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MAJ
35,2 Karakteristik komite audit
dan agresivitas pajak
Manon DeslandesdanAnne Fortin
Departemen Akuntansi, ESG UQAM, Montreal, Kanada, dan
272
Suzanne Landry
Diterima 11 Desember Departemen Studi Akuntansi, HEC Montreal, Montreal, Kanada
2018 Revisi 29 Maret 2019
8 Juli 2019
Diterima 22 Oktober 2019

Abstrak
Tujuan -Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis hubungan antara penggunaan perencanaan pajak agresif perusahaan dengan
beberapa karakteristik anggota komite audit, yaitu independensi, keahlian, ketekunan, dan keragaman gender.

Desain/metodologi/pendekatan –Makalah ini merupakan penelitian empiris dengan menggunakan data arsip
dari 289 emiten Kanada periode 2011-2015.
Temuan –Penulis menemukan bahwa ukuran keahlian dan ketekunan secara signifikan berhubungan dengan agresivitas
pajak. Keahlian keuangan dan masa jabatan di komite audit memainkan peran penting dalam membatasi agresivitas
pajak, seperti halnya memiliki komite audit yang lebih besar.
Keterbatasan/implikasi penelitian –Satu batasan - dan area untuk penelitian masa depan - adalah
bahwa efek dari hubungan anggota komite audit dengan manajer perusahaan tidak diselidiki.
Implikasi praktis –Pengetahuan tentang karakteristik komite audit dapat mengirimkan sinyal kepada pemegang saham,
investor dan agen pajak mengenai potensi risiko perusahaan sehubungan dengan perencanaan pajak yang agresif.
Analisis ini memberikan wawasan yang berguna bagi komite tata kelola dewan ketika menentukan profil orang yang akan
dicalonkan untuk posisi dewan dan komite. Dalam membahas manajemen risiko pajak, penelitian ini dapat meningkatkan
kesadaran anggota komite audit tentang peran mereka dalam hal ini.
Orisinalitas/nilai –Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa bahkan dalam pengaturan di mana insentif bagi perusahaan untuk
menjadi agresif pajak rendah dibandingkan dengan negara dengan tarif pajak tinggi, ada variabilitas dalam agresivitas pajak
perusahaan. Situasi ini memungkinkan kita untuk menemukan karakteristik komite audit yang efektif dalam mengurangi agresivitas
pajak.

Kata kunciIndependensi, Komite Audit, Keahlian, Keragaman Gender, Keagresifan Pajak,

Ketekunan
Jenis kertasmakalah penelitian

Jurnal Audit Manajerial
Jil. 35 No.2, 2020
hal.272-293
© EmeraldPublishingLimited
0268-6902
DOI10.1108/MAJ-12-2018-2109
1. Perkenalan
Sudah menjadi kebiasaan bagi manajemen untuk melakukan segala upaya untuk meminimalkan
pengeluaran pajak yang secara signifikan mempengaruhi hasil operasi dan posisi keuangan perusahaan.
Berbagai strategi pajak dapat digunakan, termasuk strategi yang menghormati semangat hukum dan
strategi lain yang mengikuti aturan hukum tetapi tetap dianggap “agresif.” Dalam dunia yang semakin
terhubung, undang-undang perpajakan nasional terkadang gagal mengimbangi korporasi global,
pergerakan modal yang lancar dan kebangkitan ekonomi digital, meninggalkan celah dan
ketidaksesuaian yang dapat dimanfaatkan untuk menghasilkan non-pajak ganda. Ini merusak keadilan
dan integritas sistem perpajakan (OECD, 2016).
Saat ini, masyarakat mengharapkan perusahaan untuk bertanggung jawab secara sosial, yang mengharuskan perusahaan untuk
menyeimbangkan kepentingan berbagai pemangku kepentingan, termasuk kewajiban mereka untuk membayar secara adil.
Para penulis mengakui dukungan keuangan dari CPA Quebec Foundation dan Profesor
Akuntansi dan Perpajakan Roland-Chagnon, HEC Montreal.
bagian pajak kepada pemerintah dan masyarakat (Sikka, 2010). Oleh karena itu, penerapan strategi audit
perpajakan yang hanya menghormati aturan hukum tidak memenuhi kriteria kewarganegaraan
komite
perusahaan yang baik saat ini.
Perusahaan pajak-agresif (multinasional dan lain-lain) mungkin menghadapi risiko reputasi yang
karakteristik
signifikan, selain risiko litigasi, jika tarif pajak efektif mereka dipandang terlalu rendah (OECD, 2016).
Misalnya, peneliti (Payne dan Raiborn, 2018), investor dan masyarakat umum semakin kritis terhadap
penyimpangan etika yang serius dan terkenal sebagai akibat dari strategi agresif pajak yang
dimanfaatkan oleh perusahaan, seperti yang terjadi dengan Google, Amazon dan Starbucks (Barford dan
273
Holt, 2013). Penghematan pajak yang dihasilkan dari perencanaan pajak yang agresif dan strategi
minimalisasi pajak dapat jauh lebih kecil daripada biaya reputasi ketika kasus litigasi pajak menjadi
pengetahuan publik, dan jenis publisitas ini dapat secara signifikan berdampak pada nilai pasar
perusahaan (Hanlon dan Slemrod, 2009). Dewan direksi dianggap sebagai mekanisme tata kelola yang
efektif dan badan yang bertanggung jawab untuk melindungi kepentingan pemegang saham (Fama dan
Jensen, 1983). Untuk manajemen dan tata kelola risiko pajak yang tepat, dewan harus dapat
mendiskusikan, memperdebatkan, dan memengaruhi posisi risiko pajak perusahaan secara keseluruhan
sebagai bagian dari peran pengawasannya (Packard, 2010).
Agar efisien, dewan harus mendelegasikan beberapa kegiatan pengawasan dan pengendaliannya
kepada sub-komite (Pedagang, 1987;Menon dan Williams, 1994). Komite audit dapat berperan dalam
membantu dewan untuk memberikan perhatian yang memadai terhadap manajemen risiko pajak karena
masalah keuangan dan yang terkait dengan risiko biasanya ditangani di tingkat komite audit sebelum
menjadi perhatian dewan (Pedagang, 1987;Cokelatdkk.,2009;Ernst dan Young, 2014). Oleh karena itu,
kami mempertanyakan apakah karakteristik komite audit tertentu dapat berkontribusi pada penilaian
risiko pajak yang lebih baik dan deteksi agresivitas pajak. Lebih khusus lagi, kami menyelidiki
karakteristik komite audit mana yang terkait dengan agresivitas pajak yang lebih rendah.

Sementara literatur banyak mendokumentasikan hubungan antara karakteristik komite

audit dan manajemen risiko selain manajemen risiko pajak, beberapa studi empiris telah
meneliti dampak mekanisme tata kelola pada manajemen risiko pajak (Lanis dan
Richardson, 2011;Lanidkk.,2017). Para penulis yang menganalisis aspek ini secara eksklusif
berfokus pada dampak di tingkat dewan. Studi saat ini menggali lebih jauh dengan melihat
hubungan antara penggunaan perencanaan pajak agresif perusahaan dan beberapa
karakteristik anggota komite audit, yaitu, independensi, keahlian, ketekunan dan
keragaman gender.
Konteks Kanada menyediakan pengaturan yang kaya untuk menganalisis pertanyaan penelitian kami
karena alasan berikut. Pertama, Komite Audit Instrumen Nasional Kanada 52-110 (Komisi Sekuritas
Ontario, 2011) meminta perusahaan yang terdaftar untuk memiliki komite audit yang sesuai dengan
persyaratan peraturan. Kedua, Kanada memiliki salah satu tarif pajak penghasilan badan terendah dari
negara-negara OECD (KPMG, 2016). Misalnya, selama periode yang diteliti (2011-2015), rata-rata
gabungan tarif pajak penghasilan badan federal dan provinsi/negara bagian di Kanada dan AS masing-
masing sekitar 27 persen dan 39 persen, menunjukkan bahwa perusahaan Kanada berada di bawah
tekanan untuk menjadi pajak-agresif dari rekan-rekan AS mereka. Ketiga, meskipun Kanada memiliki
salah satu tingkat kepatuhan pajak sukarela tertinggi di dunia, tetap saja Kanada terkena penghindaran
pajak dan penghindaran pajak yang agresif, seperti halnya semua negara. Selama dekade terakhir,
Badan Pendapatan Kanada (CRA) telah bekerja keras untuk melindungi integritas sistem pajak dan masih
mengejar tujuan itu hari ini. Misalnya, CRA menilai risiko pajak dari semua pengembalian pajak
perusahaan bisnis besar setiap tahun. Ia melakukan lebih dari seribu audit pembayar pajak dengan
hubungan lepas pantai (155 di antaranya sehubungan dengan Panama Papers). Di tingkat internasional,
CRA bekerja sama dengan 50 negara anggota OECD lainnya untuk berbagi praktik terbaik dan tren yang
muncul dan untuk
MAJ menangani risiko internasional[1]. Mengingat liputan media Kanada tentang Kebocoran Luksemburg dan

