LABORATORIUM PSIKOLOGI LANJUT

LAPORAN PRAKTIKUM PSIKOLOGI KOGNITIF

( Automatic Processing )

DISUSUN OLEH :

Nama : Mevika Anggari Putri

NPM : 14518098
Kelas : 3PA07
Tutor : Selvi Maulana

FAKULTAS PSIKOLOGI

UNIVERSITAS GUNADARMA

2021
I. TUJUAN
Tujuan dari praktikum ini adalah untuk mengetahui gambaran dari
kesulitan dalam mengontrol sesuatu proses otomatis secara sadar dan
melatih otak untuk dapat fokus dalam aktivitas yang membutuhkan
keotomatisan.

II. POINT OF VIEW

Praktikum ini penting karena dapat melatih automatic processing
dari praktikan dan juga mengetahui aspek-aspek dari automatic
processing yang mungkin akan muncul saat praktikum.

III. TEORI (MATERI PRAKTIKUM)

A. Landasan Teori
Menurut Sternberg (2008) automatic processing merupakan proses-
proses otomatis yang tidak melibatkan kontrol kesadaran sedikitpun,
umumnya proses ini dilakukan tanpa campur tangan kesadaran alam
sadar, walaupun demikian anda dapat menyadari kalau anda sedang
melakukan hal tersebut.
Menurut Tzelgov (2000) mendefinisikan Automatic processing
sebagai pemrosesan tanpa pemantauan paling baik ditunjukkan dalam
metode otonom ketika proses tersebut bukan bagian dari persyaratan
tugas.
Menurut Reisberg (2013) beberapa proses mental terjadi diluar
ruang lingkup kesadaran dan kontrol proses ini pasti dapat ditimbulkan
oleh munculnya rangsangan tertentu, dieksekusi secara paksa setelah
digerakkan, hanya memakai sedikit atau tidak memakai sumber daya
kognitif, dan tidak mengganggu aktivitas mental yang sadar.
Berdasarkan definisi dari beberapa tokoh diatas, dapat disimpulkan
bahwa automatic processing adalah proses otomatis yang tidak
memerlukan pikiran sadar/terjadi diluar ruang lingkup kesadaran dan
control proses yang bukan bagian dari persyaratan tugas.

B. Aspek – Aspek Automatic Processing

Menurut Friedenberg dan Silverman (2006) ada dua aspek dalam
automatic processing, diantaranya yaitu:
1. Interference
Dalam interference theory atau teori interferensi merupakan
sebuah teori yang menyatakan bahwa manusia lupa bukan
karena kehilangan memori tetapi karena informasi lainnya yang
menghalangi hal yang diinginkan, gangguan konflik ini terbagi
menjadi dua macam yaitu:
a. Proactive interference
Terjadi karena informasi yang baru dipelajari mengganggu
pengingat atau pemanggil memori yang lama.
b. Retroactive interference
Terjadi ketika informasi yang baru dipelajari mengganggu
pengingat atau pemanggil memori yang lama.
2. Facilitation
Mekanisme respon stimulus sederhana dapat mengontrol
seluruh sistem kognitif secara sadar atau tidak. Mekanisme
respon stimulus yang menghasilkan respon otomatis disebut
sebagai aturan produksi atau produksi. Produksi adalah aturan
pemrosesan yang diinterpretasikan di memori jangka panjang.
Mekanisme tersebut dinamakan Innate automatic processing
dan terbagi menjadi dua yaitu:
a. Bawaan manusia
Gerakan refleks sederhana sebagai mekanisme untuk
menghindari stimuli yang berbahaya.
 b. Memori manusia
Berhubungan dengan memori manusia karena lebih
sensitif terhadap informasi yang berkaitan dengan frekuensi,
lokasi dan waktu kejadian.

C. Jurnal Terkait
Menurut Tzelgov (2000) mendefinisikan Automatic
processing sebagai pemrosesan tanpa pemantauan paling baik
ditunjukkan dalam metode otonom Ketika proses tersebut bukan
bagian dari persyaratan tugas. Pemrosesan otomatis mengarah pada
interpretasi tanpa perhatian pada objek dalam paradigma kurangnya
perhatian. Terdapat beberapa induksi ilusi yang merupakan indikasi
automatic processing dari latar belakang yang tidak relevan.

