bukannya

menghambat,manajer BUMN

pemberdayaan.

Memberdayakan manajer BUMN: Persyaratan baru

untuk PMS
Makalah ini mendefinisikan pemberdayaan manajer BUMN (termasuk, tergantung padahukum BUMN

bentuk, CEO dan manajer eksekutif) sebagaimereka psikologis pemberdayaan(Spreitzer, 1995). Dalam

hal ini, pemberdayaan adalah proses yang meningkatkan persepsi manajer untuk dapat melaksanakan

pekerjaan mereka dengan baik (Conger dan Kanungo, 1988; Seibert et al., 2004). Ini terjadi melalui
peningkatan

persepsi mereka tentang (a) pekerjaan mereka menjadi penting, dan karenanya bermakna; (B) memiliki
kompetensi untuk

melakukan pekerjaan mereka dengan baik; (c) kebebasan mereka untuk memilih bagaimana
melaksanakan pekerjaan mereka; dan (d) pekerjaan mereka

berdampak pada generasi nilai publik. Dengan cara ini, pemberdayaan mendorong mereka untuk

secara aktif berkontribusi dalam pemenuhan

tugas publik.

Dengan tujuan membentuk desain pemberdayaan untuk PMS, bagian berikut menyelidiki bagaimana

fitur desain tertentu dapat mendorong semua dimensi pemberdayaan (makna kerja,manajer

kompetensi, penentuan nasib sendiri, dan dampak dari pekerjaan mereka). Gambar 1 memberikanex-ante

panduan visualuntuk kerangka teoritis yang diusulkan.

<Masukkan Gambar 1 tentang

di sini>

Gambar 1.

Usulan kerangka teoritis desain PMS yang ramah pemberdayaan

Pengukuran kinerja dan makna yang dirasakan dari pekerjaan manajer

"Arti kerja" didefinisikan sebagai nilai yang ditempatkan individu pada pekerjaan mereka dalam
kaitannya dengan

cita-cita atau standar, dan merupakan dimensi pertama di mana pemberdayaan psikologis

dimanifestasikan (Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas dan Velthouse, 1990). Prasyarat yang diperlukan bagi
seseorang

untuk menilai nilai ini terletak pada informasi yang jelas dan akurat tentang tujuan yang dibutuhkan
pekerjaan mereka.

Namun, memberikan informasi ini adalah proses yang kompleks, yang melibatkan lebih dari sekadar
keberadaan

PMS (Van Dooren, 2005). Hanya jika tujuan yang jelas ditetapkan, manajer dapat menggunakannya untuk
menilai-

kepentingan relatif masingmasing, untuk membuat keputusan yang lebih baik, dan untuk menyetujui atau
tidak setuju dengan mereka (misalnya

Aharoni, 1981; Behn, 2003; Gonzalez-Mule et al., 2014; Hood, 1995; Jung, 2012; Lindenberg dan

Foss, 2011; Locke, 1996; Sawyer, 1992). PMS yang sehat secara teknis dan dipelihara secara efektif

juga merupakan faktor penting bagi kepercayaan terhadap informasi yang diberikan (Berman dan Wang,

2000; Taylor, 2011).

Selanjutnya, komunikasi semua tujuan yang relevan dengan manajer juga harus transparan sehingga

manajer BUMN dapat menilai makna pekerjaan mereka (Melnyk et al., 2014). Namun,

transparansi - khususnya mengenai tujuan yang dipaksakan secara politis - seringkali tidak diberikan.
Politisi

khususnya seringkali sangat enggan untuk merumuskan dan mendokumentasikan tujuan, karena ini
membawa risiko

tujuan kemudian digunakan terhadap mereka atau menarik perhatian media negatif (Behn, 2003; Van

Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006). Pada saat yang sama, kendala politik memiliki dampak negatif pada

objektivitas pengukuran kinerja dalam BUMN (O'Connor et al., 2006).disepakati

Persyaratan transparansi yangdapat mematahkan spiral

negatif ini.

Evaluasi manajer terhadap makna pekerjaan mereka adalah proses yang sangat individual. Dengan
demikian,

ketentuan tujuan harus jelas dan transparan tidak hanya mengenai konten tetapi juga dalam kaitannya
dengantujuan

pemegang(Van Gestel et al., 2012; Latham dan Locke, 2007; Locke dan Latham, 2002).tugas yang jelas

Alokasijuga memungkinkan identifikasi dengan pekerjaan mereka sendiri (Grant, 2008) dan karenanya

penilaian maknanya. Namun, untuk manajer BUMN, alokasi tugas yang jelas sangat

menantang karena banyak aktor yang terlibat dalam pemenuhan tugas publik (Kankaanpää et al.,
2014).ini

Kompleksitasdapat dikurangi, melalui tingkat keadilan prosedural yang dirasakan lebih tinggi
dalamtujuan
proses penetapan, yang pada gilirannya meningkatkan penerimaan proses alokasi tugas (Hartmann dan

Slapničar, 2012; He dan Lau, 2012).

Singkatnya, makalah ini berpendapat bahwa pendekatan yang efektif dalam membentuk PMS menuju
peningkatan

makna yang dirasakan di tempat kerja termasuk penyediaan tegas informasi yang jelas dan dapat
dipercaya tentang

tujuan, transparansi menyeluruh dalam penetapan tujuan yang juga mencakup dokumentasi

arah politik, dan penyediaan informasi tentang alokasi tujuan, yang, dalamkompleks

pengaturanBUMN, juga dapat dipupuk melalui keadilan prosedural.

Pengukuran kinerja dan kompetensi yang dirasakan manajer

"Kompetensi" adalah keyakinan individu pada kemampuan mereka untuk melakukan kegiatan di tempat
kerja dengan

kecakapan (Bandura, 1982; Conger dan Kanungo, 1987; Spreitzer, 1995), dan mewakilikedua

dimensidi mana pemberdayaan dimanifestasikan. . PMS secara teratur mengevaluasi kompetensi ini,
karena mereka

menetapkan target yang ingin dicapai, menilai pencapaian mereka, dan memberikan umpan balik pada
hasilnya (Franco-Santos et

al., 2007). Dalam peran ini,mempengaruhi bagaimana manajer memahami kompetensi mereka sendiri,
dan dengan demikian

PMSdesain PMS tertentu dapat menumbuhkan atau menghancurkan persepsi ini. Misalnya, PMS yang
mencakup

tujuan yang tidak dapat dicapai telah terbukti memiliki dampak disfungsional pada upaya, perilaku yang
berhubungan dengan tugas,

dan tingkat motivasi (Becker dan Green, 1962; Csikszentmihalyi, 1975). Tingkat

pencapaian tujuan yang ditetapkan memiliki efek lengkung pada kinerja (Bandura, 1986); perilaku adaptif

ditunjukkan ketika tujuan ketat tetapi dapat dicapai, tetapi tujuan tersebut ditinggalkan ketika dianggap

tidak dapat dicapai (Sandelands et al., 1988). Karena kompetensi mengacu pada keyakinan individu
tentangmereka

kemampuansendiri di tempat kerja, penilaian terhadap pencapaian atau pencapaian yang tidak tercapai
merupakan

beban praktis yang tinggi, karena penilaian subyektif relevan dalam konteks ini (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990).