35,2 skandal Panama Papers[2], masyarakat semakin khawatir tentang perilaku pajak perusahaan dan
individu kaya. Keempat, selama periode penelitian, Kanada menikmati ekonomi yang lebih stabil
daripada Amerika Serikat dan Uni Eropa, setelah menghindari penurunan ekonomi dan menunjukkan
indikator ekonomi yang kuat dan perolehan laba perusahaan. Lingkungan yang stabil ini mengurangi
ketidakpastian bagi perusahaan dan sekarang memberikan konteks yang homogen untuk penelitian ini.

274 Akhirnya, kami mengukur variabel agresivitas pajak kami selama periode lima tahun untuk
menghaluskan setiap variasi tahunan dalam tarif pajak efektif (ETR) dan untuk mewujudkan efek jangka
menengah dan panjang dari strategi pajak perusahaan. Pengaturan ini memperkuat signifikansi dari
setiap hasil yang diperoleh mengenai hubungan antara karakteristik anggota komite audit dan
agresivitas pajak.
Hasil kami menunjukkan bahwa bahkan dalam pengaturan di mana insentif bagi perusahaan untuk
menjadi agresif pajak rendah dibandingkan dengan negara dengan tarif pajak tinggi, ada variabilitas
dalam agresivitas pajak perusahaan. Situasi ini memungkinkan kita untuk menemukan karakteristik
komite audit yang efektif dalam mengurangi agresivitas pajak. Selanjutnya, hasil ini kuat untuk periode di
mana variabel dependen diukur, yaitu rata-rata lima tahun atau data tahunan. Secara keseluruhan, hasil
penelitian menunjukkan bahwa keahlian dan ketekunan berhubungan secara signifikan dengan
agresivitas pajak. Keahlian keuangan dan masa jabatan di komite audit memainkan peran penting dalam
membatasi agresivitas pajak, dan komite audit yang lebih besar meningkatkan kinerja komite dalam
mengekang agresivitas pajak.
Studi empiris ini memiliki beberapa implikasi dan kontribusi. Pengetahuan perusahaan tentang
karakteristik komite audit dapat mengirimkan sinyal kepada pemegang saham, investor, dan agen pajak
tentang potensi risiko perusahaan sehubungan dengan perencanaan pajak yang agresif. Studi ini juga
memberikan wawasan yang berguna untuk membantu komite tata kelola dewan menentukan profil
orang yang akan dicalonkan untuk posisi dewan dan komite. Kesadaran individu ini tentang peran tata
kelola mereka dapat ditingkatkan dengan diskusi kita tentang manajemen risiko pajak. Dan terakhir,
pengaturan studi meningkatkan kekokohan hasil kami dan meningkatkan pemahaman tentang
agresivitas pajak perusahaan.
Sisa makalah ini disusun sebagai berikut. Bagian 2 menyajikan definisi agresivitas
pajak, diikuti dengan latar belakang teoritis dan hipotesis penelitian di Bagian 3.
Metode penelitian dirinci dalam Bagian 4, dan hasilnya disajikan dalam Bagian 5.
Bagian 6 menyajikan kesimpulan dan implikasi penelitian.

2. Pengertian agresivitas pajak

Tidak ada definisi yang diterima secara universal tentang penghindaran pajak dan agresivitas pajak. Slemrod
(2004)mendefinisikan penghindaran pajak sebagai segala sesuatu yang dilakukan perusahaan untuk mengurangi
kewajiban pajak mereka.Hanlon dan Heitzman (2010)menjelaskan bahwa penghindaran pajak dapat dilihat
sebagai rangkaian strategi perencanaan pajak yang dibukukan oleh strategi hukum dan penghindaran pajak.
Kegiatan perencanaan pajak bisa berada di mana saja di sepanjang kontinum ini tergantung pada agresivitasnya
dalam mengurangi pajak. Namun, tingkat agresivitas ada di mata yang melihatnya, dan persepsi semacam itu
dapat sangat bervariasi (Hanlon dan Heitzman, 2010).
Otoritas pajak Kanada, Canada Revenue Agency (CRA), mengakui bahwa wajib pajak berhak
mengatur urusan mereka untuk mengurangi kewajiban pajak mereka [Badan Pendapatan Kanada (CRA),
2013]. Namun, mendorong batas secara agresif menciptakan risiko melintasi batas antara perencanaan
pajak yang dapat diterima dan perencanaan pajak yang agresif atau kasar (KRA, 2013). Pengaturan
perencanaan pajak yang agresif seringkali memiliki beberapa dasar hukum dalam arti yang sangat
teknis, tetapi mereka tidak menghormati maksud dari undang-undang tersebut (KRA, 2013). Umumnya,
pengaturan perencanaan pajak yang agresif dibuat untuk tujuan utama menghindari pembayaran pajak
yang diwajibkan, dan dengan demikian dapat melanggar hukum (KRA, 2013).
 Dalam makalah ini, premis kami adalah bahwa perusahaan yang agresif pajak menerapkan strategi pajak audit
yang bertujuan untuk mengurangi kewajiban pajak mereka dalam jangka menengah dan panjang. Strategi
komite
tersebut dapat menghormati semangat hukum, mematuhi huruf hukum saja, atau melanggar hukum
sepenuhnya. Perlu dicatat bahwa makalah ini tidak bermaksud untuk menilai etika agresivitas penghindaran
karakteristik
pajak, melainkan untuk fokus pada hubungan antara yang terakhir dan karakteristik anggota komite audit.

3. Latar belakang teori dan hipotesis penelitian

275
3.1 Manajemen risiko pajak
Manajemen umumnya berusaha untuk meminimalkan pengeluaran pajak yang secara signifikan mempengaruhi
hasil operasi dan posisi keuangan perusahaan. Berbagai strategi perpajakan dapat digunakan, mulai dari yang
menjunjung semangat hukum hingga yang dianggap agresif. Perencanaan pajak yang agresif dapat
mengakibatkan tingkat risiko pajak yang tidak dapat diterima.Guentherdkk. (2017, p. 115) menunjukkan bahwa
"rata-rata, penghindaran pajak perusahaan dicapai dengan menggunakan strategi yang gigih dan tidak
meningkatkan risiko perusahaan [dalam hal volatilitas pengembalian saham]." Namun demikian, perusahaan
yang tidak memantau agresivitas pajak secara efektif berperilaku dengan cara yang lebih berisiko.
Mengabaikan risiko pajak mungkin tidak sesuai dengan tujuan memaksimalkan kekayaan pemegang saham.
Di satu sisi, sebuah perusahaan yang mengadopsi sikap terlalu konservatif mungkin berakhir membayar lebih
dari bagian yang adil dari pajak. Di sisi lain, perusahaan yang menggunakan perencanaan pajak agresif mungkin
harus mengeluarkan biaya besar setelah audit pajak, yang dapat berdampak buruk pada reputasi perusahaan (
Freedman, 2010) dan nilai pasar (Hanlon dan Slemrod, 2009). Sebagai alternatif, perusahaan yang agresif pajak
mungkin tidak tertangkap dan bisa membayar kurang dari bagian pajak yang adil. Dalam kasus seperti itu,
kewajiban pemegang saham untuk memaksimalkan kekayaan lebih diutamakan daripada pertimbangan
hubungan simbiosis antara bisnis dan masyarakat. Meskipun manajemen senior bertanggung jawab untuk
mengelola risiko perusahaan dan untuk memastikan kebijakan pengawasan, terserah kepada dewan direksi
untuk memantau apakah perusahaan mengelola risikonya dengan benar. Di antara manfaat dari pengawasan
ini,Minnick dan Noga (2010)menunjukkan bahwa manajemen risiko pajak yang lebih baik secara positif terkait
dengan pengembalian yang lebih tinggi. Komite audit tidak diragukan lagi dapat membantu dewan memberikan
perhatian yang memadai terhadap manajemen risiko pajak, mengingat bahwa masalah keuangan dan yang
terkait dengan risiko biasanya ditangani di tingkat komite audit sebelum menjadi perhatian dewan (Pedagang,
1987;Cokelatdkk.,2009;Ernst dan Young, 2014). Komite audit harus memantau apakah perusahaan mengelola
risikonya sesuai dengan selera risiko pajak yang ditetapkan dalam strategi dewan. Untuk tujuan ini, komite audit
harus meninjau area ketidakpastian dan penilaian yang signifikan (Deloitte, 2016).

