Repeated Games
• Permainan di mana strategi dimainkan dan
hasil (payoff) diterima berulang-ulang.
• Contohnya: persaingan dalam pasar oligopoli
dapat dianalogikan sebagai repeated game.
• Perusahaan dapat membangun reputasinya
dan mengamati perilaku lawannya.
PRISONERS’ DILEMMA
Prisoner 2
Confess Deny
Prisoner 1
high 60 , 60 36 , 70
Donna’s
Deep Dish
medium 70 , 36 50 , 50
high 60 , 60 36 , 70
Donna’s
Deep Dish
medium 70 , 36 50 , 50
• Cooperative (60,60)
• Pierce cheats one week pierce’s profit 70
• Donna plays TFT punish pierce next week
TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
• Pierce has 2 choices:
– Continue to cheat by pricing medium, and Donna will
continue to punish according to TFT profit Pierce
adalah $50 ($10 lebih rendah jika dia cooperative)
– Get back to cooperation loss in profit $24 ($36
rather than $60 that would have been earned without
any cheating). But Donna committed to TFT, would
return to cooperating the following week and both
stores would return $60 each week
TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
• OPSI 1: cheating sekali dan kembali cooperatif
– Jika Pierce cheating sekali, maka dia akan
mendapat tambahan profit $10 perminggu, tetapi
kehilangan $24 pada minggu berikutnya.
– $10 today vs $24 next week mana yang lebih
besar?
TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
• Tergantung kepada PV dari $24
24
PV
1 R
10
PV
1 r
3
10
PV
1 r
n
TIT-FOR-TAT STRATEGY
• r rate of return, nilainya +
• 1/(1+r) < 1
10 10 10 10 10
...
1 r 1 r 2 1 r 3 r
1 r
n
cooperate defect
t C C 3 3
t+1 C C 3 3
3
… … … …
1
3
PV 1
Grim Strategy
t P1 P2 π2
… … … … 5 21 2 2 2 3 ...
t-1 C D 5 5 2 2 2 2 ...
t D D 2 2
5
t+1 D D 2 1
… … … …
2
PV 5
1
.
Grim Strategy
• Playing grim strategy if and only if:
3 2
5
1 1
53
52
2
3
• Both playing grim trigger is a Nash Equilibrium if
2
the discount rate is sufficiently high such that
3
TFT
t P1 P2
π2
… … … … 3 31 3 2 3 3 ...
t-1 C C 3 3 3 3 3 2 ...
t C C 3 3
t+1 C C 3 3
3
… … … …
1
3
PV 1
TFT
• Player 2 deviates at t periode
t P1 P2 π2
… … … … 5 21 2 2 2 3 ...
t-1 C D 5 5 2 2 2 2 ...
t D D 2 5
2
1
t+1 D D 2
… … … …
2
5
PV 1
TFT
• Player 2’s one time defection and resume
Player 1 Player 2 π2
1 C D 5
2 D C 0
3 C D 5
4 D C 0
… … … …
5 (0)
PV 1 2
TFT
PV : j 5 0 5 2 0 3 5 4 0 5
5 5 2 5 4 0 0 3
0 5
yw
where
y 5 5 2 5 4
5 2 5 5 2 5 4
5 2y
5
y
1 2
TFT
• And
w 0 0 3 0 5
0 0 2 0 4
z
• Where:
z 0 0 2 0 4
0 2 0 0 2 0 4
0 2 0
z
0 0
1 2
TFT
w
0
0
1 2
j
5
0
5
1 2 1 2 1 2
• Playing tft if and only if
3 2 2
(i). 5
1 1 3
(ii). 3 5 0 2
1 1 2 3