Untuk mengurangi ketidakpastian di sini, Hartmann (2005) menemukan penerapan beberapa tujuan
sebagai

kemungkinan untuk meningkatkan pemenuhan tugas dalam konteks yang dinamis dan tidak pasti. Selain
itu, Dai, Milkman, dan

Riis (2013) baru-baru ini menunjukkan bahwa landmark temporal meningkatkan perilaku yang
berhubungan dengan tujuan. Dengan demikian,

pengukuran kinerja pada waktu-waktu tertentu - misalnya, pada awal minggu, bulan, atau

tahun - dapat membangkitkan "efek awal baru". Selain itu, tonggak jangka pendek memungkinkan para
manajer BUMN

untuk menyesuaikan kembali perilaku dan citra diri mereka untuk mencapai tujuan publik dengan lebih
baik. Semuaini

mekanismedapat mendorong penggunaan eksplorasi informasi pengukuran kinerja (Speklé dan

Verbeeten, 2014) dan meningkatkan proses pembelajaran loop tunggal dan ganda (Argyris dan Schön,
1978;

Argyris, 1977), dan karenanya meningkatkan persepsi kompetensi manajer.

Akhirnya, persepsi kompetensi terkait erat dengan prinsip pengendalian. JikaBUMN

manajerdapat mengendalikan pencapaian tujuan mereka dengan mengendalikan tindakan yang mengarah
pada pencapaian

tujuan ini, dan dengan demikian menjadikan kinerja mungkin, mereka menganggap diri mereka
kompeten. Juga,

terutama untuk BUMN, penerimaan tindakan oleh manajer sebagai tujuan bisnis yang realistis telah

diungkapkan sebagai prasyarat yang diperlukan untuk memungkinkan kinerja (Bhattacharyya, 2013).
Namun,

meskipun diakui secara luas, persyaratan ini masih belum terpenuhi di banyak organisasi

(Bhattacharyya, 2013; Burkert et al., 2011).

Secara keseluruhan, penggunaan langkah-langkah kinerja eksplorasi mengintegrasikan beberapa

langkah dan

tonggak, serta penetapan tujuan sesuai dengan prinsip kontrol, dapat menumbuhkanmanajerial

persepsi kompetensi.

Pengukuran kinerja dan persepsi penentuan nasibmanajer “Penentuan

nasib

sendiri olehsendiri” adalah persepsi individu tentang sejauh mana mereka memiliki pilihan dalam
memulai dan melakukan perilaku kerja (Deci et al., 1989; Spreitzer, 1995), dan berkaitan denganketiga

dimensidari pemberdayaan psikologis. Penentuan nasib sendiri terjadi pada kontinum antara

motivasi otonom, persepsi penentuan nasib sendiri atau motivasi yang dikendalikan, dan

persepsi yang ditentukan dan dikendalikan secara eksternal (Gagné dan Deci, 2005). Dengan demikian
PMS hanya

mampu memberdayakan manajer jika mereka memberikan otonomi yang diperlukan

(Krause, 2014).

Otonomi di tempat kerja selalu terkait dengan mitranya, partisipasi (Grant et al., 2011; Hackman

et al., 1975; Wilkinson dan Dundon, 2011). Untuk mendorong penentuan nasib sendiri,kinerja

pengukuranharus memungkinkan keterlibatan partisipatif yang tinggi (Amabile, 1996). Menurut Kenis

(1979), keterlibatan partisipatif dalam konteks pengukuran kinerja “mengacu pada sejauh

mana manajer berpartisipasi dalam mempersiapkan [...] dan mempengaruhi [...] tujuantanggung jawab
mereka

pusat” (Kenis, 1979, hlm. 709). Literatur pengukuran kinerja mengungkapkan peningkatan

komitmen, kepuasan, dan motivasi peserta untuk meningkatkan tujuan yang ditetapkan jika partisipasi
diaktifkan (Forde et al.,

2006; Langevin dan Mendoza, 2013; Locke, 1968; Strauss, 1998; Vroom, 1964; Wood dan de

Menezes , 2011), sedangkan tujuan yang ditetapkan terkait dengan resistensi (Lee dan Wei, 2011; London

et al., 2004). Selain itu, peluang untuk berpartisipasi dalam penetapan tujuan semakin meningkatkan
kemauan untuk

berkontribusi pada tugas kolektif (Lee dan Wei, 2011) serta tekanan sosial untuk mencapainya

(Groen et al., 2012).

Selain itu, manajer BUMN memerlukan informasi strategis tentang ke mana arah organisasi mereka

untuk memahami bahwa mereka memiliki pilihan dalam memulai tindakan direktif (Hall, 2011).

Dengan demikian, penyediaan informasi strategis melalui PMS meningkatkannasib sendiri manajer

penentuan(Chenhall, 2005; Hall, 2011). Informasi strategis memungkinkan para manajer untuk secara
mandiri

membuat keputusan yang efektif dan efisien mengenai metode, proses, dan sumber daya ketika
melakukan

tugas publik. Akibatnya, praktik pemberdayaan yang ditujukan untuk memberikan karyawan
denganterkait pekerjaan

pengetahuanmeningkatkan tingkat kinerja yang dirasakan secara internal (Fernandez dan Moldogaziev,
2011).

Dengan demikian, disimpulkan bahwa PMS yang merangkul partisipasi dan memberikan informasi
strategis dapat

mendorong penentuan nasib

sendiri.

Pengukuran kinerja dan dampak yang dirasakan dari pekerjaan manajer

"Dampak pekerjaan" merupakan dimensi akhir dari pemberdayaan, dan mencerminkan sejauh mana

individu percaya bahwa mereka dapat mempengaruhi hasil (Ashforth, 1989; Spreitzer, 1995). Hasil

BUMN sangat relevan bagi masyarakat melalui efeknya yang luas terhadap warga negara dansektor
swasta

industri(Grossi dan Reichard, 2008; OECD, 2005). Dengan demikian, untuk melakukan perubahan
positif,

manajer BUMN perlu mengatasi berbagai segi nilai publik (Andersen et al., 2012; Meynhardt,

2009; Moore, 1995). Namun, ketika datang untuk mengukur kinerja BUMN, penelitian menunjukkan

kecenderungan untuk mengurangi kinerja ke semacam dimensi keuangan (Ramamurti, 1987), dan dengan
demikian

mempersempit fokus pada dampak yang mungkin terjadi pada manajer. Ketidakseimbangan semacam ini
dapat memilikidisfungsional

efekpada perilaku manajerial. Karena spesifikasi ukuran kinerja menentukan fokus

tindakan manajerial (Bhattacharyya, 2013), ketidakseimbangan terhadap ukuran finansial cenderung

mengarah

pada penekanan yang berlebihan terhadap profitabilitas atau tujuan pengurangan biaya dengan
mengorbankan fokus luas padapublik

nilai. Juga, penggunaan langkah-langkah kinerja inapt untuk kepentingan diri manajer telah dilaporkan

(Moynihan, 2008), dengan penelitian menunjukkan manajer BUMN semakin menunjukkankepentingan

diri

rasionalitas(Edeling et al., 2004). Filosofi bisnis manajerial BUMN yang semakin mencerminkan

sikap manajer swasta akan mengakibatkan pengabaian tugas, fungsi, dan kepentingan publik.