Mengingat diskusi di atas, kami menyelidiki karakteristik tata kelola komite audit dalam
kaitannya dengan agresivitas pajak.

3.2 Pengawasan komite audit atas risiko pajak

Empat kategori karakteristik dapat berdampak pada pengawasan pajak komite audit:
independensi anggota komite, keahlian mereka, ketekunan komite, dan keragaman
gendernya. Teori agensi (Watts dan Zimmerman, 1986) memberikan landasan teoretis luas
yang menjelaskan bagaimana karakteristik komite audit memengaruhi pemantauan
agresivitas pajak mereka.
3.2.1 Independensi komite audit.Untuk memenuhi peran pemantauan dan perlindungannya
kepentingan pemegang saham, komite audit harus independen dari manajemen. Mirip dengan
SOX di AS, Komite Audit Instrumen Nasional Kanada 52-110 (Komisi Sekuritas Ontario, 2011)
mensyaratkan bahwa semua anggota komite audit harus independen[3]. Penelitian sebelumnya
menunjukkan bahwa komite audit independen dapat lebih objektif menilai pengendalian internal
dan pengungkapan informasi keuangan (Abbottdkk.,2004). Ini juga bisa
MAJ mengurangi manajemen laba[4] (Klein, 2002;Bédarddkk.,2004;Ibrahim, 2007;Lin dan Hwang, 2010;De

35,2 Vlaminck dan Sarens, 2015), mengurangi kemungkinan penyajian kembali (Abbott dkk.,2004;Farber, 2005
;Larry dan Taylor, 2012) serta tingkat keparahannya (Larry dan Taylor, 2012) dan kecil kemungkinannya
untuk dikenai sanksi karena penipuan atau akuntansi yang agresif (Abbottdkk., 2000). Hal ini
menunjukkan bahwa komite audit independen adalah mekanisme tata kelola yang berhasil yang dapat
meningkatkan pengendalian internal dan kualitas pelaporan keuangan perusahaan.

276 Selanjutnya, remunerasi anggota komite audit dalam bentuk skema saham atau opsi saham dapat
membahayakan independensi para aktor ini, yang dapat memutuskan untuk menyelaraskan
kepentingan mereka dengan kepentingan manajemen, sehingga merugikan peran pengawasan mereka.
Bédarddkk. (2004) menunjukkan bahwa manajemen laba meningkat dengan proporsi opsi saham
anggota komite audit yang dapat dieksekusi dalam dua bulan setelah akhir tahun fiskal. Archambeault
dkk. (2008)menemukan bahwa penyajian kembali akuntansi berhubungan positif dengan proporsi opsi
saham jangka pendek atau jangka panjang dalam kompensasi anggota komite audit. Lin dan Hwang
(2010)meta-analisis pada manajemen laba menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan saham komite audit
berpengaruh positif terhadap manajemen laba.
Penelitian telah menunjukkan bahwa independensi komite audit meningkatkan pemantauan
informasi keuangan dan diperlukan untuk manajemen risiko pajak, mengingat anggota komite
audit nonindependen mungkin ingin meminimalkan pajak untuk meningkatkan laba bersih dan
harga saham. Bukti yang ada tentang hubungan antara independensi dan agresivitas pajak
terbatas pada dewan dan termasuk studi oleh:Lanis dan Richardson (2011) danAliani dan Zarai
(2012), keduanya menyarankan agar direktur independen mengurangi perencanaan pajak yang
agresif. Karena komite audit terdiri dari anggota dewan, dan mengingat bahwa komite ini wajib
untuk perusahaan yang terdaftar di Kanada dan bahwa mereka merupakan mekanisme yang
efisien untuk memantau risiko pajak, anggota komite audit independen harus membantu
mengurangi agresivitas pajak. Dengan demikian kami menguji hipotesis berikut:

H1.Perusahaan dengan komite audit independen kurang agresif terhadap pajak.

3.2.2 Keahlian komite audit.Karakteristik mendasar lain dari komite audit adalah keahlian. Ini
dapat diperoleh melalui pengalaman dalam urusan keuangan, jabatan direktur atau keanggotaan
di dewan dan masa jabatan lainnya. Mirip dengan SOX di AS, Komite Audit Instrumen Nasional
Kanada 52-110 (Komisi Sekuritas Ontario, 2011) mengharuskan semua anggota komite audit
melek finansial. Namun, peraturan tersebut tidak meminta komite audit untuk mengungkapkan
apakah itu termasuk setidaknya satu ahli keuangan seperti yang dipersyaratkan di bawah SOX di
AS[5]. Namun demikian, pernyataan proxy harus mencakup deskripsi pendidikan dan pengalaman
anggota komite audit yang dianggap relevan dengan tanggung jawab mereka (Komisi Sekuritas
Ontario, 2011). Penelitian sebelumnya menyimpulkan bahwa kehadiran anggota dengan keahlian
keuangan memungkinkan komite audit untuk menjalankan peran pengawasannya dengan lebih
baik (Lagu dan Windram, 2004;Krishnan dan Visvanathan, 2008); mengurangi potensi manajemen
laba (Xiedkk.,2003;Bédarddkk.,2004;Lin dan Hwang, 2010); dan mengurangi kemungkinan
penyajian kembali (Abbottdkk.,2004;Farber, 2005;Larry dan Taylor, 2012).
Lebih khusus lagi, dalam survei terhadap 134 anggota komite audit perusahaan publik AS, Wilbanks
dkk. (2017)menemukan bahwa anggota dengan pengalaman profesional sebagai pengontrol perusahaan
mengambil lebih banyak tindakan untuk menilai risiko pelaporan keuangan yang curang dan integritas
manajemen. Dalam sebuah percobaan,Pomeroy (2010)mencatat bahwa anggota komite audit dengan
pengalaman akuntansi lebih teliti ketika menyelidiki keputusan akuntansi yang agresif.Baxter dan Cotter
(2009)danDhaliwaldkk. (2010)menemukan bahwa keahlian akuntansi pada komite audit meningkatkan
kualitas akrual. Dalam contoh asuransi kewajiban properti, Mataharidkk. (2012)mengamati hubungan
antara akuntansi, keuangan, dan keahlian keuangan asuransi dan perkiraan cadangan kerugian yang
lebih akurat. Beberapa penelitian tidak menemukan
hubungan yang signifikan antara keahlian keuangan anggota komite audit dan ukuran audit
kualitas pelaporan keuangan, yaitu penyajian kembali laba untukLindkk. (2006)dan komite
manajemen laba nyata untukMataharidkk. (2014).
Keahlian juga bisa datang dari duduk di komite audit lain, karena pengalaman ini dapat
karakteristik
memperluas pengetahuan anggota tentang praktik pemantauan.Bédarddkk. (2004)
menunjukkan hubungan negatif antara jabatan direktur lainnya anggota komite audit dan
manajemen laba.De Vlaminck dan Sarens (2015)menunjukkan hubungan positif antara
proporsi anggota komite audit yang merangkap jabatan lebih dari tiga direktur dan kualitas 277
laporan keuangan. Namun,Lagu dan Windram (2004)hasil menunjukkan bahwa beberapa
direktur dapat merusak efektivitas komite audit dalam pelaporan keuangan. Demikian pula,
Mataharidkk. (2014)menemukan hubungan positif antara jabatan direktur tambahan
anggota komite audit dan manajemen laba riil. Mereka mengaitkan temuan ini dengan
fakta bahwa efektivitas pemantauan anggota komite audit terganggu oleh kesibukan
mereka (Mataharidkk.,2014).
Masa jabatan dapat meningkatkan pengetahuan anggota tentang urusan perusahaan dan
manajemen eksekutifnya dan meningkatkan efektivitas anggota dalam pemantauan (Bédarddkk.,2004;
Matahari dkk.,2014). Namun,Vafeas (2003)menunjukkan bahwa direktur jangka panjang cenderung
berteman dengan manajer dan dengan demikian menjadi kurang efektif dalam memantau mereka.
Dhaliwaldkk. (2010)menunjukkan hubungan positif antara kualitas akrual dan rata-rata masa kerja dewan
anggota komite audit.Bédarddkk. (2004)menemukan bahwa masa jabatan anggota komite audit
berpengaruh negatif terhadap manajemen laba sedangkanMataharidkk. (2014)tidak menemukan
hubungan dengan manajemen laba riil.
Hasil penelitian yang dilaporkan di atas umumnya menunjukkan bahwa keahlian komite audit
meningkatkan pemantauan informasi keuangan. Dalam kaitannya dengan manajemen risiko pajak,
keahlian anggota komite audit bisa menjadi sama pentingnya, jika tidak lebih, karena pajak adalah
domain khusus. Dengan demikian kami menguji hipotesis berikut:

H2.Perusahaan dengan anggota komite audit ahli kurang agresif terhadap pajak.

3.2.3 Ketekunan komite audit.Ketekunan adalah proses dimana komite audit dapat efektif dalam
melaksanakan tanggung jawabnya kepada pemangku kepentingan (DeZoortdkk.,2002). Literatur
telah mengukur sifat ini menggunakan proxy seperti frekuensi rapat komite audit dan ukuran
komite audit (Larry dan Taylor, 2012;Menon dan Williams, 1994).
Untuk memantau manajemen secara efektif, komite audit harus bertemu secara teratur.
Meskipun Komite Audit Instrumen Nasional Kanada 52-110 (Komisi Sekuritas Ontario, 2011) tidak
menentukan jumlah minimum pertemuan per tahun, komite audit biasanya bertemu setiap
kuartal. Ketika komite audit sering bertemu, insiden masalah pelaporan keuangan dapat menurun
(Farber, 2005) dan efektivitas panitia meningkat (Lagu dan Windram, 2004).Xiedkk. (2003)danLin
dan Hwang (2010)menunjukkan bahwa jumlah rapat komite audit berhubungan negatif dengan
manajemen laba. Beasleydkk. (2000)menemukan bahwa perusahaan non-penipuan bertemu lebih
sering daripada perusahaan penipuan. Abbottdkk. (2004)menunjukkan bahwa minimal empat
pertemuan komite audit per tahun menyebabkan terjadinya penyajian kembali yang lebih rendah.
Namun frekuensi pertemuan tidak berhubungan dengan manajemen laba dalamBédarddkk. (
2004), kualitas laba dalamBaxter dan Cotter (2009), atau terjadinya penyajian kembali laba dalam
Lindkk. (2006).
Selain itu, untuk melaksanakan tanggung jawabnya dengan baik, komite audit
diharuskan memiliki jumlah anggota minimal (ukuran komite audit). Misalnya, Komite Audit
Instrumen Nasional Kanada 52-110 (Komisi Sekuritas Ontario, 2011) menetapkan setidaknya
tiga anggota. Penambahan anggota dapat meningkatkan kinerja komite karena
meningkatkan jumlah orang yang memenuhi syarat untuk ditarik (Vafeas, 2005)
MAJ dan memperluas jangkauan keahlian (Baxter dan Cotter, 2009). Namun, dapat merugikan
35,2 jika panitia terlalu besar, karena kerugian proses dan difusi tanggung jawab (Vafeas, 2005).
Yang dan Krishnan (2005)danLin dan Hwang (2010)menemukan bahwa ukuran komite audit
berhubungan negatif dengan manajemen labaXiedkk. (2003) danBédarddkk. (2004)tidak
menemukan hubungan seperti itu.Lindkk.'s (2006)Hasil menunjukkan hubungan negatif
antara ukuran komite audit dan terjadinya penyajian kembali labaAbbottdkk. (2004)tidak
278 menemukan asosiasi seperti itu.Mataharidkk. (2014)tidak menemukan hubungan antara
ukuran komite audit dan manajemen laba riil, sedangkanBaxter dan Cotter (2009)tidak
mendeteksi satu dengan kualitas laba.
Hasil sehubungan dengan ketekunan komite audit beragam. Namun, karena ketekunan adalah
proses di mana komite audit dapat efektif dalam memberikan tanggung jawabnya kepada pemangku
kepentingan (DeZoortdkk.,2002), termasuk manajemen risiko pajak, kami merumuskan hipotesis berikut:

H3.Perusahaan dengan komite audit yang rajin kurang agresif terhadap pajak.

3.2.4 Keragaman gender komite audit.Beberapa alasan dapat menjelaskan mengapa memiliki wanita di
komite audit sangat berharga. Sutradara wanita lebih berorientasi pada proses (elangdkk.,1992) dan
partisipatif (elangdkk.,2003), memiliki lebih banyak keterampilan komunikasi dan lebih siap untuk rapat (
Stewart dan Munro, 2007). Sutradara wanita mengangkat lebih banyak masalah (Tukang gerobakdkk.,
2003) dan mengajukan pertanyaan sulit, menantang manajemen untuk menjelaskan sudut pandangnya (
Kramerdkk., 2006). Sutradara wanita membantu mengurangi tingkat konflik, sehingga meningkatkan
efektivitas (Nielsen dan Huse, 2010). Kehadiran direktur perempuan membantu menghasilkan wacana
produktif yang “melibatkan penyajian perspektif dan sudut pandang yang berbeda, yang pada akhirnya
dapat menghasilkan lebih banyak alternatif dan pengambilan keputusan yang lebih berkualitas terkait
dengan strategi dan praktik organisasi” (Nielsen dan Huse, 2010, p. 138).
Sejumlah penelitian menekankan dampak yang menguntungkan dari perempuan pada peran
pengawasan komite audit.Thiruvadi dan Huang (2011)melaporkan bahwa kehadiran direktur wanita di
komite audit memiliki dampak yang menguntungkan pada manajemen laba dengan meningkatkan
akrual diskresioner negatif, sehingga menurunkan pendapatan. Anggota komite audit wanita yang
disurvei olehWilbanksdkk. (2017)lebih mungkin daripada anggota laki-laki untuk melaporkan terlibat
dalam tindakan untuk menilai integritas manajemen. Komite audit dengan setidaknya satu direktur
wanita lebih aktif daripada komite yang semuanya pria (Thiruvadi, 2012).
Dalam hal perilaku berisiko yang terkait dengan pajak, literaturnya beragam.Bobek dan Hatfield (2004)
menemukan bahwa laki-laki dan perempuan sama-sama cenderung memberikan nasihat pajak yang agresif,
tetapi bobekdkk. (2010)menunjukkan bahwa profesional pajak wanita dibandingkan dengan pria cenderung tidak
merekomendasikan dan mengizinkan posisi pajak yang menguntungkan klien. Dalam percobaan bidang surat,
Hasseldine dan Hite (2003)menunjukkan bahwa perempuan lebih patuh pajak daripada laki-laki, sementara
Fransiskusdkk. (2014)menemukan bahwa CFO pria dikaitkan dengan lebih banyak agresivitas pajak dibandingkan
dengan rekan-rekan wanita mereka.Lanidkk. (2017)menunjukkan bahwa kehadiran perempuan di dewan
mengurangi agresivitas pajak.
Diskusi di atas menunjukkan bahwa direktur perempuan meningkatkan pemantauan komite audit.
Ini membawa kita untuk mengusulkan hipotesis berikut:

H4.Perusahaan dengan komite audit yang beragam gender kurang agresif terhadap pajak.

