Jurnal Ekonomi Pengetahuan

https://doi.org/10.1007/s13132-021-00883-x

Kontrol Politik dan Komite Penyelidik Parlemen:

Penguatan Kualitas Demokrasi

Matthias Keppel1

Diterima: 24 Oktober 2021 / Diterima: 20 Desember 2021

© Penulis 2022

Abstrak
Di Austria dan sistem parlementer Jerman, komite penyelidikan mewakili
instrumen kontrol politik yang paling komprehensif. Dengan bantuan
komite-komite ini, anggota parlemen dapat memperoleh wawasan yang
tepat tentang pekerjaan pemerintah. Wawasan ini diperlukan ketika
kasus-kasus mencurigakan dibawa ke perhatian publik, dari mana tindakan
pemerintah dan penyalahgunaan kekuasaan terungkap. Berdasarkan studi
kasus kualitatif pertama dari komite investigasi di Austria dan Jerman, artikel
ini berfokus pada hasil komite parlementer ini. Dengan meneliti otoritas dan
lembaga ini, anggota parlemen memperoleh pengetahuan yang luas tentang
tindakan tersebut. Ini membantu dalam reformasi dan mengarah pada efek
inovatif pada kualitas demokrasi dari sistem politik. Dengan membandingkan
hasil ini dan dengan bantuan kerangka analitis sentral dari matriks 15
bidang Hans Joachim Lauth, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa komite
penyelidikan dapat mempengaruhi semua bidang politik, hukum, dan
masyarakat. Pengaruh ini terjadi terutama melalui penciptaan pengetahuan
pada proses politik yang nyata, dan memberikan kontribusi yang signifikan
terhadap demokrasi pengetahuan.

Kata kunci Komite penyelidikan · Kualitas demokrasi ·

Pengetahuan dan inovasi · Demokrasi pengetahuan · Kontrol politik

Pengantar

Pusat dari bentuk-bentuk baru demokrasi adalah konstitusi, yang

mengabadikan sistem politik suatu negara dalam hukum, dan sistem
pemilihan, yang memberikan kesempatan kepada rakyat untuk membentuk
kebijakan. Konsep sentral bahwa demokrasi gabungan ini adalah
kebebasan, kesetaraan,

Artikel ini adalah bagian dari Kumpulan Topik dalam Pendidikan Tinggi, Demokrasi
dan Ekonomi

Transdisipliner Matthias Keppel

 matthias.keppel@parlament.gv.at

1
Parliamentary Administration; 5.3 Layanan Warga, Wina 1010, Austria 13
Vol.:(0123456789)
Jurnal Ekonomi Pengetahuan

dan kontrol. Ketiga dimensi ini juga diperlukan dalam menentukan kualitas
demokrasi di suatu negara (Lauth, 2004, 96f). Ciri-ciri konstitutif demokrasi
menemukan ekspresinya dalam partisipasi rakyat. Dalam artikel ini, dimensi
kontrol politik khususnya, komite penyelidikan parlemen akan diperiksa
secara rinci. Di satu sisi, efek investigasi parlementer tersebut terhadap
kualitas demokrasi akan dinilai, dan di sisi lain, karakter inovatif mereka
akan diilustrasikan.
Komite penyelidikan parlemen sangat penting untuk kontrol politik dalam
sistem demokrasi. Melalui kekuatan investigasi khusus mereka, mereka
dapat memeriksa dokumen dan dokumen pemerintah. Dengan demikian,
fungsi kontrol mereka meluas lebih jauh daripada hak pengawasan
parlemen lainnya.
Namun, di media dan publik, hasil panitia angket seringkali diragukan dan
dianggap tidak relevan. Alasan untuk ini termasuk kurangnya konsekuensi
personel di tingkat politik dan kurangnya konsekuensi di tingkat hukum
(Keppel 2019).
Artikel berikut mengeksplorasi pandangan-pandangan ini melalui analisis
kualitatif untuk menguji penyelidikan parlementer di Austria dan Jerman.
Reformasi komite penyelidikan tahun 2015 di Dewan Nasional Austria
memungkinkan hak minoritas untuk membentuk komite penyelidikan untuk
pertama kalinya. Di Austria, ini mengikuti praktik Bundestag Jerman, yang
telah berlaku selama beberapa dekade. Konstelasi ini memungkinkan untuk
mengamati hasil investigasi secara komparatif dan mengejar pertanyaan
penelitian utama: Apa pengaruh komite investigasi parlementer terhadap
dimensi politik pengawasan, dan apa kekuatan inovatif dari instrumen
pengawasan ini?
penelitian ini adalah penelitian Hans Joachim Lauth tentang konsep tiga
dimensi demokrasi, dengan menggunakan dimensi kontrol (Lauth, 2004,
32f) sebagai landasan teorinya. Lauth mengembangkan konsep ini untuk
menentukan kualitas demokrasi dan menyarankan menggunakan matriks
15-feld (Lauth, 2015). Indikator yang relevan untuk menentukan tingkat
pengendalian digunakan untuk tinjauan untuk menggambarkan dampak
yang dapat ditimbulkan oleh komite penyelidikan terhadap dimensi
pengendalian. Uraian teoretis dari dimensi kontrol akan diuji praktiknya
berdasarkan hasil dari komite penyelidikan, yang juga akan menentukan
karakter inovatifnya. Inovasi dalam penelitian ini dibuat terutama dengan
menghasilkan pengetahuan tentang lembaga dan lembaga yang diselidiki.
Semakin banyak pengetahuan yang diperoleh, semakin baik identifikasi
keluhan dalam sistem demokrasi, yang pada gilirannya dapat berkontribusi
pada peningkatan kualitas demokrasi.
Berdasarkan pemeriksaan teoretis tentang hubungan antara kualitas
demokrasi dan kontrol, bagian “Pengantar” menyajikan matriks 15-feld
secara lebih rinci. Bagian “Kualitas Demokrasi dan Kontrol Politik” dari
artikel tersebut membahas komite penyelidikan parlemen di Austria dan
Jerman. Berdasarkan hasil-hasil tersebut, bagian analisis (“Kontrol dan
Matriks Demokrasi”) menjawab pertanyaan penuntun penelitian. Ini
menghasilkan hipotesis untuk memandu
penelitian kuantitatif lebih lanjut dan menetapkan klasifikasi konkret dari
pengaruh politik, hukum, dan sosial dari komite penyelidikan. Dengan
mengacu pada ini, pengaruh komite investigasi pada demokrasi
pengetahuan (In't Veld, 2010) juga akan diperiksa. Generasi pengetahuan
sangat penting untuk penentuan rinci lebih lanjut dari

kualitas
demokrasi

. Ini menambah elemen tambahan pada hubungan antara pengetahuan dan

kualitas demokrasi.