Ini dapat diatasi melalui integrasi langkah-langkah non-finansial dan mengambilholistik

pendekatanuntuk menilai kontribusi manajer BUMN terhadap nilai publik.

 Pendekatan holistik dalam PMS selanjutnya mencerminkan berbagai akuntabilitas terhadap kelompok

administratif, politik, sosial, dan profesional (Bovens, 2007; Pollitt, 2003; Schlenker et al.,

1994). Meskipun pengaturan yang kompleks membutuhkan solusi tata kelola yang kompleks, pendekatan
yang terdiri dari semua

dimensi akuntabilitas juga dilihat sebagai masalah. Ambiguitas dan tujuan yang saling bertentangan yang

kemungkinan dihasilkan dari beragam akuntabilitas dapat mengarah pada sistem yang tidak dapat
dikelola (Johnsen, 2001;

March dan Olsen, 1995). Namun, jika PMS memasukkan kesadaran akan masalah-masalah bermasalah,

iniini dapat mendorong komunikasi aktif dan pertukaran antara BUMN, otoritas publik, danlainnya

pemangku kepentingan. This can be realized through encouraging SOE managers to participate in
administrative

goal-setting processes, occasionally inviting public authorities to advisory board meetings in order to

restrain non-transparent policy processes, and through defining benchmarks (Amaratunga and Baldry,

2002; Askim et al., 2008) in order to enter into dialogue on professional accountability with public

bodies. So as to foster the perception of socially imposed accountabilities, the public voice can be

consulted in user boards, at town meetings and public hearings, or through customer surveys

(Sørensen and Torfing, 2012), and the results integrated into the PMS, not only as quantitative

measures but also as qualitative statements (see Ferrari and Manzi, 2014). Ho (2006) furthermore

found that citizen involvement in performance measurement practices increases the perceived

usefulness of the data in the eyes of elected officials. Thus, instead of targeting an inflated

performance measurement approach that integrates all accountability dimensions, the present study

proposes a PMS that encourages exchange and increases the comprehensibility of different

accountabilities affecting SOEs and managerial performance within.

In summary, PMSs that integrate non-financial measures to account for the specificity of public

task provision and are sensitive to various public value perspectives are more likely to increase SOE

managers' perceived impact.

Case setting and research method

This study's theoretical implications are specified within an exploratory case study approach. Forming
the basis for the study, the next section portrays the case setting and elaborates on the research method

by providing insights into the collection and analysis of the research data.

Case setting

The entity of SOEs owned by a single city represents a fruitful object through which to study the

effectiveness of particular performance measurement practices, as it comprises a large number of

discrete units operating under almost identical public governance conditions (see Przeworski and

Teune, 1970). This paper's case study was located in a large German city in North Rhine-Westphalia

hereafter referred to as “Citee”. In 2014, Citee held more than 70 SOEs to a major, equal, or

significant but minor part. In particular, Citee had a majority ownership (more than 50 per cent) of

almost half of its enterprises, some equal ownership solutions (50 per cent ownership), and minority

ownerships (less than 50 per cent) of more than half of its enterprises. Most of Citee's SOEs were

private limited companies (in German, Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung), together with a few

public limited companies (Aktiengesellschaften), and some limited partnerships with limited liability

companies as general partners (Gesellschaften mit beschränkter Haftung & Compagnie

Kommanditgesellschaften). The enterprises operated in very diverse areas, ranging from social

activities (eg child and youth services) to more business-oriented activities (eg public utilities,

public transport). In order to govern its SOEs in line with its municipal goals, Citee had established a

central unit under its financial department that, at the time of the study, comprised one ownership

manager and five employees. This unit was responsible for the facilitation of SOE governance; in

particular, for financial controlling, reporting, performance management, and overall SOE support.

Also, social, economic, cultural, and educational requirements needed to be balanced, harmonized,

and aligned to the city's overall strategic goals (see Schwarting, 2004).

The governance of SOEs in Citee was subject to high financial pressure (Döhrn et al., 2013) that

resulted from structural changes and high unemployment rates (Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik,

2015). Historically, coal had been the main economic driving force in North Rhine-Westphalia

(Döhrn et al., 2013). Due to a turnaround in energy policies, though, unemployment in North Rhine-

Westphalia was very high (circa 760,000; Bundesagentur für Arbeit Statistik, 2015), representing
more than a quarter of the total for the whole of Germany (approximately 2,900,000; Bundesagentur

für Arbeit Statistik, 2015). Overall, the cities of North Rhine-Westphalia had found themselves to be

under economic and financial pressure. The sum of cash loans in North Rhine-Westphalia was

equivalent to half the cash loans granted in the whole of Germany (Burth et al., 2013). Indebtedness

and over-indebtedness were accelerating. Thus, the principal focus of Citee's ownership management

lay in austerity management.

Financial pressure had resulted in mainly output-based SOE governance in Citee, with a strong

focus on strict budgeting. Moreover, inconsistent approaches to performance measurement and

incentive schemes had led to a rethinking of the old PMS. After an intense political decision-making

process, in 2013, the city council decided to restructure the performance measurement processes along

with the compensation schemes for their SOE managers. Alongside 60–80 per cent fixed pay, one

short-term and one long-term variable pay component (each 10–20 per cent) were introduced. The

short-term variable component was an annual bonus based on the achievement of public service

provision goals, whereas the long-term variable component depended on predefined financial goals.

The newly implemented adjusted balanced scorecard (see Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1996, 2001)

reflected these two goal sets: public service provision goals incorporated three perspectives – namely,

(1) customer/citizen, (2) cooperation within Citee, and (3) development – that together constituted 50

per cent, while the fourth perspective, (4) finance, served as a counterweight. (To guarantee its

practicability, each perspective of a balanced scorecard should entail at most three goals.)

All contracts completed since the council decision have been settled under this scheme. This

change process makes the case particularly interesting for the present study. New performance

measurement practices exist alongside old ones, revealing functioning performance measurement

practices, room for improvement, and potential for conflict. For instance, the difficulty of balancing

financial and service provision goals became obvious within the case study. A strong focus on

predefined and highly ambitious financial goals questions the controllability of the set goals. In such

surroundings, high levels of pressure make the empowerment of COEs through performance

measurement unlikely. Taking this into account, the study scrutinized which performance

measurement mechanisms supported them in or restricted them from actively contributing to public

task fulfilment. Thus, the actual workings of the underlying causal mechanisms were traced (Blatter
and Blume, 2008a, 2008b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; George and Bennett, 2005; Haverland and

Yanow, 2012). The richness of the insights as well as the historical familiarity with the sequence of

events that were gained from the case study allowed for in-depth exploration of the causal processes.