4. Metode penelitian
4.1 Sampel
Sampel kami mencakup perusahaan publik Kanada yang terdaftar di TSX yang aktif selama
periode lima tahun mulai tahun 2011. Kami memilih jangka waktu ini karena alasan berikut.
Pertama, ini memungkinkan kita untuk menghitung ETR jangka panjang[6] untuk mengidentifikasi perusahaan yang Audit
terlibat dalam strategi pajak yang mengurangi kewajiban pajak mereka dalam jangka menengah dan panjang. Kedua,
committee
perusahaan publik Kanada diminta untuk mengadopsi standar pelaporan keuangan internasional paling lambat untuk
characteristics
tahun fiskal yang dimulai 1 Januari 2011. Akibatnya, data akuntansi yang digunakan untuk mengukur variabel dalam
model ditetapkan dengan dasar yang sebanding untuk seluruh periode.
Dari daftar 975 perusahaan di Stock Guide, kami mengecualikan 157 perusahaan yang tidak terdaftar di TSX,
68 perwalian pendapatan, 25 perusahaan bukan penduduk di Kanada, 349 perusahaan yang menyajikan
pendapatan sebelum pajak negatif untuk seluruh periode karena perusahaan-perusahaan ini tidak akan
279
membayar pajak, 67 perusahaan dengan informasi yang hilang dan 4 perusahaan dengan rasio market-to-book
negatif. Dari 309 perusahaan yang tersisa, kami mengeliminasi 16 perusahaan dengan ETR lebih besar dari 1,
karena nilai ini dapat menyebabkan masalah estimasi model (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). We also excluded firms
with ETRs lower than -1 and obtained a final sample of 289 firms.

4.2 Model
The empirical model used to analyze the association between firm tax aggressiveness (ETR) and
audit committee characteristics was[7]:

ETR ¼ b 0 þ b 1IND_PERC þ b 2IND_SRENUM þ b 3EXP_FIN

þ b 4EXP_TENURE þ b 5EXP_OTHERAC þ b 6DIL_NMBR

þ b 7DIL_NMEETING þ b 8DIL_PRESAC þ b 9DIV_WOMEN

þ b 10MULTI þ b 11SIZE þ b 12ROA þ b 13LEV þ b 14PPE

þ b 15INTGBL þ b 16TLCF þ b 17MB þ b 18to 23IND þ «

4.2.1 Dependent variable: tax aggressiveness. There is no universally accepted

measurement construct for tax aggressiveness[8]. In this paper, we measure tax
aggressiveness as the ability to reduce tax liability over the long run, and we use a long-
term ETR (Dyreng et al., 2008) calculated over a five-year period. This method allows
smoothing annual variations in ETRs and embodies the medium- and long-term effects of
firm tax strategy.
In line with Chen et al. (2010), Davis et al. (2016) and Dyreng et al. (2008), our measure of
tax aggressiveness is the long-term cash ETR (ETRpaid) calculated as the sum of the firm’s
cash tax paid for the period divided by the sum of the firm’s pre-tax income for the same
period. In keeping with previous research, ETRs are constrained to the 0-1 range (Chen et
al., 2010; Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Lanis et al., 2017). We winsorized negative ETRs so
that the smallest observation is equal to 0 (Armstrong et al., 2012; Dyreng et al., 2008;
McGuire et al., 2012). Finally, as a higher ETR represents a proxy measure of a lower level of
tax aggressiveness, we multiply ETRpaid by -1 to obtain increasing measures of tax
aggressiveness for the empirical analysis (Lanis and Richardson, 2012; Lanis et al., 2017).
Data to compute ETRs were gathered from the Compustat database and supplemented by
the firms’ published financial statements when required.
4.2.2 Independent variables: audit committee characteristics. The measurement of audit
committee characteristics mentioned in the theoretical development section is described in
the following paragraphs. All variables are five-year mean values to match the dependent
variable calculation period (Davis et al., 2016). The information was obtained from the
Boardex database and hand-collected using the firms’ proxy statements (management
information circular) as appropriate.
MAJ 4.2.2.1 Audit committee independence. Audit committee members’ independence
35,2 (IND_PERC) was measured by the five-year mean percentage of non-executive directors on the
audit committee (i.e. coded independent in the proxy statement).
The effect on independence potentially caused by stock options or stock ownership
(IND_SRENUM) was measured by the five-year mean percentage of audit committee
members’ remuneration in the form of equity (share units, deferred share units or stock
280 options).
4.2.2.2 Audit committee expertise. A financial expert has financial or accounting
experience in terms of her/his occupation or professional accreditation. Because taxation is a very
technical topic, expertise considers only audit committee members who are more likely to be
knowledgeable about tax issues. Therefore, EXP_FIN was measured as the five-year mean
percentage of committee members with accounting[9] or financial experience.
Audit committee member tenure (EXP_TENURE) was measured as members’ five-year mean
number of years on the audit committee.
Audit committee member service on other audit committees (EXP_OTHERAC) was
measured as the five-year mean number of audit committees on which the members of the
audit committee were concurrently serving.
4.2.2.3 Audit committee diligence. The five-year mean number of members on the
committee (DIL_NMBR) (audit committee size), the five-year mean number of audit
committee meetings (DIL_NMEETING), and the five-year mean attendance rate of members
at audit committee meetings (DIL_PRESAC) were used to measure audit committee
diligence.
4.2.2.4 Gender diversity. Gender diversity (DIV_WOMEN) was measured by the five-
year mean percentage of women directors on the audit committee.
4.2.3 Control variables. Based on previous studies (Chen et al., 2010; Dubar et al., 2010;
Dyreng et al., 2008; Lanis and Richardson, 2012), we control for firm characteristics that are
correlated with our tax aggressiveness measure. These variables are international activities
(MULTI), firm size (SIZE), profitability (ROA), leverage (LEV), firm asset mix (property, plant
and equipment (PPE) and intangibles (INTGBL)), tax loss carryforward (TLCF), growth
opportunities (MB) and industry (IND).
Firms with international activities (MULTI) have greater opportunities to avoid taxes
because they can shift income between high- and low-tax rate jurisdictions. Larger firms
(SIZE) have more resources to devote to tax planning and can organize their activities to
minimize their taxes (Siegfried, 1972, cited in Gupta and Newberry, 1997). More profitable
firms (ROA) have greater incentives to reduce their tax burden. According to the debt
covenant hypothesis, managers of indebted firms (LEV) have incentives to make financial
reporting decisions that reduce the likelihood that their firms’ debt agreements would be
violated. These financial decisions may influence our measure of tax aggressiveness. Firm
asset mix may influence firms’ tax rate. Capital-intensive firms (PPE) may claim a lower tax
rate because of accelerated asset depreciation. Firms with intangible assets (INTGBL) may
have access to R&D or other tax credits. Firms with tax loss carry forward (TLCF) may use
their prior losses to reduce their tax burden. Growing firms (MB) may invest more heavily in
tax-favored assets that generate timing differences in book and tax reporting (Chen et al.,
2010). Finally, tax aggressiveness might fluctuate across different industry sectors (IND) (
Omer et al., 1993, cited in Lanis and Richardson, 2012)[10].
The information on control variables was obtained mainly from the Compustat database and
was complemented using firms’ published documents when required. Measurement of control
variables is presented in the Appendix.
5. Empirical results Audit
5.1 Descriptive statistics committee
Table I reports the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (ETRpaid),
characteristics
independent variables (IND_PERC, IND_SRENUM, EXP_FIN, EXP_TENURE,
EXP_OTHERAC, DIL_NMBR, DIL_NMEETING, DIL_PRESAC, DIV_WOMEN), and control
variables (SIZE, ROA, LEV, PPE, INTGBL, TLCF, MB, MULTI).
The dependent variable ETRpaid has five-year mean (median) of 0.224 (0.202). This mean
effective tax rate is about 5 per cent lower than the average combined corporate statutory
281
tax rate in Canada for the same period.
In accordance with Canadian regulation, virtually all members of the audit committee are
independent (IND_PERC mean of 99.2 per cent). About one-third of audit committee
remuneration (IND_SREMUN) is in the form of equity. The mean percentage of committee
members with financial or accounting experience (EXP_FIN) is quite high at almost 51 per
cent. Tenure on the audit committee (EXP_TENURE) is around five years, enabling members
to develop experience with the issues faced by the company. Experience gained on other
audit committees (EXP_OTHERAC) is low at 0.567. The mean number of members on audit
committees is close to four (DIL_NMBR) and the number of meetings in a year
(DIL_NMEETING) close to five. Committee members are diligent in discharging their duties
because their presence at committee meetings (DIL_PREAC) is about 97 per cent. The
proportion of women on audit committees (DIV_WOMEN) is low at a mean of 11.3 per cent.
However, this proportion reflects that of women on boards of TSX-listed companies, i.e. 12.6
per cent, according to a study by the law firm Osler, Hoskin and Harcourt LLP (Pitts, 2017).
Overall, an acceptable range of variation is observed for most of the variables presented in
Table I as well as a reasonable level of consistency between the means and medians, reflecting
normality of distributions (Hair et al., 1998).