Kualitas Demokrasi dan Kontrol Politik

Pengukuran dan konseptualisasi teoritis kualitas demokrasi berkembang

dari dua dimensi (Dahl, 1971) menjadi delapan atau lebih (Carayannis &
Campbell, 2021; Diamond & Morlino, 2004). Namun, banyak “alat” untuk
mengukur demokrasi memunculkan pertanyaan tentang apa yang
seharusnya diukur dan apa yang diukur. Apa metode terbaik untuk
merepresentasikan kualitas demokrasi? Indikator mana yang penting dalam
konteks ini? Standar apa yang harus digunakan untuk mengukurnya? Dalam
beberapa dekade terakhir, berbagai pendekatan telah diterapkan, membagi
kualitas demokrasi menjadi variabel kuantitatif dan kualitatif, serta struktur
masyarakat, sistem pengambilan keputusan, dan bentuk kelembagaan
demokrasi yang semakin beragam (Abromeit, 2004, hlm. 73; Campbell,
2019). Dimensi kebebasan, kesetaraan, dan kontrol tidak terbantahkan,
terlepas dari pilihan indikator yang mengukur demokrasi. Selain itu, ketiga
dimensi ini saling terkait; kesetaraan dan kebebasan tidak dapat dijamin
tanpa kontrol. Membatasi aturan politik tidak diragukan lagi terlihat dalam
teori demokrasi sebagai dimensi yang diperlukan, di samping kesetaraan
dan kebebasan (Beetham, 1994, 28f). Bahkan dalam konsepsi demokrasi
yang minimalis, pemilu diabadikan sebagai dimensi kontrol (Schumpeter,
1950, hlm. 432). Para ahli sepakat bahwa harus ada kemungkinan kontrol
yang luas, selain pemilihan, sebagai mekanisme “kontrol rakyat”.
“Akuntabilitas horizontal” telah digunakan untuk mendefinisikan baik
konseptualisasi yang sempit maupun yang luas. O'Donnell (1999)
berpendapat untuk pemahaman yang sempit tentang kontrol, di mana hanya
lembaga negara yang dapat meneliti dan, jika perlu, menghukum aktor
negara lainnya. Di sisi lain, Schmitter (1999) berpendapat untuk
pemahaman yang lebih luas, di mana aktor negara dan masyarakat harus
melakukan kontrol atas kriteria hukum dan politik. Pemahaman ini sudah
melekat dalam dua dimensi kontrol hukum dan politik, seperti yang
dianjurkan oleh Dunn (1999, 337f). Patut dicatat bahwa ada perbedaan yang
jelas antara kontrol hukum dan politik dan kebebasan informasi dan
transparansi yang mendukung kontrol rakyat. Dunn menekankan hal ini
ketika dia menunjukkan bahwa politik membentuk cabang eksekutif dan
legislatif. Dalam hal ini, pentingnya kontrol rakyat lebih menonjol (ibid.,
336f). Untuk lebih mendefinisikan kebutuhan yang tepat dari dimensi kontrol,
dua pendekatan telah dibahas: akuntabilitas vertikal dan kembalinya ke
pemilu, dan akuntabilitas horizontal dengan penyerahan kekuasaan politik
kepada hukum. Namun, perbedaan lebih lanjut diperlukan untuk
pemahaman yang lebih akurat tentang kontrol, bahkan pada dua tingkat ini.
Misalnya, Beetham (1994, hlm. 29) menambahkan kontrol keuangan oleh
parlemen ke dalam mekanisme kontrol politik dan hukum. Rudzio
mengekstrapolasi hak kontrol parlemen dan kemungkinan luas mereka
untuk mengendalikan pekerjaan pemerintah. Parlemen harus mengontrol
efisiensi, tujuan, dan legalitas tindakan pemerintah (Rudzio, 2019, 210f).
Namun, ketegasan pengendalian ini hanya bisa berupa transparansi. Tanpa
wawasan tentang tindakan pemerintah, parlemen – dan oposisi parlementer
khususnya – tidak dapat menjalankan kontrol yang berkelanjutan. Ini juga
berarti bahwa publisitas harus diciptakan untuk membahas

2012a
,

tindakan pemerintah di media dan masyarakat sipil (Bühlmann et al., hlm.

521–522).

Kualitas Demokrasi dan Peran Parlemen

Segera setelah peran parlemen menjadi relevan untuk menentukan kualitas

sistem demokrasi, kesenjangan yang cukup besar ditemukan dalam banyak
konsep. Hal ini karena sistem parlementer sering berbeda secara signifikan
satu sama lain. Check and balance parlemen juga bervariasi. Oleh karena
itu, banyak indikator untuk menentukan kualitas
demokrasi bahkan tidak berusaha menembus kontrol parlemen tingkat
mikro. Sebaliknya, mereka mengandalkan pendekatan yang lebih umum,
seperti Transparency International Corruption Index (Lijphart, 1999),
Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (López-Pintor &
Morlino, 2005), atau indikator formal dan substansial sederhana dari kualitas
demokrasi yang mengukur antara lain kepercayaan pada institusi politik
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2005).
Seringkali, fokusnya murni pada keberadaan institusi, seperti dalam Polity
Index, tetapi ini tidak cukup menangkap realitas dari konstitusi
masing-masing atau dampak praktis dari institusi. Namun, studi empiris
tidak dapat diharapkan untuk menyelidiki kedalaman masing-masing sistem
secara konsisten. Mungkin rumit untuk menangkap rincian aturan parlemen
dan realitas konstitusional. Misalnya, Bühlmann et al. (2012b, hal. 151-153)
menggunakan 18 komponen dari 51 subkomponen dan 100 indikator untuk
mencoba menghapus ketidakakuratan ini, tetapi tetap umum dalam
pengukuran kapasitas pengawasan parlemen. Pendekatan ini juga
mengandalkan Indeks Persepsi Korupsi (Transparency International) untuk
transparansi, dan komponen umum, seperti pengungkapan keuangan partai
atau kemauan untuk berkomunikasi secara transparan.
Sulit untuk mengukur efektivitas kontrol legislatif atas eksekutif
berdasarkan indikator tertentu. Semua parlemen di negara-negara
demokrasi Barat memiliki tingkat kontrol yang berbeda, sehingga tidak
mungkin untuk menilai dampak aktualnya secara kuantitatif.

Kontrol dan Matriks Demokrasi

Salah satu kontribusi yang mengatasi kedalaman dimensi kontrol adalah

kontribusi Hans Joachim Lauth. “Istilah 'dimensi' menawarkan keanggunan
konseptual yang dapat diterapkan secara 'transtheoretically', yang berarti
bahwa teori-teori demokrasi yang berbeda dapat dihubungkan dan
dipetakan secara komparatif dalam dimensi-dimensi ini. Berbicara secara
metaforis, dimensi berperilaku seperti 'blok bangunan' untuk teori dan
kemajuan
teori. (Campbell et al., 2015, p. 471) Berdasarkan klasifikasi primer dan
klarifikasi dimensi kontrol ini, Hans Joachim Lauth (Lauth, 2015, 9f) melihat
perlunya pemisahan yang ketat dari level-level tersebut di atas, sehingga
aktor kontrol dapat ditentukan dengan jelas. Konsepsinya berfokus pada
kontrol hukum yang dikelilingi oleh kontrol politik. Dalam kontrol politik,
Lauth membedakan dua aktor krusial: aktor negara dan aktor masyarakat.
Aktor masyarakat terdiri dari warga, media, dan organisasi perantara yang
secara terbuka melanggar aturan hukum atau memulai tindakan
hukum.berada di pinggiran konsepsi mereka, sedangkan

