GOVERNANCE ON INFORMATIVE
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT IN THE
CHINESE MARKET
Zhijun Lin, Ming Liu, and Carlos Noronha (2016)
ABACUS Vol. 52 No. 3 Page 568-608. Year 2016
Scopus Q2
Presenter:
I Gusti Dimas Ranuh - 041914253019
Elysabet Christy – 041914253020
Nila Hiliyah Yusuf – 041914253027
Priandini Rahmawati Pratiwi - 041924253003
1. INTRODUCTION
Studi ini menyelidiki hubungan antara perusahaan Praktik tata kelola
perusahaan dan manajemen laba informatif manajerial (IEM) dalam konteks
Cina. Tujuan utama dari tata kelola perusahaan adalah untuk memantau
perilaku berbagai pihak yang berkepentingan dan untuk mengurangi biaya
agensi yang mendasari berbagai prinsipal-hubungan agen
H3(a) The effectiveness of the board and SB can positively contribute to managerial IEM
▫ Regression Model
12
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
H1
{
H2
{
H3 {
13
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
DESCRIPTION OF DATA 14
Empirical Results
▫ Managerial shareholdings can help align the interests of managers and shareholders and
reduce agency conflict and information asymmetry, thus prompting managerial IEM.
However, the higher the portion of non-tradable shares, the less transparent the financial
disclosures and the less likely it is that managers will pursue IEM.
▫ Firms with shares listed in overseas markets tend to reveal more inside information to
outside stakeholders.
▫ More independent directors or more supervisors induce a higher chance of signaling inside
information through managerial IEM.
▫ The active function of the BOD and the SB contributes positively to managers’
communication of private information to external investors, as they are positively
correlated with IEM. Large firms are more likely to signal inside information to users than
smaller firms.
▫ More profitable firms, compared with their counterparts, are more willing to convey
inside information through IEM.
A larger controlling owner (high ownership
concentration) generally impedes managerial
motivation to pursue IEM.
Other large shareholders (blockholders) can
effectively monitor the largest shareholder
and the management and require more
transparent or informative reporting.
A more active BOD and SB and greater
shareholder activism should induce managers
to engage in IEM, which supports our overall
proposition, which assumes a positive
relationship between the activeness
(effectiveness) of the oversight/monitoring
function and the possibility of IEM.
The regression results are
basically similar when Model
2 is used, but we find more
significant results and higher
goodness of fit (the
Nagelkerke R2 values for the
first, second, and third
reporting quarters are
17.9%, 19.8%, and 20.9%,
respectively). These results
are robust for this different
measure of IEM (IEM2).
In Model 3, a more stringent
relationship between the
discretionary accruals used by
managers in quarterly reporting
and the yearly earnings that are
the net of discretionary accruals
can be tested to obtain additional
evidence for our findings.
The regression results in Table 6
show that they are generally the
same as those reported in the
previous main tests.
Robustness test
CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION
▫ The hypotheses are supported by empirical results, indicating that better corporate
governance, which can reduce agency problems and information asymmetry between
firm managers and external stakeholders, prompts managers to pursue IEM, and
therefore leads to more transparent financial reporting and better informativeness of
reported earnings.
▫ This study will also have important policy implications. Market regulators (or standard
setters) and investors need to be aware of the different types of earnings management.
Although OEM tends to mislead investors, IEM will, in fact, provide useful information
through signaling out managers’ private information about the firm’s future cash flows
and earnings potential.
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