Data collection

Initial contact was made with the ownership manager of Citee in April 2014 at a conference during

which he presented Citee's new performance measurement and management system. In order that the

study's authors could become more familiar with the case and to confirm subsequent steps, a

telephone conference was held. Next, the case study was authorized by the municipal finance director,

as well as by the mayor of Citee. These steps were particularly important, as case accessibility is a

primary precondition for this kind of in-depth investigation. As this study sought to answer the

question of under which conditions PMSs can empower SOE managers, and as a plurality of factors

within the different empowerment dimensions is assumed to work together to produce the desired

outcome, the underlying case study approach encompasses causal-process tracing (Blatter and Blume,

2008a, 2008b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; George and Bennett, 2005). Furthermore, causal-process

tracing as a within-case approach explains the study's single-case approach. The investigation

depended on gaining a comprehensive overview of the unfolding of all of the processes that

accompanied the introduction of the new PMS at Citee and the possibility of gaining profound

insights into the perceptions and motivations of important actors (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).

Accordingly, during a preliminary meeting with the ownership manager at the beginning of July

2014, key SOE managers were selected as interviewees. The main selection criteria sought to strike a

balance between SOEs from different sectors of varying size and financial strength, and between

SOEs in which CEOs were contracted under the old as well as under the new performance

measurement scheme. Theoretical saturation defined the absolute number of the selected interviewees

(Baker and Edwards, 2012; Ullrich, 1999a, 1999b). Real-world occurrence established a natural limit

to this approach. For instance, no SOE manager of a small SOE existed who had been contracted

under the new PMS.

 Table I.

Overview of interviewed SOE managers

<Insert Table I about here, including footnotes>

Table I summarizes the sample SOEs and the managers with whom interviews were conducted,

further to the initial interview with the ownership manager. As shown, a balance was struck between

SOEs with high, medium, and low impact, as measured by number of employees (SOE size) and

capital stock (financial impact). Also, a diversity of sectors and a balance between loss- and profit-

making SOEs were taken into account. Moreover, approximately half of the SOE managers chosen

were employed under the new performance management scheme and half were still under the old

PMS. This maximum variation enabled a diversity of empirical observations within the case study

(Blatter and Haverland, 2012; Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Altogether, six in-depth, face-to-face interviews were conducted in the third quarter of 2014. All

the interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed. The interviews lasted approximately 50

minutes on average, with the shortest being 37 and the longest 100 minutes. The trustworthiness of

the data was increased by tape-recording the consent of all the interviewees. In addition, a transcript

of their interview was sent to every interviewee shortly afterwards unless explicitly rejected. The

interviews were open ended and geared towards ensuring a deeper understanding of all evolving

processes and the interviewees' cognitions in reaction to the differing measurement practices.

Primarily, the interviewees were asked about their role in their respective SOE, about their own goals

and those they pursue within their enterprises, about their perception of the governance mechanisms

in place, and, in particular, about their experiences with the PMS and their interactions with the

municipal ownership management. They were also encouraged to freely describe the way in which the

new system was introduced, its components, and the targets that the city is pursuing with it. Follow-up

questions focused on increasing the richness of the collected data (Rubin and Rubin, 2012), and the

interviewers used Hermanns' (2004) stage directions for interviewing to establish a positive

atmosphere and concentrate on the real-life world without losing sight of the research question.
Additional case-relevant documents, such as internal documentation, presentations, and council

documents, were also collected and expounded during the interviews.

This case study approach permitted a refinement of the explanatory framework of how PMSs can

empower SOE managers, as well as an understanding of a possible set of causal mechanisms behind it

as the collected data allowed for finely grained empirical insights and the consideration of a broad and

diverse set of explanatory approaches (Blatter and Haverland, 2012).

Data analysis

The empirical data from the interviews were transcribed and analysed directly after the interview

phase (Miles and Huberman, 1994) using MAXQDA 11 software (Flick, 2014; Paulus et al., 2014). In

order to ensure confidentiality, a numerical order was assigned to the interviewees (Manager I,

Manager II, etc.). The data analysis process included re-listening to the recordings as well as reading

and re-reading the transcript, on the one hand (Windeck et al., 2013), and the coding and re-coding

process on the other. The entire analysis followed the “four eyes” principle. The very first step of the

coding process sought to discover the structural aspects to the data, and, to this end, used open coding

(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). During this stage, repeatedly reverting back and forth between empirical

data and the broad theoretical basis facilitated the derivation of the theoretical framework described

above. In particular, after grouping the discovered codes, there were received as the main in vivo

codes, on the one hand, ones such as “procedural fairness”, “controllability”, “participation”, or

“diverse accountabilities” that could be grouped alongside the concept of psychological

empowerment, and, on the other, a prevalent “goal congruence” code that reflected the research

question. “Goal congruence” was identified as the main purpose of PMS and defined as transforming

individual goals into organizational or collective goals (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2014; Cugueró-

Escofet and Rosanas, 2013; Locke and Latham, 2002; Locke, 1996). However, despite being the main

purpose of PMS, the introduction of these systems is evidently not always recognized by managers as

being empowering. Moreover, at this stage of the analysis, even dysfunctional effects were detected,

in that managers' existent orientation towards public service provision goals had been distorted by a

strong focus solely on financial goals. Indeed, this key aspect of the first open-coding step led to the
specification of the research question, which asks how PMSs can be designed in order to empower

managers towards public goal fulfilment rather than diminishing their existing foci on public-service

fulfilment.

Once the real world-driven research question had been specified, an understanding of the entire

landscape had been gained, and the theoretical basis in the described iterative process built up, the

three-step coding approach laid down by Miles and Huberman (1994) (see Windeck et al., 2013) was

followed. Then, the in vivo codes were further grouped and developed according to the study's

theoretical framework (“theoretical coding”), and a “start list” was created around the four dimensions

of psychological empowerment. These served as the main coding families, which were then enriched

with subcodes. As a last step, this start list was revised during the data analysis, its structure checked,

and selective coding used to further elaborate the study's case (see also Glaser, 1992).

Once again, the researchers were constantly moving back and forth from the empirical to the

theoretical dimensions of the analysis (Dubois and Gadde, 2002). This single case study thus relies on

abduction as a combination of inductive and deductive research strategies (see Goretzki et al., 2013;

Järvenpää, 2009). Given the complex background of SOEs and the interplay of diverse mechanisms,

abduction was identified as an appropriate method for constantly refining the theoretical framework.

Rather than striving for generalization, the study aimed at a “possibilistic generalization” (Blatter and

Haverland, 2012, p. 31), in order to gather in-depth knowledge about a possible combination of causal

conditions that might lead to managers' empowerment through PMS.

Empowering SOE managers through effective PMSs

In the following section, in order to discover how managers' empowerment works in the study's case

setting, theoretical interpretations are enriched with empirical material. The study's findings are then

summarized and discussed with respect to design principles for empowering PMS.

Findings: Towards empowerment through performance measurement

in Citee

This case study highlights the key design aspects of Citee's newly introduced PMS, investigates how

it is perceived by SOE managers, and traces how particular aspects of it empower or fail to empower

these managers towards an active work role. For each dimension of empowerment – meaning,
competence, self-determination, and impact – the observed design parameters are identified and

discussed.