IV. PELAKSANAAN DAN HASIL PERCOBAAN

A. Langkah-langkah
1. Buka laman web http://cogsidemos.swarthmore.edu/
2. Setelah laman web terbuka, pilih “Reserve Stroop” pada menu
Experiments
3. Bacalah teori dan instruksi tertera pada laman Reserve Stroop
4. Setelah membaca teori dan memahami instruksi, klik Try It!
5. Setelah muncul bagian Parameter, isilah:
Jumlah Trials (Number Of Trials) = 40
6. Klik tulisan “click to start” yang terdapat pada bagian tengah
halaman
7. Terdapat sejumlah lingkaran dengan berbagai warna dan juga
sebuah tulisan
8. Anda diminta untuk memperhatikan tulisan yang ada, untuk
kemudian memilih jawaban yang sesuai
 Contoh: tulisan “blue” berwarna merah. Maka arahkan kursor ke
arah bulatan berwarna biru, bukan merah.
Jadi, warna dari kata yang berada di tengah berfungsi sebagai
distraktor.
9. Setelah selesai mengerjakan tes, pada akhir praktikum akan
muncul hasil dari tes yang tadi sudah dikerjakan oleh praktikan
yaitu berupa tabel dan grafik. Lakukan screenshot atau screen
capture untuk di letakkan di laporan pada bagian hasil.
10. Setelah selesai screenshot atau screen capture hasil tes, close
laman web.
B. Hasil
Berdasarkan praktikum Automatic Processing hari Senin, 19
April 2021 berikut hasil yang didapatkan pada saat praktikum
berlangsung.
 C. Pembahasan
Menurut Tzelgov (2000) mendefinisikan Automatic
processing sebagai pemrosesan tanpa pemantauan paling baik
ditunjukkan dalam metode otonom ketika proses tersebut bukan
bagian dari persyaratan tugas. Automatic processing pun dilakukan
berulang-ulang dalam menentukan mana warna yang paling sesuai
dengan tulisan pada percobaan dengan berbagai macam distraktor.
Yang mana pada saat percobaan dilakukan terjadi proactive
interference yaitu terjadi sebuah kelupaan karena informasi yang
baru dipelajari (tulisan warna dan warna tulisan pada soal
berikutnya) mengganggu pengingat atau pemanggil memori yang
lama.

V. KESIMPULAN
Berdasarkan hasil praktikum yang telah dilakukan dapat
disimpulkan bahwa automatic processing merupakan proses otomatis
yang tidak memerlukan pikiran sadar/terjadi diluar ruang lingkup
kesadaran dan control proses yang bukan bagian dari persyaratan tugas.
Pada percobaan yang telah dilakukan terjadi proactive interference yaitu
terjadi sebuah kelupaan karena informasi yang baru dipelajari (tulisan
warna dan warna tulisan pada soal berikutnya) mengganggu pengingat
atau pemanggil memori yang lama.
Daftar Pustaka

Reisberg, D. (2013). The oxford handbook of cognitive psychology.

New York: Oxford University Press

Riedenberg, F., & Silverman, G. (2006). Cognitive science: an introduction to

thestudy of mind.
United State of America: Hazelden

Sternberg, R. J. (2008). Psikologi kognitif.

Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.

Tzelgov, J. (2000). On processing in the inattention paradigm as automatic.

Psyche: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Consciousness, 6, 17.
See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228499221

On processing in the inattention paradigm as automatic

Article  in  Psyche · January 1998

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On Processing in the Inattention
Paradigm as Automatic
Joseph Tzelgov
Department of Behavioral Sciences
Ben Gurion University of the Negev
Beer Sheva
ISRAEL

tzelgov@bgumail.bgu.ac.il
http://www.bgu.ac.il/beh/yossi.html

Copyright (c) Joseph Tzelgov 2000

PSYCHE, 6(17), December 2000

http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v6/psyche-6-17-tzelgov.html

KEYWORDS: automaticity; attention; Stroop; inattentional blindness; autonomous

automatic processing; direct measures; indirect measures.