ini
aktor

institusional negara dan politik langsung melingkupi dimensi hukum. Oleh

karena itu, melibatkan semua aktor ini, baik melalui partisipasi aktor sosial,
sejauh menyangkut aktor negara (misalnya, melalui pemilihan), atau melalui
hak inisiatif dari dua aktor pertama, untuk memungkinkan penggunaan
politik dan hak kontrol sipil (ibid., 9f). Rule of law merupakan hal mendasar
bagi Lauth sebagai pusat kendali. Ini mendefinisikan kerangka kerja untuk
keputusan politik dan mengikat tindakan negara dengan aturan hukum. Ini
juga mensyaratkan bahwa semua tindakan kontrol yang memantau dua
bidang pertama mematuhi prinsip-prinsip supremasi hukum. Oleh karena itu,
kontrol hanya dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai berfungsi jika semua level
politik dikendalikan secara memadai.
Untuk menentukan secara tepat kualitas demokrasi, konsep Lauth
menyerukan lima institusi selain tiga dimensi (Lauth, 2015, 12f).
Berdasarkan ini, Lauth menyusun matriks 15-feld, sehingga memungkinkan
untuk melakukan analisis rinci dari setiap aspek (lihat Tabel1). Metodologi
matriks demokrasi harus memungkinkan pengembangan yang sistematis
dari konsep demokrasi di semua bidang dan indikator yang didefinisikan di
dalamnya. Setiap kotak menggambarkan ciri khas demokrasi, yang dapat
dilihat pada nama masing-masing kotak.
Dimensi kontrol didasarkan pada pengawasan aktivitas pemerintah.
Secara khusus, transparansi paling penting ketika menerapkan kontrol, lebih
dari level matriks lainnya. Dengan demikian, transparansi merupakan
prasyarat utama bagi pengendalian tindakan pemerintah (ibid., 2015, 9f).

Bidang Kontrol Matriks

Dalam konsepsinya, Lauth meneliti isi dan kategori bidang tunggal (Lauth,
2004, 327f). Untuk studi ini dan pendekatan metodologis yang disajikan di
sini, bidang kendali akan diringkas secara lebih rinci. Inti dari hal ini adalah
bidang-bidang yang terkait dengan kontrol politik dalam parlementerisme,
serta bidang-bidang yang mewakili bidang pengaruh yang mungkin bagi
komite penyelidikan.
Berangkat dari bidang prosedur pengambilan keputusan (1/3),
pertanyaan sentral bagi Lauth adalah sejauh mana prosedur pengambilan
keputusan ini dikendalikan. Dengan demikian, pemerintah dikendalikan
dengan menyelenggarakan pemilu yang adil, yang mensyaratkan adanya
komisi peninjau pemilu yang independen, kompeten, dan efektif, serta
partisipasi aktor masyarakat sipil dan partai oposisi dalam kontrol ini. Fungsi
ini tidak berfungsi jika tidak ada badan pengawas atau keberadaannya dan
putusannya tidak mengikat secara hukum. Untuk tujuan ini, Lauth juga
memilih Komisi Peninjau Pemilu Independen sebagai apa yang disebut
indikator terbatas dalam pemilu nasional (Lauth, 2004, hlm. 346,2015, 19f).
Kontrol politik oleh partai oposisi menjadi indikator pembatas kedua (2/3).
Hal ini menimbulkan pertanyaan apakah para aktor menggunakan potensi
penuh mereka untuk mengontrol pemerintah di semua bidang kegiatan.
Transparansi yang memadai dari tindakan pemerintah sangat penting di sini
karena hanya dengan demikian kontrol yang komprehensif dapat terjadi.
Jika ada tingkat non-transparansi yang tinggi, kemungkinan kontrolnya
lemah. Transparansi dapat dianggap sangat tinggi jika persyaratan formal
untuk pengendalian aman secara hukum dan tidak bergantung pada niat
baik dari mereka yang dikendalikan. Bentuk kontrol ini terutama terjadi di
tingkat politik. Konsekuensi hukum diperlukan hanya sampai batas tertentu
(Lauth, 2004, 346f).

13
Jurnal Ekonomi Pengetahuan
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Jurnal Ekonomi Pengetahuan

Bidang komunikasi dan kontrol (3/ 3) harus menunjukkan sejauh mana

kebebasan komunikasi digunakan untuk melakukan kontrol. Faktor penting
dalam mengevaluasi kategori ini adalah transparansi akses media terhadap
informasi tentang tindakan pemerintah. Jika akses transparan tidak tersedia,
jurnalisme investigasi dapat memberikan kompensasi. Semakin banyak
aktor kritis yang terlibat dalam pengawasan ini, semakin teliti evaluasinya.
Hanya jika tidak ada bukti nyata bahwa media menjalankan fungsi kontrol,
kategori tersebut dapat dianggap tidak memadai (ibid., 347f).
Tujuan dari kategori ini adalah untuk menguji apakah putusan tersebut
efektif diterapkan terhadap semua institusi di semua tingkatan politik (4/3).
Fokus di sini adalah pada putusan Mahkamah Agung, yang dapat mengatur
semua badan negara karena posisinya di dalam sistem. Satu-satunya
kriteria adalah verifikasi aturan hukum dalam tindakan pemerintah. Kontrol
politik tidak diperiksa karena tidak termasuk dalam yurisdiksi peradilan (ibid.,
348f).
Kantor audit yang efektif dan hak kontrol parlemen yang berfungsi adalah
kriteria terakhir untuk menentukan dimensi kontrol (5/3). Secara khusus, ini
menyangkut administrasi audit oleh badan-badan semi-otonom. Area
tindakan utama pemerintah (yaitu, keuangan dan legislasi) harus dikontrol.
Sangat penting untuk menentukan kekuatan yang dimiliki aktor institusional
dan sejauh mana mereka dapat digunakan. Contoh kontrol parlementer
adalah pengesahan undang-undang: Apakah waktu rancangan
undang-undang memungkinkan pihak oposisi memperoleh informasi yang
cukup tentang undang-undang yang diusulkan? Tidak akan dapat diterima
jika undang-undang atau amandemen konstitusi disahkan pada hari mereka
diperkenalkan. Kontrol anggaran oleh parlemen dan Pengadilan Audit
merupakan faktor penting lainnya. Tidak hanya penggunaan dana yang
benar yang penting, tetapi juga efisien. Meskipun laporan yang dihasilkan
tidak memiliki konsekuensi hukum, politisi harus menanggung konsekuensi
hukum untuk perilaku ilegal yang terbukti. Pengawasan di bidang ini tidak
cukup jika parlemen tidak memiliki hak formal, yang tidak terjadi pada
lembaga pengawasan lainnya (ibid., hal. 349) (lihat Tabel2).
Lauth mengembangkan kriteria komprehensif dalam konseptualisasi
dimensi pengawasan, yang membantu pertimbangan komite penyelidikan
saat ini. Dalam diskusi yang komprehensif, ia menunjukkan mengapa
kontrol membutuhkan diferensiasi yang tepat, dan bagaimana hal ini
mempengaruhi kualitas demokrasi. Secara khusus, indikator yang terbatas
menawarkan kemungkinan untuk mengukur keadaan lembaga tunggal
dalam demokrasi secara akurat.