Enhancing the perceived meaning of managers' work through goal clarity

Clear and trustworthy goals, transparent information provision, and unambiguous and fair task

allocation are crucial prerequisites for managers when it comes to assessing the meaning of their

work. However, when asked about their roles, their personal goals, and the goals that they pursue

within their enterprises, most managers in Citee did not refer to the dimensions provided by the

introduced balanced scorecard – these being (1) customer/citizen, (2) cooperation within Citee, and

(3) development. Most answers related to the specifics of the managed enterprises, although the stated

goals could just as well have been subsumed under the city's general balanced scorecard dimensions

(1) to (3). This highlighted the potential for bringing forward individually adapted balanced

scorecards under a citywide balanced scorecard umbrella in order to increase identification.

One exception to the rather restrained awareness of the PMS was managers' vivid identification

with the financial balanced scorecard perspective. Financial and economic goals were widely

perceived as clear and transparent. Although the executive managers of Citee's SOEs were under

severe financial pressure, they regarded their financial and economic plans as neutral and given. One

manager stated, “Whether that's good or bad, I still have the objectivity” (Manager V; 105), and he

felt assured as he was able to “deduce what the level of [his] goal attainment should be” (Manager V;

105). In accordance with the financial balanced scorecard perspective, the social desirability of

commonly working on halting the city's accelerating indebtedness was stressed. As the financial goal

perspective was then overarching, it had been communicated by the ownership management much

more extensively, and differences in acknowledging the financial perspective as opposed to the public

service provision dimensions could be traced to these major differences in their communication.

Besides illustrating how PMSs can enhance the perceived meaning of work, the case study

demonstrated that the mere existence of such systems does not guarantee clear goal allocation, and

does not even mean that all parties involved are aware of their existence. Thus, one manager denied

the existence of an overall balanced scorecard:

 “There is an internal, balanced scorecard [for my SOE], there is no approved balanced scorecard

with the city of [Citee].” (Manager V; 53)

In fact, the balanced scorecard implementation process in Citee had not been completed at the

time of the present investigation. Furthermore, the implementation plans had not been adequately

communicated. Such consequences of a lack of information show that the necessity for goal clarity

and transparency starts long before the use of a PMS. To drive forward the implementation process,

trust in the system has first to be established. In the case study, some managers adhered closely to

official internal documents when answering questions or follow-ups concerning the balanced

scorecard dimensions. They were unfamiliar with the system and showed discomfort in using it.

Accordingly, several scholars point to measurement system maturity as being a key driver of

purposeful performance information use (Kroll, 2015; Padovani et al., 2010).

In addition to the provision of clear and trustworthy performance information, meaning also

requires an overarching transparency in goal formulation. Transparent goals can establish a formal

and institutional basis that is able to serve as a solid starting point in complex settings. In Citee,

internal transparency was widely reported and executive managers experienced goal formulation as a

“well-described system accessible on the Internet” (Manager IV; 57). In some cases, though, Citee

had provided very detailed information (eg “multi-page documents”; Manager IV; 57), which was

mostly experienced as overwhelming.

Citee also had in place a council information system that was used as an online platform for

communicating most of the decisions taken by the council to the public. SOE managers were

informed of the new performance measurement and incentive system through this communication

channel, too, once it had been approved by the council, and they stressed unequivocally that all

managers should actively seek out this information and be “familiar with the system” (Manager III;

96). However, the interviewees stated that transparency in political directives was not being actively

fostered in Citee, which reflects other research that sees a political reluctance to provide clear goals

(Behn, 2003; Van Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006). Managers in Citee were constantly in search of political
developments and directives, resulting in insufficient information flows. Although this task is largely

considered a routine duty, the importance of an additional, two-way, and more personal exchange

with all involved parties was stressed and proposed as a solution.

“Therefore I do think that the city has a legitimate interest to look at in this way, especially the

financial areas, and, I think, when it comes to the detail and content, then, for example, the

technical committees, too, are likely to be interested. That something happens, for example [...],

when we describe goals in child and youth work that we want to increase the number of visitors.

This could also be interesting for the youth welfare committee.” (Manager VI; 48)

Finally, the new performance measurement approach was generally perceived as being fair. At the

executive management level, tasks were allocated in a complex process, partly through the work

content itself, through political directives, and through the supervisory board. The study's findings

demonstrate that, in this complex setting, the establishment of governance mechanisms perceived as

procedurally fair is a supportive element. Procedural fairness can, in addition, enhance the

significance of tasks and thus their meaning to an individual. Executive managers in Citee regarded

the new system as one that standardizes procedures formerly contracted on a rather opaque and

individual basis. This change from individuality towards uniformity was realized as a path towards

more justice:

“So I'm primarily assuming, of course, that you want to have justice throughout the companies.”

(Manager V; 84)

Enhancing managers' perceived competence through balanced goal difficulty

PMSs clarify managers' goals and provide necessary information on their attainment, and thus have

the potential to enhance managers' perceived competence – as long as managers are able to

accomplish these goals. In the study, goal difficulty was omnipresent in Citee as it battled the twin

pressures of indebtedness and over-indebtedness. Accordingly, the pressure to constantly reduce staff

numbers and costs was weighing heavily on Citee and its SOEs. “The main objectives of the region”
were associated with “exorbitant targets” (Manager III; 84), a perspective that further increased

executive managers' perception of goal difficulty as a feeling of having “no choice but to operate with

these strict requirements, including with regard to the subsidiaries” (Manager III; 84). Surprisingly

then, in general, SOE managers perceived the very high financial goals as reasonable, and stressed

that they should be commonly pursued.

Indeed, challenging financial goals were, in some cases, reported as being motivating, as they

demanded high levels of competence from the managers in order to progressively come up with

innovative solutions. Several managers reported at length that they were actively searching for

innovative solutions to halt the financial burden. For instance, some had started to cooperate in new

fields with other SOEs, or had found new markets for their services outside of the city:

“So, one of the main reasons why we have been able to work so cost-effectively in recent years

has been collaborations with other institutes in the city.” (Manager I; 35)

“We also meet with [... let's call them 'third parties' [...] 'external third parties', and also do

business with them – Stadtwerke [X], for example. That's not [Citee]; I also do business with

them outside the city. And we want to increase this further.” (Manager II; 63)

Thus, supporting previous research (Walker et al., 2011; Wynen et al., 2014), this study observed

that clear performance targets may even induce management innovation. However, these

interrelations are complex and depend on various contextual factors. Wynen et al. (2014) found that

size and an organization's budget restrict innovation. This is reflected in the present work's empirical

data: only managers of SOEs with higher capital stocks (independently of whether they were loss- or

profit-making SOEs) were actively reporting innovative behaviour.

Further, at some point, the motivating effect of high targets tilts into demotivation and frustration,

supporting a curvilinear effect of goal attainability on performance (Bandura, 1986):

“[...] we could happily expand that, because we would then benefit ourselves from the

exploitation of this company [...] then I would have to cut down on what I stand for.” (Manager I,

53)
 The burden of increasingly unattainable goals at the peak of the curve was just starting to become

visible, as interviewees were forecasting their results for the following periods. An “enormous need

for maintenance” (Manager V; 79) was reported throughout one interview, and was strongly

perceived due to an obsolete infrastructure having to be replaced in the coming years. In this respect,

SOEs were judged to be “operating at the edge” (Manager II: 81) and the budgetary outlook was

generally negative.