COMMENTARY ON: A. Mack and I. Rock. (1998). Inattentional Blindness. MIT Press.
288 pp. ISBN: 0262632039. Price: $US 25 pbk.

ABSTRACT: In the critical trial of the "inattention paradigm" about 25% of the
participants did not notice the target stimulus. A significant percent of these
"inattentionally blind" subjects did not detect the target objects when explicitly asked
about them. Nevertheless, in an implicit test these subjects showed that the target objects
were processed. The "inattentionally blind" subjects in the inattention paradigm are blind
to the critical stimulus in the same sense that subjects in the Stroop task are blind to the
meaning of the presented words. In both cases blindness reflects the limitations of the
representations resulting from automatic processing. Therefore, these results are best
conceptualized as indicating automatic processing of unattended stimuli.

1. Introduction
In the "inattention paradigm" of Mack and Rock (1998) participants in all trials had to
decide which arm of a presented cross was longer. In a critical trial (a single one in each
study) a target stimulus was presented in parallel, and the participants were later asked
whether they noticed it. About 25% of the participants did not notice the target stimulus
and this percentage increased to about 80% when the critical stimulus was presented at
the fixation point. Furthermore, a significant percent of those that didn't detect the target
objects when explicitly asked about them showed in an implicit test that they did process
them. In the present commentary I wish to argue that the results obtained in the
inattention paradigm are best conceptualized as indicating automatic processing of
unattended stimuli.

2. Analysis of the Inattention Paradigm

In the inattention paradigm the subject is asked to report which arm of a presented cross
is longer. In the critical trial another object is presented at the same time, with the critical
stimulus appearing close to fixation. Immediately after, the subject is asked whether she
/he has noticed something on the screen other than the cross. The instruction given to the
subject defines the cross as the attended object or as the object of focal attention (Neisser,
1967). Consequently, any other object appearing in the field is assumed to be ignored.

Pashler (1998) pointed out that two concepts have been discussed in the context of
attention; selection and capacity. Mack and Rock (1998) emphasize that their use of the
term "attention" focuses on selective attention. In the inattention paradigm instructions
guide selection; the cross is selected for intentional processing. However, as Mack and
Rock (1998) show in their own experiments that attentional resources are not limited to
the objects selected by instructions but cover a whole zone in the physical space around
it, inattentional blindness is of the same magnitude when the critical object is located on
the cross and when it is located in one of its quadrants. If the task slightly changes so that
a rectangle is presented instead of the cross and the subjects have to decide which of its
dimensions (height or width) are longer, inattentional blindness is larger within the
rectangle than the area spread around the outside of it. This is consistent with the
spotlight notion (Posner, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 1988) of attention as focusing
over a region in space and not being constrained to a specific object. The CODE
component of Logan's (1996) CTVA theory specifies a possible mechanism for focusing
attention on a region in space. Within this region objects may be selected intentionally for
further processing. Intentional selection of "objects" within the focus of attention is at the
center of Mack and Rock's experiments. This analysis emphasizes that there is more to
attention that just intentional selection. In the remaining part of this commentary I
suggest that what the authors refer to as unintentional blindness is best conceptualized as
unintentional, and thereby automatic, processing.

3. On Defining Automaticity
Hasher and Zacks (1979), and Posner (1978) defined automatic processes as being
attention free, unconscious, and involuntary. It is rarely the case however, for all three
features to hold simultaneously (see Neumann, 1984; Carr, 1992; for reviews). Bargh
(1989, 1992) pointed out that the ability of a process to run to completion once started,
without the need of conscious monitoring, is common to all automatic processes, and
Tzelgov (1997) proposed the adoption of processing without monitoring as the definition
of automaticity. By monitoring I mean intentional setting of the goals of processing and
intentional evaluation of its outputs. A process is automatic if it has (due to genetic
prewiring or due to routinization by practice - see Logan, 1988; Palmeri, 1997; Rickard,
1997, for possible models of such routinization) acquired the ability to run without
monitoring. This notion of automaticity is used in the present commentary.