Tabel 2 Tindakan Kontrol Institusi (Lauth, 2004, p. 349)

Kontrol
Dimensi

Proses pengambilan keputusan Komite independen yang mengawasi proses pemungutan

suara selama pemilu nasional
Intermediasi institusional Kontrol politik melalui partai oposisi Komunikasi publik/opini publik
Pers yang kritis terhadap pemerintah Aturan hukum yang efektif Yurisdiksi yang efektif atas
lembaga pemerintah lainnya Penetapan dan pelaksanaan hukum Pengadilan audit yang efektif
dan hak kontrol parlemen
 13
Jurnal Ekonomi Pengetahuan

Oleh karena itu, masuk akal untuk menggunakan pendekatan Lauth untuk
pemeriksaan rinci satu instrumen kontrol politik: komite penyelidikan
parlemen. Sepintas, komite ini dapat diklasifikasikan sebagai 2/3 dan 5/3.
Analisis lebih lanjut akan menunjukkan bagaimana pengaruh pada
bidang-bidang ini dapat direpresentasikan secara tepat, dan apakah
pengaruh lebih lanjut pada bidang-bidang lain dari matriks dimungkinkan.

Komite Penyelidikan Dalam Dewan Nasional Austria

dan Bundestag Jerman

Untuk lebih menggambarkan dampak aktual komite penyelidikan pada

dimensi kontrol, pertama-tama kami memeriksa dasar hukum dari perspektif
ilmu politik. Di sini, peran oposisi dalam membentuk komite penyelidikan
penting, karena kontrol politik oleh partai oposisi (feld 2/3) dan hak kontrol
parlemen yang efektif (feld 5/3) merupakan indikator yang relevan. Sejak
reformasi 2015, empat komite penyelidikan telah dibentuk di Dewan
Nasional Austria. Dalam artikel ini, tiga investigasi sekarang menjadi
sasaran analisis kualitatif berdasarkan laporan akhir mereka.
Komite penyelidikan Dewan Nasional Austria berikut digunakan untuk
analisis kualitatif:

• Komite Penyelidikan
• Eurofghter
• BVT

Selama 2015–2020, delapan penyelidikan parlementer berlangsung di

Bundestag Jerman, beberapa di antaranya telah didirikan pada tahun 2014.
Karena sulit untuk menetapkan batasan atau perbandingan topik investigasi,
investigasi Bundestag berfungsi sebagai objek kontrol dalam investigasi
berikutnya. Tradisi panjang
hak-hak minoritas dalam komite penyelidikan Bundestag Jerman sangat
cocok untuk fungsi kontrol seperti itu. Hal ini terutama berlaku karena aturan
prosedur saat ini di Dewan Nasional Austria mirip dengan Bundestag
Jerman.

Hak-Hak Minoritas

Sejak reformasi tahun 2015, Dewan Nasional Austria membentuk komite

penyelidikan untuk hak-hak minoritas. Secara konkret, ini berarti bahwa
seperempat dari anggota parlemen (46 dari 183) dapat menuntut agar
dibentuk. Reformasi ini secara besar-besaran memperkuat opsi kontrol
partai-partai oposisi di Austria. Model reformasi ini adalah hak-hak minoritas
di Bundestag Jerman. Pada awal Republik Wei mar, seperempat anggota
parlemen dapat memulai penyelidikan parlemen. Max Weber adalah
pendukung yang menentukan hak pengawasan yang begitu besar, yang
modelnya berasal dari parlementerisme Inggris. Dalam sebuah analisis, ia
menyadari bahwa hak penyelidikan yang sederhana akan membawa
manfaat, dan bahwa dengan menyelesaikan ketegangan antara

dan
parlemen

pemerintah, penyelidikan akan lebih sedikit dilakukan. Sebab, pemerintah

didukung mayoritas di parlemen dan melakukan penyidikan hanya akan
merugikan pemerintah. Oleh karena itu, ia menganjurkan hak-hak minoritas
di parlemen untuk memungkinkan oposisi memiliki kontrol terus menerus
atas pekerjaan pemerintah (Weber, 2011/1918, hlm. 62).
Komite prosedur penyelidikan Jerman diatur oleh undang-undang dan
disusun sebagai komite parlemen biasa (Bundestag 2019a, hal.39-40).
Reformasi Dewan Nasional Austria juga didasarkan pada aturan prosedur
ini, meskipun fitur-fitur tertentu dicatat (Konrath & Neugebauer, 2015).
Misalnya, presiden Dewan Nasional mengetuai komite penyelidikan dan
diberi nasihat oleh hakim prosedur independen. Selain itu, sistem ketua
yang dipilih oleh anggota parlemen, yang masih umum di Jerman,
dihapuskan untuk memungkinkan tingkat netralitas yang lebih tinggi di kursi.
Perbedaan antara aturan prosedural Bundestag Jerman dan Dewan
Nasional Trian Australia juga terlihat dari bagaimana publik diperlakukan.
Sementara destag Bun umumnya mengizinkan akses publik ke sesi, Dewan
Nasional hanya mengizinkan perwakilan media untuk melakukannya.
Demikian pula, rekaman audio dan visual diizinkan di komite penyelidikan
Bundestag, asalkan dua pertiga dari anggota komite memberikan
persetujuan mereka. Di Dewan Nasional, rekaman seperti itu tidak diizinkan.
Akses yang luas ke pertemuan ini juga tercermin dalam pelaporan tindak
lanjut dari komite penyelidikan. Bundestag memberikan informasi tentang
perkembangan komite penyelidikan harian, sementara media parlemen
Austria menerbitkan ringkasan yang tidak teratur dari proses tersebut.
Hak Minoritas di Bundestag Jerman mengalami penguatan selama
periode legislatif ke-18. Sejak fraksi Sozialdemokratische Partei
Deutschland (SPD), Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU) / Christlich
Soziale Union (CSU), menguasai 504 dari total 631 kursi di Bundestag,
fraksi oposisi hanya menguasai sekitar 20% dari total kursi. Jumlah tempat
duduk. Namun, berbagai hak minoritas, seperti pembentukan komite
investigasi, hanya dapat diterapkan di Bundestag jika setidaknya 25% dari
anggota parlemen mendukung mosi yang sesuai. Dalam hal ini, untuk
periode parlemen ke-18, peraturan hukum tentang penerapan hak-hak
minoritas disesuaikan agar pihak oposisi dapat terus menggunakan hak-hak
minoritasnya (Bundestag, 2019b).
Selain tradisi lama minoritas di Bundestag Jerman, keanggotaan komite
di Bundestag dan Dewan Nasional juga berbeda. Sementara di Bundestag,
anggota komite penyelidikan dihitung menggunakan prosedur Webster (St.
Lague/Schepers), Dewan Nasional Austria menggunakan prosedur D'Hondt.
Dengan demikian, jumlah keanggotaan panitia angket sangat bervariasi.
Misalnya, pada periode legislatif XXVI, dari 18 kursi komite, kelompok
parlemen terbesar memegang enam kursi, sedangkan kelompok parlemen
kecil hanya memiliki satu kursi (Parlemen, 2020). Karena prosedur Webster
berpihak pada kelompok parlemen yang lebih kecil, keanggotaan dalam
periode legislatif ke-18 di Bundestag Jerman adalah sebagai berikut: dari
total delapan kursi,
kelompok parlemen terbesar CDU/CSU menerima empat kursi, SPD dua,
Partai Hijau satu, dan Die Linke satu.