“So, for this year, the goals are certainly achievable. In perspective, the financial targets in

particular are no longer be achievable. Unless I bring together the issues of quality and financial

impact. We have a declining dividend, we have the city of [Citee] facing tougher budgetary

constraints.” (Manager V; 79)

In this study's theoretical framework, an exploratory approach to performance measurement was

introduced that encompasses balanced goal difficulty and various controllable goals to enhance

managers' perceptions of their own competence. Congruently, most of the interviewees in Citee

stressed the importance of a generally balanced approach to goal setting:

“The main point would be to ensure a balance.” (Manager V; 119)

Counteracting the increasing unattainability of financial goals, managers drew attention to the

formally balanced design of the new PMS, which, aside from financial goals, also entailed three

public service provision goal dimensions. This is in line with the proposition advanced in the

theoretical discussion, above, for the use of a variety of goals. Thus, a variety of goals also

acknowledged by public authorities – and not just gathered together pro forma – can help to balance

out the negative experience of underachievement, regardless of whether the managers are responsible

for this underachievement or not.

Another possibility proposed by the managers for an improved reflection of their competencies

was the adaption of goals to the specific needs of their enterprise. This possibility particularly
appealed to the respective managers – even during the interviews, some were already starting to

outline possible adaptions. Almost all of the executive managers refrained from “a one-size-fits-all for

all companies” (Manager V; 87) approach. This became particularly obvious when discussing the

potential of conflicting goals reported as fairly probable in the balanced scorecard approach, and

which diminished not only managers' motivation but also an acceptance of the system. The study's

theoretical model does not take into account conflicting goals. In the case of Citee, though, the

conflict between financial and public service provision goals was very noticeable. Because of the

prevailing financial issues, financial goals were accorded a higher value, which was perceived as

being negative and prompted managers to call for a balanced approach:

“So we don't want it to fail because of that, but the problem [is] that public service provision and

financial goals should have bite, we'll need to work on this so that there is also mutual

acceptance.” (Manager III; 78)

“Well, as already stated, overall, there should be a balance of the [balanced scorecard] elements,

in other words, no 50:50 distribution. [...] Finally, the financial and qualitative goals should be

linked.” (Manager V; 91)

Closely linked to conflicting goals is the concept of controllability and a requirement that “results

should definitely be filtered to determine which components can be influenced” (Manager V; 91).

Conflict automatically renders a set of goals unachievable, as one perspective contradicts another. In

addition, as highlighted by the research, the controllability of particular goals in Citee was also not

guaranteed, as shown by the next quote:

“If I, during a population explosion, have growing numbers, then I can boast about it, but I cannot

help it. And in 15 years, we will all be dealing with declining numbers, and if the utilization

figures then decline, then you still can't do anything about it. So they then also naturally need

some kind of evaluation, but the utilization figures are still essentially meaningful for measuring
 success.” (Manager IV; 43)

The disregard of the controllability principle in Citee is in line with that reported by other

researchers (Bhattacharyya, 2013; Burkert et al., 2011) and points to structural problems requiring

further investigation. A possible solution, proposed by one of the interviewed managers, might be the

transparent publication of the degrees of goal achievement, which might also help with goal

controllability throughout the year.

Enhancing managers' perceived self-determination through autonomy-enhancing measurement

Goal-setting processes were primarily directed by the managers and supervisory boards in Citee.

Thereby, the executive managers of Citee's SOEs were able to influence the goal-setting process and,

thus, directly influence their goals.

“I can influence it. I had a constructive discussion with the chairman of the board, during which

we sorted things out. I think we both felt this afterwards and that things will stay sorted. He didn't

lay down the law or say, 'Take it or leave it', and he didn't accept anything I said which was pie

in the sky or old hat. And that was fine. Essentially, we discussed one of my proposals.”

(Manager IV; 69)

This is in line with research that shows a tendency to use bottom-up approaches for the internal

use of such systems (Torres et al., 2011). The possibility of influencing goal-setting processes also

mirrors the present study's underlying supposition that PMSs that embrace participation and provide

strategic information can foster self-determination. However, public service provision goals, in

particular, were reported as being defined in a participative process that was limited for financial

goals, as financial goals were strictly predefined in view of Citee's poor financial situation:

“I have more room for action – naturally [...] in a narrow corridor [with respect to] the financial

targets.” (Manager V; 82)

 With regard to financial goals, a top-down approach was used in Citee, although interviewees

perceived this as undesirable.

“There is a kind of a tendency to talk the system to death, which at some point leads to it being

out of control, including as far as discussion is concerned.” (Manager III; 76)

This strictness in financial goal setting limited the SOE managers' scope of action, and sometimes

rendered them incapable of acting. Managers were therefore calling for a system that, in a top-down

approach, defined the general dimensions of performance to be measured, but, at the same time,

offered room for participation in the setting of concrete measures.

With respect to strategic information provision, no evidence was found of the use of performance-

measurement information for the communication of strategic goals. This strategic perspective, which,

from a theoretical perspective, is crucial in terms of enabling managers to direct enterprises actively

towards common public goals, was lacking in Citee. Some managers believed that the lack of strategic

information provided by Citee and its administrative bodies was placing obstacles in their way:

“[What goals the city is pursuing] escapes me at the moment.” (Manager I; 23)

Enhancing the perceived impact of managers' work through a broad goal scope

Managers in Citee did not display the increasingly self-interest-centred behaviour predicted by the

research (Edeling et al., 2004). Instead, they saw themselves as public servants and mediators

between political expectations, public needs, and economic interests:

“You know, whether I now have 10 or 12 thousand more or less, I can truly say to you that that

for me is no motivation. [...] Because they pay us well. We have everything we want. Iya. So

someone, who, what do I know, is motivated by one, or maybe two or three months' salary, if that

is their only motivation, then all I can say is that such people are in the wrong place.” (Manager I;

53).
 Also the research did not unequivocally confirm a shift in public managers' behaviour towards a

style more in line with the private sector for all countries (see Xu-hong, 2004), which supports the

view of prior research that involvement in meaningful public service provision is an important

incentive for public managers, compared to private sector managers (Rainey, 1982). In general,

managers in Citee did acknowledge their multidimensional accountabilities and wished to have a

dialog with all involved parties. Correspondingly, Kroll (2015) identified stakeholder involvement as

the second most important factor for enhancing the use of performance-measurement information.

To encompass the broad impact that SOEs have on society in general, the present study found that

PMSs should sensitize managers to and enhance dialogue concerning all accountability dimensions.

Examples of diverse dimensions not yet included in Citee's PMS but of crucial importance for the

fulfilment of SOEs' tasks were reported in many of the interviews. These examples were presented

according to the introduced administrative, political, professional, and social accountability

dimensions. Enhancing sensitivity to these accountability dimensions within goal setting should

increase managers' obligation to justify their actions towards all groups and not just administrative

bodies (Pollitt, 2003; Schlenker et al., 1994).