Variable n Mean SD Minimum Median Maximum

Continuous variables
ETRpaid 289 0.224 0.161 0 0.202 1
IND_PERC 289 0.992 0.040 0.667 1 1
IND_SRENUM 289 0.350 0.265 0 0.351 1
EXP_FIN 289 0.514 0.245 0 0.500 1
EXP_TENURE 289 5.506 2.294 0.667 5.40 12.667
EXP_OTHERAC 289 0.567 0.491 0 0.476 2.530
DIL_NMBR 289 3.758 0.943 2.600 3.400 7.600
DIL_NMEETING 289 4.877 1.232 3.600 4.400 13.200
DIL_PRESAC 289 0.975 0.035 0.750 0.986 1
DIV_WOMEN 289 0.113 0.147 0 0 0.667
SIZE 289 6.962 2.227 2.169 6.572 13.614
ROA 289 0.065 0.066 - 0.020 0.051 0.641
LEV 289 0.184 0.158 0 0.156 0.983
PPE 289 0.360 0.298 0 0.312 0.971
INTGBL 289 0.151 0.203 0 0.066 0.901
TLCF 289 0.515 2.048 0 0.044 27.047
MB 289 2.307 2.283 0.167 1.779 24.921

Dummy variable
0 (%) 1 (%)
MULTI 289 80 (27.7) 209 (72.3)
Table I.
Note: Variable definitions: see Appendix Descriptive statistics
MAJ 5.2 Correlation results
35,2 The Pearson pairwise correlation results are presented in Table II. Significant negative
correlations are found between the dependent (ETRpaid) and the independent variables
EXP_FIN, EXP_OTHERAC, DIL_PRESAC (p < 0.10 or better). These results indicate that
accounting expertise, experience on other audit committees and presence at audit
committee meetings significantly reduce tax aggressiveness. We also find significant
282 correlations (with predicted signs, where appropriate) between the dependent variable and
some of the control variables, ROA, PPE, INTGBL, TLCF, and MULTI (p < 0.10 or better).
Table II also shows that overall, only moderate levels of collinearity exist between
explanatory variables. The highest correlation coefficient is 0.54. Finally, we also compute
variance inflation factors (VIFs) when estimating our regression models to test for signs of
multi-collinearity among the explanatory variables. Our (unreported) results confirm that
with the highest VIF at 3.204, multi-collinearity is not problematic in our regression models (
Hair et al., 1998).

5.3 Regression results

A Tobit regression analysis is used because ETRs are limited to the 0-1 range. In such
situations, Tobit regression analysis “uses all of the information, including information
about the censoring, and provides consistent estimates of the parameters” (Long, 1997, p.
189).
Our regression results for five-year mean data are reported in Table III. As many studies of tax
aggressiveness use annual data (Lanis et al., 2017; Richardson et al., 2013), we performed
additional analyses on such basis. The objective was to capture additional effects linked to audit
committee characteristics that could be obscured when considering five-year mean values.
Starting with the annual data from our 289 companies and using the same criteria applied in the
selection of the original sample (section 4.1), we obtain 1,249 firm-year observations. These
findings are also shown in Table III.
The four hypotheses posited that firms with an independent (H1), diligent (H3) and
gender-diverse (H4) audit committee composed of expert members (H2) are less
taxaggressive. The regression results show that the measures expertise and diligence are
significantly related to tax aggressiveness (p < 0.10 or better), supporting H2 and H3.
Financial expertise (EXP_FIN) plays an important role in constraining tax aggressiveness.
Additional tests (not reported) were performed using a broader definition of financial
literacy that includes members with supervisory roles such as chief executive officers. The
results using this broader definition were not significant. This suggests that owing to the
technical nature of taxation, more specific expertise is needed.
Members’ tenure on the audit committee (EXP_TENURE) favors lower tax
aggressiveness, suggesting that better knowledge of the company’s affairs increases
members’ effectiveness in challenging tax decisions and assessing tax risks.
A greater number of members on the audit committee (DIL_NMBR) enhances the
committee’s performance in curbing tax aggressiveness as it increases the number of
qualified persons to draw on (Vafeas, 2005) and broadens the range of expertise (Baxter and
Cotter, 2009). Taxation is a highly technical topic that requires a certain level of expertise to
challenge management on tax issues.
A more independent audit committee does not seem to reduce tax aggressiveness (H1).
This result could be explained by the Canadian regulations that require audit committee
members to be independent. Indeed, as shown in the descriptive statistics, virtually all
members of the audit committee are independent (IND_PERC = 0.992, Table I), which is in
line with Canadian National Instrument 52-110.
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1. ETRpaid 1
2. IND_PERC - 0.03 1
3. IND_SRENUM - 0.02 0.16*** 1
4. EXP_FIN - 0.10* - 0.01 0.03 1
5. EXP_TENURE - 0.03 0.08 - 0.05 - 0.06 1
6. EXP_OTHERAC - 0.09* 0.09 0.26*** 0.02 0.11* 1
7. DIL_NMBR - 0.00 0.06 0.27*** -0.02 - 0.04 0.16*** 1
8. DIL_NMEETING 0.00 0.03 0.25*** -0.01 - 0.09 0.15** 0.30*** 1
9. DIL_PRESAC - 0.08* 0.01 0.06 0.10* 0.03 0.11* 0.11* 0.10* 1
10. DIV_WOMEN 0.01 - 0.06 0.19*** -0.01 -0.06 0.13** 0.37*** 0.28*** 0.16*** 1
11. SIZE 0.03 0.12** 0.41*** -0.06 0.02 0.42*** 0.54*** 0.48*** 0.13** 0.35*** 1
12. ROA 0.07 - 0.10 - 0.10* 0.03 0.02 - 0.14** - 0.10* - 0.16*** 0.01 - 0.15** - 0.36*** 1
13. LEV 0.07 0.13** - 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.11* 0.02 - 0.02 - 0.02 0.07 0.17*** -0.22*** 1
14. PPE 0.11** 0.02 0.06 - 0.02 0.04 0.10* - 0.05-0.14** 0.00-0.15*** 0.05 - 0.12** 0.24*** 1
15. INTGBL - 0.13** -0.01 0.05 - 0.01 - 0.04 - 0.04 - 0.060.03 - 0.03 0.05 - 0.05 0.01 0.28*** -0.41*** 1
16. TLCF 0.05 0.03 - 0.03 0.00 - 0.12** -0.09-0.09-0.04-0.06-0.09-0.14** - 0.01 - 0.07 0.02 0.00 1
17. MB 0.02 0.05 0.01 - 0.07 0.04 - 0.05-0.03-0.07-0.05 0.01 - 0.07 0.36*** 0.16*** -0.14** 0.30*** 0.09 1
18. MULTI - 0.13** -0.02 0.14** 0.10 0.03 0.15** -0.03 0.09 0.17*** 0.09 0.05 - 0.17*** -0.11* 0.00 - 0.08 - 0.04 -0.19***