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Hasil Komite Penyelidikan

Aturan prosedural menunjukkan perbedaan kecil tetapi signifikan antara

Bundestag Jerman dan Dewan Nasional Austria. Untuk publik, seseorang
dapat berbicara tentang tingkat informasi yang lebih tinggi yang disediakan
di Bundestag Jerman dan mode operasi komite yang lebih publik. Hal ini
tidak untuk mengurangi transparansi komite penyelidikan di Dewan
Nasional; tetap saja, penyediaan informasi yang lengkap kepada publik oleh
parlemen merupakan faktor penting ketika menilai dimensi pengawasan.
Demikian pula, keanggotaan komite penyelidikan di Bundestag Jerman
bias mendukung minoritas parlementer, daripada Dewan Nasional. Bagian
berikut menggunakan analisis kualitatif dari komite penyelidikan sebelumnya
di Dewan Nasional Austria, untuk memberikan gambaran umum yang patut
dicontoh dari temuan mereka.

Hypo—Komite Penyelidikan

Komite penyelidikan ini adalah yang pertama dibentuk setelah reformasi

aturan prosedur di Dewan Nasional Austria. Itu didirikan atas permintaan
minoritas. Pusat penyelidikan adalah tanggung jawab politik nasionalisasi
lembaga kredit, Hypo Alpe Adria. Republik Austria harus menyelamatkan
bank dari kebangkrutan pada Desember 2009 dengan
menasionalisasikannya dan mengumpulkan miliaran Euro. Selain itu,
anggota parlemen menyelidiki isu-isu kunci, seperti kegiatan kontrol dan
audit yang dilakukan oleh badan-badan federal dan klarifikasi tanggung
jawab badan-badan negara. Sebanyak 52 bab audit tunggal disiapkan
(Korespondensi Parlemen, 2015a).
Setelah 79 kali pertemuan, 142 wawancara dengan 124 responden, dan
review yang terdiri dari 16 juta halaman A4 dokumen, hakim acara
menyerahkan laporan pertama dan terakhir (Korespondensi DPR, 2016a,
2016b).
Hakim acara merumuskan rekomendasi, sebagaimana disyaratkan oleh
aturan acara. Ini menghasilkan inovasi yang dimaksudkan untuk
menunjukkan keluhan kepada pembuat kebijakan dan membantu
menghilangkannya. Selama perumusan rekomendasi ini, perkembangan
menjadi nyata, yang dapat dilihat di banyak komite penyelidikan lainnya: di
 samping penyelidikan yang sedang berlangsung, beberapa undang-undang
dan peraturan disahkan di tingkat internasional dan nasional, sehingga
rekomendasi komite penyelidikan sudah diantisipasi sebagai hasilnya.
Dalam Hypo Committee of Inquiry, ini menyangkut pengetatan standar
Basel, aturan tentang kebangkrutan bank, penciptaan mekanisme resolusi
tunggal dan dana resolusi tunggal, dan reformasi undang-undang yang
berlaku untuk auditor (Parlemen, 2016, hal. 460). Selain undang-undang
baru yang telah disebutkan, hakim acara merekomendasikan enam
amandemen untuk dibahas oleh Dewan Nasional setelah publikasi laporan
akhir:

• Perhitungan seragam dan pembatasan kewajiban bagi otoritas lokal akibat

nasionalisasi Hypo Alpe Adria: metodologi yang tidak konsisten untuk
menghitung tingkat kewajiban dan batas yang ada di Austria mencegah
perbandingan di Austria dan tidak memberikan transparansi yang
memuaskan.

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• Undang-undang kepailitan untuk provinsi dan kotamadya: menurut hakim

prosedural, kurangnya hak semacam itu mengarah pada insentif yang
salah arah dan, di pihak negara bagian, menimbulkan risiko ekonomi
yang tidak berkelanjutan dan ceroboh pelanggaran, karena orang
berspekulasi tentang bantuan dari pemerintah federal dalam keadaan
darurat.
• Pengaturan yang tepat tentang peran komisaris negara: komisaris negara
memiliki fungsi audit dan dikirim oleh Menteri Keuangan ke bank-bank
yang jumlah neraca melebihi ambang batas tertentu. However, their
actual role is inad equately regulated, as there are no powers other than
the right to inspect doc uments of the supervisory board and the right to
object to resolutions of the supervisory board (ibid., p. 286–291).
Therefore, the procedural judge pleaded for a clarifcation of the role,
whether by using an expansion of the audit powers or a general abolition
of the function.
• Optimization in cooperation, procedures, and responsibilities of the
supervisory bodies: as was already evident in the case of the state
commissioners, the Hypo Alpe Adria case was based on poor
cooperation between the responsible super visory bodies. Information
was not forwarded, and the rights to audit and inspect were not
exercised. The procedural judge ruled this to be systemic inaction on the
part of the authorities (ibid., p. 461).
• The procedural judge recommended clear rules for auditors, due to their
dubious role in the audit of Hypo Alpe Adria. The commissioned auditors
would have had a confict of interest and objectives since the bank
commissioned and paid the auditors. The procedural judge
recommended ending the resultant economic dependence of the auditors
on the banks using a law. For example, the frst approach would be a
 limitation on the maximum number of audits for annual fnancial
statements by the same auditor or the same audit frm.
• The fnal recommendation of the procedural judge was a transparency
register for ultimate benefciaries, so that international companies and
trust constructs could no longer be used to conceal economic
benefciaries (ibid., p. 460–462).

Influence on the 15‑Field Matrix and Dimension of Political

Control

The frst efect of the Hypo Committee of Inquiry does not stem from the
recom mendations of the procedural judge, but more generally, from the
reform of the procedural rules of the committee of inquiry. With recourse to
the Constitutional Court on contentious issues (eg, the submission of
evidence), the scope of scrutiny by committee members can be signifcantly
increased. In addition, a new quality of transparency was created, as
demonstrated by a ruling during the redaction of fles. The Constitutional
Court ruled that when fles were submitted to a commit tee of inquiry, they
were inadmissible (Parliamentary Correspondence, 2015b). In the 15-feld
matrix, this can lead to an impact on felds 4/3 and 5/3. Parliamentary
control, which starts with the committee of inquiry, is strengthened. Likewise,
this reform infuences feld 2/3. The opposition's rights have been signifcantly
strength ened, and government action can be subjected to more
comprehensive control in the

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form of legal certainty through the Constitutional Court and the associated
increased transparency.
In analyzing the six recommendations formulated by the procedural judge,
it was possible to identify the following efects at the legislative level:

• Toward the end of the parliamentary inquiry, the National Council decided
to establish authority for auditors that was free from instruction. They
implemented a primary European Union directive; however, its
implementation consistently accelerated the investigations into Hypo Alpe
Adria that was ongoing at the time (Parliamentary Correspondence,
2016a, 2016b).
• In general, the audit professions were newly regulated, and the connection
to the simultaneous exercise of the tax advisor's function was decoupled. •
This was followed by the introduction of a registered law for benefcial
owners in July 2017, as required by the procedural judge and an EU
regulation, as well as the tightening of the Money Laundering Act, a
restructuring of the Financial Market Supervisory Authorities Act, and an
amendment to the Banking Act (Parliament, 2017a, 2017b). The National
Council reacted to fnancial and banking crises events, with the pioneering
role in legislative projects already taking place at the EU level.