According to this definition, once a process has been automatized it can be performed
automatically as part of the task requirements by being a component of a higher order
processing scheme defined by the required task (see Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). Or, it
can run in an autonomous mode, as happens in Stroop-like phenomena and in the
Exclusion task in the process dissociation paradigm (Jacoby, 1991). Tzelgov (1997)
pointed out that the defining condition for the automaticity of a process is that it can run
in the autonomous mode. Consider, as an example, the color-word Stroop task, in which
the subjects are required to report the color of ink of a word while ignoring its meaning.
The most frequent finding is that the response latency in the incongruent condition (e.g.,
"RED" written in blue) is longer than in the congruent condition ("BLUE" written in
blue) or in the neutral condition (a nonword written in blue). This phenomenon, known as
the Stroop effect (Stroop 1935), is usually taken as an indication for the automaticity of
the reading process, at least in the narrow sense of "automatic" as processing without
monitoring.

The clearest indications of autonomous processing in Stroop-like phenomena are found

when there is dimensional overlap between the relevant and the irrelevant dimension
(Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990). However, indications of (automatic) processing
of irrelevant aspects of the stimulus appear also in the absence of dimensional overlap, as
indicated by the fact that interference due to automatic reading of the irrelevant word is
not constrained to color words (Klein, 1964).

To sum up, according to this analysis, Stroop-like phenomena, i.e., phenomena in which
a process that is not part of a task requirement affects behavior, are indications for the
automaticity of that process. These indications are indirect because the process in
question in not part of the task requirement (e.g., in the color-word Stroop task people are
not asked to report the meaning of the word, they are asked to ignore it and to name the
ink color). The automatic activity (reading in the color word Stroop task) is indicated by
its effect on the intended activity (color naming). It should also be clear that in
experiments in which attempts were made to directly measure the outcomes of automatic
processing (e.g., subjects were asked to report the meaning of the word in addition to
reporting its color) subjects frequently failed to provide indications of processing, and
thus it has been suggested that people are not aware of the outcomes of such processing
(Marcel, 1983, but see Holender, 1986).
4. Inattention Paradigm as Reflecting Automatic
Processing of the Critical Stimulus
Automatic processing defined as processing without monitoring is best indicated in the
autonomous mode when the process in question is not part of the task requirements.
Therefore, Stroop-like phenomena provide indications of automaticity. I wish to argue
that perceiving the target stimulus in the inattention paradigm is analogous to automatic
processing of the irrelevant aspect(s) of the stimulus in Stroop-like phenomena, such as
reading the word in the picture-word Stroop-like task (e.g., Smith & Kirsner, 1982) in
which the automaticity of reading is evident without dimensional overlap.

Consider once again the inattention paradigm. Subjects are performing a specific task
(deciding which arm of the cross is longer). The focus of their attention is on a region in
space or on the "object" in space in terms of Logan's (1996) CTVA theory. Within the
focus of spatial attention the critical stimulus appears in one of the trials. Its processing is
not part of the task requirements. The phenomenon of attentional blindness is defined in
terms of a direct measure. Thus, asking the subject if he/she had seen something besides
the cross results in a significant portion of cases in which there was no indication that the
critical stimulus is processed. The use of direct measures in the inattention paradigm is
analogous to asking the subjects in the Stroop task to report the word of the stimulus after
responding to its color (Marcel, 1983; Tzelgov, Porat, & Henik, 1997). Thus,
inattentional blindness is parallel to subjects' limited ability to report the word in the
Stroop task.

The experiments of Moore and Egeth (1997) demonstrated an experimental paradigm in

the perceptual domain which parallels the Stroop paradigm in terms of using an indirect
measure of automatic processing: they asked subjects to decide which of two presented
lines was longer. In some of the trials dots in the background were random, in other trials
the dots were grouped in specific ways that induced the Ponzo or the Muller-Lyer
illusions. This induction of the illusions is an indication of automatic processing of the
irrelevant background. Please notice that this indication is based on an indirect measure.
In parallel, the subjects were not able to report which display occurred, once again
showing the limitation of direct measures of automatic processing.