Note: Variable definitions: see Appendix. Note that ETRpaid is multiplied by -1 to obtain increasing measures of tax aggressiveness. N = 289 for all variables. The p-values are one-tailed for directional
hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise. *significance at the 0.10 level; **significance at the 0.05 level; ***significance at the 0.01 level

Table II.
characteristics

Pearson correlation
Audit
committee

283

results
MAJ Five-year mean ETRpaid Annual ETRpaid
35,2 Variables Predicted Sign b t-statistics b t-statistics

IND_PERC - - 0.184 (-1.02) - 0.062 (-0.40)

IND_SRENUM þ 0.021 (0.44) - 0.012 (-0.38)
EXP_FIN - - 0.130** (-2.27) - 0.086*** (-2.41)
EXP_TENURE - - 0.007* (-1.42) - 0.005* (-1.51)
284 EXP_OTHERAC - - 0.034 (-1.12) - 0.007 (-0.38)
DIL_NMBR - - 0.031*** (-2.54) - 0.024*** (-2.87)
DIL_NMEETING - - 0.001 (-0.06) 0.004 (0.81)
DIL_PRESAC - - 0.296 (-0.83) - 0.091 (-0.65)
DIV_WOMEN - 0.099 (0.80) - 0.022 (-0.38)
MULTI - - 0.089*** (-3.07) - 0.074*** (-3.44)
SIZE ? 0.014* (1.76) 0.007 (1.05)
ROA þ 0.347* (1.41) 0.141* (1.58)
LEV ? 0.146 (1.43) 0.082 (1.26)
PPE þ 0.056 (0.93) 0.105** (2.07)
INTGBL ? - 0.225*** (-3.66) - 0.130*** (-2.66)
TLCF þ 0.006 (0.68) 0.003** (1.70)
MB ? - 0.003 (-0.36) - 0.003 (-0.69)
Intercept ? 0.415 (1.08) 0.130 (0.63)
IND ? Yes Yes
YEAR Yes
F-value 2.58*** 4.38***
Log likelihood 45.13 - 7.67
N 289 1,249

Table III. Note: Variable definitions: see Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01
Regression results – levels, respectively. The p-values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise.
ETRpaid Tstatistics are calculated based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors

Finally, a gender-diverse audit committee (DIV_WOMEN) does not seem to lead to less tax
aggressiveness (H4). This result may be explained by the small number of women on audit
committees (mean = 11.3 per cent, median = 0; Table I). Hence, the process effects
anticipated cannot materialize. Post et al. (2011) obtain a positive association between
women directors and environmental reporting only when three or more women are on the
board. The small differences in financial risk preferences between women and men noted
by Croson and Gneezy (2009) and Bobek and Hatfield’s (2004) finding that males and
females are equally likely to give aggressive tax advice may also explain the absence of a
genderdiverse audit committee effect on tax aggressiveness. In explaining the absence of a
significant effect of board gender and ethnic diversity on financial performance, Carter et al.
(2010) posit a contingency explanation. Board diversity effect “may be different under
different circumstances at different times. Over several companies and time periods, the
results could offset to produce no effect” (Carter et al., 2010, p. 396).
A number of measures of expertise and diligence are not significantly related to tax
aggressiveness. Expertise from participating in other companies’ audit committees
(EXP_OTHERAC) does not seem to contribute to members’ effectiveness in monitoring tax
aggressiveness. This result could be explained by the low mean number of other audit
committees on which the sampled members were concurrently serving (mean = 0.567; Table
I), therefore little experience may have been garnered from that activity. Another
explanation could be that audit committee members who do not accrue expertise through
service on other audit committees compensate for this gap by preparing more thoroughly for Audit
meetings and by actively participating in deliberations and debates. committee
The number of audit committee meetings (DIL_NMEETING) and the presence of
members at these meetings (DIL_PRESAC) are not related to tax aggressiveness. The latter
characteristics
result might be explained by the low variability in the presence of members at the meetings
(SD = 0.035; Table I).
The control variable MULTI has a significant negative relationship with tax
aggressiveness measures (p < 0.01). Firms with foreign operations have greater 285
opportunities for tax avoidance by shifting income between high and low tax rate locations.
Consequently, multinational firms might present a lower ETR as reported in studies using
US firms. However, as the Canadian corporate tax rate is low compared to that of other
countries, Canadian firms with international activities report a greater effective tax rate.
For the control variables, SIZE, ROA and LEV have a positive relationship with our
measure of tax aggressiveness while INTGBL has a negative relationship (p < 0.10 or better
with predicted signs, where appropriate). The coefficients for PPE, MB, and TLCF are not
significant.
Results obtained using the annual data confirm the findings for the five-year mean
regression[11]. Our results suggest that even if with a 5 per cent difference between the ETR
and the average combined corporate statutory tax rate, Canadian firms use tax planning
strategies to reduce their tax liability not only in the medium- and long-term but also in the
short term.

5.4 Sensitivity and robustness analyses

As a sensitivity analysis, stepwise regressions were run to eliminate some of the
nonsignificant variables to obtain the best fit (not tabulated). The significant audit
committee variables for the five-year mean and annual data are the same as in Table III of
this paper. Financial expertise, tenure, and a greater number of members on the audit
committee reduce tax aggressiveness. Independence (IND_PERC) as measured by the
percentage of nonexecutive directors on the audit committee becomes marginally
significant in the five-year mean stepwise regression.
To check robustness, we performed our tests using GAAP ETR for the five-year mean and
annual data. GAAP ETR is calculated as the sum of the firm’s current tax expenses for the
period divided by the sum of the firm’s pre-tax income for the same period. It is important
to note that GAAP ETR is a noisier measure as it may include a tax cushion and does not
reflect the amount of tax paid.
In the GAAP ETR regressions (see Table IV), financial expertise and a greater number of
members on the audit committee decrease tax aggressiveness for the five-year mean and annual
data as in the ETRpaid regressions. However, tenure on the audit committee reduces tax
aggressiveness only for annual data. Further, number of meetings (DIL_NMEETING) becomes
marginally significant for annual data but with a positive sign. Hence, contrary to expectations,
more frequent audit committee meetings seem to provide opportunities for increased tax
aggressiveness. This effect could be explained by an increase in the number of meetings beyond
the usual four, i.e. one per quarter, in years when specific transactions require more tax planning.