The infuence of the Hypo Committee of Inquiry on the dimension of

political control can be traced through the examples presented earlier. In
addition to the direct infuence on felds 2/3, 4/3, and 5/3, concrete laws have
been implemented to combat money laundering and better regulate audit
procedures of fnancial institutions. With the help of the committee of inquiry,
it was possible to identify issues in government actions and remedy them in
certain areas. However, it should be noted that the main fndings had already
been discussed at the EU level, and concrete steps were taken using
regulations and directives. Likewise, the opposition criticized the recommen
dations of the procedural judge as far reaching and bold (Die Presse, 2016).

Eurofighter Committee of Inquiry

The procurement of the Eurofghter-Typhoon combat aircraft was the subject

of three committees of inquiry in the Austrian National Council. Government
politicians were accused of corruption, although these accusations were
never substantiated. The fnal committee of inquiry on this took place in the
XXVI legislative period, from April 19, 2018, to September 25, 2019, and
followed up on the second committee of inquiry (March 29 to September 20,
2017). The procurement process was exam
ined in detail, and the associated countertrade for 4 billion euros. In 31
meetings, 51 respondents were questioned. Approximately 2 million pages
of documents were submitted to the committee for examination
(Parliamentary Correspondence, 2019a).
The fnal report submitted by the procedural judge comprises 483 pages and
dis plays an inventive step compared to the Hypo Committee of Inquiry. A
much clearer structure was followed by the procedural judge through both a
fnding facts and evaluating evidence. Thus, an actual assessment of political
events was conducted, for the frst time, by a committee of inquiry. The
procedural judge identifed severe

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misconduct on the part of the political decision-makers in the handling the

purchase and the drafting the countertrade agreement. The roles of each
relevant ofcial were examined and evaluated. The company that ofered jets
for sale was also evaluated. The large number of ofshore companies
involved in executing the countertrade and the often-occurring proximity to
Austrian politicians gave rise to the suspicion of corruption or covert party
fnancing in many cases (Parliament, 2019ap. 247–269 & p. 287–288). The
committee of inquiry could not uncover concrete evidence (ibid., p.
282–285), but the results of the investigation revealed clear political
responsibilities, which resulted in possible violations of the law (ibid., p.
272–277). These violations were uncovered in the purchase itself and the
drafting of the countertrade agreement (ibid., p. 280–282).
 The procedural judge drafted nine recommendations to improve
transparency in military procurement and improve documentation
requirements in government departments. In particular, they addressed the
following issues:

a The creation of more apparent structures in military procurement and

centraliza tion of responsibilities.
b Better documentation of procurement processes.
c Statutory disclosure of vendor requirements when entering into military
procure ments.
d Counter transactions to be capped at 100% of the contract value. e
More staf resources to review countertrades within the relevant
ministry. f Clearer wording in invitations to tender and contract
conclusions. g General avoidance of ambiguous terms.

Impact on the 15‑Field Matrix and the Dimension of Political

Control

The third committee of inquiry into combat aircraft procurement stood out
from the Hypo Committee of Inquiry, primarily due to its in-depth analysis of
political accountability. This development demonstrated the potential of the
investigative instrument and reform of the rules of procedure. In both the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Finance and Economics, the
procedural judge was able to iden
tify non-transparent and, in certain cases, unlawful behavior on the part of
political decision-makers. Thus, the committee of inquiry had a powerful
impact on the 2/3 feld and the disclosure of government actions.
In contrast to the Hypo Committee of Inquiry, the procedural judge avoided
mak ing specifc recommendations and calling for legislative changes. One
issue that made headlines during the investigations and beyond was the
criminal proceed ings that ran alongside the inquiry committee. Since 2011,
the public prosecutor's ofce has investigated many defendants in connection
with countertrade transactions and suspected money laundering, bribery,
and corruption. Documents provided to the committee indicate attempted
political infuence on these criminal proceed ings (Klenk, 2019; Parliament,
2019b). The independence of the judiciary is one of the main pillars of a
functioning political system and must be valued accordingly (Lauth, 2004, p.
95–97). All the more decisive were the steps and measures taken

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after the committee of inquiry, which ultimately led to a restructuring of the

Aus trian Ministry of Justice (Die Presse, 2020) and deprived the signifcantly
criticized person responsible for his power.

BVT—Committee of Inquiry
This investigation was set up at the request of a parliamentary minority. The
decisive factor was a house search at the Federal Ofce for the Protection of
the Constitution and Counterterrorism (BVT1) on February 28, 2018. The
search caused an outcry in domestic politics, as the BVT was a hybrid
institution of the secret service and the police. The reasons for this search
seemed manifold, but the political opposition sus
pected an attempt to exert infuence on the BVT by Freiheitliche Partei
Österreich (FPÖ) Interior Minister Herbert Kickl. Accordingly, questions were
investigated as to whether there had been any attempted political infuence
in the BVT. Hence, post ings were investigated, house searches were
examined, and the delayed destruction of sensitive fles was questioned
(Parliament, 2019c, p. 14–16).
During the investigation, 102 interviews were conducted, and 88
respondents were interviewed. In addition, authorities submitted 340,000
pages of fles. The outcome of the inquiry varied, although all parties
expressed some agreement that further research on the issue should follow.
Diferent perceptions were particularly evident between the governing parties
and the opposition. The opposition and FPÖ located networks within the
BVT, close to the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP). The party of Chancellor
Sebastian Kurz, on the other hand, saw gross negligence on the part of the
then Interior Minister Herbert Kickl (Parliamentary Correspondence, 2019b).
The questioning of the witnesses and the fnal report of the procedural
judge revealed misconduct on the part of the Ministry of the Interior and the
Ministry of Justice. According to the procedural judge, the investigating
public prosecutors hast ily carried out a house search. Owing to the
artifcially high speed and considerable defciencies in the planning and
execution of the house search, enormous damage was created for the
intelligence service in Austria (Parliament, 2019c, p. 280).
In the BVT itself, as well as the Ministry of the Interior, grievances have
been revealed predominantly in the areas of personnel management and
data security. The BVT staf showed negligent handling of sensitive data. In
some cases, classifed fles were lying around freely in ofces, and some
employees had even taken protected data home with them (ibid., p. 282).
Concerning the allegations of political networks, the procedural judge
noted plenty of circumstantial evidence, but no clear proof. In any case, the
procedural judge did not fnd it questionable that political parties wanted to fll
leadership positions with people they were familiar with. However, this
should be applied only if no other more suitable persons are available. The
neutrality of an ofce can only be guaranteed if appropriate importance is
permanently attached to professional suitability (ibid., p. 284–285).