With respect to administrative accountability, Citee had laid down financial requirements that

managers must fulfil; thus “...to work economically as possible for the city” (Manager II; 25) was at

the core of SOEs administrative accountability.

“So that's the main thing; you know how bleak our budget is, I think soon we will become over-

indebted. I think the capital will soon be exhausted, I no longer remember exactly, but I think by

the end of the year at any rate.” (Manager II; 25)

With respect to political accountability, Citee exhibited a high level of involvement in its owned

enterprises. The city council in particular had a significant influence over executive managers'

decisions. “There's a market master who maintains order in the market, ie they check whether the market

regulations set for us by the board are being complied with.” (Manager II; 9)

But the ruling political parties, too, influenced the goals of the SOEs, with their political ideas
shaped by the expectations of their voters. This also encompassed, for example, youth policy, with

“talks [being] held with the youth welfare office” (Manager VI; 21). Furthermore, every company

specialized in a certain professional field containing specific professional standards and benchmarks,

and, consequently, “prescribed rules and regulations” (Manager IV; 7) were important and formed

part of day-to-day work. The regulations were diverse, and ranged from broader, local area transport

plans to more detailed ones.

“We have a local area transport plan which prescribes certain quality standards for the public

transport network. At the same time, we have set as part of Green Capital targets for the split

model – a gradual increase by 2035 from the current 19% to 25%.” (Manager V; 5)

With regard to socially imposed goals, this study proposes that the public voice should become

visible within set goals and performance standards. Related suggestions in the literature include user

boards, town meetings, public hearings, and customer surveys (Sørensen and Torfing, 2012) as ways

of integrating the public voice into PMSs. However, social goals have, up until now, been absent from

the goal-setting processes in Citee, although non-profit enterprises in particular were very much aware

of their social accountabilities. They also recognized the social aims involved; for example, “[What]

we pursue is the provision of cultural necessities for the region” (Manager I; 20).

The case of Citee furthermore illustrates that a holistic approach to all accountability dimensions

is crucial, as interdependencies exist with other empowerment components. However, ambiguities

resulting from diverse accountabilities could lead to an unmanageable system and dysfunctionality

(Johnson, 2001; March and Olson, 1995). In Citee, in cases in which social accountability or

professional accountability was strongly perceived but administrative accountability was not (due to a

lack of strategic information), the perception of goal clarity was diminished, as financial goals lost

their substantiality without the necessary strategic background, leading to dramatic financial

grievances, even in cases where past financial results had been universally outstanding:

“Everyone knows – and I am checking the actual numbers right now – that next year we will have
 a deficit of 6.3; the following year, 7.2; the following year, 8.1; then 8.7, and then 9.9 million.”

(Manager I; 75)

“In perspective, the financial targets in particular are no longer achievable [...], I have an

enormous need for maintenance, which has also not been displaced by the city.” (Manager V; 79)

However, where all accountability dimensions were holistically perceived, weaknesses in the

PMS, such as unattainable performance goals, did not have such dramatic consequences:

“We will reach our targets but we are operating at the edge.” (Manager II: 81)

Discussion

In exploring the underlying case, this study has shown how PMSs that are designed in accordance

with the concept of psychological empowerment are able to foster managers' active work role and

thus support the effective governance of SOEs. An empowerment-friendly performance measurement

design was proposed in accordance with the four dimensions in which psychological empowerment is

manifested: meaning, competence, self-determination, and impact (Thomas and Velthouse, 1990).

Considering each dimension in turn, first, the meaning of SOE managers' work can be fostered

through the provision of clear goals within a PMS. Goal clarity necessitates that the goals imposed by

administrative as well as political bodies be transparent. Only in this way can a formal and

institutional basis be established from which SOE managers can form a clear view of the value that

they place on their work in relation to their own ideals or standards. However, a PMS needs to

become established itself for it to be perceived as clear and useful for assessing the meaning of one's

work. As was shown in the case of Citee, this process can be additionally supported through extensive

communication, and, within this communication performance, priorities can be established. Goal

transparency can be fostered through a two-way exchange with politicians (who are commonly

reluctant to formulate and set transparent goals), while procedural fairness can be fostered through

transparent goal allocation. All of these aspects helped the managers of Citee's SOEs view their work

as meaningful. In this context, it is also helpful to use information systems as communication

channels, especially between SOE managers, administrative bodies, and politicians (Behn, 2003; Van

Dooren, 2005; Ho, 2006), and communication channels can thus support reliable documentation. With

regard to the multiple accountabilities that SOEs face, procedural fairness in a PMS can further

support the active work role of managers as it increases their acceptance of goal-allocation processes.

The case study showed that PMSs that standardize performance measurement procedures for all SOE

managers through higher acceptance of goals also increase the perceived value of their work and thus

the meaning they attribute to their own work.

Secondly, high degrees of perceived competence are crucial for empowering managers. However,

public managers are largely confronted with difficult and conflicting goals due to their manifold

accountabilities, and goal difficulty has a curvilinear effect on managers' perceived competence. In

Citee, increased motivation and – particularly in financially strong SOEs – increased managerial

innovation capacities were shown when goals were demanding, but, as soon as these veered towards

unattainability and unreasonableness, managers became frustrated and demotivated. Thus, exploratory

use of a PMS can help maintain goals at the difficult but attainable level. From what was observed at

Citee, such exploratory use is possible, as a PMS integrates a multiplicity of goals, keeps track of goal

achievement in a transparent way, sets milestones, and enables the adaptation of measures to the

specific needs of the SOE. Such an exploratory approach can provide a basis for the managers'

personal development and thus can enhance managers' perception of their own competences.

Thirdly, participation in goal-setting processes fosters managers' perceived self-determination.

With respect to financial austerity, such participative processes were limited for financial goals at

Citee. Nevertheless, the case study revealed that the detailed formulation of goals and measures is a

way of enhancing managers' perceived self-determination and thus empowering them. In addition, the

provision of strategic information through PMSs was found to have untapped potential.

Fourthly, a holistic view of goals can reveal the impact of a manager's work to an SOE manager.

In this respect, it was interesting to observe that managers at Citee largely saw themselves as public

servants and acknowledged their multiple accountabilities. Thus, they wished to have a PMS that took

into account all the accountabilities that SOE managers face as well as the goals resulting therefrom,

thereby enhancing any dialogue. This broadened view on goals is a crucial element of a reconsidered
PMS, but is limited, as it entails potential dysfunctionality and unmanageability (Johnson, 2001;

March and Olson, 1995). Thus, rather than integrating all accountability dimensions as particular

measures into a PMS, SOE managers' participation in administrative goal-setting processes, the

occasional invitation of public authorities to advisory board meetings, the use of other professionals'

benchmarks, as well as listening to the public voice can all help to broaden goals without making

them unmanageable.

Each of the presented performance measurement elements considers and supports one

empowerment dimension. In this way, empowerment becomes a means for enhancing the active work

role of SOE managers and the governance of SOEs in general.