6. Conclusion
Because taxes constitute a major cost for companies, their amount has a direct impact on
profitability and market value. Hence, to maximize shareholders’ wealth, management may use
aggressive tax planning and tax minimization strategies. Investors may well perceive the use
MAJ Five-year mean GAAP ETR Annual GAAP ETR
35,2 Variables Predicted Sign b t-statistics b t-statistics

IND_PERC - - 0.246 (-1.26) - 0.006 (-0.05)

IND_SRENUM þ 0.033 (0.83) 0.002 (0.07)
EXP_FIN - - 0.089** (-1.89) - 0.042* (-1.39)
EXP_TENURE - - 0.003 (-0.65) - 0.005** (-1.87)
286 EXP_OTHERAC - - 0.020 (-0.84) 0.005 (0.38)
DIL_NMBR - - 0.014* (-1.41) - 0.014** (-1.98)
DIL_NMEETING - 0.001 (0.16) 0.006* (1.53)
DIL_PRESAC - - 0.031 (-0.12) - 0.090 (-0.70)
DIV_WOMEN - 0.078 (1.13) - 0.004 (-0.07)
MULTI - - 0.081*** (-3.65) - 0.059*** (-3.28)
SIZE ? 0.006 (0.84) 0.004 (0.66)
ROA þ 0.250 (1.25) 0.158** (1.81)
LEV ? 0.084 (0.93) 0.054 (0.87)
PPE þ 0.078* (1.61) 0.083** (2.02)
INTGBL ? - 0.182*** (-3.16) - 0.134*** (-2.68)
TLCF þ 0.006 (1.02) 0.003* (1.64)
MB ? - 0.001 (-0.21) - 0.004 (-0.92)
Intercept ? 0.166 (0.52) 0.012 (0.06)
IND ? Yes Yes
YEAR Yes
F-value 2.93*** 3.90***
Log likelihood 111.72 297.25
N 289 1,249

Table IV. Note: Variable definitions: see Appendix. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01
Regression results – levels, respectively. The p-values are one-tailed for directional hypotheses and two-tailed otherwise.
GAAP ETR Tstatistics are calculated based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors

of such strategies as good business behavior. However, the public expects companies to be
socially responsible, which requires firms to balance the interests of various stakeholders,
including their obligation to pay their fair share of taxes to the government and society (Sikka,
2010). Further, tax authorities may contest the tax strategies used by companies, a situation in
which tax-aggressive firms can face significant reputational and litigation risk.
As audit committees are usually at the forefront of financial and risk-related matters
including tax-risk management and governance, the objective of this paper was to
investigate audit committee characteristics related to lower tax aggressiveness. Results
show that measures of audit committee expertise and diligence are negatively related to tax
aggressiveness. These results are similar for both models, i.e. five-year mean and annual
data. This means that the relationship we found between audit committee characteristics
and tax aggressiveness seems to be insensitive to the time frame, showing the robustness
of our results.
More specifically, our results suggest that audit committees with greater financial
expertise and members with longer tenure can curb tax aggressiveness. A larger audit
committee also helps in reducing tax aggressiveness, as having more members can
enhance the committee’s performance (Vafeas, 2005). Indeed, more members may
contribute to a better assessment of tax risks and the detection of tax aggressiveness.
Our findings provide useful insights for board governance committees when
determining the profile of persons to nominate for audit committees. They should aim
for more rather than fewer members. The committee should include several persons Audit
with financial expertise, and longer tenure on the committee should be encouraged. committee
Audit committees that do not follow these guidelines may be sending a signal to
characteristics
shareholders, investors, and tax agencies regarding the company’s potential risk with
respect to aggressive tax planning. These insights could also help direct government
tax audit efforts.
As with any research, this paper has some limitations. The data cover a single fiveyear
period. A sample covering several such time periods might provide more insights.
287
Accounting data are used to estimate tax rates because fiscal data are confidential in
Canada. Results are thus conditioned on the proxies’ representativeness of effective tax
rates. The determination of the value of some independent variables, such as expertise and
the number of additional committees on which audit committee members were
concurrently serving, was conditional on the information being publicly available in
company documents. The use of a dummy variable for firms’ international activities may not
have captured the extent of the activities’ impact on tax aggressiveness. One limitation –
and an area for future research – is that the effects of the audit committee members’
relationships with managers of the firms were not investigated.
Future research conducted through interviews with audit committee members could
investigate the importance they place on tax risks as well as the time they spend on tax
issues and whether they use external experts to assist them in this task. It would also be
relevant to increase understanding of companies’ tax function structure in relation to their
executive management’s tax objectives and tax aggressiveness. Future studies could also
develop more elaborate ways of capturing the extent of the impact of firms’ international
activities on tax aggressiveness.

Notes
1. www.canada.ca/en/revenue-agency/campaigns/tax-evasion-no-borders.html

2. See the following links for more information on Canadian companies and tax heavens: www.cbc.ca/ news/
politics/panama-papers-cra-tax-recovered-charges-1.5082058; https://pressprogress.ca/corporate
- canadas-pile-of-cash-in-offshore-tax-havens-has-hit-353-billion-for-the-first-time-in-history/

3. National Instrument 52-110 indicates that the following actors are not independent: the issuer’s
employees and executive officers (current or within the past three years); individuals whose
immediate family members are executive officers of the issuer (or have been within the past three
years); auditors and their firms’ employees and their spouses; and consultants and advisors paid by
the issuer. A board member not fitting in these categories could be considered independent as per
rule 52-110 but be categorized as dependent in the company’s proxy statements, e.g. a former
executive officer of more than three years.

4. Earnings management is the use of accounting rules and principles to manage earnings to present a
favorable view of a company’s business activities.

5. SOX 407; NYSE Rule 303A.07(a).

6. More explanations are provided in section 4.2.

7. Company subscripts omitted to alleviate presentation.

8. For a discussion of the various tax aggressiveness measures, refer to Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)
and Lee et al. (2015).

9. Neither proxy statements nor Boardex generally provide information on whether a board
member has tax expertise.
MAJ 10. Industry categories are as follows: Agriculture and Construction (SIC 0100 to 0999 and 1500 to
35,2 1700), n = 7 (2.4%); Financial, Insurance, and Real Estate (SIC 6000 to 6799), n = 58 (20.1%);
Manufacturing (SIC 2000 to 3999), n = 67 (23.2%); Mining (SIC 1000 to 1400), n = 53 (18.3%);
Services (SIC 7000 to 8999), n = 37 (12.8%); Transportation and Public Utilities (SIC 4000 to
4999), n = 38 (13.1%); and Wholesale and Retail Trade (SIC 5000 to 5999), n = 29 (10.0%).
Transportation and Public Utilities is the category omitted from the regressions.
288 11. To examine whether we had an endogeneity issue, we checked for important shifts in our audit committee
variables and concluded that our audit committee variables are stable throughout the fiveyear period. We
also ran our five-year mean regression using audit committee characteristics both at the beginning of the
period and at the end of the period (instead of the five-year mean). Our findings are confirmed. Lastly, for
our annual regression, we ran a lagged model using audit committee variables at t-1 as well as ETR at t-1 as
an independent variable. Our results remain the same.

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Appendix Audit
committee
characteristics
Variable Definition

Dependent variablea
ETRpaid Sum of the firm’s cash taxes paid for the five-year period divided by the sum of the
firm’s pre-tax income for the same period
293
Independent
variablesa
IND_PERC Five-year mean percentage of non-executive directors on the audit committee Five-year
IND_SRENUM mean percentage of audit committee members’ remuneration in the form of equity
(deferred share units or stock options)
EXP_FIN Five-year mean percentage of committee members with financial or accounting
experience
EXP_TENURE Five-year mean number of years of audit committee members on the audit committee
EXP_OTHERAC Five-year mean number of other audit committees on which the members of the audit
committee are concurrently serving
DIL_NMBR Five-year mean number of members on the audit committee Five-year
DIL_NMEETING mean number of meetings of the audit committee Five-year mean member
DIL_PRESAC rate of attendance at audit committee meetings Five-year mean
DIV_WOMEN percentage of women directors on the audit committee

Control variablesa
MULTI International activities, MULTI = 1 if subsidiaries present in foreign countries for three
of the five years as indicated on the annual information form, 0 otherwise Natural log
SIZE of total assets, five-year mean
ROA Return on assets, five-year mean
LEV Total debt/total assets, measured at the beginning of the year, mean over the five-year
period
PPE Property, plant, and equipment/total assets, measured at the beginning of the year,
mean over the five-year period
INTGBL Intangible assets/total assets, measured at the beginning of the year, mean over the
five-year period
TLCF Tax loss carryforward, net operating losses at the beginning of the five-year period/
total pre-tax income for the five-year period
MB Market value of equity divided by its book value, mean over the five-year period Industry,
IND coded 1 if the firm is represented in the specific two-digit SIC code category, 0 otherwise

Year Year, coded 1 if the observation pertains to year n, 0 otherwise

Table AI.
Note: aFor annual analyses, variables are measured on an annual basis Variable definitions

Corresponding author
Manon Deslandes can be contacted at: deslandes.manon@uqam.ca

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