1
Original German: Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung BVT.

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 Following the fndings of the study, six recommendations were formulated
by the procedural judge (ibid., p. 288–289):

a) Standardization of information security is not uniformly regulated between

the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the Interior. Gross defciencies
were found here, particularly in the handling of classifed fles.
b) Legal protection during investigations must be evaluated, especially
concerning the adequate protection of fundamental rights.
c) The reporting system of public prosecutors must be subjected to a
review. d) Personnel decisions in ministries must be sufciently documented
and standard ized. There is a lack of transparency and opportunities for
retrospective review. e) Ministries should develop uniform standards for
documenting internal commu nications.
f) As with the procedural judge in the Eurofghter committee of inquiry, the
judge criticized the short deadlines in preparing the fnal report.

Influence on the 15‑Field Matrix and the Dimension of

Political Control

The results of the BVT Committee of Inquiry showed a classic reappraisal of

internal procedures of ministries, which undoubtedly corresponded to the
lean indicator defned in feld 2/3 by Lauth. The opposition demanded results
at the legislative level, but these could not fnd a majority vote in the National
Council. The initiatives of the Sozial
demokratische Partei Österreich (SPÖ), Das Neue Österreich und liberales
Forum (NEOS), and JETZT included all the fndings of the committee of
inquiry. They called for changes in the organization of the Ministry of Justice,
more political control of the intelligence services, and public hearings when
flling senior positions in the civil ser
vice (Parliamentary Correspondence, 2019c, 2019d). Unfortunately, the
early election meant that relevant initiatives could no longer be implemented.
However, the new Min ister of Justice, Alma Zadic (Greens), returned to the
call for a reorganization of the Ministry of Justice, which was initiated in May
2020 (Eberhardt, 2020). Zadic, before her candidacy with the Greens, was a
parliamentarian for the JETZT Party, which also introduced the motion for
reorganization in the summer of 2019. Zadic was also a member of the BVT
Committee of Inquiry and was thus able to gain a more immedi ate
impression of the events. Thus, there was an evident infuence of the
committee of inquiry on this restructuring, which simultaneously implied a
strengthening of the inde pendence of the judiciary in Austria.

Committees of Inquiry of the German Bundestag and Their

Influence on the Dimension of Political Control

In the comparable period, fve committees of inquiry were set up in the 18th
legis lative period of the German Bundestag, two of which are examined in
more detail in this article. These were globally known topics, such as the
spying activities

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of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Bundesnachrichtendienst

(BND) (resulting in NSA-Committee of Inquiry) or the investigations
surrounding the National Socialist Underground (NSU) terrorist network.
Suppose one compares the fnal reports of the investigations of the Aus
trian National Council with those of the German Bundestag. In this case, one
can observe a signifcant scope of the reports of the Bundestag. Likewise, a
higher level of detail can be seen in the report's fndings and assessments.
The fnal report on the NSA committee of inquiry vividly illustrates this
(Bundestag, 2017a, 2017b). In addition to these extensive reappraisals, it
also provides an informative account of the consequences already drawn at
the government and agency levels during the ongoing investigations
(Bundestag, 2017a, 2017b, p. 1085–1106).
In contrast to the fnal report of the procedural judge in the Austrian
National Council, the report in the German Bundestag does not make direct
recommen dations; only assessments are made. Therefore, the report
delves into the conse quences and reforms already taken and less into
recommendations for the future. The formulation of recommendations was
carried out in the NSA Committee by the experts appointed to the committee
and the statements of the opposition.
In the general part of the committee, the experts made 11
recommendations on data and communications security (ibid., p. 403–412).
They also reformed the BND Act after uncovering illegal wiretapping by the
BND (ibid., p. 1388–1392). In addition, the parliamentary control committee,
which carries out political monitoring of the BND in the Bundestag, was
reformed and restructured to carry out control measures more efectively
(ibid., p. 1392–1393).
The reform of the BND Act was a signifcant consequence for the commit
tee of inquiry, who were predominantly made up of the two governing parties
CDU/CSU and SPD. The intention was to create missing legal regulations
for the BND's strategic telecommunications reconnaissance. The criticism of
the opposition and media was then obvious (ibid., p. 1696–1697; Biermann,
2017). This new law, which was a direct consequence of the investigative
shot, also became the target of a complaint before the German
Constitutional Court. The latter found that the reform was contrary to
fundamental rights and violated the freedom of the press and the
fundamental right of telecommunications secrecy (BVerfG, 2020).
Another well-known committee of inquiry in the 18th legislative period was
on terrorist attacks by the NSU in Germany. In two subsequent
investigations, the parliamentarians attempted to shed light on the modus
operandi of the execu tive branch and the Ofce for the Protection of the
Constitution. The goal was to uncover weaknesses and errors within the
authorities and remedy them through policy measures (Bundestag, 2017c, p.
977–979). The committee formulated 47 recommendations for the federal
government in the frst committee of inquiry regarding events triggered by the
NSU. With the start of the 18th legislative period, all parliamentary groups
were reafrmed as a motion, and the government was legally obligated to
implement them (Bundestag, 2014). This was followed by the federal
government's draft legislation to implement the recommendations in the
same year, which was fnally adopted on March 19, 2015, by the CDU/CSU

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and SPD government coalition (Bundestag, 2015a). The monitoring of

whether the government implemented the legislative resolution was followed
by a small question from the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) (Bundestag,
2019c) and, earlier, by a major question from the Die Linke Parliamentary
Group (Bundestag, 2015b). When the federal government answered the
major question (Bundestag, 2016) and the minor question (Bundestag,
2019d), it became clear that signifcant reforms had taken place in many
areas of the executive branch and the Ofce for the Protection of the
Constitution. New institutions and clearinghouses were established,
preventive measures were taken, and training in the executive branch was
reformed.

Influence on the 15‑Field Matrix and the Dimension of

Political Control

The two committees of inquiry of the German Bundestag are particularly

impressive because of their extensive fnal reports and detailed investigative
events. However, if we look at the infuence on the dimension of control, it
can be observed on many levels, as conceptually envisaged in Lauth.
Political control by opposition parties is present (feld 2/3), although there
were cases, particularly in the NSA Committee of Inquiry, where the
government parties prevented the delivery of fles. Similarly, witness
summaries were prevented by the majority of committee members
(Bundestag, 2017b, p. 1283, p. 1394–1395, p. 1403–1404). Accordingly, this
approach is also contrary to the require ments of government transparency
and access to information by a parliamentary com
mittee of inquiry, as defned by Lauth (2004, p. 87).
The two investigations analyzed are relevant to two other events, as
practical exam ples of the infuences within the dimension of control. First,
the fact that the BND law enacted by the federal government violated
fundamental rights demonstrated efective jurisdiction (feld 4/3) by the
Federal Constitutional Court. Legal control thus regular izes the
consequences of political control.
Second, the comprehensive recommendations of the NSU Committee of
Inquiry and their implementation by the government show an exemplary
procedure for parlia mentary control. The aim is to expose and correct
irregularities in government actions, which occur largely around the NSU
investigation.
Analysis

The comparative qualitative analysis of parliamentary committees of inquiry

revealed several infuencing factors in the dimension of scrutiny. On the one
hand, extensive investigative powers mean that there is a high degree of
transparency. Transparency refers to the disclosure of government actions
to parliamentarians. Second, committees of inquiry create a coherent picture
for the public through fnal reports. This picture is put together like a jigsaw
puzzle. Each interview conducted and each document examined adds
another piece to the puzzle.