Mack and Rock (1998) considered the Moore and Egeth (1997) experiments as "modeled
on" their inattentional blindness paradigm. Furthermore, in additional experiments of
Mack and Rock the analogy between the inattention paradigm and Stroop-like task is
complete; when the target stimulus was a word it affected stem completion and induced
lexical and semantic priming. Thus to sum up, it seems that that the inattention paradigm,
similar to Stroop-like tasks and the Exclusion task, reflects automatic processing in the
autonomous mode.

5. Conclusions and Implications

It seems that the inattention paradigm as applied by Mack and Rock (1998) and by Moore
and Egeth (1997) presents an example of autonomous automatic processing in the
perceptual domain. Thus, the findings referring to indirect measures reported by Mack
and Rock, as well as those of Moore and Egeth, provide indications for automaticity as
processing without monitoring of perceptual information. At the center of interest of
Mack and Rock are direct measures. The very limited reliability of direct measures of
automatic processing, in general, and of autonomous automatic processing, in particular,
leads to an interpretation of inattentional blindness in the inattention paradigm.

The "inattentionally blind" subjects in the inattention paradigm are blind to the critical
stimulus in the same sense that subjects in the Stroop task are blind to the meaning of the
presented words. In both cases blindness reflects the limitations of the representations
resulting from automatic processing. While there is still an ongoing argument whether
participants of Stroop experiments are aware of the words presented (see Marcel, 1983
and Tzelgov, Porat, & Henik, 1997, for contrasting findings), there is an agreement that
nonautomatic and automatic processing result in different representations (Dulany, 1991;
1996; Tzelgov, 1997). One way to look at this difference is in terms of Logan and
Zbrodoff's (1999) analysis of attention as aimed to support thought and language.
According to their analysis, attention results in mapping from perceptual to cognitive
(propositional) representations but this applies only to the attended aspects of the
perceived situation. Thus, if some aspects of the perceived event are unattended, in the
sense of not being selected for intentional processing, their representation will be
perceptual rather than propositional and thus, less available to direct measures, i.e., verbal
reports. Tzelgov, Ganor and Yehene (1999) analyzed the products of automatic
processing within the framework proposed by Dienes and Perner (1999). Their analysis
emphasizes that automatic processing results in a representation that is only partly
explicit, which once again, leads to the conclusion of such products being less available
to verbal reports.

According to the present analysis, the critical stimuli in the inattention paradigm are
processed without attention in the (narrow) sense of not being selected for intentional
processing. This is always true in the case of automatic processing. In the case of the
Stroop task, when such processing is autonomous, it is the color that is intentionally
selected for processing. In the case of processing the words of a sentence read for
meaning, when automatic processing is "intentional", the sentence is intentionally
selected and in this sense, attended (and monitored). In typical experiments of the
inattention paradigm this is also the case. Under these conditions automatic processing is
indicated by indirect measures, even in the case of subjects being "attentionally blind".
However, since the critical stimulus is part of the spatially attended region, it is within the
attentional spotlight. This may be one reason why when the critical stimulus is of
ecological significance (e.g., one's name) attentional blindness is reduced. Logan and
Zbrodoff (1999) pointed out that selective attention (on which Mack and Rock focus)
results in propositional representations, which are more available for verbal reports. But it
seems reasonable to assume that stimuli of ecological significance are mapped onto
propositional representations even when they are not intentionally selected, in particular,
when they are within the spatial attentional spotlight.
Mack and Rock (1998) use the term "inattentional blindness" because they define
attention as a "process that brings a stimulus into consciousness" (p.26) and by
consciousness they mean availability to report verbally. But we are conscious of many
aspects of the external stimulation even if we are not able to report them verbally. This
mode of consciousness is based on perceptual representations (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1999)
of the stimuli perceived, provides the "feeling of" (Dulany, 1991) the stimuli and
supports the indirect indications that the stimuli have been perceived. This notion of
consciousness applies in particular to stimuli within the spatial attentional spotlight that
were not selected for intentional processing. Those are the stimuli that the participants are
"blind to" in the Mack and Rock experiments. Therefore, if the term attention aims to
encompass spatial attention also, then describing Mack and Rock's data as reflecting
automatic perceptual processing rather than "blindness" without attention, should be
considered a serious alternative.

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