Conclusion

Previous studies have tried to determine whether PMSs lead to better outcomes in the public context,

with mixed results (Greiling, 2006). Some scholars have analysed the factors that foster the use of the

provided information (eg Ammons and Rivenbark, 2008; Kroll, 2015), while others have begun to

examine how PMSs should be designed – as opposed to whether or not they should be implemented –

to produce the desired effects (eg Padovani et al., 2010). However, to the present paper's authors'

knowledge, no study has been carried out within the specific context of SOEs. This study therefore

investigated how PMSs might be designed to increase the governance effectiveness of SOEs.

It found that, for the complex settings of SOEs, effective governance solutions require compatible

governance mechanisms, as combined governance solutions can adapt more flexibly to the changing

needs of SOE governance and respond better to historically developed, coexisting governance

mechanisms (Bruton et al., 2015; Christensen and Lægreid, 2007; Grandori, 1997, 2001b). Instead of

outlining the contradictory elements of coexisting governance mechanisms, this study searched for

possibilities for further developing existing ones. In particular, it was investigated how a PMS, as the

basis on which most NPM governance mechanisms are built, can be combined with self-steering

governance mechanisms. When it comes to public value, it is important that SOE managers take an

active role in achieving public goals rather than merely pursuing their own interests. Empowerment at

work supports this, as it leads to increased task motivation (Hall, 2008; Spreitzer, 1995). Thus, we
further developed a model PMS according to the dimensions of psychological empowerment (Conger

and Kanungo, 1988; Hall, 2011; Seibert et al., 2004; Spreitzer, 1995; Thomas and Velthouse, 1990),

and proposed an empowerment-friendly performance measurement design.

The study sought to discover under which conditions PMSs can empower SOE managers, and

hence, assuming a plurality of causal factors within the different dimensions of empowerment, causal

process tracing was chosen (Blatter and Blume, 2008a, 2008b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012; George

and Bennett, 2005) for the “Citee” single-case evaluation. The underlying causal mechanisms of the

study's theoretically deduced concept thus were traced. Based on in-depth interviews with the

executive managers and the CEOs of various German SOEs within the “Citee” case city, the study

found that a clear, transparent, and fairly designed PMS, along with a balanced approach to goal

difficulty and the provision of strategic information through performance-measurement practices,

positively influences all four cognitions in which empowerment is rooted (meaning, competence, self-

determination, and impact). It was shown that these practices, together with a broad view and

discussion of the manifold SOE goals, could empower SOE managers. Consistent with these findings,

an “empowerment-friendly” performance measurement design was presented and the implications for

governance research in the post-NPM decade were outlined. This facilitated the modelling of a

theoretically derived, empowering PMS, enhancing the framework with concrete propositions for its

arrangement.

Theoretical and practical

implications

This paper makes several contributions to performance measurement research in public management.

It extends prior studies that have observed that a particular design of PMS can empower managers and

employees (Hall, 2008; Taylor, 2013). Principally, it proposes a holistic concept for an empowerment-

friendly PMS. As other researchers have shown, empowering managers increases their focused

attention, provokes greater effort and persistence during tasks, improves task strategies, and enhances

their performance (Hall, 2008; Pinder, 1998; Taylor, 2013). Used in the design of PMSs, all of these

benefits can facilitate the governance of SOEs.

Furthermore, the study's findings contradict research streams that assume that output-based

governance mechanisms and self-governance mechanisms are incompatible (Fimreite and Lægreid,
2009; Sørensen, 2012). Instead, this paper calls for a complementary approach, and shows how

elements of empowerment help to construct PMSs that empower managers towards an active work

role. Thus, it follows recent literature that takes a holistic view of governance mechanisms

(Christensen and Lægreid, 2007, 2010; Christensen, 2012; Egeberg and Trondal, 2009). From this

standpoint, combined governance mechanisms offer an effective solution to complex governance

settings, as they can flexibly adapt to constantly changing and layering governance needs (Christensen

and Lægreid, 2010; Grandori, 1997, 2001a; Morner and Misgeld, 2013).

Finally, this paper contributes to existing research in that it links the proposed empowerment-

friendly PMS to contextual factors – namely, the highly complex and volatile setting of SOEs that

face multiple and diverse accountabilities.

The case study reveals how PMSs can be designed (a) according to the principles of goal clarity,

transparency, and procedural fairness to foster managers' perceived meaning of work; (b) to ensure

exploratory use of performance information and the controllability of performance targets, both of

which foster managers' perceived levels of competence; (c) to enable participation and provide

strategic information in order to enhance managers' perception of self-determination; and (d) to

integrate multiple dimensions of public value creation and non-financial measures in order to increase

the perceived impact of managers' work. Therefore, administrative bodies, ownership managers, and

municipal finance officers are advised to re-think existing governance structures in order to empower

managers through effectively designed PMSs and prevent them from following their own interests.

Previous studies have described public managers as increasingly turning towards their self-interests

and neglecting their public tasks (Edeling et al., 2004). The present case study, however, observed

SOE managers as highly and intrinsically motivated by the higher-level public services that their

enterprises are providing. Practitioners in the field of public administration might beneficially act on

this paper's findings by placing a stronger emphasis on all the dimensions of empowerment (namely,

competence, self-determination, and impact) as central regulators of performance measurement

practices in order to enhance present levels of public-service motivation.

Limitations
This study focused on performance measurement practices. From a content-related point of view,

however, it is also important to assess the reasons why performance information is being measured.

For the public sector, strategic decision making, learning, controlling, and budgeting as well as

sanctioning and rewarding are revealed as purposeful reasons for measuring performance information

(Behn, 2003; Van Dooren et al., 2010; Kroll, 2015; Moynihan, 2009). Accordingly, van Veen-Dirks

(2010) concluded that, depending on their use, PMSs could be adapted. In the present case, the

significant underlying performance information use concerned the effective governance of SOEs.

However, different recommendations might be derived for other purposes.

Also, the context of the study's findings was restricted to a German setting, which provides

opportunities for further research in other countries. Likewise, Citee was a specific example, facing as

it was the dilemma of extreme financial pressure (Döhrn et al., 2013; Schwarting, 2004). However,

the study's findings might lead to different empowering goals and structural conclusions in other

municipal settings.

Moreover, a qualitative methodology was used to trace the underlying causal mechanisms that

could lead to managers' empowerment through PMSs. In particular, the relative meaning of

empowerment with respect to governance effectiveness should be tested, and the actual dearth of

influence on self-governance elaborated. Through the study's purposive sampling (Table I), insights

were gained into a diverse spectrum of public tasks and accountabilities. However, as with other

qualitative studies, generalizations cannot be derived from it. The objective of process tracing is to

refine theory rather than generalize it (Blatter and Blume, 2008a, 2008b; Blatter and Haverland, 2012;

George and Bennett, 2005). Examining the applicability of this study's refined results within

comparative case studies could be a possible next research step, and would help to situate these results

in a more general context. For instance, focusing on and elucidating specific governance mechanisms

vis-à-vis the specific business activities of SOEs, executive managers' positions, and/or SOEs' legal

forms could offer additional criteria for further research on the design of empowering PMSs. Lastly,

further quantitative research is needed to support the current study's framework. Nevertheless, this

study and its findings mark a starting point for the exploration of how PMSs as the foundation of

output-based NPM governance can be designed to simultaneously empower those whose performance
is being measured.

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