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A closer look at the fnal reports also revealed that recommendations did
create legislative changes and reforms for government institutions. The NSU
Committee of Inquiry provided a particularly vivid example, which led to
far-reaching legis lative changes and structural reforms in the executive
branch. However, the ongo ing involvement of a high-ranking Austrian
Ministry of Justice ofcial in various questionable decisions could also be
traced through the Eurofghter and BVT Com mittees. This ultimately led to
the restructuring of the Ministry of Justice and the demotion of the ofcial from
their position (see the “BVT—Committee of Inquiry” section).
The results of parliamentary investigations also have a demonstrable
impact on the political, legal, and civil society levels. From a qualitative
perspective, they reveal the internal interrelationships of the micro-level
dimensions of democracy that would not be captured quantitatively by
numerous other indicators.

What Impact Do Parliamentary Committees of Inquiry Have on

the Political Dimension of Control?

It is clear that minority rights exist in the Austrian National Council and
German Bundestag; intermediary mediation/control (feld 2/3) has been
particularly strength ened. Opposition parties can thus exercise more
extensive control and scrutinize the government's actions comprehensively.
This also creates greater transparency for
the public, which other parliamentary control instruments cannot provide.
Along with the strengthening of feld 2/3, rulemaking and rule applications are
also strengthened (feld 5/3). Although Lauth does not specify the criteria for
the degree of fulfllment in this feld (see the “The Matrix Field of Control”
section), several factors are at play because of the far-reaching control
possibilities of a com mittee of inquiry. The fact that ministries are legally
obligated to provide fles and documents to a committee of inquiry
automatically provides committee insight into all activities of the ministries. A
committee of inquiry can thus subsequently check whether parliamentary
inquiries have been answered correctly by the ministries, and whether the
Court of Audit or other auditing bodies have received the correct infor
mation. However, investigative committees also provide the media (feld 3/3)
with extensive opportunities for scrutiny. Furthermore, the creation of
transparency ena bles civil societies to hold public discussions. Their results,
like those of the com mittees of inquiry, can lead to extensive innovative
reforms.
This qualitative analysis allows for the generation of the following
hypotheses for further research:

#1: The more specifc the recommendations from a committee of inquiry,

the more likely the government will implement them.

This hypothesis could be generated when comparing the fnal reports of the
Austrian National Council's investigations, particularly between the Hypo
Com mittee of Inquiry and the Eurofghter Committee of Inquiry. While the
fnal report

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Journal of the Knowledge Economy

of the Hypo Committee of Inquiry made precise recommendations, those of

the Eurofghter Committee were formulated in more general terms. More
than half of the recommendations in the Hypo Committee of Inquiry report
were implemented, whereas no implementation of recommendations from
the Eurofghter Committee report was detected. If one compares the
investigations of the German Bundestag, then the NSU Committee stands
out. It created 47 concrete recommendations for the federal government.
The latter was prompted to implement them using legislative resolution,
monitored by parliamentary inquiries from the opposition (see the “Com
mittees of Inquiry of the German Bundestag and Their Infuence on the
Dimension of Political Control” section).

#2: The more parties join the recommendations in a committee of inquiry,

the more likely the government will implement these recommendations.

This hypothesis can be derived primarily from NSU Committee events.

Through a motion supported by all parties, 47 recommendations were
drafted and implemented.

#3: The more signifcant an object of investigation is across national

borders, the more likely recommendations will be implemented.

Especially in investigations such as the one on Hypo Committee of Inquiry

or NSA, it became apparent that the high level of international interest and
cross-border issues often prompted governments to act quickly. Laws and
reforms were initiated during both the Hypo Committee of Inquiry
investigation and the NSA committee. In addition to the international
pressure, federal investigations have also accelerated these reforms.

#4: The more media and civil society are involved in the investigation, the
more likely political institutions are to push for reforms and innovations.

Creating transparency is a crucial factor for all indicators that measure the
quality of democracy. Although standard measurements always focus solely
on corruption, the information provided by committees of inquiry ofer a
glimpse into the mecha nisms of a state and its rulers. Moreover, through
public discussion of grievances, civil society is involved in resolving them,
and innovative reforms can improve the quality of a political system in the
long run.
The four hypotheses presented are intended to guide further research and
examine the central role of generating knowledge. As introduced by in't Veld
(2010, p. 1–12), committees of inquiry reveal the signifcance of generating
knowledge and the infu ence of knowledge democracy. The relationship
between knowledge production and dissemination is particularly vivid when
provided to inquiry committees. When they focus on the processes that led
to political malfeasance, they demonstrate the power of political control.
Moreover, generating this knowledge shows that actual political processes
often do not match the formal facade. Factual decision-making processes
are thus made visible and can be evaluated. If necessary, they are changed
by the

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Journal of the Knowledge Economy

media, civil society, the judiciary, and parliaments. Thus, knowledge

democracy can also be identifed as a signifcant factor in determining the
quality of democracy.

Conclusion and Considerations

Based on the qualitative analysis, a positive efect can be observed in

several areas of the dimension of control. The creation of comprehensive
transparency, the possi bility of setting up an inquiry by the parliamentary
minority, and the (partial) imple mentation of written recommendations have
a signifcant infuence on the dimen sion of control and the quality of
democracy of the political systems in Austria and Germany. In particular, it is
the disclosure of the activities from the government and involved authorities
that make committees of inquiry a precious instrument for the quality of
democracy. In doing so, parliamentarians use the documents that must be
delivered to the committee of inquiry by the ministries. They also resort to
the infor mation channels of the media to inform the public.
The infuence of the media then allows the results of the investigations to
be pro vided to the public. Likewise, the media are crucial players when a
debate is held in civil society about the results of committees of inquiry. This
allows the population to participate in discussions on systemic reforms.
Committees of inquiry can thus guarantee control over the executive branch
and engage the entire population in a discourse.
The actual measurement of the committees of inquiry's impact on the
quality of democracy seems possible only through a qualitative approach.
Moreover, the difer ent parliamentary systems and oversight powers indicate
that a general comparison is inadequate. In any case, it must be noted that
the typical instruments for meas uring democracy only incompletely include
the parliamentary level and its mecha nisms; thus, they do not test the efects
of parliamentary control on their political reality. For example, the criteria for
including parliamentary scrutiny could be as follows:

• Can a parliamentary minority demand an investigation, or what rights do

the par liamentary minority have regarding investigations?
• How often is a parliamentary inquiry used in a legislative period? • How
extensively must fles and documents be submitted to a committee of
inquiry?
• Are there restrictions on committees of inquiry that prevent complete
oversight?

The examples given here are intended to provide an initial basis for
discussion and could be expanded on, deepened, and thus made more
precise. In any case, the intention is to illustrate that the dimension of
political control has the potential for expansion, which can be used to
determine the quality of democracy more precisely.
Of particular interest is the new consideration of knowledge democracy
when determining the quality of democracy. The analysis of investigative
committees has shown that knowledge generation and transparency are key
strengths of this investi gative instrument. Further research should not
disregard this aspect. The quality of

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Journal of the Knowledge Economy

Fig. 1 Determining the quality of democracy

democracy should always be viewed in connection with knowledge

democracy. The dimension of political control and its actors are essential for
generating knowledge, which can beneft all people within a democratic
system.(see Fig.1)

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